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A B S T R A C T 
RATIOMia OP INVESTMEHT POLICX OF I M W S m m m 
coRpcaATios's Ft®i) mr> ITS IMFACT OK OAraja 
FOBMTIOH I» IH0IA 
A B S T B A O f 
7bB iovttstffidnt fwlic^ of tdte Insurance 0orporatioa has eimked coceideral^ 
pttlxLlo iat«T»fft booatise liftt Ineuraaee was aatlooidised is India for the *effeotii^  
mobiXiaation of aavinss* and *«ffieie&t finanoing of eooii<»tie dovelopneiit. Both 
thasa objaotivae of aationaXiaatioa are intardependent. % a auooassful parforoan^  
of the effaotive aohiliaation of aavings lapoaea the TesponsibiXitiaa of thi 
affioient fimmtag of aoonoaio davelopaeat* This la itaalf eraates a probtLem 
the eooBomio daveXopi^nt depeoda vipon the pi<»3eeriiig efforts of the emftXX conoero* 
which have very little to offer as finaneial aeowity to L.I.O. In view of the 
liability charaoteristioa of both the Xegii^ative loandates aaad the 
iaveatmeat aaaagement have eaphaaieed the traditional investaent policy whioh 
favour iaveatment i» fixed earning seoiuritiee of established oofioeme as againstl 
the flttctuatiag earalng aeeta-itiea of new veotwea. ^ e traditional policy 
folloi«4 Igr I».I,G., «qpart trtm oreaticg the problem of ooacentration of inveatme] 
in few eoapsAies^has deprived the new ventturea of t ^ pera<»aal ea^ ringa of th«t-vai 
aalority of policyh-oldere. In fs^ isre, wii^ the effective mobilia&tion of saviagai 
the Inveatoant reeponaildJllties of L.I.C. wHl eonaideratily increase •A l^cauae 
aooiamlation of eaviaga that ea«a not be employed in the typee of iavestmeata 
available at the tin» may lead to a ata^ fiant ecoaoaay. Direotion of inveatssnt 
into particular sectors ia likely to reaalt in overatiaml&tioa of those areas 
and bring oa aubeeqtjent diffietultiea. liarge-seale sMfta from one type of 
investment to another without corresfjondiag chmgse ia inveetaent deaands mi^t 
also i^set adj«atmeats ia the ©esaoisys It is eseentialt therefor®, that the 
investmnt policy of Z».I*CA8di^ pted to <^nging needs so that it should not vofic 
against stable progress* 
lij pursuiag this work I was aaialy concerned to eaqulra if the inveataent 
policy of the t.I.G. represents the tr«e character of its liabilities? Whether 
( 1 1 ) 
It. 1.0. Bboold oontint]0 to iniwst more and more In OoTenKudat aetmtitSaa a&d pla^ r 
'safe* or a new route be ohartez«d in interest of its polloyiiolders as as 
of the economic development of tbe eountry? ftm present study disoloses that the 
iawetnent policy of teas not tjeen oiaBHwnstirate with national interest* Ths 
Corporation has not taken full advantage of its jsdainistrative capacity and has 
not mtilised the vast aectontjilation of the life fond to ths best of its ability. 
The analysis further reveals that if we e^ply the sane eoonoioic test the 
Ciovertaaent applied in Jtidging the performance of private life insurance at the 
time of nationalisation^ we find that has not to a groat extent * succeeded 
in achieving the much avowed objeotiv© of nationalisation. It has been passive 
in solving the problems of national econocoic interest, like the dev«»l0|»>»nt of 
housing and xeffloving of the regi<mal iabalcmoe^  which could have added to the 
welfare of the eoonoaor and finally to the devslopsient of life insurance* 
In defence of I^ .I.C. it aay be at^ pied that as insmrer, it is freed fron^^ 
otiisr responsibilities &M is prevented its oliligatioas froro cmtzlbuting to 
the solution of the 'deficiencies* of the capital aarket. Bat the basic idea of 
effective mobilisation of perscmal savings does not i«lieve the L.I«C. of its 
rosponsibilities. Thus, after a thorough anal^ nsis of the legal fraaework, lialdlity 
characteristics of L.I.C. and 8ocio-0oon®ttie reqxjdreoents of the countrjr; I have 
recoamcaded that Ii.I.O. should follow a raore active invostment policy. In fact, 
ths analysis indicates that, the 'policyholdeivi interest' and "^ national eoonoaio 
V 
interest are not contradictory to each other, A possible comprooise could be 
made throu^ a rational iuTOstswnt policy. An active invostaent poli<sr should 
aim at thB asDciaiisation of return on Investment consistent witti the safety of 
funds. This in turn squires the 'unveiling of investment opportunities* in a 
developing econoi^ and the n,ow of capital, after a constant searchjin the areas 
of le^ lative scarcity and growth* 
(iii) 
Xa advocating for an actl^ iaveetoent pollcgr I do not men Idsat tha Qorporatlo) 
sliould tako improportioiiat« or mdtm risk. Wmt X hare suggested is tliat in th* 
iaterests of eocnaomlo stability and progress it is important that the should 
not vary nonsoessarily ths rate at t&ioh it invests its funds and should not hs 
too conservative in the ohoiee of its investments* For the effectiveness of its 
working the COopporation should folly diversify its investments and follow a 
broad hased investa^nt policy. spreading its risks both geographically and 
industrially and fcgr distributing its investments over a wide range of basiness^ it 
wonM earn compensation for losses in me direction thro\jgb profits in another. 
Snch a pt^cy would benefit the coital wartet without impairing the profitability 
of the Ir.l.C. The studiy in this manner has aade an i^^rtant contribution in the 
existiiig field of kraswledge. It presents a coiaproaise formula between the policy'^  
holders* interest and n^ational eao&omic interest.* Concrete proposals» as regan 
investoents in saall industries and in housing have been loade to enaltiLe the hJur^ 
to fulfil its role as an iu^ rfeant source for capital fonaation without Jeopsrdi-
sing its primary function as en instirer. 
ZNTROOUGTIOS 
wmmofion 
fhB iBini«1»snt poller of IdfB Zumtranott Corporation liaa evoked eonsideralale 
pablie interest after nationalisation. Xt has been noted on several oooasions 
that the >p6tionality of its investment tehxviour has not been (MaaEBensnrate vith 
the national interest. This has not onljr been eritieised but led to the publio 
enqnivy of highest order V Honoterable Mr* Justioe Ohagla in the famous oase of 
*Hnndhra Dei^. * As a student of ooraneree X vas a H along wondering as to vhether 
anjr sound eoonoioio criteria for investment ean be laid dovn whicOi oan serve the 
best interest of the polioyholders as well as the national eeonomio interest. 
This is all tlw more important beeanse life insnranoe was nationalised in 
Xndia for "the effsotive mobilisation of pablio savingl^ |, uid 'efficient finaneii^ 
of eeonooio develo|«ant*' Both the aims are iaterdependent as the rapid growth 
of *lifB ftmd'whioh is implied in the 'effective aoMlisation of the savings- has 
oonsideraKLe infLoenee on the rate of capital formation in Xndia. This is evident 
fi^m the fact that the life fimd which has steadily increased to Bs 519.7 crores 
1 
in X960 is likely to increase at a mach high»r pace in the years to eom* fhe 
fttnre growth of life fand would have considdrable affect on the capital marlcet 
because it would flow in different sectors of the econoay according to the legal 
framework aiul liability characteristics of the Z>.X.G. 7he vaj^ dA growth of life 
fund and its flow in Oovemment securities ^  considerable influence on the Debt 
and Honetasy Management. Again, both the legislative mandate and investment 
manafement of L.X.G. have ei^ hasised the traditional investment policy which 
favours investment in fixed earning securities of established concerns as against 
the fluctuating earning securities of new ventures. Only in recent years investments 
1. Xn I960, the total Mfi Fund of Si.X.C. was its 560.38 crores. Out of this the 
Mfe Bisurance Fund of Business in Xndia was fts 519.65 crores and of Business 
outside Xndia was Bs ^ .73 croresCLife Xnsuranoe Corporation of Xnctia - Heport, 
and Accounts for the year ended 31st December, 1960 » p 60), 
2 
flown in viitdtiAtt bat thi:^  at* eeiqyasatlvtljr wory flaaU. fide tiM «re«tMMt 
« void in th» oapitai mx1mt» 7fe» t««aitiotial foaior followmt Igr tfai I..I.C. 
aparl tim woattng tl» i>iK»l93«ii of ocKitAns^ mtion of InwitsMmlb la f«w eoaqpNoanioo tea* 
ddprlwd ^  m u vmtwmB of tl» jpomoeaX savinso of « vwit naj^tjr of polioir-
ti^en. SMHiloai to ei^ tHat is a ^ veloplsis e^nmay mv tmo&mt tam »p9eiel 
0i0^ ifioaaae em tMy tliR statu soisnmi of oeofKoio gmfttu Squalljr li^ pox'tast 
is to f«oeqpi«o tliat tiio saall tmA mv matimm Mm littta to offar as aootnrltcr 
to «ttit tl«ii I]i9«sta»iit ToquiYei^ ata of 
Tldo i^ tiRralljr a <lefiiiit» etiaiiga jja t!te Invoetinamt i ^ i o r of l»*X.O. 
90 that it may 4»p&rt trm orttodosi isfoatiMiBt ohanneXs mn Invest in ventoroo 
tfhioh farthar the *eoeia3. edvBxteemnt of t )» aoantx^. * Xq foosnt ydaxn* 
ths v&ry eim of t.I.C'o portfolio otmatitntoa a tos^ rtation to eem vlio «aiit to 
0saimm tho 6otn$fnn»ikt*e Tooourcfts and iaaist tMt tlu» QovdfumBt sttfraiSjd tal» ovar 
tho estifo ii»Ni«tiia# ftmia of I..X.C« as ae tmfkaMtoo 41ftl)t* ttomomr, 
pXmmeim «boa* tMaKii^ ia iidflisnaoed Igr o iliffomrt iMit of priaoipOLoa tbss tlukaa 
tfhiob guida th8 igmimm» koitUMa^ trootM Ilka to fit tl^ isestittitioa into 
tliair o«a orMt. fl» proimilli^  politioal. pMlosoplf^  of tlao paat y^e^ tarn 
mtweeXty taodad to foam att««tt<m on tMa oonfliot of id»«Xo|[laa. 
Probiama of tha tuia to tihi<^ mtfmtm baa boon attiAa abotw^ ba«« pvos^ sytod 
•a to wfita tMa thaaia on %\m *RatioBala of txmvtMBA Folio/ of US* Ixm^xmm 8 
Ooi^mtioii*a Fwd an^ Its lapaot On Gapitai Foymtion & Zadia. * 
1. Batiaataa Oomittaa 1960*61 * HnndMd and IfMrt^iartb Baport (Saoond Lot 
Miniatr^ of Fiastnoa (Dapartiaont of Boonoaio Affair*) fb» IdU Xommam 
OofpoTAtion of Zc^ ia* B(mtmy, Lok Saiim 8aerataHat» Saw DalM^ Af^X, 19ftl» p 
S. *fofpor^ tiiOtt*a Fund* aeena *UfB Fmi* (Baa alao Sotaa on Sottroea and of 
Offioiftl Btatiatioa ragaidii^  tdfe Xoeomioo Savings aod Zwraatmsnt in India 
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have flovn in •quitlAs bat th»x are ooa]>aratlv»3^  ymty omall. This has created 
a void in tbe oapitaX aartet. The traditiocal polloy folXoved Ir tfaa L.X.C. 
apart from oreating the prolilea of ooneeatration of iawstaeat in few etmpanies laa 
deprived the new ventures of the personal savings of a vast majority of poXi^> 
holders* KeedXess to say that let a deveXopixig ecososgr mv oeneerns have speoial 
sigttifioanoe as thay are the main source of eoon^aio growth. Squally important 
is to recognise that tho raaU end new veattires have little to offer as seeuriV 
to suit the tovestment requirements of t.l.C. 
This naturally demands a definite change in the iw^stment policy of l>.1.0. 
so that it may depart from orthodcac investment channels and invest in ventures 
which further the s^ooial advancement of the countxy.* In recent ysarsi however* 
the vexy sise of I».I*6's portfolio constitutes a testation to some who want to 
enhance the Oovemii»nt*a resources end insist that the Oovemment should take over 1 
the entire investifale funds of L.I.C. as an unfunded debt* Moreover^ economio 
planners who«i thinking is influenced lay a different set of prinoiples than those 
which gtd.de the '^life insurance business would like to fit this instittxtion into 
their own orbit. The prevailing political philoeoplo^  of the past few years has 
naturally tended to focus attention on this oonfliot of ideiPLogies* 
Problems of the type to which reference has been made above» have prosqpted 
me to write this thesis on the *Eationale of Investment Policy of Xdfe Insurance 2 
Corporation* s Fund and Its l^ apact On Capital Formation In India. * 
1. Sstimates Committee 1900-.61 > Hundred and TkLrtyfourth Sepo^ 't (Second Lok 
Sabha) Ministry of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs) The X>ife Insurance 
Corporation of India, Bombayi IiOk Satdta Secretariat, Hew Delhi, April, 1961, 
p 56* 
2. iCorporatl^ M&'s Fund' means 'Xiife Ftood' (See also Hotes on Sources and Uses of 
Official Statistics regarding Lif» Insuranoe Savings and Investment in India -
APPEHDIZ A. 
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Im. imrmdsg tMs work I waa mialx eoaeemed as to wbitlisr li.I.C. should 
oontl2xa» to iavoat aos^ ani aox^ in <k>ir»»iment iHietxritioe and pla^ r iafa or a iiev 
rottto b® (Oiartetted ia tha last iirterests of tba polt«^ l»e>ld«re as woll as of ttas 
oconomic dawlopiaent of tho oouatiy? The «t«dly presents a posstlxLo coapjjoaiiso 
beiwwn ti» polio^ iiolder's intaraai am the general mtionai oo^ome interest. 
The analysis rewals that the interestt of poU^holders and national eoonooie 
intsrest are not e^tx^dietoiy to oaoh other* The ooonoodo and social sounda^ss 
are freqijontay foand in tl» saat intrsstajsnts. The I..I.O, vhieh applios appropriato 
eoonomio tests in disposition of its funds has fotiM that its action nore or 
less ant^oaticaHy redousds to the velfart of pnblio. tha keiy to tha solution lies 
in pursuing 'an aeti-ve investarant policy' vhich aljas at oaximisation of return on 
investments, this in turn requires the 'unvsilii^  of investaent opportunities' 
and the flow of capital* after a octant search, in the areas of relative soarcitjr 
and growth* In this way %tm ot^ eotives of effioient financing of economic develi^ 
sent consistent with polic^^lders* interest cotiild be acconplished. 
ftaraughotj^  the study an atteiq>t has been !n»ie to arrive at the conclusions 
with the help of economic analysisy experience derived from insurance iMmtxy 
both at hoae and abroad and from the lessons of eoonomio history* I imve chosen 
I 
the period of five year (1956-^ 1960) for inveeti#»ti<Hi. I ara ceoscious that this 
1. It may be pointed out here that the present stuid^  has not taken into aecount 
any alxiormal situation after 1960. fhis is particialarly relevant for 
Chapter H I which ooapfobes the potential resources of X«.I.O. The study in 
that Chapter is entirely based on the Planning Comzdssion's estimates of 
future growth of Kational Income* Saving and Investments in the Indian 
econoiai^r during the Third, Fourth, and ^ ifth Five Xear Plans. Ifational 
emergentgr which has arisen in the year 1968 due to Chisese aggression is 
bouM to affect the future growth of life insurance savings in as as 
the aggression is deemed to influence the economic development of the countxy* 
period i» short for dftacrlbing th» lovsataeiit behaviour of L.I.C. But it nay ba 
pointed out that the nationaliaation of lifa insurauee is oxOy an addition of a 
chapter in the hiatojy of life insurance. The assets which the Gorporetion has 
inherited have deep roots and JustiQr ^ dX discussion in its historical perspeotive. 
For the purpose of inteneiw cuoaljrsis, therefore, the period generally tept 
in ylev is approxinateljr the last deeade« thov^ h it has not been strietljr followed 
in every instance because of the difficulties of obtaining the authentic statistics. 
A nuch longer duration, for instance, has often been taken into consideration 
where the uiulerlying trend coiald be studied only by taking a long period into 
account or where historical antecedents appeared to be particularly relevant to 
this study* Thus the thesis, though apparently conocmed mainly with the period 
1956 tc 1960, has stade use of the historical data i»>re proftxsedly for drawing 
condtisitins than the period indicated i^ * 
The work of presentation of statistics, their analysis, their interpretation, 
the derivation of conclusioi^  and the forauLation of policies for future guidance 
has been done for the most i^sort on the .basis.,of official data* Statistical inference 
to foreign countries relate to figures which have been officiaVreleased or whic& 
bear the stasis of authority. 
f 
The thesis consists of e i ^ chapters. Chapter I describes the role of life 
insurance eatings in capital formation. It has been contended that on the one hand 
life insurance has the ability to create the desire among the people to save and 
on the other hand its contractual nature binds the individiial to stick to his 
decision. Thus the preaiuiBS are paid in spite of the fluctuations in incoaie. The 
statistical study svqpports this genaralisaticm end shows that life insurance 
savings have positive influence on the volunie and fom of personal savings. The 
statiatioal data besMea iodioatiog th» signifieanes of life insuraiica aavioge in 
oapltal fozisation in tha Fablio Sector and Fxlvate Seotor, reveala that tha 
growth of life insuran<» savii^ a although related to the aoonomio dowlopaent ©f 
the oouatiy have lagged behind the rate of capital foraation in the eoutttTy. 
Chapter H reveals that tl» slov growth of life i&Buran<» aaviaga was laaiiiljr 
due to the organisational aod etiruetural veakmaaes of the life isaiaranee enterprise 
in India. The hiatorioal and statistical acaljivis also point out that the gzvvth 
of life insttranoe was aainly dt:^  to natural factors suoh a« poptdLation grovth» 
inoooe growth, urbanisation and industjfialisation of the ootmtsy while the insiirers 
themselves have not pla;fed a significant role in creating life instsranoe oonscieras" 
ness aiBong the people. oo!£parative sttid^ r shows that the standard of life 
insm*anee in India was perhaps the lowest in the world. Thtas to spread ths 
insnranee more widely and ohea|Ll3r in the ttrban and rural areas* Ctovenment's 
action to nationalise the life insurance was justified. After t)»i nationalisation 
L*I*0. has succeeded in inex«asing the rate of growth* This is evident from the 
rapid growth of mv businessi life insurance in force and the amount of life ftuad. 
But a careful exanination of the L.I.C's efforts in the oobilisation of savings 
indicates that there is still room for further inproveiaent. Suggestions for the 
more effective siobilisation of savings have likewise been made. 
Chapter III confutes potential resources of L.I.C. and suggests that 
increasing popuLationi increase in incoios due to urbanisation and industrialisation 
of the country offer considerable scope for the dovolopoent of ISfe insursnoe 
business in India. With the econoEiio devulopoent underway I*.I.C. will be the 
custodian of the enormous resources of the country and its investment decisions 
will have profovoid influence on capital formation in India. 
In order to verify the above remarks I have described the iavestiaent behaviour 
of L.I.C. in Chiqpter IV and V. The study in Chapter 17 indicates that ths growth 
of lifft fund iuod its oontimiotis i^ow ia the Qovexuaent aeouritios has profound 
IsfXusnee on tbs Monetazy Matutgoinent and £>ebt Mamigoao&t polioles. The analysifl 
In Chapter V also ehovs that the innrsstnnt requirements of L.I.C. have ooneiderahle 
infl^ itise on the capital struoture of the eoi^ Mmies. Wbareas the operation of L.X.C. 
in the Stock Harket has sigaifieant influenee on Stock Prices* the growth of life 
fund has created serious profaleme in the nev issue market. This is due to the 
liability oharacteristies of L.I.C. and other similar savings institutions idiioh 
favour investment in fli»d earning securities of well established eonoems as 
against the fluctuating earning seeurities of new and untried forms of businesses. 
This is deterimental to the growth of corporate sector in India, To a certain 
exbent L.I^ C. has overcome "^ bie obstacle through secondary financial izistitutions. 
But no satisfactory soluticm of the problem of equity capital in the industZT* has 
yet been found. In view of the growing importance of the new and small concerns 
in the economic development of the ootnxtry aM in view of the effective mobilisation 
of savings by L.I.C. it has been ta*ged that L.I.C. shotild depart from orthod<ac 
investment channels and make a def jjoite change in its investment policy* 
The chances of suecess of such public pressures are praised in terms of 
the investment requirements of L.I.C. in Chapter TI. In defining the investment 
objectives of L.I.C. I have emphasised that besides yieldf liquidity and safety* 
L.I.C* must invest in those ventures which favour economic and social advancement 
of the country beoause such investments in turn are conducive to its growth. In 
faot the legal trtmvnitk and liaHlity characteristies of L.I.C. allow certain 
latitude to follow a more omprehensive and fleacible Investment policy. 
But the analysis of different forms investment in Chapter VII reveals that 
there is presumably greater risk in earning hi^r 'yield' because yield varies 
inversely with risk. In a developing economy 'risk' is not oaay inevitable but it 
appear* in a diirersit/ of forms. It la present la laearly a U foxms of Investaeats 
right from Clovenusent seourlties to that of ordinaxy shares and imrastmnt is 
Real Bstate. fbs main ooneenx of aa Invests^ nt policy iS| therefore, to ninialse 
the risk throij^ h a policy of dlwrslfloation. The policy of dlversifioatioii, 
lacideotalXy becomes aa important source of flow of life fund in the differant 
sectors of the econoogr. BSjr spreeditig its risks both geograpbiesiay and industrially 
and ligr distrlbotlag its Investmsnts over a vide range of boslaesst l».I.C. w o ^ 
earn conpensatloa for losses in one direction throtagh profits in another. Such 
a distribution of investaient would benefit the cspital siarkst withotit impairing 
the profitability of L.I.G. 
i^ainst thie background end aleo in the light of diseossion in Chapter 71, 
the investment policy of L.I.C. has been examined in relation to tbs over all 
capital fozmation and financing of the econ^z^ in Chapter VIII. fhe impact of 
changing econcmlc conditions of the pwrtfolio atructwo of the instarers has been 
sttidied. the critical examination of the investaient policgr has revealed that 
althoiigh L.I.C. has earned stlptilated rate of interest, it has not succeeded to 
eisy material extent in disehax^ ing its 'trusteeship' duties as defined and stated 
in Chapter VI. 
The Corporation has not taken full advantage of its admlnistativB capacity 
and has not utilised the vast accumulation of life fund to the best of its ability. 
The analysis also sbovs that if ve apply the same economic test which led the 
Ctoverment to nationalise tTm life insurance business in India. We find that 
L.I.C. has not, to a great extent, succeeded in achieving the much avowed 
objective of nationalisation. It has been 'passive' in solving the problems of 
national ecommlc interest, like the developaent of housing and the removal of 
regional inbalances which could have added to the welfare of the economy and 
8 
fijiaXlj to th» 4«T»lopii9Bt of life iasurajice* For tho effeotiv» working of tb* 
If.I.O. ctnd alao for the efficient finanoiag of eeoiaoniio dewlojpment I b&TOf 
therefore* stiggeated a broad baaed inveataent policy. The recomeadatiozta ia 
thia CShapter are deaigiied to enable tbe Corporation to failfil aatiafaotorily 
ita role aa an iopox^ ant aouroe of funds for oapital formation witbotzb 
jeopardising ita primary obligationa totdrards tbe polieyholdera* 
I 
amma Am smmiGMm of im mswmcs 
mmas m omTAi womwum 
m IHDXA 
CHAPTER I 
QROUTH AND SlONlFICiUHCE OF LIFE INSORANOB SAVmOS IN CAPI7AI. FORMATION 
IK INDIA 
The process of Cftpital Formatloo generally Involves thsree distlaot but 
iBterdepeiuient aotivitles vis. saving, finanoing and investment. In a 
developing eoonooqr the functions of saving and investment are distintegrated. 
Saving institutions, like the insurance companies, commercial and co-operative 
banks, post offices, pension and provident funds assume ooasiderable importance 
in assembling the small scattered savings of individtials (the surplus unit) 
and in financing the investsrant plans of 'deficit units. * Besides, saving 
institutions also motivate the people to refrain from high consumption and 
to save in 'life insurmce' and 'postal savings' etc. instead of looking up 
their fortune in gold end currency hoards* Thus in les^ developed economies 
the persuasive activities of the saving institutions are also an iiaportant 
factor in detensinlng the voliuse and form of savings* In this Chapter I have 
discussed the role of life insurance between Saving and Investment and have 
shoMR its significance in capital foxiaation in India. 
SECTION I 
EFFECT OF LIFE INSBRANCB ON THE DESIRE TO SAVE 
The amount of savings is determined fegr two factors, namely desire to 
save and ability to save. While the ability to save depends upon the income 
of the people, the desire is effected by a variety of motives. In this section 
I have analysed individual's motives to save and have shown the influSnoe of 
life insurance on the desire of the people to save. 
I. IB 
Saving Motivgfl Cfnd Llfg Inam;'imee Savings? 
The underlytog motive for saving l3Qr an eocmomio unit is refleoted in its 
willini^ess and ability to sot aside current inocHBe for future use* Some speoifio 
reasons for saving may to differentiated here. An important motive for saving hsr 
an IjE^ ividual is to smooth out the fluctuations in his Inaoasa. An individual may 
attempt to save from his eurrent income in order to protect himself or his family 
against future ecaitingeneies. Savings can also be motivated toy the desire to 
leave property for * ones' off-springs* etc. Finally» a classical eecmomio reastm 
for saving is to get an interest return and theretsy enhance one's inocm* The 
individual's reactions to a given interest rate is further conditioned Igr his 
expectaticms of future price movements to some extent. These price esq^ ctatiims 1 
influence tbfi incentives to save in other ways as veil. 
Apart from the eocmomio motivating factors as considered above, the non-ectmomio 
factors suoh as 'tastes' play a critically important role in infliieneing the saving 
incentives of the people. People differ for a wide variety of reasons in respect 
of their saving behaviour. Thus large number of statistical studies have shown 
that the over all ratio of saving in ai^ eeonongr depends upon two groups of peoi^t 2 
the 'rich few* i.e. the 'automatic saver' and the 'poor masses,' whose saving 
is effortful and based on attempts of rational provision for old age or the 
avoidance of family distress in the evnat of disability, unei^oyment, children's 
education or some other financial emrgenc^. Saving, for this class of peopLs, 
represents an effort that has to be planned on some rational consideration governing 
1. Priend,Irwlni The Concepts and Measurement of Savings in Saving in the Modem 
Econonor - A Symposium Edited by Heller,Walter,W» Boddy, Francis M and Nilson, 
Carl L) in University of Minesota, Muneapolis, 195S, p 93. 
2. Kuanet»,Simoni International Differences in Capital Formation and Financing 
in Capital Formation and Eoonomic Qrowth - National Bureau of Economic Researoh 
(Hew lork) Princeton University p3Pess,Princeton, 195S, p 47. 
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the dletrlbutlon of limited inoome betiieen the eonaufflption and provision for the 
future. Life Insoranoe is am of the forms of personal saTiJogs. Its outstanding 
mission is threefold, namely (l) to assist in the creation of an emergency savings 
fond to protect the insured and his family against teo^razT' misfortune of a 
finenoial nature, (2) to create a potential family estate should the source of the 
family head's current earning power be removed Isy death, and (3) to assist in the 
accumulation and ccmservation of a competence lay the time of retirement from 
active work. Th^ the Delhi Saving Survey shows that life insuranee savings are 
2 
largely made by the middle incoB» group vdth the above three objectives. 
It may be mentioned that some of the above economic and non-economic motiva-
ting factors are mostly important at the micro-level, though they may also form the 
basis for motivation of saving at the macro-levels For the nation as a vhole, the 
desire to create oonditiesis of economic stability and to attain accelerated 
economic development also constitute ia^rtant motives for saving. A particular 
aspect of Ooverament saving is its ability to enforce a major change in saving of 
th9 other economic units as well as the econoa^ as a whole. Besides, the persuasive 
activities of the institutions in motivating the people to save are also important 
in influencing the volume end form of persaial saving. This is especially true 
in less developed ecoQomies where most of the people malce saving in passive forms 
such as 'gold' and' currency hoards' whidd do not serve any national economic 
interest. Moreover, some of the peoples in less developed countries have the 
income but not the will to save. Thus) 
•*Th6 wage and salary earning classes have a more regular income than the 
paaaanta, and usually also even th® unskilled urban worker eariB more than 
1. In 1904 Qonner had given a classification which throws the incentive to save 
into anti-tboais. According to hln when men save against an uncertain or a 
certain events their Incentive is not be worse off in the futxire. Whenver 
they save to procure something in the future which present income will not 
procure, their incentive is to be better off in the future. (Gonner,E.C.Kt 
Interest and Saving - Macraillan, London, 1904, p 6). 
2. National Council of Applied Economic ResearchJ Delhi Saving Survey (A pilot 
Survey), New Delhi, I960, p 26. 
I. IB 
the average peasant, tet these classes save very little heoause their 
mentality is directed towards spending rather than towards saving. 
Workers' saving are veiy small. The salaried oiddle classes save a 
little, but in practically evexy community the savings of the middle 
classes out of their salaries are of little consequences for productive 
investment. This is especially so in countries where the ruling class 
differs in race from the middle and lower classes, since the middle 
classes than seen to distinguish themselves in ccmspicuous con8tt]npti<ai, ^ 
in their seal to demonstrate that they are as good as their forei^ rulerst* 
The Urban Saving Survey testifies the above stateirant and shows that only 
14 per cent of the urban household (classified by income) are responsible for 
practically the entire aggregate saving in India »rtiile 86 per cent account for 
2 
considerable amount of dissaving. Ths dissaving is not only an aocoimt of in-
3 
adequate income bat also due to the ignorance of the people. The persuasive 
activities of the institutions in educating and motivating the masses to save 
are therefore is^ ortant factors in affecting the volume and form of personal 
savings. Iiewis has therefore rightly pointed out thatt 
** Saving is also a habit, which can to some extent be created by propaganda 
...people can be persuaded to save in their own individual or family 
interest, for education, for old age, for house purchase, for weddings or 
fonnrals, or as a safeguard against sickness or disaster. Even if these 
savings are largely offset by consumption, tlie habit of self-reliance and 
the avoidance of (testitution are conqpelling reasons for doing all that 
we can to stimulate them. The principle of insurance appeals easily, and 
a c)^ap well advertised system of personal insurance atiaulates saving.* (4 ) 
The -ability of life insurancse in motivating the people as a media of saving 
lies in the combination of two accounts - a decreasing ineuranoe account and 
increasing saving acootmt. In ordor to diacuas the competency of life insurance 
in relation to other forms of savings, let sac clear the groxmd by emplaning the 
mechanism of the accusiulatitMi of fund in life insuraice in the following pages. 
1. Lewis,Arthur,W; The Theory of Sccaaomio Growth - George Allen & Ujtria Ltd., 
London, 1956, p 228. 
2. national Council of Applied Economic Research: Urban Income and Saving, 
Hew Delhi, 1912, pp 76-79. 
3. national Council of Applied Economic Research, Delhi Saving Survey, 
Op.Cit, p 35* 
4. Ibid, p 229. 
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The Meohanlsm of Saving throtudi Life Insuraniiat 
The priMary function of life insitfence is to sell protection against finanoial 
i 
loss in the event of the death of the inisured. ^hus in consideration of a stipulated 
premium* tluj insurer agrees to pay the insured or his beneficiasy a; fixed sum upon 
the happening of death or some other happening. The simplest method of charging 
for this service is the ^ natural premium plan' or it is commonly known the yearly 
renewable term insurance plan* 
The term insurance provides insurance for a period of one year only* but permits 
the Insured policyholder to renew the policy. In the event tlie insured dies idiile the 
policy is in force, the face amount wHl te paid to his designated beneflciaiy. The 
ooiiq}any does not pay any thing to the insured, if he survives as the event insured 
against had not arrived. Each premium purchases onl^ one year of insurance protec-
tion, the premium charged for yearly renewable term insurance is based on the death 
rate for the •attained age* of each insured individual. Since death rate increases 
with the age, the premium based on mortality rate will obviously vary with the 
death rate. Table Ko. X explains thia point. 
TAmS No. 1 
MODIFIED ORIBNTAI. (1925-35) MORTALITr TABLE 
Rate of Mortality Natural premium for 
Age per 1000 Rs lOOO Insurance 
1 2 3 
20 2.94 2.94 
50 3.26 3.26 
m 5.38 5.38 
50 13.05 13.05 
60 36.42 36.42 
70 82.68 82.88 
80 147.76 147.76 
90 2 6 8 . 9 9 268.99 
100 ^7.88 497.88 
XOK 1000.00 1000.00 
SOORGBJ Received from the courtesy of ihahlic Relation Officer, L.I.O» 
It will be seen that the premium dmrgad under the renewable term insurance 
is exactly the same as the death rate, and it is this fact which has led yearly 
xwMitrabItt t«ra ijusuranoe to be called th» natural premitn plan* Goltuoii 5 
of th« tabla shoua the rate ot natural |>reaiam increasing vith the age exactly 
on the basis of oortalitjr rate* Vt^er this-plaay however^  sinoe the poeeibilit/ 
of death inoreases with inoreaeing age» the preaium will gradiially becoae 
nore and store bardensoae and at le^ t probibltiTe at the adyanoing age. iniere-
f ore the method ooiamaalcir used Isgr the insurance companies to charge the poliogr* 
tolders is ** Level Praad.uiB.*' 
fhe lerel preadua is simply a device to level out annual premium} policy 
holders pay more than their 'p\nre insurance** in earlier years and less in 
the later years* Tlas difference betitesn the premium ^ dd in the early years 
and the cost of insurance accumulates in the Corporation at' a guaranteed compound 
interest rate (the actual reserve) is available to finance the deficiency 
of premiums over the cost of pure insurance in the later years * Iioofced at 
in other way the level premium scheme combines a deczreasing insurance plan 
and an increasing savings plan in a simple contmot* The rising insurance 
cost with advancing age is thus neutralised by the diminishing amount expiied 
to risk so that poli^holders can be charged uniform premium throughout his 
life* If for exaiqple ^  Ij^ OOO ordinary (whoWlife) without profits policy 
is talun oat at the age of 30, the level premium is b 21*S7nF according to, 
L*I«C* rates* The actual death rate at this age according to Table 1 is 
Is S«26nP per 1000* fhe excess psyment is approximately Bs 18*llnP* Stereo 
fore, during the first year the amount of risk is not Is 1,000.00 but 
fis 981*89nP* And similarly for eubseqoMit years until the premium falls below 
the cost of pure insurance for the eame face amount* Thus a fund is created 
from the annual level premiums paid in the early pcOLiey years when mrtality 
x«tes are low. I^ bis fund is exactly sufficient when interest on the ftmd is 
I.? 
«dd«d and future preBiums ar« eoUeoted to pay daath olaiow as th»y oooor 
during tha period of tha poll^. ffaa effeot of aubatitating & level pmaiua 
for a aeries of inoreaalng praaloms is illustrated in Figure i.« 
fba aurra line AF shows the inoreasingjpayoent necMissary at suocesaive 
age to provide insurance of h 1000.00 in eaoh year from age thirty until 
eactx«me old age* fhe straight lint BGE represents tha annual level jxreaiua^  
nea»3y, the premiua for an ordinary life policy issued at age 30 under vhi^ 
It l(XiO.CX> is payable in event of death or at azqr tiioe* fhe aaount of this 
level preaiuffl, aocording to Ii.X.O. (without profits polioy) rates is b21*S7nP 
only* 
Froa age 50 to 55 the lev«Q. annual prestiuia for ordlnaxy life insuranoe 
issxied at age thirty is higher than the presdLuia payable on the yearly renewable 
term plan, the differenee in eost in any year being measured on the diagram 
by tto distance between the curved line and the horisontal line» After age fifty 
five» however^  the annual prraiiam is less than the yearly renewable term 
premium* The total excess cost on the level premium i^ Lan in the early years^ 
where this plan calls for greater payment than on the increasing premium 
plan* is represented In the diagram by the area botinded by ABC« The total 
excess cost on the incveasing premium plan in the later years» when that 
plan is the more etxpensivet is rej^^ented by the area FCH« It is evident 
that there is a great disparity between the respective areas and that the 
first is <n)ly a smeOl fraction of the seoond* In other words^  the small 
additional sums paid in the early yea» a» off-set fay the lower payment 
thereafter. The two arrangements providing the same benefit* namely^ Rs 1000 
at death are nevertheless exactly equivalents 'i.e. the two sets of premim 
1 
payments having* at the out set* exactly the same present worth* 
1* Riegel* Robert and Miller* Jerome 3i IniwPanoe*Prineiples and Practices 
Prentice* Hall* Inc.* Englewood Cliffs* 194lr* p 149. 
Comparative Cost Of Insuramcl On Level Pcemium 
HewewaBU-TIRM AI-
30 40 50 60 70 00 
Ag£ Attained. 
T I G 1 
3 O U R C £ 5 : TABLE 1 AND L .I .C.TABLE OF RATES. 
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It vill be clear» therefore, that the level premius plan is not pure 
t^ sttranoe. It requires larger payaent at the beginning than are neoessaxy for 
pure insuranoe of the nominal face amount and involves an investment feature 
repressnted bif the reserve, level premium plan of insurance is the most 
practicable pliui in fact, the cssly practicable plan for furnishing permanent or 
l<mg term proteoti<»i in the case of individual lives extending to the higher 
agesi while a yearly renewable term insuranoe is suitable mly for limited periods 
and where insurance extends only up to about age go or so and for such special 
purposes as group Insurance and reinsurance. The level premium plan is appllable 
not only to whole of life insuranoe but also to term insurance and to other forms 
which are described hereafter. 
Saving Feature in Different Tyias of PoUciesi 
the level premium rates under which the modem life insuranoe is sold are 
computed on the basis of (l) the rate of mortality (2) the rate of interest and 
(3) the rate of eigpenses. Premium are chari^ d from the policyholders with 
regards to the above three factors. Since the L.I.C. caters to the needs of 
different types of the people it offers different types of policies where the 
proportion of 'pure protection* and 'saving' elements differ. Tims to «3q>loit 
the income motive of the people» L.I.C. offers with profit policies. In witb-
profit policies the poli<Qrholder is expected to pay some hi#er rates of premium 
The motive for 'income* is satisfied the payment of a 'bonus* or * dividend* 
to the policyholden, at the end of the valuation years. The amount is usually 
credited to his account. 
tfithin these two broad categories of with-profit policies and without 
profit policies* different forms of life insurance cimtraots are issued. 
They are classified as (l ) Standard Forms of Life Insurance Contracts and 
1. Huebaer,S.S & Black,Keimeth (Jr): Lfe Insurance, Appleton Century, 
Crofta, Inc., New York, 1958, p 8. 
1.9. 
(2) Spooial Fosns of Life ooatraets* Standard forms of lif« insuranoe 
contract® ars broadly claeslfiad Into (l) trhole-life polici«s (2) endownent 
policies (8) and term policies. 
Aaide from ninor qualifications> special policies may be broadly oharao-
terised as f<dlowsf 
(i) Common policy forms to which aonte additional option of settlement of 
proceeds has been added» or which provide a modifioation of the usual level 
premiutt payment such as life insuranoe policies idth Incoiae Settleoii^ t. 
(ii) Combination policies, which include In one contract features that might 
be obtained tgr separate contracts, such as combinations of life, endowment, 
or term insurance or of insiirance and anj^ uities in the same contract* 
(ill) Special policies proper, which are distinctive in methods of paying 
either proceeds or premium. So definite boundry ^ dLsts, of course, between 
1 
this and the first grovsp, 
The idea In issuing these different types of policies is to meet the 
different needs and requirements of different class of the people and to 
make the *product' more competitive* Thus to suit the oircum^tances of 
young person who have Just entered in Itfe 'ConvertabOLe* forms of policies 
are offered and to exploit the motive of ohUdrwa education and provision for 
daughters marriage etc*,Juvenile Insurance Policies are sold. Similarly, 
several types of ainsjanities such as 'immediate' annuity and deferred annuity 
are designed to meet the varying n e ^ of the people* Jtomiities relieve., the 
person from the harden of administrating his fund and assures him a regular 
receipts of money from :the. Corporation ^ at '^ hie old age. 
1* Maclean, Joseph Bt Life Insuranoe > Me Qraw^ill Company, .Inc« 
Bew 7ork, 1957, p 58« 
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Th« p*«miu« rates of different types of policies differ^  besides they 
have yarylng element of •pure insurance* md * saving.* The wctent of the 
investment element in a given type of policy may be illustrated Igr that 
proportion of the premium paid which is represented by the revenue on the 
policy at the end of a specified pexlod of time, say five years from issuance* 
In the figure S are shown the total value of typical premiums paid in five 
years, with interest at per cent» the reserves on various types of policies, 
and the proportion of the latter to the former* 
It will be seen from the Figure 2 that each policy has vazying proportion 
of 'protection' and saving element. In the case of endowment insurance there 
is a greater element of investment and correspondingly lesser protection than 
under whole life forms of Insurance • - kihere the endowment period is short 
the insur&Qce involved is small in relation to the face amount* In considering 
any policy from an investment point of view it is necessary to take into 
account the fact that a substantial part of each preoium paid is used for 
insurance protection. That part is spent# or 'consumed;' it is only the 
balance of the premium which accumulates in the cCotporation in 'the form of 
'Reserve' or 'Fund.' 
Figure 3 shows the accumolation of the reserve on different types of 
policies. It can be seen that a reserve will aocum^te only under the 
single, level, and decreasing premixsun plans, because under the natural 
premium i^an, although some iBfinitesinal reserve may exist during the year, 
by the end of the year it is exhausted by the death claims. In the case of 
single premium the sum is increased each year by the interest and then /from 
the total the current mortality cost is deducted, the factor of interest 
making the reserve per policy grow larger and more rapidly as shown in the 
Figu^ft. 
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It vill also be seen that the reserve under the level premium plan is 
not as large at first, in actual amount, as under the single premium plan. 
But it grows with greater speed, because it increases each year, not only tor 
the interest but also b$r the amount of the level premium, althou|^ reduced 
each year by its share of the matured policy claims. 
It is also evident that on all life policies the reserve equals 8s lOOO 
by the end of the period of centract, because death is then considered certain. 
On the endowment policy the reserve reacbes Bs lOOO at the end of the endowment 
period because the Corporation is then obliged to pay the face value to 
the sui^ ivors. On the term policy the reserve is zero at the end of the 
term because the Corporation's liability then ceases, and, since the annual 
premitBB is very small, little more than enou^ to meet the current death 
claims, the reserve is at all times insignificant. On the life annuity the 
reserve diminishes, because the annuity is a method of escpending a previously 
accumulated capital. 
Each life insurance policy may therefore be regarded as e(MabjLnations of 
pure protection (indemnity at death) and investment (accumulated savings), 
the proportion of these ingredients varying with different types of ccmtract. 
Short term policies are almost entirely protections, with virtually no saving 
or investment element and therefore have no cash value. Short term endowment 
on the other hand entails considerable investment element. 
It is therefore dear that every insurance policy issued by L.I.O. has 
some 'saving element under which the premium payments bsr the Individuals 
aeounulate in the hands of the Corporation in the form of funds. In stead of 
eccumulatlng these reserve in the Corporation, for exang)!®, an individual could 
boy the same face amount of pure insurance in the form of 'term insurance' 
and save and invest the difference between the cost of pure ixxsurance and the 
higter amount involved in the level premium plan. Whether this will be to 
1.12 
his advantage or not depends on other factors such as on the rate of retum 
on his investment oompared with the effeotive net earning rate of the 
inauranoe aoocnsaUtion, and his inoonetax bracket. 
Besides suoh a prograauae is esqposed to three risks that he is ooiopelled 
to run (l) the possibility of prenatt^ death long before the ncessary 
saving period is completed > (ii) the possible lack of will power to continue 
the savings efforts consistently over so long a period, and (3) the possible 
inability, even assuming the successful avoidance of the first two risks, 
of keeping that which he may have succeeded in accumulating. Moreover for 
most peoi^e, persistency to save each year the required amoimt without the 
pressure acoootpanying a contractual obligation and personal solicitation, 
and to aocumulate them at not less than required oaa^ Mtsd interest rate, 
would involve greater self-discii^ ins and systematic management of affairs thati 
they are capable of. liife insurance <m the other band, through oontractxial 
payments of premiums, controls Individualb impulses and fosters saving habits 
in him. 
¥he principal virtue of life insurance as a promoter of thrift lies in 
the union of two accounts explained under level premium, namely an increasing 
saving ftoids throu|^ out the contract and correspondingly decreasing term 
insurance. Saving and family protection are wisely tied together and the 
psychological effect on the insured is vexy marked. The saving in the 
insurance account are unobtainable, before the eixpixy of stipulated period, 
the insured thus held in line through the stick-to ivei-ness that life 
insurance gives* He keeps on paying his premium a part being devoted to the 
payment of current protection and another portion to the saving account, 
and his life insurance value keeps cm. growing. The contractual nature of 
1.13 
life inaurmee tends to cause the polloyholders, partlouXarly after the first 
few yearsf to oontinue more flmXjr in his resolution to save than do aost of 
the other agenoies designed for the inculcation of thrift. When onoe started 
the desire to oontinue the protection offered l^r insurance aots as a powerful 
spur to oontjuue the saving feature. This sakes the life insurance most 
obstinate type of savings* Further* the savings effort under life insurance 
has the advantage of being spread over a Icmg period* if desired the whole 
of the working life* whereas other savings accounts are usuallor organised 
with a much shorter period in mind* 
Moreover successful thrift is largely the result of force of habit. 
Regular premium payments tend to strengths individual's ability to save in 
a s^tematic manner. Uhsn the aei^ sssity of life insurance is once recognised 
as an important and integral part of the famlly;|bttdget* botb from the stand 
points of protection and saving* household aM personal eaqpenses are soon 
adjusted to the necessity of paying the premium, ^hs thought of the family 
is thus molded in the right way with respect to the avoidance of needless 
extravagance and the making of proper capital provision for future ccmtingenciest 
From the above discussion it will be clear that life insurance is an 
importiint institution in motivating the people to save. In less developed 
eoonogay of India these persuasive activities of I4.I.C. and contractual nature 
of life insurance have special significance in capital formation. This is 
also evident from the statistical study in the following section. 
pondusicait 
The analysis in this section has shown that besides income* the persuasiv* 
efforts of the ins£itutioiis are important factor in determining the form and 
volume of saving in tl» econorny. The saving services offered Igr the insti* 
tutions are differentiated by the Individuals «n the basis of their income. 
ia4 
aotive* and fatuM needs. In thle oonneotion the nature of life insurance 
saving and the process of its aooumolation under level preadum has been 
desorlljed. It has been observed that the distinotlve feature of life insuranee 
savings is its oontraotual nature and oombination of two aooounts* i.e. a 
deoreasing insuranoe aeoount and an inereasing saving aooount. fhe::ip^ suasiv* 
methods adopted bgr the L.I.C.appeal the masses and oreate a desire among then 
to save« whioh is maintained thro&s^ the ocaitraotual nature of life insuranoe* 
L.I.C. therefore, has a positive effeot on the volume of savings. The next 
Section gives the quantitative proof of this generalisation* 
SECTIOH 2 
aROUTB OF him INS0HiUf(» SAVmOS M D THEIR BfPACf OH TUB VOUDME M B FORM 
OF PERSONAL SAVISGS 
In the folloving> pages I have desoribed the proeess of aoeumulation of 
life insuranoe savings in the Bidian Econoaor end have shown its signifioanoe 
in empital foannation in the PuULio and Private Seotors* 
Qyoi^h of lii^ e Inyffan^ y 
Savings In the Indian EconogBrt 
The amount of savings through life insuranoe is equivalent to the excess 
of pK^om over vhere inoome embraces premiums and net interest and 
where outgo embraces paints to policyholders» esqpenses and distributed 
profits. This is equivalent to the increase in total life funds during the 
year plus any amount transferred from individual life funds to additional 
revenue funds. Thus Table 2 gives the process of the accumulation of life funds^  
throui^ the Inoome and out flow of Funds in the Indian Economy since 1948* 
1. Harbert,A.Q and darke^R.Di The Sources and Nature of Statistical 
Information in Special Fields of Statistics (The Statistics of British 
Insurance. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. CIV, part II, 
1982, p 277. 
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The Table ahovs that ths inoone reoeived bsr Indian Ihsuranoe Offices trom 
premitaas. Interest ai^ other aourees in a particular year exceeded the total 
outgo in the shape of claims, stxrrenders* anmmities* dividends* manageanit 
expenses* co&tribation to funds etc. in that jrear and the balance was a>n 
addition to the life fund. la this way in 1980, the Corporation had an aggre-
gate excess of total incoiw over total outgo to the tune of 8s 519.85 orores 
in :^ dia« An idea about the jjuportance of this amount can be had from the 
faet that it is approxioately 80 per cent of the paid up capital of pablio 
1 
limited companies in India; four times of the gold coin and laillim held by 
the Reserve Bank of Indlaj twentysix per cent of the notes in circulation 
2 
in 1960; twentycme per cent of the Rupee loan of the Government of India. 
The life fund is nearly five per cent of the total capital outlay of the 
3 
Third Five Tear Plan • eight per cent of the Public Sector and twelve per cent 
of the Private Sector. 
Table 5 gives figures of annual increase of life fund since 1938. 
tmM 5 
AHKUAL mCRBASE W THE VOtOMB OF LIFE FUSB 1938 to i960 
_______________ (Rs Crores) 
fear 
Annual Ibicrease 
in Idfe Fund 
lear Annual Increase 
in Itlf e Fund 
1938 8.5 19S0 8.3 
1939 5.7 1951 14.9 
1940 8.1 1992 35.5 
1941 8.8 1953 23.7 
19 7.2 1954 22.2 
1945 8.2 1955 23.1 
1944 10.3 1958 50.9 
1948 13.0 1957 27.4 
19 4S 9.1 1958 34.7 
1947 13.1 1959 44.9 
1948 20.7 1980 62.1 
1949 22.8 
SOUKCBSt Insurance tear Boolcs* L.X.Ct Annual Beports and Aeoounts* 
NotetSlnee 19S7 separate figuree for Life Insurance Pond in India are available. 
1. HlgamiHaj.K and ChaudhuriyN.Os The Coxporate Sector in India -
Department of Company Iaw Administration, Oovemment of India, p 39. 
S. Reserve Bank of India* Reports m Gurrenor and Ficaace - Statement 37. 
3. Qovemment of India] The Third Five Tear Plan, p S9» 
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It will be a«6n frcsn Table 3 that amount of additional saving entrusted 
the insuring publio to Indian Insttraaoe Offices had been generally increasing 
from y»ar to year. Tl^ rising tendency was in evidence in all the jmars 
except 1943, 1950, 1993 and 1954. It will be observed from the table that 
the average amount of additional savings handed over to insurance companies 
before partition of ths ooiaitf^  i.e. from 1936-1947 was 6,9 erores per anuumn; 
and the average amoimt of additional saving daring the post-Indepenadence 
period i.e. 194B»1955| increased to 8s 21.4 orores per annumn. The average 
for the p riod 1938 to 1995 comes to Kg 14.2 orores per annumn. Since the 
nationalisation of life insurence business in India, the life fund is increas-
ing at the average rate of te 44 orores per year. At present cost of capital 
outlay this amount could add Is 2508 to Its 3036 lal^ per year in agilculture, 
h X4S& lakh in consumer goods industries and Rs 616 lalOi in ircai and steel, L 
The sai^  investment can provide, at current wage rate an emplo^nt for 22,000 
persons in heavy Industries, 90,600 persons in large scale consumer goods 
industries and 1,74,000 persons in agriculture and house-hold industries per 
1 
year. 
Contrilyition of Life J^ surance in the Nationip. Savings* 
More ' useful ' from the point of view of this study is to see the contri-
bution of life insuranod in the National Savings. The National saving represent! 
the totality of savings of all sectors (Household, Corporate and Oovemment) 
in the economy. The propensity to save for the nation as a whole, therefore, 
depends upon the relative amounts of income aecuring to different sectors of 
the populatiMi which have different saving propensities. Hence, while att«q>> 
ting to increase national saving, it becoiMs essential to consider the relative 
magnitudes of saving propensities of diffetwnt sectors of the population 
together with their relative shares in total income. For exaa^e, business 
firms have in general higher saving propensities than any other sector, while 
1. Shflnoy,B,R» The Tbird Plan, Indian Ebqpfese (New Delhi Bdition), 
October 28, 1961. 
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faraers tend to save more than non-farotftra of equivalent inoone. Thia diatri-
batl<mal effect forma an important conaideration in an attempt to atlmulate 
saving in the eocnoogr* 
In a less developed oountzy the share of the household seotor in the 
Rational Saving is of oonaiderable importanoe. This is evident from the 
foUoniag Table whieh shows the aggregate as veil as seotondse estimates of 
saving at current prices for the years 1950«51 to 1958-59. 
TAMJB 4 
VOia«E AN0 PATTERNS OF SktmOS 
IN INDIA 
1950-51 - 1958-59 
House- Corporate (iovem- House- .fgi.w Corpo- , in Qovsni— 
hold Seetor sent Total hold rate ment as 
Tear Sector Seotor Saving as per- as per- percen- Tota: 
centage centage tage to 
to total to total total 
1950*51 509.88 33.16 93.84 635.88 80.2 5.1 14.7 100 
1951-S2 254.76 S6*« 192.30 503.53 50.5 11.2 38.2 100 
19S2-53 492.61 4.29 88.39 585.29 84.2 0.7 15.1 100 
1953-54 504.88 22.87 70.99 598.74 84.3 3.8 11.9 100 
1954-55 561*54 38.88 82.22 682*74 82.3 5.7 12.0 100 
1955-56 785.98 54.33 69.92 910<23 86.4 6.0 7.6 100 
1956-57 810,86 53.69 328.92 992,97 81.6 5.4 13.0 100 
1957-58 686.55 17.20 n4.4S 818.17 83.9 2.1 14.0 100 
1958-59 837.57 34.27 103.00 974.84 85.9 3.5 10.5 100 
SOimCB} Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, August 1961, Vol* p 1203. 
The above table shows that the volume of saving in the Indian eoonomy has 
inoreased from h 635.88 orores in 1950>S1 to 974.84 cores in 1958-59. The 
important thing to note here is the relative importance of the house-hold 
seotor in the o<»iponent of Hational Saving* It will be seen that house-hold 
seotor contribute nearly 80 per cent on an average during the i^riod, corporate 
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Motor 5 per cent and 15 per eer.t is omtributed by the government sector. 
In practieally all eomtries* house«-hold is the main oontributory in the 
National saving stream. In 0.S.A. for mcanple, tmder nomal oiroumstanoes* 
the share of the individual sector is about sixth-tenth of the ooontzy wide 
1 
saving. The share of hoiise-hold sector* hovever« is ooaparativelor large in 
India due to the less developsent of the econooor. In a developing eoQnc»^ 3r in 
fact the 'corporate or business savings'are oontparatively small and the surplus 
income mainly originates at the farm due to increasing agricultural prices. 
2 
In 1960 the National Savings amotmted to 8s 1207 orores and life insurance 
contribution was appr<»dLnately 5 per cent and in relaticoi to Hational income 
the ratio of life insurance saving was 0.4 per cent. In the National Aooount-> 
ing, life insurance is classified as the component of houee-^ hold sector-Jit 
will be desirable* therefore* to consider life insurance saving in relation to 3 
household saving and personal disposable income. 
Component of House^hoM Savlagst 
Although house-hold has relatively greater share in the national savings, 
its saving ih less developed countries are usually in a form that do not 
contribute directly to the economic develojsoaent. This is evident from Table 
No. 5. The table shows that at the end of 1958-59 nearly 6i per cent of house* 
hold savings are locked up in currency hoards* gold and i^sical assets. 
Savings in Corporate securities are only i per cent* Provident Funds Savings 
are 11 per cent and Savings in the form of Bank deposit are 10 per cent* Postal 
Savings are 7 per cent and Life Insurance Savings are only 4 per cent of the 
total house<-hold savings* 
The pattern of saving from 1950*51 to 1958-59* however* suggests that 
1. Kuzvets SimcQ] Intexnatianal Differences in Capital Formation and 
Financing in Capital Formation and Eooncxnic Growth* Op.Cit.* p 45. 
2. Government of Indiai The Third Five lear Plan (Planning Commission, 
New Delhi* 1961* p 28.) 
3. The words'Individual Saving'*Personal Saving* House-hold Saving, Private 
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thft proiK>rtlGn of iiiistlttttional aa^ings such as Bank deposit^  Postal Savt&gs# 
Life Insuraaoe* Provident Fund ©to. are stoadUjr Inoroaaing while the ratio 
of passive form of savings are deoreaeing. This will be clear from the faot 
that whereas comraeroial banks deposits^ liisuranoe Saings, pension end Provident 
Fxmds have increased 1894 per cent, 344 per cent* 270 per cent respeotivwly^  
savings in the form of currency, gold md jdjysioal asaets "nave increased only 
by 39 per cent, 16 per cent, and 17 per ^ nt respectively during the period. 
This change in the form of savings may be due to industrialization and urbani-
sation of the country . Persiiasive efforts of the institutions and other 
factors to bs discussed later* 
Relation to Personal Disposable 
Income and Total fastltuticmal Savipfjp|: 
Usually all types of loans, mortgage of property, loans granted on 
policies or on other security such as stocks and shares etc. and other 
miscellaneous loans granted fay the instiranee companies to the policy holders 
are treated as 'dissaving' on the part of individuals* Thus to obtain the 
net policy holders savings the yearly addition io these loans are deducted 
from 'gfoss policy holders savings.' Sudb estimates have been computed 
by the Natioanal Council of Applied Eccmoaic Research, New Delhi, in their 
2 
estimates of Saving in India. ^ Bat to oy mind, in the absence of reliable 
statistical study, it would not be proper to consider all the policy loans 
and mortgages for consumption. This is largely due to the faot 
1. Personal Disposable income has been defined as Persemal Income less 
personal taxes (See Friend,Irwin - The Concept and Measureaent of 
Savings in 'Savings in the Modexn Econo^r' Op.Cit., p 86). 
2. Hational Council of Applied Eoonomio Research: Saving in India, 
New Delhi - 1961, p 144* 
1^2 
'ihat in Xndla inauranee eorapftnies shrUc partioipaticoi in oonstaMx* flAanM ot 
I 
thii nature, I hav«, therefor®, assmed In the study that 'polioy loona,* 
personal loans and other loans taken tssf the policy-holders aire * consumption* 
loans vhile the 'mortgage loans* are producers loans. That is mortgages have 
been treated as investstsnt of insuranoe for financing produotion, other loans 
have been treated as for financing consumption - an aot of dlssaTlng on the 
part of the polioy-holdera• 
Thus Table No, 0 shows the amount of net policy-holders satdng after 
adjusting the National Council of Applied Sconoiuic Resesreh Study according to 
the abore formula. 
6 
Net Polii^lwlders Saving as Percentage to PeraoB&l Disposable Income* Total 
Person^ Saving and Private Institutional 
Savings 
Individual Indivi- Total liet Per- Percen- Percen-
Tear Disposable dxial Priwite Pc^icy- centage tage of tage of 
Income. Savings Tnstitu- holder's of 4 to 2 4 to 3 
tional Savinga• 4 to 1 
Satings• 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1948-49 848443 N.A, 73 H.A. N.A N.A. N.A. 
1949-50 8828.4 348.3 38.0 15.8 4.54 41.57 
1980-51 9341.4 7^8 .9 83,1 16,4 .17 3.« 19.73 
195i-Se 9731.2 296a 69.4 13.5 .13 4.57 1945 
1952-53 9664,4 4B3.1 103,3 18.8 .19 3.91 18,29 
1953-54 10316.7 505.0 m . 8 22.S 4.45 1S.2® 
1954-55 9427.8 586,6 183.6 23,6 .25 4.00 I2.S5 
1955-56 97C8.7 8B4.4 232.3 25.8 .26 2.91 
1955-57 11112.2 757.8 202.5 24.8 .32 3.27 13.84 
1957-58 11205«4 908.3 287.2 32.4 .28 3.S2 13.65 
Percentage « « « « « 
iraristion 32.07 224^ 35^ -225? -S7JJ 
1948-49 
to 1957-58 
SOURCESi National Council of Applied Boonomio Research Saving in India, 
Op.oit, Tables Ko. 2.1 (p 22),Table 3 (p 40) and Table 3.11.3, p 1«. 
N.A « Hot Available.* Variation computed from the figures of 1949-50 
1. An analysis of the purpose for vhioh the mortgage loans have been granted 
reveals that 48% of the loans granted is excliisive for construction X8% for 
repayment of existing loans, partly for building construction and partly 
for other purposes and about 19% for business (logaksbema. Vol. 5, 
Numbers 1961, p 60, 
I. IB 
Table No. $ shove that Life Insuraaee Savings constitute a rery small 
proportion of personal disposable income. In 19^-50 life insurance savings 
tresre only 0.18 per cent of the personal disposable inoome and during the 
decade thay could only inprove to 0.23 per cent in 1957-S8. Moreover, in 
Biost of the years life insurance could not keep pace with the Increase in 
personal disposable incone and other forms of savings. Tims in the 
percentage of life Insurance savings to total house-hold savings was 4.S4 per 
cent it fell to 3.S2 per cent (decline of about 22 per cent) in 1957.-58. 
Similarly the prc^rtlon of life insurance savings to total institutional 
savings has declined from 41.67 per cent in 1949-50 to 15.65 per cent ( a 
decline of 67 per cent) in 1957-58. This decline is not due to any fall in 
life Insurance savings bat total house-hold savings have increased at ouch 
..higher pace during the period than the life insurance savings, this is 
revealed tor the fact that during the period 1948-19 to 1957-88 total house-
hold savings have increased I^qt 162 per cent} total private institutional 
savings have inci^ eased ligr 22 4 per cent and life insurance savings have increased 
by only 105 per cent. 
Life Insurance Savingst 
The slow growth of life insurance savings 1« due to variety of reasons 
to be discussed in the next chapter. At present the distinctive feature 
about i^se savings oust be noted. It will be observed from the above statis-
tical study that in relation to other forms of personal savings, life insurance 
savings have increased with stability. This is also evident from Fig. 4 which 
shows the growth of different forms of individual savings m Log Scale. The 
figure Indicates that OoBSMroial Bank deposit and other forms of saving have 
increased with erratic fluctuations while life insurance savings and provid«nt 
funds etc. have Increased with stability. 
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5OURC[5: R.B.I. RLPORTS OM CURSLNCY AND FIWRMCI 
INSUPANTT YEAR BOOOL I C ANNUAL REPOPTS AND ACCOUMT5. 
1.2'4 
Figure 6 also Indicates tlaat during the period 1949 to 1960 the indices 
of the premium paid, average oiae of polioios and number of policies have 
steadily increased ty 148 per cent, 160 per cent and 26 per cent respectively. 
This increase has been maintained in opit« of rise in cost of living by 24 
per cent and fluct\iation« In National Income, It is in fact this truth about 
life insttranee saxdngs that gives us soa® belief that they ar« aade not only 
at the cost of other forms of saviBge but also at the coat of consaaptico. 
The factors which give stability to life insurance can now be smuaarised as 
followsi 
The persuasive methods adopted by ' L.X,C. apped. to masses and create 
desire sjnong thea to purchase 'life insuranee. * As soon as a policy has been 
issvied the fi^ ced term of the contract o<mtrol in^ vilses and does not permit 
the policy-holder to liquidate his saviag so easily* This is due to the faet 
that evexy holder of life insu2>ance poli^ which has a saving feature has 
plazined hia savings in a more formal and bindizig mazmer than he has planned 
his constimption. Once m insurance programme is launclKid the premiums are 
just as demanding and just as an anticipated cost of living as the rental paid 
for the use of a^ pa3!>tment and other monthly bills. Insuranoe premium in this 
respect becomes a pai^ of consumption. In fact, it will usually be found 
more expedient to go without some luxury item of diet or son® new article of 
olothings than to stop the insurance programme with the loss suffered by these 
who do not see the policy through its maturity. The quantitative importance 
of this factor is great when it is considered that saving can only take plaee 
when people resist impulses to increase ejipenditure. A life insuranoe contraot 
makes such decision more effective, for failure to save enough to pay the 
premium ouases the insuranoe to lapse which invdres considerabile loss* Besides 
life insurance which forms the bulk of middle class savingpsi-cre'the outooM 
I. IB 
of plana, baaed on certain expeotations of Inoome, and are carried out before 
unforeaeen changea in income requiare the alteration oti pain. Unforeseen 
fluetuationa in economic activity directly affect not the aairinga themaelTOa 
but the conditiona iriiidi determine future aavinga* In otber vorda it ia in 
thia field that the volume of aavinga are leaa merouri«l than elaevhere and 
1 
the ex-anl^ e and ex-poa^ aavinga raoat oloeely approximate. 
It ia true that the rate at trhich people place or wiah to place funda in 
L.I«C'8 handa ia dependent m what at a particiilar time they chooae to do with 
their total aaaeta rather than what they choose to do with titieir cut^nt 
aavinga. For, by diaaaving in other directiona (auch aa the withdrawal of 
Savinga Bepoaita and the caahing of National Saving Gertificatea) the public 
may wiah to place ftrnda in the hands of the l».I.G. at a greater rate than the 
rate of totia current aavinga. fo the extent thia happens, life insurance 
will only affect the form of aavinga rather than volume of aavingB in the 
economy. But the vevy fact that the aavera have no heaitaticm in liquidating 
other forma of aavinga for paying premium eataisliafaea the auperiority of life 
insurance in relation to the other forma of aavinga. It auggeata that life 
inaurance savinga will increaae both at the coat of other forms of savings 
aa wall as at the coat of consumption. 
\ 
Jn less developed countries life insurance has special aignificance not 
only becauae ita principlea can appeal to maaaea but <alao ita ccmtractual nature 
1. the queation whether aavingl are determined or determinant of the ec<»xomio 
activity largely depends upon the form of aaving. Generally both aavinga 
and inveatment can be auppoaed to include paaaive elements in part. 
(See lAunidberg,Erik > Studies in the Theox^ of Bconomio Eaqpanaion, 
XuUy and Millman Ino., New £ork, 1955, pp 144-45). Since the premivun 
payment of life insurance ia planned and decided at the beginning of the 
period, and due to the contractual nature it ia paid even at the cost 
of consuaqption, it can be concluded that life insurance are active 
saving and hence determinent of economic actiiity* 
I. IB 
oontrola high propensity to oonsiiffis. Moreover, life Ixisttranee savings ftoottsni)" 
l&te tmder oonditions vtaere thsir long-term investment is essential from iHm 
point of viev of business itself. In the Interest of the poliojr-holders as 
well as in the interest of stability in eeonomio develo^ i^ nt it is desirable 
that L.I.C. should transmit those funds to the various outlets for investment 
at an eveu rate b^ aTOiding slgaixioant variatitms In the proportion of new^  
funds which it decides to hold as a liquid cash reserve. Thus taULe No. 7 
will show that increasing amount of assets have been procured against the 
aoeuimilatlon of these Amds. 
TABLE NO 7 
UfE POND; , fOTAL ASSETS AN0 INVESTMENTS OF INDIAN LIFE OFFICES 
Tear Life Fund Total Assets Total Investments Percentage of Inveslaient 
to total assets. 
1948 190.4 193.1 166.6 8$«2 
1949 173.2 219.1 188.5 86.1 
1950 181, S 827.5 186.6 86.4 
1951 197.0 253.1 215.0 85.3 
1993 231.9 295.4 254.0 85.9 
1953 255.6 318.2 276.7 86.9 
1954 277.8 342.0 295.7 86.5 
1955 299.7 370.5 318.8 86.0 
1956 N.A. 415.0 362.0 87.2 
19 OT 410. 4 465.0 420.8 90.5 
1958 447.8 904.8 420.8 91.3 
1959 563.9 497.4 89.8 
1960 560.4 622.5 570.8 91.7 
SOURCBSt (l) Reserve Bank of Indiat Banking and Monetary St&tistios. 
Controller of Insurancei Insuranoe Tear Books* 
(3) L.I.Ct Annual Reports and Accounts. 
Note I Figures for total assets and investments for 19S6 are for 8 months 
and figures of life fund for 1957 are for 16 months. 
I. IB 
It would be observttd that In 1995 th» total life fund amounted to Is 299.7 
oroTes against lAiloh the insuMTs hold assets of h 370.5 orores and inTestment 
1 
vere Is 318 orores. At the end of 1960 the total life fund inoreased to Its 960 
orores f total assets moved to Is 622*9 orores and total imrestment Inoreased to 
Bj 970.7 orores. Thus the table Ho. 7 shows that in the period 1990-1959 the 
life fond, total assets and investments have inoreased at an average rate of 
Is 292.4 ororesy Is 319*9 orores and Is 272 orores* per year respeotivel^ . In 
the period 1996-1960, the average rate per annum of life ftuad» total assets 
and total investment inoreased to B> 459 orores» Its 932*2 orores and fit 462.2 
orores per year respectively. 
These faots oan also he observed from Fignre 6 which covers a period of 
12 years from 1918 to I960. It shows that the total life fund curves, the 
total assets curves and total invostnmnt curves have moved together and in 
the same direction, thus mutually vesting them with oonsideralxLe representative 
oharaoter. This is perhaps adequate evidence to show that L.I.C. is an 
important agency for the 'TrunsportatiiMi of Capital* in the ooantty, i.e. it 
mobilises savings from numerous policy holders and finance the capital require-
ments of the*D«fioit Units* by holding their obUgatioas. 
Role of 1>.I*G. in Financing Capital Formation in 
l^^ e Pab j^,? an4 P^y^t^ of t ^ , ^cono^t 
Table Ho. 8 gives the estimates of inter-seotoral flows of excess of 
gross savings ovef capital formation for the years 1948-49 to 1999-60* It will 
be noticed that in most of tie years the private non-oorporate sector had 
surplus of savftngs which (on net basis) it lent to other tuo sectors namely 
(l) thex1*ublio Sector and (2) the Private Corporate Sector. These two sectors 
are generally in defioit end thoy make up by borrowing first from the private 
non-corporate sector and secondly from abroad. For instance, during the four 
1. See note on Statistical Data regarding Life Insurance Savings and 
investment in Appendix 'A*. 
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I. IB 
yeara 1956-57 to 1959-60, the PuWlo Sector saved Is 895 orores and invested 
fis 3»2S0 orores, and the private corporate sector saved Is 517 crores end 
invested Is 1,065 orores* Thus they *over invested' Is 2,335 crores and 
Is 54B crores respectively, their continued 'over investment' totalling upto 
Bs 2,883 crorofl. This gap of fe 2,883 crores was filled fjp Igr drawing upowi 
the private non-corporate sector ( Is 1,482 croree) and the foreigners (Is 1,401 
crores)* The private non-corporate sector savings as ve have seen previously 
are aobillsed Ijf tlie caving institutions in vasying proportion and are laade 
available to the two deficit sectors in the eccaioaqr against the obligations 
issued Igr them* L.I.C. is one of the intem^diaxy which mobilise personal 
savings and finance the investment plans of the corporate sector and Govenaaisnt 
sector. Figure ? shows the contribution of life insurtmce in total gross capi-
1 
tal; formatim in India and Table 9 gives important items of inveotneAt of L.I.O. 
It indicates that the corporation finances the capital formation in the publio 
sector investing in Central Government securities. State Ctovemment Securi-
ties, Approved securities and Municipal Loans. categoiy wise distribution 
in fable 9 shows that in 1960 L.I.C. has invested Is 228»2S crores in Central 
Qoveiment seouritiesj 8s 94.90 crores in State Qovemment Securities and 
Is 21.0 crores in Municipal and approved securities. 
In the private sector L.I.C. has invested both in 'equity' as well as 
debt obiligatione issued by that sector. In 1960 L.I.C. invested about Bs 47.5 
crores in the ordinary shares issued lay the private sector and Is 20*7 crores 
in preference shares; Is 23.9 crores in debentures. Investment in mortgages 
constituted about Is 9.2 crores and in Land and House Property Is 26*5 crores* 
It is clear therefore that the sources of finance opened up by L.I.C. to 
finance the capital formation in the public sector are the Oovemment 
1. The shaded portion in the Figure 7 Indicates the net capital Inflow 
from abroad. 
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eeourities » Central* States* Himlolpal and approved securities and Loans to 
State Qoveroments. la the private sector tbs availabOLe sonroes are shares 
and debentures issued bssr the Companies* Mortgages and I<and and house property 
(for Offioe use as veil as for investment}* fable 9 also shows that the auijor 
porti<m of i.Z.C's investments is in the pafalio seotor while only a small 
percentage is invested in the private sector. The porporticmateljr large amount 
Invested bjr L.I.C. in the public seotor is due to its legal framework and 
liability (diaracteristios. The contractual obligation of L.I.C. towards policy-
holders produces strcmg inoentive -to maintain a portfolio structure with top 
heavy *8afe public securities.^ Provided such high grade securities produce 
a yield large enough to cover its contractual obligation. This is an important 
factor in creating a relative advantage in the public sector of the economy 
as compared with private enterprise. This is also evident from the Table 10 
which idiows capital formaticm through insurance con^ anies in the public end 1 
private sectors of the economy* The total capital formation through insurance 
companies in the public seotor by additions in government securities comes 
to about b 224*7 crores during the First and Second Five Xear Flans* As 
against this the total addition in shares and debentures* mortgages and Land 
and Buildiite is about Is 81*7 crores* In oth^ r words* the total capital forma-
tion in India through insurance coiqpanies during the First and Seocmd Five 
Tear Flans amounted to Rs 306.4 crores.Out of this amount approximately 73 per 
cent flowed in public sector and only 23 per cent in the private sector* 
1* Thet9 tised to be a settled conviction in India that the funds invested liy 
L.I.C. in Oovemment Securities do not ccaitribute in the capital formation* 
This* however* is a mistaken notion because the funds borrowed by the 
Qovemment were productive to the tvme of 82 per cent and tnproduotive to 
the extent of 18 per cent. Taking this as a guide* it has been assumed 
in appendix HI.l, in the computation of capital f^ zmatitm though insurance 
conqpanies in India that 82 per cent of the amount invested by Indian 
insurers in Central Ooveniment Securities during 19 4B to I960 is productively 
used* 
1.38 
TABLE £0* 10 
CAPITAL FORMATXOfi THR00CSI BiSORAKGE COMPAKIES AND THEXS C0NTHIB(7TI0N IS 
8BT GAPXTAL FOBMAf lOK IN INDIA 
mOM 1948-49 TO 1960^1 
A^ M ftif P'^ml 
leap 
Capital PozvatioB throoi^  Sat Capital Insarera* 






tion in Net 
oapital 
fontation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 pre-plan Period 
194&-48 10.1 6.9 17.0 469 3.6 
1948-50 7.0 9.5 16.5 481 3.4 
1950-51 1,S 5.5 6.8 480 1.4 
Total of 
1948-49 to 1950-51 18.4 21.9 40.3 1480 2.8 
1951.SB 6.9 6.7 13.6 791 1.7 
1993-53 19.2 13.1 32*3 443 7.3 
1953-54 u.o 7.5 18.5 761 2.4 
1954-85 i.6 4.9 9.5 779 1.2 
1955-56 14.4 9.4 23.8 986 2.4 
Total of 
1951-52 to 1955-56 56.1 41.6 97.7 3760 2.6 
1956-57 42.4 0.9 41.5 1662 2.5 
1957-58 1S.2 18.7 33.9 1267 2.7 
1958^ 59 SO. 3 4.9 35.2 1680 2.1 
1959-60 26.6 4.9 31.5 1663 1*9 
1960-61 54.1 12.5 66.6 1959 3.4 
Total of 
1956-57 to 1960-61 168. 6 40*1 208.7 8231 2.5 
Total of I A II 
Piw lear Plana 22i.7 81.7 .306.4 11991 2.6 
SOtmOBSt (l) O.S.Ot Batiaatea of Oroaa Capital Foraatioa in IDadia 
for 1948-48 to 1960.61. 
(2) AppMidlx B.I.1 
Notat It liaa baan aaauaad that oapital formation for 1948-48 ralataa to 1948 
and aiailar aasuB^ioa haa been aada for later yaara* 
11.3 
It la also important to note that duiflitg thA First FiT» Xsar Plan tlM 
total capital formatloii through inouranee eoaQMxiiaa vaa to the ttme of Bs 97.7 
oror»s« Koarly 58 per eent of this aooont financed capital formation in the 
pttblio motor and per cent in the private aeotor* During the second 
Five tear Plan the total capital fonaatitm through L.I.C. increased to Bs 208.7 
erores, Btit approziaatelr 31 per cent of IMs aaoont flowed in publie sector 
and onljT 19 per eent in the private sector* 
fhe average capital fonaation through insurance companies during the 
First Five lear Plan comes to about Is 19.9 crores per /ear* In the PubHo 
Sector the average rate of capital formaticHi was Bs 11.2 crores and in the 
private sector it was 8.3 crores per year. During the second Five fear Plan 
the average rate of cai^tal foxnation increased to 33.72 crores per annum} 
but ths balance t'ilteli d more in favour of public sector than in the private 
sector. From the point of view of capital formation* the ratio between public 
and private sector which was approximately Itl during the First Five tear Plan 
became 4tl in the Second Five Tear Plan* 
The rate of capital formation during the First and Second Five Xear Plan 
and insurers contribution therein can be seen from column 5 and 6 of the table. 
Net capital formation during the First Five Tear Plan was Bs 3760 orores and 
insurers oontributiaoi during the same period was only 2.6 per cent. During 
the second five year plan (1996*57 - 1960-61) net capital formation was 
Bs 1959'- orores and insurers oontribation increased to 3*4 per cent* Again it 
is also important to note that in most of the years the ratio of capital 
formation throti^ life insurance to total net capital formaticn has significantly 
declined* For example, in 1948-49 the life insureuace contribution in capital 
formation was 3.6 per cent it declined to 1*7 per cent in 1991-S2 at the 
beginning of the First Five tear Plan. The ratio increased to 2*4 per eent in 
1.34 
1955-56 bat again deoltned to 1.9 per cent in 1959<*60, fhe deoltiia in th« 
ratio was not dtie to any fall in tha lita insuranee savings bat in faot th» 
rate of capital formation has inoi^ aaed at siaoh hig^r paoa than the rata of 
groifth of Ufa insuranee savings in most of tbs years. This is evident fron 
the following Table No. 11* 
fABLB NO. 11 
QIDIGES OF THE (mOWTH OF OStOSS CAPITAL FC^TZON AND UIS WStmAfiCB m D 








1948-49 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1949-SO 103.1 100.2 100.7 110.1 
1950-51 119.2 97.8 101.5 40.1 
1951-30 147.3 117.4 122.5 72.3 
19Se-53 121.9 90.2 95.6 171.5 
1953-54 144.2 120.1 324.2 114.5 
1954-55 220.1 109.2 128.2 107.2 
1955-56 239.7 126.5 145.9 111.6 
1956-57 318.3 170.7 196.0 N.A. 
1957-58 361.2 120.2 161.5 133.3 
1958-59 361.2 157.4 192.3 167.6 
19t9-69 435.7 140.6 191.3 216.9 
1960-61 407.1 165.5 207.0 300.0 
SOUHOBSt (l) C.S.Ot Estimates of Oross Oapital Formation in India 
for 1948-49 to 1960-ei (1961) p 99 (Table 8.3} 
(2) Insturanoe Tear Book 
(3) L.I.C Ayiyiiifti Reports and Aoooants. 
Notet 8se Note of Table No. 10. 
The above Table gives the indices of the rate of the growth of Oross 
Capital Formation in thB Publio and Private Sectors along with the indioes of 
the annual inorease in life insurance fund. It will be seen that in most of 
the years the indices of the growth of life fund have lagged behind in rela-
tion to the gross capital formation in the public and private sectors. This 
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i« partljr due to ths hoavy outleT- in the publio aeetor and partljr due to 
slow growth of life ineuranoe aavings. The fapid growth of lif«i Insuranoe 
fund in ^ e years 1959 and i960 is also notatile. 
It is one of the Isqportant feature of life insuraaee savlnga that they 
1 
are related with the ee<moiaie development and oapital foroatioo in the eoonooiy. 
ait in India the foregoing study j^ws that life ineuriaxee savings ootild not 
keep pace with the eocmooio developm^t* In fact the low ratio of life 
insoranee savings in relation to personal savings and the slow growth of life 
fund in relation to the growth of oapital fonaation in the eoonQaiy is mainly 
due to low standard of life insuranee in India. I have disoussed this faotor 
In the historioal baekground of life insurance industry in India in the 
following ohapter* 
Smamaiiy and Coneluqlong 
In tiiis Chapter» the iapaet of life insoranoe <m the volunte and form of 
saving has teen examined. It has been oonoluded that life insuranoe by affect-
ing the desire to save and through the oootraotual payment of premium,effeets 
both the form end volume of personal saving. In less developed oountries life 
insurance performs a very useful funotion in controlling individual's propensity 
to consume and makes the resouroes available for long-term Investment. Thus 
through mobilising saving from the 'stably en^ >loyed braokets* life insurance 
finanee the capital formation both in the Private and PuhLio Sectors of the t 
economy. 
The statistical study has proved the impact of life insuranoe savings on 
Capital Formation but reveals that the growth of life insurance idxioh is 
1. Agarwalaf A.Nt Some Aspeots of Eocmomic Advancement of Underdeveloped 
Eocaiomics, Kitab Mahal Allahabad* 1958, p. 64. 
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related to the economio development of tfas country^  eould not keep pace vith 
other forms of personal savings. Since the tmpaot of L.I.C*s investment 
will depend npon its resotirces* it is important to enqtiire into the fatore 
prospeots of the growth of life insuranoe* This could be investigated only 
after examining the faetozn that have faeilil^ ted the growth of life insuraaee 
in the past and at the same time it is also isqportant to e3q;>lain the causes 
that have obstructed its e3Q)Qn8ion in recent years. 
CEAFfl^ ZI 
HisfORiaii a^ OK(mous0 md PBESE^ posmoir OF u m 
DiSURAHCa IBDtJSTPl W WHIA 
CHAPTSR ZZ 
RISfOBZCAL MCKOHOUNB M O FRESBRf POSZTIQB OF 
U n IfiSVRAHCB INDUS^ TE? XK ZNOU 
Tbft growth of life Itisaraaoe fund ia iwlatod to th« growth of life 
inauraaoo in foroo. The low percentage of the life lueuraiioe eavtogs to 
personal disposable income as iadieated In the previous Chapter is due to 
the low standard of life insurance in the eountry. This in turn is mainly 
on aoootmt of the organisational and struotural weaknesses of life insura&oe 
offices in India whidx have failed to create insurance oonsciouoaess among 
the pecqple. In this Chapter Z haim substantiated t^is statement in ths 
1 
background of the history of life instarance in India* 
P^ ft^ or^ fial Baykgytmd f^f 
Life aisurance in India 
There are various phases of the development of life insurance industrsT 
in India. Ths]r have been classified by various authors in different ways. In 
my opinion the following dassificatitm is quite logical to trace the history 
1. Prior to nationalisatian> life insurance in India was sold by 
Indian and Kon^Indian Insurance Con^ wnies* Provident Societies and 
Post Offices* The number of Non-Indian Insurance Coaq>anies vas 
very small in relation to Indian Insurance CoBpanies* The contri-
bution of the Provident Societies was also insignificant in the 
total life business. Postal Insurance was sold only to certain 
categorised persons without employing insurance agents* la the 
historical description I have> therefore, concentrated wy attention 
mainly on the life insurance activities of Indian Inaaxera* 
of lif« insuranoe la its true perspeotlv*. 
Ii Period of Early Foundation - 1818 • 1918 
Xlt Period of Stoedy Prognst • 1919 * 
Z I I L Period of BOOB - 193% • 19«6 
m fhe I^ ynasio En * 194^ 7 • 1955 
Vt Period after the Kationalisation of Life Insuranoe (1956-1960) 
Period of Early Fomtdatlon (l8ia-1918) 
The foundation of aodora life iasmrenoe in India was ooapleted in Imndred 
yttazv through tha eoaittant and mtiring efforts of the foreign and Indian pro-
atotors* fh» Europeans irere tha pioneera in layizig the foundation in 1818when 
Oriental I.ife Ascuranoe Goapanjr oaiae into ^ dstono^ at Calcutta* This oonoem 
ttltiaately failed and was teJxm over bgr the 'Hew Orimtal' in 1834. The period 
about half a oentuTT* oosmenciDg l^m the estahliahBsnt of the 'Hew Oriental* 
and ending about 1870 covered the early atten^ ts of foreign interest to start 
aodem soiwtifio ineuranoe in I ^ a on the basis of &)gll8h model* Idfe 
instiranee was denied to Indiane as there was no aiortelity data available on 
their lives* The atteiqpts of Indian psraaotors to stairt Xife offices ooiiqiletely 
failed in earlly years because of the ignorance and prejudices of the people 
towards life insurance. Even the Ooirextiment attempts to start a State ControUvd 
Inffurance Coaq>any failed beoanse of the absenoe of aortaXity data and tradi-1 
tional pre^ udioes of the people towards the industry. 
It wa* only in 1870> that the first Indian Insurance Co>apany# i*e* the 
Bombsy Mutual I«ife Assurance Society with Indian capital and nanageioent oane 
into existence. This was olosely followed by the establishment of the 'Oriental 
Oovemaent Security Life Asauranoe Co* Xttd«>* in 1874* The history of Indian 
3^ uraranee becaate insoparably lin^ with the history of the Oriental* For 
1. A Short History of the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance 
Company Ltd., (Bonbay, 192 4) pp 26-28. 
tia 
marly 20 7«ars after the fonofttion of tfaa *0xlenta2.' ao bay life of floe was 1 
•tartod in India* 
The period X900-12 saw the e&txgr of nan^ ' foreign offices into iMOia. and the 
estabXiehaent of eeveral indieenooe o<»ioem8« This period also sair for the 
first tlae after the'natit^ 'a strong ware of aationalisa in India* Jja the 
vaks of Swadeshi noveioent several new Indian enterpri»d oene into being* The 
conditions for the establisbment of life insuranoe also became faTourable due 
to ia^ rovement in environmental hfgiene and nedioal facilities» which enhanced 
the span of life. Besides th^ last quarter of the nineteenth oenttoy faroui^t 
a large adddle oIms population to the cities, "with poverty as backgroimd and 
2 
govenuoent service as their goal*" This also gave an impetus to the establish-
stent of new life offices with Indian capital and laanagenent, end althot^ the 
ocsmeotion of the established foreign offices and their leadership in the 
business continued^  the Indian offices were able to expand their own operati«ms 
and proi)agated the need for supporting Indian institutions* By 1905 Indian 
offices had an estijaiated business of lb 12 CTOrea* Life OoBQ>anies like tb« 
Oriental, the Bharat and the Enquire of India, which were established in the 
19 th century, began to expand their organisation* is' .> ;^ veral new offices 
were also established. It is estimated that during 12 years period 1900»32 
not less than 40 new offices were registered in I^ idia. Side fey side over 
500 Provident Societies were established to cater to the needs of the waall 
incooe groups. But they failed in consolidating the savings of their oonstl* 
S 
ttients* 
1« The Indian Life Assurance Offices Assooiatixms Silver Jublee Souvenir•*. 
Boiib^, 1958, p 4* 
2* Ibid, p 6* 
3. !Uty,R.Mt Ufe Insurance in India, Its Bistoxy, Law, Practice and ProKLeos • 
Allied Publishers, Bombay, 1941, p 28* 
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Thus Igr 1910« a situation vas created vhich va« xiot good for the future 
of Indian insurance* The rapid pronotion of ooihroem Coo|>anie8 had to be 
eurhed and it vas clear that the Indian Coapanies Act, Igr which insurance offices 
were governed, could alone give no guarantee of soundness in the proaotion of 
life offices* The tendency to conduct the business on actuariaXyussouM prinei-
^es had also to be stopped. This led to the enactnient of two Aote in 1932, 
called the Provident InsTirance Sooiettss Act and the Indian Life Assur^ce 
Coaq^ anies Act 1912. They ^ ovemad only Indian coapardee and l«ft forei^a offices 
o\it of their control. There was congplete absence of control over the bosioess 
of general insurance in this first liidi&n Insurance Act. The act also left the 
investment of life offices unregulated. Even the adld provision of the Act 
had healthy influenco on the growth of life insiwance Iwoinoss in Indie» 
Several of the Indian Companies which oonduot>ed schemes based on the principles 
of "Assessiaentlsn,** or on actuariaVunsound basis, had either to drop theo or 
modify to conform to actuerial roqulrcments • Kany of the companies could not 
reach the actu.ar:lal standard aet by the Act and went into liifjiidatian* 
The Act also required the companies to snbnit certain returns in a scheduled 
form and they weare published under the authority of the Sovemmont of India. 
Thus since 1914 authoritative statistical record regarding life instance 
business have become available. 
The oommencement of the Great War la 1914 ovorshado^d all other activities 
and a considerable amount of the good effects of -the Insurance Act of 1912 was 
lost. The problem of investments became acute, due to depredation of Stock 
Kxchange Securities. The new business underwritten by coa^ winies also declined 
and in 1916 touched the lowest figure of h 175 lakhs. Since then, however, the 
new life business written by Indian Oompaniee each year has rapidly increased. 
XI. 5 
Bank failures during this early period of grovth also gave serious jolts to 
life ittsuraaoe ooapanies. Tbe iitflu<»}aa epedeade of 1918 also affected 
the nortality experienoe of Indian Companies. The fact that Indian 
offices suooessfttlljr sorTived theee ci^ isis indicates that the period of 
early foundation vas over. 
Vprw o? stei^y PyoiP^?? • 
The close of the war soif the flotation of several coaponies. Aoongst 
them may be mentioned the Mew India Assurance Go.Ltd., and the Jupiter General 
Insurance Go. Ltd. Both these companies were floated with huge subeorihed 
and paid-up capital to enable them to inspire confidence in the minds: of the 
ptthlic. Thus the number of life offices increased from 48 in 1919 to 195 in 
1938. The formation of new companies and aaalgamaticm of smaller units 
created a favourable climate for life insurance during this period. In spite 
of the international ibsmoilj, foreign concems ceoatinued to pour in the 
coiintry-y as the post-war prosperity resulted in a rapid increase in the 
voluiM of new business. Hgure 8 shows that the total new life insurance 
business affected in India by the Indian and Foreign oonoems increased 
from !ls 28.6 crores in 1929 to 8$ SI.7 crores in 19S8. The total business 
in force whit^ was fe 135.19 crores in 1^9 increased to h 278.60 crores in 
1 
1938. 
The Kational awakening after the First World War and the publio agita-
tion to save the indigenous offices frcmi foreign competition forced the 
Qovenusent to amend the Insurance Act 1912. Thus the Insurance Amended Act 
of 1928 required the foreign conoems to submit the details of their accounts 
1. At a result of passing of the Act 1928, separate figures of Indian 
Insurance Companies writing business in India became available as 
also the particulars relating to the business written by non-Indian 
comapnies* Thus Figure 8 shows the growt& of life insurance in India 
since 1929 underwritten by Indian and no^-Indian companies. 
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and othar particular* of their tnsuranoe bosiness in India. One of the results 
of this amndment was that sooe of the foreigpa oonoextM who did not like to 
sutalt their accounts-to the OoireraiBent of India ceased to write further business. 
Besides the Civil Oisobedienee Movement of 1930 and the intense deaand for 
S^wadeshisnl^  helped the Indian Coapaioies to inorease their business Ouoh »ore 
rapidly than the foreign omeems. Rence the percentage of Hew Business transac-
ted br the H(»i*2Adian Life offices to total Business declined from iH,! per-cent 
in 1929 to 16.2 per cent in 1938 and in the total Business inforce their share 
declined froa 47,4 per cent to 34 per cent. 
Indian life offices succeeded In ousting the foreign life offices but the 
competition aaong theaselves resulted in the sale of small size of policies. 
this is evident froa the fact that the average sise of policies issued ligr 
Indian offices in 1929 was only for li 1,794 as against is 3»092 issued bgr the 
Foreign offices. In 193B the average sise of the policies issued tgr Indian 
offices fell to 8s 1,4S1 and that of foreign offices increased to Is 3,244. This 
1 
clearly indicates the pressure of co^tition among Indian life offices. 
In fact the enonsous growth of life insuxvnce lausiness in India during 
tthid^  period attz«oted new and small conoenis which began to ecHiQMte with each 
other for the bisiness. Coaqpetition which is the essence of private enterprise 
aaintains efficiency and serves thetoonsuoers* interest but when it takes 
ugly turn such as rate cutting, high rebates, excessive commission, and increased 
operational expenses, it res\ats into losses and makes the entire industry 
hollow and wasteful* l!his becomes more dangerous in the absence of 'any^ stat^ t'ory 
regulations of the investment of life fund. 
1. Agarwala, AJI. Life Insurance in India, Allahabad, Law J'oumal Press,. 
Allahabad, 1960, p 24. 
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It soon beeaw olear to the big and d8tabli^«d insurers in the eoontxy 
that the growth of imsotmd and inefjCicient life offices would he detrimental, 
to the insuranoe induatiy as a whole. For failures of life offices results 
into loss of publie oonfidenoe towards IMustry and that in a eountzr whet* 
social and religious prejudices predominate» it would becoiw still more diffi-
cult to fflotivate the masses. Thus the public agitation on the one hand, pre-
assure of insurer and their association on the other ooopelled government 
1 
to pass the Indian Xnsuranw Act 1938. This was the first oomprehensive 
Insurance Act which regulated a H types of insuranoe in India* It differed from 
ths British "^ ot in the sense that it also regulated the inveslments of life 
offices* 
The Period of BotaP- 1938-19 
The new Insurance Act 1938 was a ooiqprehensi've piece of legislati<m 
governing not onlj^ lfe but also non-life branches of insurance» and provided 
for a strict type of State control over insurance business* It did not foUov 
the irltish principle of minimom State contrcCL with maxiroam publicity* i^ioh 
is unsuited to India) but was based on the principle of rigorous ccantrol and 
supervisions by the govemmsnt of insurance business* The control and supervi-
sion was exercisod through the Cmtroller of Insurmce* The Act regulated 
various aspects of insurancNS btuiiness in a careful and detailed manner with 
refAXd to investments, loans, ^-J3»aiageii»nt, inve8tigati<«i, amalgamatiw etc* 
The Act succeeded in eradicating uneconomieal offices with the result that the 
number of life offices fell from 200 in 1938 to 177 in 1941, The figure, however, 
increased to 198 in 1945* The quaUty and quantitf of the business oontiaoed 
to iagprove. Indian life offices began to write comparatively larger volume 
of new business. 
1* The Indian Ufe Assurance Offices A8sociati<m. Silver Jubilee Souvenir -
C^.Cit., p 41* 
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Thtts dtiring this period. In spite of a fall in the nuolier of life officei, 
the amount of nev btulnese Inereaeed from 8s 46,6 ororea in 1939 to Hs 144.2 
erores in 1943. The total bosiness in force increased from h 271.8 cror&a to 
h dis.as orores. The average siee of the policiea ioaued fcy the Indian offiees 
increased from Ss 1,473 in 1939 to Its 2,205 in 1946 and during the same period 
average size of the polloies isstwd the Foreign offices increased from 
Rs 3,718 to Rs 6,114. The rematarable achierenent of Indian Offices during this 
period was the elimination of foreign officos In nev business as their share 
declined from 16.2 jer cent in 1938 to 8.9 per cent in 194S and in ease of 
business inforce their share declined from 34 per cent to 16.4 per cent. It 
is true that the notable increase in life insurance business during this period 
was due to war time prosperity, but it must be admitted that these years of 
business prosperity definitely increased the insurance ccmselousness among the 
people. 
The (fart; time growth, hovever, was again responsible for the creation of 
several unsound concerns* Competition became more and more fierce and various 
evil practices crept in the business. Financial viaaards played with the trust 
i'mda of policy holders. The Insurance Act of 1938 was found to bo ^ effective 
to control the business in many respects, especially as regards investments, 
valuation, and expenaea etc. A committee under the Chaiiwanship of Sir Gowasjee 
Jehanglr was appointed in 1945 to enquire into and to recommend measure to check 
certain trends and laideslrable features in the management of insurance compsnles* 
The Committee in its report reoonnnended inportemt araendm«ntB in the provlsicaw 
of Insurance Act containing intetvalia: (i) Restrictions on transfer and 
Acquisition of shares and certain provisions regarding capital structure of 
Companies (il) Restrictions on Ihvestnionts of life insurance funds, (ill) 
Restrictions on emoluments of Financiers or officers of Companies, etc. The 
n.ii 
wtima reeonawDdatioiie of th« C(88»ittKie mre ijaoorporat«d in a Bill which ooiald 
not be i»at86d dua to strong opposition of bosiness interest. It was« hsm^r, 
sfeelwd due to the {wuptition of the ooontiy* 
Sofl^ al ...p^ gei^  
1 have named it en era of d^tasie dtianges not wul^ r beoause l^ die. bseas^ 
independent during this period bat sevexal econ<»de and sooial ehani^s oeouxfed 
trhich affeeted the growth of life insuranee. fhe Industrial Pt^ioy Stateiamit 
I 
of 194B and the latmohing of the Five fear Han in IdSl, for eamsiikle* cKreated 
eireumsteoiees which proved oonduoive to the growth of life insaranee* Sisilarly^ 
the abolition of Zaoindari* liopiidation of princely States and other i^asures 
talQ^ the Gbv«mi»nt to remove inequali't^  in the distHbution of wealth 
for <a socialist pattern of soeietT'' also helped the gsrawth of life insuranoe* 
The partition of the ootrntzT* i8»l0Qbtedly gav» a rerf serious jolt to the 
insurance industiT. !Fhe vast migratim of the population affected the looati<m 
of life offices, fhe eountry wide riots resulted in tbis paymmt of heatf 2 
olaioSf and the business of insurance was dislocated* The Bvacuee Insurance 
Companies Assooiati<m was formed to look after the property e»d business of 
3 
the Insurers who migrated from Paldsten to India. The government of India 
appointed a Ooamittee under the Chairmanship of Shri Banganathan in 1948 to 
investigate into the effects of the pax<tition m the Indian Insurance. 
recommendation of this Committee as well as that of Sir Cowasjee Jehangir 
1. From 1.98(3 also begins the *Take off* Date of India - Rostow»W.Vt The 
Process of SoonmBio Growth, Oxford tteiverslty Press^ Iiondon, 1960, p 283. 
a. Sharma,S.Pt Problems of l^ian insurance, Agra Book Store, Agra, 19^, p 2S. 
3. According to Indian Insoraaoe lear Book, on 30th September, 19^, the number 
of head offioss of insurance ecmpanies in India was 218 and in Pakistan . 
only 21, while their respeotive figures on ISth November 1917 were 238 and 9. 
The decrease in the number of insuMrs in Pakistan was to their traigration 
to India* 
U.IO 
Coiimitt«ev were tnoorporatediln the Indian Ineuranoe hamdmnt Aot of 1950• 
The Act removed several dieorepancles of the Inaurance Aot 19^ and etrlotly 
regulated the adainletr&tlon and investa^ nt aepeot of life insurance bosiness 
In India, It Immediately checked tlie growth of weak and unsound concema as 
the valuation o requirements became more strict and investment vas fimd^ 
regulated. The fall in the number of new offices produced healtlqr effect in 
the amount of new business* ThAi • amount of new business figure which was 
only Bs 326.4 crores in 19<1! increased to Bs 238.5 crores in 1955 and the amount 
of business inforoeincreased from Its 649.07 crores to Is 1,123.76 crores. The 
average size of the policies issued by IDndian offices also Increased from 
Its 2>177 in 1947 to Bs 2,950 in 1955 and that of the foreign offices increased 
d^rcMB Bs $ttX4k to Is 7,889 in 1955. The most; remarkable thing to note is the 
further fall in the business of foreign life offices. Prom the total new 
business, the share of tl» foreign offices further declined from 9.7 per eent 
in 1947 to 7.2 per cent in 1955; and in the business inforce their share went 
down from 15.7 per cent in 1947 to 12.3 per oent in 1955. 
It will thus be seen that the instirance business rapidly increased during 
this period dxie to the efforts of Indian insurers. But looking to the internal 
economic conditions the progress cannot be said to be proportional and satis-
factory. This was due to the fact that although big and strong co]iQ>anies were 
doing good business and favourably coaq^ting with foreign enterprises, the 
natters in smaller coai^ tanies did not iminrove appreciably. In mox« l^bueua one 
concern the funds of policjrwholders were misappropriated and value of insuranfie 
in general and of life insurance in particular to the individual and the society 
were endangered. No less than seven prominent insurers were placed toider 
Administratdrs, in twenty five coaqpanies funds of the policy holders were 
n.ii 
fritt«red away and In as mai^ as in 5X oompanl«0 oasoa of miaoanageoent wera 
detaoted. Thia shook the oonfidacoa of the iatiring pubUo and affeoted the 
2 
progress of life inauranoe basiness in India* 
fhua table No* 12 indioatea the sudden deoline in basiness in the deoade 
1945-1935* ^ nofflber of nev polioiea vhioh was inoreasing at a rate of 40*0 
per oent per annua in the deeade 1925-1935} declined to 19.0 per oent in the 
deoade 1935-1945 and 8.9 per cent in the decade in 1945>1955* The new boainess 
whioh was inoreasing at an annual rate of 26.4 per cent in the deoade 1915-1925) 
28.7 per oent in 1925-1935; and 28.9 per oent the deoade 1935-1945, declined 
to 8.0 per oent per annuiB in the deouie 1945-1955. Life insurance inforoe 
which was increaaing at the rate of 21.0 per oent in the decade 1^5-l935| 
21.5 per oent in the deoade 1935-1945« also declined to 11.4 p r oent. Cktnse-
quently the percentage inoreased per annum of life fund also declined from 
22.0 per oent in the deoade 1935-1945 to 17«8 per oent in the deeade in 1945-1955 
From this decline it should not be concluded that any saturation point lisil ag 
been reached in Indian Insurance or it was fastly approacMng. 3n fact the 
progress aiAdeved during any particular period is a function of ooltiple faotors 
whioh do not always remain constant in a dynamio world. The progress achieved 
during the peHod of World Var II may be associated with war time prosperity 
while the progress in the deoa^ 1945-1955 might have been obstruoted due to 
the partition of the coimtzy and the economic aspeot of the Korean war. let 
it was in this period that the favourable climate of the development of life 
insurance was oreated through the industrialisation and urc^ anisation of the 
oountzy. But the insureas could not fully utiliae the opportunity. Thus in 
the Lok Sabha Mr. DeshnalEh« the then Finance Minister statedt 
*The industry was not playing the role ejipeeted of Insurance in a 
modem State and efforts at iaqproving the standards further 
legislation, we felt, were unlikely to be any more suocesefol than 
in the past. The ocneept of trusteeship i^ioh should be the ooxner-
stone of life insurance seemed entirely laoking. Indeed most management) 
1. Sharma, 3.Ft Op.Cit, p 31. 
2. Lok Sabha Debates - Vol. I, So.i2, 29th February, 1950, Colums 1135-1141. 
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t ab le : : 
HATE OP BXPAHSIQN OF LITE XHSORANCE BUSINESS OF INDIAN INSURERS 
PER DECADE 1915-1935 
1925 1935 1945 1955 
1917 1542 2128 2950 
0.4 2.0 5.8 7.5 
8.15 31 .57 122*8 220.8 
47.0 X46.0P 439.4 984.2 
12.58 35.23 107.5 299.7 
14.86 45.80 138,27 370.6 
(mOWro OF LIFB INSORANCBi 
1. Averagci si8« of Policy(In Rs) 
2. No. of Now PoliciesC i lakhs) 
3« Now Insured Mount(b Groros) 2*24 
4. Total twusinoss in foroo( 0rores)22.83 
5. Llfo Foitd ( Bs Croros) 6.63 
6* Total Assets (ite Orores) 8.22 
1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 
BECENNIDM OROVflH (PBRC0JTAQE) 
7. Average XnsQred &mottnt(Ki lakh) KJL. -19.6 38.0 38.6 
8. So .of Now Polloies (F= laleh) - 40.0 ^90.0 29,3 
9. New Insured Aaount (Ss Crores) 263.8 287/4 288.9 179.8 
10. Business in force (is Grores) 105,8 210.7 214.7 114*0 
11 • tife Fund (Rs Crores) 89.7 180.0 205.1 178.8 
12* Total Assets Crores) 80.8 208.2 202*0 167.9 
PERCENTAOE jUTE OF QROWTH PIR ARNPM 
13. Average siae of Policies (is) 
No. of Now Policies (l> lakh) 
-2.0 3,8 3,9 
14. - 40,0 19.0 2.9 
15. New Insured Amount (>s Grores) 26.4 28,7 28,9 8,0 
16. Life Insurance in force (BJ Crores) 10.6 21,0 21,5 U,4 
17. Iiifo Fund ( b Crores ) 9.0 18.(& 20,5 17,9 
18, Assets ( Is Crores) 8.0 20,e 20,2 16,8 
SOURCES) Reservo Bank of India* 
Banking and Monotazy Statistios, 
Section lit pp 921-24* 
N.A* • Not avaUablo. 
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bad no Appreoiation of th« olear and vital dlatinotion that 
exists between trust Bone^ and those vhloh belonged to Joint 
stook companies that is to say« ovmed fegr the shareholders 
themselves."(l) 
It was in faot imder these eiretuttstanees that the insurance business 
was nationalised in India end L.I.C. caste into eoeistenoe in September, 1956« 
Insurance Industry. i9Sfi»19flO 
The eiroomstanoes and ecmsiderations which led to natitmlisation were 
briefly discussed &\x>ve, The reMcmB tor nationalisation inoorporated in 
the statement of Objects and Reasons of the L.I.C* Bill 1956, vexes 
"To ensure absolute security to the policy-holder in the matter 
of his life insurance protection, to spread insurance more widely 
and in particular to the raral areas and as a further step in the 
directicm of more effective mobilisation of pitilio saving."(2) 
Thus the first step towards nationalisation was talsen on the 19th ^anuaxy, 1956 
by the proBolgaticoa of Life Insurance (Etaergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1956 
whereby pending the passing of a BUI to nationalise suoh business the manage* 
ment of the life insurance business in India vasjrasted in the Central £ovez»> 
ment. To replace that Ordinance, the Life Inaiirance(&8ergenoy Provision) Bill 
vas introduced in the Lok Sabba on the i7th Febroaiy, 1956* The Life ^ suranee 
Corporation Bill, which laid down ths peziaanent arrangements for nationalisa-
tion, was introduced in the Lok Sabha on the 19th Febroasr, 1956, and oam into 
1. Seehmukh, C.Dt Broadcast Speech <m the Nationalisation of Life 
Injsuranee in India, Ibid, oolumn 1139. 
Z, Estimates Committee - 1960-61, l39th Report (Second Lok Sabha) 
Hinistxy of Finance (Department of Economic Affairs)* Tbo Life 
Insurance Corporatlcox of India, Bombay, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 
Bew Delhi, 1961, p 1* 
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foroe from Ist. Jiilyy 19^. th« Life Xmiuranoe Corporation of India oame into 
esdstenoe on Ist. Soptember, 1956. 
As a rssult of nationalisation the controlled basiness of 245 different 
units which had ^ total assets of about Ss 411 crores. Life Fond amounting to 
Bs 380.61 orores^  over SO lakh polioies assuring a total sum of more than 
Bs lf250 crores, nearly 27,000 salaried employees and 216 branches and eub-
1 
offices was integrated. 
After a transition period which may be called the teething period the 
Corporation oon^eted the task of its reorganisation in a short time and 
\ 
started its work with new schemes of derelopment. At the end of December 195^, 
the Corporation had total asset^ S; of about lb SB2 orores. Life Fund amounting 
to Ks 493 orores, about 68.36 lakh policies assuring a total sum of Is 1,964 2 
croresi 37,341 enqployees eoid 3 ^ branches and sub-offices* 
The present organisation of the Corporation has been oharacterised in 
some quarters as 'monopolistic' and 'mcmolithic.' Xts organisation is broadly 
laid down in seotionA^, of the Life Insurance Cozporation Act 1956. At present 
it consists of a central office at Bombay and five zcmal offices (Northern, 
Southern, Central, Bastem, Westexn) with Head Office at Delhi, Madras, Kanpur^  
Caleutta|( and Bombajr respectively, ^^ lere are a number of divisional and 
branch offices under each Zone* 
The business of the Corporation Is required to be carried in accordance 
with the provisions of section 6 of the Life Infsuranoe Corporation Act 1956* 
Its principal object is to carry on life insurance business in and outside 
India, in such a way that it is developed to the best advantage of coaKounity* 
The Corporation has also been given powers to carry on Capital Redemption 
1 * Estimates Committee Report 1 9 6 0 - 6 1 , Hundred and Thirty Fourth Report 
(Second Lck Sabfca) Life Insurance Corporation of India, Lok Sabha, 
Secretariat, New Delhi (l96l), p 1* 
2. Ibid, pp 5-6. 
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Basinsssy and Anmmity and-Relnsuranoe btuilneas relating to life inauranoe. 
Sinoe nationalization^  life insurance business has oade rapid progress* 
The comparative figures of new business and business in for<» transaeted ^ 'urixig 
the year preceding nationalissation and each of the year 19S6 to 1960 are given 
in the following Table No* IS and are also illustrated in Figures 9 and !!• 
TABLE NO 13 
aBOWTH OF UPS INStmAN(E AFTKR IliE HATIOKAMSATION OF LIFE BiSOlUNGE 
IN INDIA 
New Business ftisiness in foree 
Tears Average Number of Sum Number of Sum 
sum Policies assured policies assured 
assured la lal^ in in lakh and 





1955 7.96 240.01 45.16 1,128 
1956 3,416 5.49 187.69 Please see Note below 
1957 8.11 277.67 54.18 1,374 
1958 3,551 9.55 339.06 59.74 .1,584 
1999 3,671 11.43 419.70 66.73 1,862 
1960 3,903 12.50 487.84 74,56 2,176 
SOOBdit Ii*I*Cf AxmvuaX Reports and Aecounbs - 1960. 
Note (l) As the first aocounting period of thd Oorporation covered the 
16 months from 1st. September, 1996 to 31et Oeoember, 1957» the 
Corporation did not compile the figures in srespeot of total 
business in force in Slst Oeeember, 1996. 
(2) The figtires for 19S6 include the new basiness transacted bgr provident 
societies in that yvar. For the years 1957 onwards« the business 
under the Janata Policy Scheme has been included. 
It would be seen that between the period 1995 and I960 the number of 
policies Issued by the Corporation in India had increased bgr 97 per cent and 
the sum assured by noro than lOZ per cent. The average sum assured had also 
(B IN CR.ORT5 
Niw bu5iN£55 IN INDIA 
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inoreased tagr more than 29 per oent* The life insurance in force has increased 
iQT more than 92 per cent« From Figures 19 and H it also appears that during 
the period 1951 to I960 the life business/ in force in India has almost treKLed. 
To this remarkable increase the contribution made Iff the erstwhile insurance 
ooopuiies during the period 1950>95 was Is 380 eroress During t!^ following five 
years the increase has been as much as 8s 1,048 orores* 
II: Cfuses of the Growth of Itife Insurance» 
The historical resume of the life insurance i^ustxy in India has shown 
that dwring the period 1931 to 1960 life insurance in force has increased from 
Bs 168.15 crores to^ Ss 2»1*76 crores * a thirteen times increase. In the same 
period the number of policies has increased bgr eleven tin^s end the average 
size of the pcO-icies has been doubled. It means that of the thirteen times 
increase in life insxirance in force elevwsi times is due to 'e3qE>ansive growth* 1 
and only twice due to 'intensive growth.* The fundamental causes of the 
growth of the life insurance industry can be discussed under three heads) 
(i) Population growth, (ii) Income growth, (iii) Industrialisation and 
urbanisation of the ooontZT'* 
(a) The Qrowth of Population and the Growth of L^fe Insurancet 
TIM growth of life insurance in India is largely due to increase in 
population rather than increase in the percentage of the insured population. 
This is proved by the fact that percentage of the insured population at the 
For convenience of analysis, the growth of the life insurance industry 
may be divided into two parte, expansive growth and intensive growth. 
By the former is meant selling lif« insurance to people who did not 
previously own any. By the latter is meant increasing the averagj^ r 
amount of policy holder's coverage,(Porterfield, ff|tanes,J>$p Life 
Insurance Stocks as Investments - Alness Research Series No. 9, 
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, California, 1956, p 4. 
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1 
prwsent oroi^ lap ratio has inowaaad from 0.17 par cent in 1931 to 1.2 per oant 
ia 1960 - a six foXd iaereaee vhile tho Ufa inauraaoe in foroe itaelf has 
inoreaaed Ijy thirteen tioea during the period. Otorioualy the eegatenta of life 
inauranee ia largely dm to increase in population and secondaxy from a rising 
peroentage of the popolation. 
file increasing population has faoilitated the growth of life insurance 
in two ways. Firstly, as the fable 14 shows the fall in death rate from 4 
per cent in l941*l9Sai hae considerably reduced the ratio of Death Claim to business 
7ABLE fiO 14 
BIRTH RATE, UBATH RAfE, EXPECTATION OF LIfS AUD RATIO OP 
DEATH CMIM TO INSBRAHOE IS FOHQE 
imy . Ratio of 
death Inf&nt Mortality Sagpeotation of lAfe 
Period Birth Death claim to Rate . at Birth 
Rate Rate Life Insu- felS—POTRST 
ranee in Male Females 
force. 
1941-51 39.9 87.4 0.66 190.0 175.0 %.45 31.66 
19Sl-Sd 4i.7 25.9 0.47 161.4 14S.7 S7.76 37.46 
1956-61 10.7 21.6 0.56 1^.3 127.9 41.68 42.06 
SOORCBSi Oovemment of India* The TMx^ Piw lear Plan, p 6flB. 
1. A census of persons holding life policies has not yet been held in India* 
From the number of policies issued or in foroe it oan not be Inferred that 
there wore 7.14 lakh persons insured in 1931 or 74.56 lakh insured in 1960 
because there are persons who hav-e taken more than one policy. However, 
according to L.I.C. Chairman the poli<^ OTexw>lap xtitio in India in 1960 
was 2tS i.e. out of evexy three persons insuring with L.I.O. two were 
seeking life insursnce proteotion for the first time. (Jjodian Egress, 
New Delhi Ed., August 30, 1962). The same ratio has therefore been employed 
for life insurance in force. 
The situation does not improve even if it is assumed that the policy 
0Ter>-lap is sero (a remote possibility). In this case the {ercentage of the 
population insured as judged by the number of policies issued has increased 
from .29 psr cent to 1.8 per cent which is again a six tiaws increase cnly>« 
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In force from 0.66 per oent in the period 1941-1961 to 0,4?r per cent in the period 
1951 to 1956 end 0.36 per oent in the period 1956-61 • The deelii^ in the ratio 
of death olaim to toasinese in force, whioh is atainly due to fall in erode 
Death Bate and increase in the expeotation of life has created better chances 
of the eur^ lYal of basisese which ethenfise vould have lajwed due to Death of 1 
thd policyholders. 
Another iiiqiwrtant factor vhioh has faoilitated the growth of life insurance 
is the changing composition of the population. The decline in the infant 
mortaHty- rate from 27.4 per thousand to 21.6 par thousand and the inprovement 
in the e3q>eotatioa of life ofrom 22.45 years at birth in 1941-1951 to 41.68 
years tn 1956-61 were oonduoive to the growth of life insorance as both of these 
groups spell dopendeno/ in one forb or the other. Fresumably this has created 
more demand for life insurance. Thus the demographic factor had been one of 
the most important in the growth of life insur^ yaoe in India. 
(b) The Inorease in Per Capita Inotaie and Bedistribution 
of Inooaes As Causes of tacreased tlfe InsuranGe* 
Increased Income levels have added the growth of life insuz^ce botilx eapan^  
sively and intensively. The per capita income has increased from Is 65 in 1931-32. 
to Is 327.3 in I960. The affect of higher Incomes on the one hand have enabled 
people to purchase life ^ surance coverage who previously were unable to do so 
while on the other hand those already owned life insurance policies have increased 
their coverage as their inemKis increased. This is indicated Isy.the iaq^ veiaent 
in the average size of policy* 
1. The latio of Death Claims to Life Insurance in force in Table 15 is for the 
total business in force of Indian Jjosurers as ths separate figures of Death 
Claim in Itidia are not available • Even then the ratio indicates in broad 
tezne genez^ improveinente in mortality esqperience of Indian Insurers as 
the foreign business ctmstituted a very insignificant part of the total business 
Separate figures for Death Claims in ^ i a have beoome available since 
1958. The ratio for 1966-60 is therefore average ratio for three years 1958-60 
. as the figures for 1956 and 1957 are not available for the 3£ months. 
n.i9 
Another faetor wMoh helped tbe growth of life Insuranoe savings in 
reosnt jwars is the rsdistribation effects offprogressive texation and th« 
aisooiated transfer payfe»nts« 'The jibol4tion of ZeuBindarl and prineelj^  States 
have changed the entire social and eeonoaie structure of the society. Sine* 
saving habits and preferences of upper and lower inoone groups differ substan-
tial]^ » the redistribation of Inooae has oaterially altered the channels 
thiwgh whi<di sayings nnd their way into Inveslaent and the form in whioh 2 
long term funds are nade available. Moreover the Increasing burden of 
Federal Incoae t&xes« and estate and Inherltanee tams have profoundly 
influenced tha saving and invests^nt preferences for institutional savings* 
The TitSa. class whose tax burden has Increased since 1922 prefer either tax 
free government securities or takes a policy In order to enjoy a relief of 
maxiimm amount of exempted income* 
(«) Impact of InduetriaU«atlon. grbanj^ sation and Ptoinution 
of Natural Security as a Cause of the ftrowth of l*ife Insurancei 
In addition to the growth and age distrllmtion of population and the 
secular inex^ ease in income* 
Industrialixatlon and urabanisation of the country 
is another important factor whioh has contributed to the growth of life Insurance, 
fable No. 15 shows that the urban population has increased more rapidly than 
the rural populatitm during the period i931 to 1951. The increase in urban 
population has created more demand for life Insurance. In agricultux« societies 
the small or large pieces of land owned by individuals used to serve as the 
1. Plnto,P.I.2t Measuz^s for mobilising fiomestio Capital in India through 
Bond Sales and Postal faollitles R.B.IB^  Vol. »o. 12, December 19, 1951« 
p.273* 
2. KuznetSf Simon> Shares of Vpper Inoome Gx-oups in Inoome and Saving. 
(Occasional Paper No. 55), National Bureau of Bconoalo Research, 1950), 
p. 4. 
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TABUS 1 5 
QROm OF FOPULATIQS IB HLL/LGSS ASP fOtffiS 
1 9 3 1 1 9 4 1 1 9 9 1 
POPOUTIOBi 
(a) Vniogee ... 2,420 2,710 2,980 
(b) Touaa 334 438 619 
BEGESSTIAL GROHTH 
(a) Villagea ... 221 290 249 
( b ) fovma . . . 1 0 4 1 8 1 
RATE CiV onOVffflt 
( a ) V i l l ag«5S ... 10.1 aa . O 8.9 
(b) Toims ... 18.4 34.0 41.3 
S(nj(8(Sf Orient Longmeas ltd. India at a COance, p 65. 
oontre of eoonomio aeourlty. Binder auuh societies the saving takes the foim 
of reinvestment eithei? in land or in the tminoozi>orated boeiness.Moreov^' in 
villages Joint family system and tfoditional afHiations of the Individuals 
ttset^to provide sooial seourity. But the liquidation of the Joint family system 
ood the mobilisation of the population from the farm to the eities have oreated 
the need for life insurance. 
the effdot of this faotor has been presumably both ei^ansive, "in mar-
shalling new entrants to the institution of life insuranoaP and intensive in 
oonvinoing those already owning polioies of their need for increased ooverage. 
1. Forterfield, Jamest p 6. 
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While tha edondnie and tooiaX ohanges have ereated the oiroumstanoes whieh 
favour the growth of life insuraBiee savlBg, the prcasotlonal aetivitiee of the 
life offioes have lagged behind in illation to the population growth and income 
growth. This ie indicated hr the fMt that the savingsaffeoted through life 
it^ uranoe are it^ l il«¥8 than 1 per oent of the national as against 3 per 
cent in United Kingdom euod Auatralietj 3*4 per oent in the United States and 
2.8 per eent in Canada• Besides in India onl^ 1.2 per oent of the population 1 
is insured as against 70 per oent of the population insured in t ^^ nited States 
rof- iAmr±oa.^ z\.i le. The following fable Ko* 16 shows that the ratio of life 
TABLE 16 
BATIO OF LIFE BrSORAKOS IN FORCB TO MTIONAL ISC(»(E IB VAEXOUS CO0HTRIES 
Country 
i9Se 19S? 1960 
Country 
19SC 1957 1960 
i i i i i 
Argentina 5 8 5 Japan 16 42 m 
Australia £ 62 74 Mexloo 6 m 32 
Austria N.A. 57 8 Ketherlands 77 4$ 94 
Belgium 26 16 43 Hew Zealand 63 88 102 
Canada U 5 14S 172. fiorwegr 34 29 35 
Chile 5 » 3 Pakistan 1 « 5 
Colombia 9 IB H.A Philippines 10 16 20 
Costa Rica 7 16 22 Portugal fi.A. « * 9 
Denmark S4 34 34 Perto Rioe 19 38 48 
Eoundar 4 4 4 Spain 8 5 6 
FizOand 24 30 42 Sweden m 59 
f^oe 10 16 25 Switaerland SO «» 55 
Oewnany (West) 20 28 30 Thailand 1 m 4 
Gtaalemala 6 15 15 United Sihgdom 58 37 67 
India 8 9 16 United States 97 126 142 
lerail 9 6 9 lugoslavia N.A. 2 
Italj 8 13 14 
SOORGBt Life Xnsuranoe Fact Book*1960 and 1962. 
1. Aoeording to L.I,e» Chairman out of every three persons insuring with the 
Corpox«tion two were seeking life insurance protection for the first time. 
I have assumed the same St 2 ratio of polio/ ratio in deriving the pexventage 
of the population insured in India - Indian latpress l»ew Delhi 
August 30, 1962* 
iaaurfi&ee to natlotiBl iBeonte is OBH^ 16 per cent in India as against 172 per 
eent in Canada; 143 per eent tia 1T.S.A« and 67 per cent la U.K. 
TliS lov life insurance stai^rd in India nay be due to less-developed 
econwfiy as "insurance is largely^  the product of an advanced .society*.• 
(It) is tlie oliaraoteristio response of a market oirilisation to the 
universal human search for seoority. It finally oame to f ^ 
flower only in the conqple* industrial society of the twentieth 
ceatmy." 1 
In less developed ooimtries such as ours« the fi^ ig of insurance has traditionally 
been plcgred by other agencies. In India up to recent time various kinship 
olAigatiim or age^grsde loyalties such as Joint family system provided mutual 
aid* which served to insure the individual against many of the vioissitud^es 
and the uncertainties of life* In western countries the social revolution 
that acoon^ wmied the rise of capitalism* the rapid industrialisation and urbaai-
sation of modem life have destroyed or reduced the effectiveness of many 
sstatilished devices for * insurance* of the individual and it was on these 
ashes that the modem life insurance has developed to such an extent in 
U.S«A. and Canada* It is striking^ however, that the low life insurance 
standard in l^ odia is not only in relation to advani^ economies but it is lower 
than some of the less developed countries such as Gcd.ufflbia and Mexico* PiiHher' 
it will also be observed ^ hat the major impsravement in India*p^ p^ositim came 
only in the year 1960 as in the yearsl9S0 and 1957 India had the lowest life 
I 
insurance standard in the Vorld. 
Thus, whereas during the seven year period 1930 to 1987 the ratio of life 
insurance in force to national income has improved only by 12.5 per cent, it 
has increased by more than 78 per cent in the period 1957 to I960* This 
1, Kimball, Spencer Is Insurance end FaUio Polioy, Theffniversity of Visoonsin 
Press, Hadiscm, 1960, p S* 
2« Ro8tow,Uf.Wt The Stages of Bconomio drowth, Oambrid^ University Fress, 
London, 1960, p 5« 
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ladioBtas ^ t tbB alov arcnrth of lif# ifuniroitee in period 1950 to 1987 
tfas not dtM to ttw samivnois of tlai aajrtfitt )xit due to ^  orgKEdftatlcmoX end 
stxuotuxvl vealQseM of tho Inottraitoe org^ieation* Tide faotor ab^ uld be 
diaooasad ia oMar to wMurara futttfo potentiaiitiaa of lifa inaursaea In 
Zadifi. 
iLlMBSsai&i&Ji^' 
Svan thoiig^  ineimmea aislit 1)o Xooload on oa a raapcmse to fandeaeotol 
psy<^ ologloal ttrg^ s of tho humB balBs^  tbate are 
fsetors that laakaa 
izusufaaoa auceaasftPL in tbo aoo]!H>SQr*PzdiDaril7 it dapanda ttia cM^ ifidenaa 
of tlta paiq^ m tho inatitationa. Soooitdly* tha j^ Tsuaaiira aotivitioa of tSm 
Oos^ n^iae aleo imtpox^ ont in oraatiaag inaturanoa ofmeoioaendaa IXGIORQ tlia 
pe^a. Finally', tba finanoial induoaiaQait in tHa forst of higl^r benna ia 
an ini^ ptaiit 
factor ithara pee/pSjo porehaaa ineuranca not only for protao* 
tloB bat alao for *eaving*. 
Xt ia tnia that bafore t)^ naticmaliaation of lifa inaoranea IMuatsy aona 
of tfe» big Indian oeaaama waro anjc^ jring graat pablia eonfidanea duo to thdir 
aisa and finanoiel adsdndatratioiif Bat tha affairs in asaH ooneama* aa it haa 
boen ahoim aarXier* ware not at ell aatiafaotorjr* Ttis o<a^tition asions 
eoa^ paniea end ai^ Hing of inauranoa at wry onall eontant of aurplna nazsin in 1 
tha premitm rataa haa fmqawoitljr raauXtad into failiara or inaoranee coaqpeniaa 
ifhi<^  had ahafcen tha pablio aonfidanoa. 
Siailarljr inaurara in India bava failad to oraata inauranea oonaoiouanaaa 
among tb« paopla* ?hia vonM ba a-vident froa tha Survay oonduatad bar tba !• For exaofilB tha aun^na ooatant of praDinm r taa aold bgr 0ri nt l,an of 
tha largaat oanoenia in Indianbafora natioanliaatimt was only 2.1 par oant 
in 1983 and 1084 mloation aa against 85.7 par oant of Bomioh Ifnion 
(1949 valuation) and 20 par eant of th» 6m Lifa of Canada. (1948 valuation) 
fha mirpltM oontant in tl%» praaitoi rataa of othar inaurara noat ba lower aa 
Oriental rataa vara aomparatiiraljr higher (AgamaXa, Op.oit.* p 218) • 
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:]^ 8tltute of Eoonoatoo Hyderabad, of the I»ow SaocHne group. It iaadioatea tbat 
aborat 10 per eent of the pdopde in th» area have ahoim their igaormoe about 
laauraiiee, and nearly 60 per eeftt people have 3?elisi«uB and traditional pre-1 
jttdioes against insaranee* Similarly the mw&y of the Inetitu^ of PufaSLio 
opinion shows that "A large majority of the raral houeeholdera reported eoaplete 
ignoranee of life insuraAce. About 80 per oent of the families had no aiMftber 
who had got his life insured. While nearly 1.5 per oent refused to give aagr 
answer^  only per oent of the respcnuients ata^d that one or mere member 
of their faaily had their live covered egainet death. Host of the members vho 
reported undertaking life insurance were educated^  while the number of illiterate 2 
peoif^ e going in. for iaeuranoe wae almost negllgiUeJ* 
Thj.s attitude of the people towards life insurance prevail because the 
long-term operations and principles; of life insurance are not easily understood 
and there is traditional reluetanoe to contemplate death and its coiusequences. 
Suoh psydhologieel attitude of the people towards industry prevails In almost 
ell traditional sooieties. For example in America^ the 1640 when the first 
serious efforts made to popularise life; insurance on the east coast mUoh of the 
sales effort was directod in rafuttc^ religions objections • Elaborate argU!-
mente were constnteted to show that the porchase of life insurance did not 
»tesq?t Providence!;* Thus in tI,S.A. and Canada, life Insurance has made great 
progrees due to the organleatiMx of a proper salee force* Through ^ e^ gressive 
1* Institute of Sconoaics Hyderabad} An &iquiry into Life Insurance and 
Provident Fund Problem of Low Inebme (Iroup in Hyderabad. Soiinderabad City 
Area* p 75. 
2, The Indian Institute of Pttba.ie Opinion, Hew Delhi, All India Survey of 
Rural Incomes, Assets and Bacpenditures, 1909* Vol. 5, (June-Aogust), 1960. 
3. Kimliale, Spencer: Op.Cit., p 4, 
11.25 
aales efforts' Inmirers hare bee& sueoessfoil in edtioatiag and removing 
traditional objeotions' againat lii'a insttranoa. In India this aspaot of lifa 
inauranoe jUstdoatry Isaa la m tarriblr ignorad, The eratwhile inaurera raerultad 
part-tins agenta hating *good aooial oonnaxioni The part-tiiaa i^ anta vexe 
moatljr imtrainad and they tandez^ wrftte buatneaa entirely dae to -ttisir aooial 
oonneiions without sweating ineteance eonsol^ rjsneas aaong the people* 
Teohnioalljr apeaking, there ia no harm in xearuitii^ part->tiiBB agenta 
for underwriting life inauranoe aa aueh a practiee haa been followed in moat 
of the ecmntriea of tiie world where life inauranoe haa aade rapid progreaa. 
But in India the appointmsnt of part-tia» agenta having no permanent atake in 
the bBBineaa ia quBationahle in view of the large aiae of uneduoated population* 
Beaidee* it ia one of the dlatinetive featured of life inauranee buaineaa 
in other advanced oountrlea that insuranoei oonseioaaneaa among the people haa 
been oreated through the matual and ooordinated efforta of the inaurera. In 
V.S.A* for exan^le, oosqpany training oouraea^  training aohoola, and aalea 
aide of all typea have taade the aaleaman taore effective. The Idfe Inauranoe 
Agenoy* Management Aaaooation, through reaeareh* dtimulationt and adviee, haa 
made a Taluable oontribution to agenoy management training and aalea promotion* 
The laatitute of tife Ineviranoef through ita advertiaing and pubLie relatione 
aotivitieaf haa done much to inoreaae publio aoeeptanoe of life inauranoe and 
life underwritera. The American GoUege of Life Underwritera and the Life 
Inauranee Marketing Sohoola on OoUege Cempusee have helped to improve the 
profeaaional oosqpetSnoe of the aalea force* The Joint efforta of the Inaurera 
have oreated a life Insurance aalea force whioh ia alert» competent and 
I 
* ethioa^ * Indian inaurers on the other hand paid aoant attention to thia 
aapeot of life inauranee* Private inaurers with the unorganiaed Salea force 
1. Kalmbaok, Uland Jt The Life Inauranee Boaineaa in Proceedinga American 
Life Convention, 55th Annual Meeting, 1953, p 213. 
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a»d In dOB5)0titlon with «ttch other partly eneooeded In laobiltslng the urban 
saving and whan duyixig the first fiv« year plan there had been gx%dual shifts 
in income towards the areas they could not mobilise rural savings. Bi 
fi|ci the fflotiraticn of illiterate jApolation is more difficult and requires 
heavy procuremsnt cost in the beginning, fhe inaocessability of the vUl^ges 
due to lack of proper roads ssid high ways, lack of medical facilities, diffi-
eulties of securing adequate proof of age etc. have also discouraged the 
private instirers to oaMfi any attempt to mobilise the rural savings* 
These proKLems cotild not be solved with individual efforts of the eoo^ies. 
It required that the life offices by come agreement or cooperative effort 
among tiMmselves should have explored the field. Bat the erstwhile insurers 
did not make any attempt in that direction with the result that the rural 
population whidh constitutes more than 80 per cent of the population of India 
had no protection* And due to this fact life insurance savings eould not ke^ 
paoe with the rising saving and income whidi largely originated in the rural 
1 
areas during the last decade. 
fh» 'feethiag Period of 1,1,G, 1936 to 19S7i 
After the nationalisation of life insurance, the Corporation continued 2 
to recruit part-time agents end granted Benami agenoies. a developing 
economy reliance on Benami agcncy is not desirable as '''they cannot fulfil 
the first obligation of an agent vis. perstmalised service . Moreover 
they cannot have the same urge to procure additional or sound business as 
a regular agent would have done. There Is also the likelihood of their being 3 
used by the Field Officers of the Corporation for their own benefits." 
1. liokBathan,P*S« and Singh fHas there been a Real la^rovemoit in the 
Standard of living of our villagers? -Krukshetra, (Republic Day Number) 
Jmaory, 1961, Vol. 9, No. 5 (New Delhi) p 
2. A Benami agency is one where the o<aiva8aing and proctirement of business is 
done by some body other than the person in whose name the licence is held. 
3. Estimates Committee (1960.^1) 139 (Second Lok Sabha), Beport on *The Life 
Insurance Corporation of India, fi(»Bbay, Lok Sabha Seeretariat> New Delhi, 
1961, p 64. 
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Aooording to the Estimates Committee the evil of Benani agencies was not onl^ 
persisting but increasing. An i(tea of the insinoerity of the Benami agents 
tovM?d8 the life insurance can be had from the following fable which shows 
thejiistribution of business of the Corporation throu^oat the year^ 
fABLB 17 
DISTRIBOTIOH OP THE BUSINESS SBCimED BT TBE GORPOHAIION DURINft THE XEAR 1999 
WITH COMPARATIVE FIOURSS K)S THE U.S.A, 
Hoaths L.I.G. (jg) 
January 0.5 6.9 
February 7 , 4 
March • 4.1 8.5 
April 4.7 8.3 
May S.l 8.1 
June 5.7 8.8 
July 6.0 7*9 
August 6*1 7.9 
September 6.5 7.7 
October 6.4 8 . 4 
November 8,0 8.8 
December 44 .4 11.3 
SOtmcEt Estimates Casamlttee, Op.Clt., p 20, 
It would be seen that the over concentration of a majpr position of the new 
business in the last months of the year in India is in striking contrast to 
the corresponding distributicoi in the n.S«A* This rush of business towards the 
end of th© year is said to be mainly due to the field staff trying to complete 
its qtxota of annual business in the last two months as their inorement or conti-
nuation of ^ gencyfde|)end8.iOntit»^ i^The2 present, eoncentr&tion of business towards 
the end of th® year visi not desirable as it imposed a severe strain on the 
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organisation. Them is also greater lltelihood of tmsotrnd bosiaess beiag 
written during* rurti period resulting in higher lapse ratio and oonsequently 
higber ex^ ienses. Further« this conoentraticxa of business in the last month 
of the year also reveals that how muoh insurance liaainess is eooacealed in the 
hands of the field force end what their efforts could add to the growth of 
life insurance in India. 
Horeorer* in India the average incotae per agent is so low that it has not 
attrioted young educated persons. For exas^e it is estimated that the average 
income of an agent is aboat^3» per annum, without allowing for his working 
expences for securing Imsiness. A few others who ai^t be whicOe time, may 
write a considerable amount of business aM have a larger income. On the 
whole ttie average reouneratic® that an agent can get is not sufficient to 
enable him to work whole-time. This is in great contrast to U.S.A. where 
only whole-time agents are es^ loyed by the Insurance Conpanies. They are 
trained for about two to three years before being allowed to work. India 
upto very re<»nt tine ag^ts were recruited Isy the untrained Field Officers 
who were eaqpeot«d to tmin their field force. 
Prompt and 
efficirait service to the policyholders is an<ithor important ' 
factor in insurance which inspires c(mfiden<K» among the insured population. 
Such sertricing is continuous and varied and includes work relating from the 
time a policy is iesued till its final settlement normally fay payment. 
Immediately after the nationalisation of life insurance the Service Standard 
of the Carporation sharply deteriorated. There wore instances where premium 
receipts were not issued, loons on policies veT0 granted after six months of 
the receipt of application and settlement of maturity and death claims have 2 taken more than a year. The public opinion became averse and this made the 
1. Bstioates Committee, Op.Git., p 64. 
2. Estimates Committee, p 71. 
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task of field foroft stilX tDOZ« diffieult in iwtivating the people to porohaae 
life insuranee. The deterioration in tiie sertriee standard was due to the 
reorganisation of the business of about 243 life office, iathough it vas a 
temporaxy phase, yet in life insurance it should be remembered that the puliLio 
8 opinion counts much as Knovlton has pointed out that if <*90,000 people are 
dissatisfied and the x^im is that tb»y are, then it oaly takes ten years to 
•I> 
get 900,000 dissatisfied people." In fact the buainess of L.I.C, as distinct 
from other public ccmoem is ffiaoh more sensitive to the public opinion. Life 
insuranoe office flourishes with favourable public opinicm. It means that th» 
6orporati<»} should have taicen special care in serving the policy holders and 
in the management of the funds. But there had been lapses both in providing 
the service to the policyholders BHA in the investment of funds where the 
2 
public confidence had been shaken. 
Mother cause of the low life insurance standard is the conposition of 
life basiness of the Cozporation. Xh India with profit policies constitute 80 
per cent of the total policies issued by the Corporation. And Figure 10 will 
also show that the psreentage of endowment policy to total ijnsuranoe in 1960 
was approximately 65 per cent. can be coo^ ared with 99 per cent of endw-
ment in8uran<^ iM England. It is, honever, in oantraet to Canada and 0.S.A. In 
Canada, for exaaq?le, ^ B^stm^ endowment is only 13 per cent| whole life 50 per cent 
and term or temporary insuranee 37 peer eent. 3a U.S.A. endowment insurance is ^ 
only 8 per cent} whole life ^ per cent and term and miscellaneous insurance 
it> S3 per cent, k higher coaqposition of whole-life policies indicate that 
insurance in those countries is purchased for the purpose of social security* 
1. Knolton,Hon. Oonaldt Influence of Public Opinion on Insuranoe in Proceeds 
ings of the 4Bth Annual Meeting of the Aoarican Idfe Convention,Chicago,p 39, 
2. ISstimates Committee Beport, p 73* 
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II. 30 
SlAoe the premium rates of euoh policies are low it would oean a higher 
insurance cover for the saate amount of preaiun paid. Thus the higher per 
capita insurance cover in U.S.A. and in some other ootmtries is to an important 
extent duo to relatively lar^r volume of premium paid for pure insurance. In 
contrast to this the high oonqposition of idth profit policies especially of 
endovmsnt indicates that in India life insurance is Qonsidered as the media 
of saviag and not as a fisasure of social security alone. 
The composition of the business also shovs that in a country where the 
life Insurance is taken for income» the persuasivR activities of the Corporation 
would bear very little fruit unless t!-ey are baclsed by financial inducement, 
Shis is i&q>ortant as Lewis has pointed out that: 
"In addition (to the persuasive efforts of tho institution) the 
iinancial incentives for saving should be adequate» in the sense 
that the rate of interest should be attraotive* (7his is more 
is^rtant)...If the community ts also using inflation for the 
purpose of capital fotmation, with the rssult that the value of 
money is falling, there is something to be said for guaranteeing 
the real value of small savlngsj otherwise siaall savors are dis-
criminated against (since the value of other assets risi^ as prices 
rise), and small sairln^s are dis<!Ottraged.«'(l) 
The life insurance companies in India cos^etely ignored this aspect in 
the Inveatment of their funds. They continued to foU-ovr a defensive invest-
ment policy which did not earn mack credit as Prof. Agarwela has pointed outt 
"The investment policy pursued bT them (Indian Insurers) during ihe 
4Z years of their existen^w did not show my pronounced degree of 
elasticity and flexibility. On the other hand, it proved to be 
rigid and obstinate jji its adherence to Qovemment securities which 
continued to constitute a major part of total assets..."(2) 
In pursxiing a defensive and unenterprising investment policy the insurance 
companies havo no doubt earned adequate Interest to moot their contractual 
obligations but they did not make th© earnest endeavour to earn a higher rate 
on investments. After the nationalisation of life inouronco oven the L.I.C. 
ignored this aspect in the investment of its funda and did not mate any genunine 
1, Loo.Cit. p 229. 
2. Ibid, p 368. 
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Since the premitua ratea of eudh policies are low it would oean a higher 
insurance cover for the saate amount of premium paid* Thus the higher per 
capita insurance cover in U.S.A. and in some other ootmtries is to im important 
extent due to relatively larger volume of premium paid for pure insurance. In 
contrast to this the high ooiqposition of uith profit policies especially of 
endovment indicates that in India life insurance is eonsidered as the media 
of saving and not as a measure of social securitj aXoae, 
I'he composition of the business also shows that jjn a country where the 
life insurance is taken for income> the persuasivfi! activities of the Corporation 
I would bsar very little fruit unless tv©y are backed ty financial inducement* 
Shis is iBq|>ortant as Lewis has pointed out that: 
"In addition (to the persuasive efforts of tha Institution) the 
financial incentives for saving should bo adequate, in the sense 
that the rate of interest should be attractive. (This is more 
iiiqportent)...If the ccnmrnmity ts also using inflation for the 
purpose of oapitol formation, with th© rssult thst the value of 
money is falling^ there is something to be said for guaranteeing 
the real value of small savings; otherwise sxaall savers are dis-
criminated against (since the value of other assets rises as prices 
rise)« and small o&^ inga are dlsoonraged.«(l) 
The life insurance companies in India conqpletely ignored this aspect in 
the investment of their funds. They continued to fol3.ow a defeiwive invest-
ment policy which did not earn mudi credit as Prof. Agaruala has pointed out: 
"Tte investment policy pursued by them (Indian Insurers) during "Uie 
years of their existent did not show any pronounced degree of 
elasticity and flexibility. On the other hand, it proved to be 
rigid and obstinate in its adherence to Oevemment securities which 
continued to ccmstitute a major part of total assets. **'*(2) 
In pursuing a defensive and unenterprising investment policy the insurance 
companies have no doubt earned adequate ^^^ their contractual 
oMLigationa but they did not make the earnest endeavour to eara a higher rate 
on investments. After the nationalisation of life insurance even the L.I.C. 
ignored this aspect in the investment of its funds and did not males any genunine 
1, Loc.Cit. p 229. 
2. Ibid, p 368. 
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attenqpt to aerre the polleyholders by earning a higher income on investmente. 
Ill contrast to the investment policy of the insurers^  the fffl«|Tl saving 
drive of the Govermaent of India introduced mai^ nev features In the scheme..» 
Through the National Saving Organisation the Government launched it® selling 
oompaign to make its sales programme effeotivef the Qovermsent introduced 
aansr new foaturcs in the schcs^s such as easmption frca Xacome Tax, etc. It 
also designed various types of bonds to suit thB requirements of different 
classes of the savers* In additiraa the rate of interest <m. these bonds 
2 
continued to Increase to attract the people to invest in Small Saving Sohemo. 
Life Insurance Investment Policy, m the otl»r hand, remained unmindful to 
these changes in the capital martet. Thle was an tapo3fi;ant reason for Ibsepli^  
down the rate of growth of life ingaranco saving in relation to the Small 
Savings (FOatul S&vloga) during tue Period 1950-51 - 1955-60. 
Absence of State*a Support in 
St;tffilatiog Demand for Life Insurance in Indiai 
The role of the Oovemment in creating the * insurance consciousness' 
among the people is not the least inqi^ ortant, in advanced countries. For 
exaitq;)le in most of the vestem cormtrles, government's oonqpulsoxy life insurance 3 
scheme has worked as an ignite In spreading insurance habit among the peoj^e. 
Similarly, during the second World War, the introduction of War Risk Instirostee 
Schemes tended to make property insurance popular in India. T)^ habit once 
acquired and the utility of insurance once recognised gives continued iCillip 
to the insurance* In case of life insurance the Central Government has no 
oampulsory life insurance schemes for its 20 lakh ea^oyees. The introduciion 
t 
of Goii^ 3Uleory insurance scheme could have been an important factor in creating 
insurance consciousness among the people. It is all the more surprising that 
the scheme has not been introduced by the Central Government when it is possibiLe 
1. Infra, p 7III-17 
2. See pages 111*15 to IIX-16. 
3. Porterfield, Jamest Op.Cit., p 26* 
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1 
for a ntimber of States Qcrvexnment to do so* 
Apart from this the Ooverttment can also give incentive to its employees 
to insure bgr pt^viding the facility of the paynsnt of preaium from the Salary 
or the Provident P ^ , Colleetion of premia at souree from the salaries of 
the insured Oovemmen^t servant is a facility vhioh has deniable advantages^ 
It not only stijinilates the demand for insurance taut it alao malcee lapses alaiast 
impossihley reduce oolleeti(m eocpenses and is generally appreciated hy the 
insured. Such a facility is provided under the Postal Life Insurance JDepartn^t 
bat is not available to the Govemnrant servants insured vith L.I.C* Respite 
the recommendations of various bodies and coHBidttees the Gbvemment has denied 
2 
this opportunity to the L.I.C. due to admiaistrativB and aocoonting difficulties. 
In view of the fact that the Government has recently extended this facility 
for small saving eohiam, I can safely recommend that in the laz^r interest 
of the society, our Government should see the feasibility of introducing the 
payment of policy premium from the salaries of its ei^ Qiloyees* 
I?i Present Positlen The Bevival of Life Xnayance 
bjsSees due to the Efforts of L.I.Q. (195S-1960); 
While the very fact of nationalisati<m of life insurance is having a 
salutary effect on the public mind, the Corporation has taiton several steps to 
popularise life insurance in the oomtry in recent years. The efforts of the 
Corporation in this connection could be discussed under the following beadst 
(l) Administrative laqproves^ nts in order to (a) Sale more insurance and (b) 
to setire effectively those uho are already insured} (2) intensive and extensive 
derive in urban find rural areas. 
1. In India the States of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Mysore, Madhya Pradesh, 
Uttar Pradesh, Bajasthan and JammU' and Kashmir have compulsory insurance 
schemes (Esti^tes Committee, p 28.) 
2. Sstioates Committee, Op.Git., p 70* 
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Mainlstratlire Refonaai 
To ijiq;»rove administrative effioienoy and to ensure that a large otimber of 
decisions are tkken at lower level the Corporation has embarked vpan a 
programme of progressive decentralisation. It has also posted hi^r grade 
officers to ses» of the important divisional offices with larger powers, 
the divisional offices are being gradually provided with the maohinersr necessazr 
to maintain polie^ iliolders services at en efficient level. ?or the purpose of 
effective sales and service of tl»i policqrholderB the Corporation has opened 
several Xtivisional and Branch Offices not merely to procure new business but 
to ateorb and service its ever increasing business* Thus in 1956 the Oorporai-
tion had (mly 33 Divisional Offices and 216 8ranch Offices or sub-offices, at 
the end of 196G, it had in addition to the Central and Zonal Offices* SS 
Divisional Offices* 287 Branch Offices* 144 sub-offices and Oevelopi^t 
Centres* In this way- the Corporation has a total of S96 servicing centres i/w 
1960 as against 219 with which it started. 
OrS^isation, , Por^t 
IText to the estabLishrasnt of oifii^B, the organisation of Field Personnel 
is of pri»e importance for the promotion of life insurance* The Corporation 
adopted a pattern of field officers and agents workjjaig under the branoh 
officer. The Corporation has introduced sufficient incentives both for 
supervising personnel and fbr the agent to encourage them to give of their 
best. To increase the efficiency of the sale and servicing of life insurance 
of its field force the Corporation arranged for their training. 
1. logakahemai ?ol. 5, Nos. 8^9, p 7* 
Tl^ training in the field of administraticoi^  is todaj imparted through 
iastruotWB posted at the dlviai<mal offices. For training of the adainis^  
trative staff* supervlstog staff and officers there is the Administrative 
Staff College at Hagpur. Development training is given through 8 centres 
at present. The Institute has so far inqparted training to 536 officers and 
I 
Supervisory Staff, SB14 field officers and 4844 agents, 
(a) SaJ^ es Efforts in,the Orban Areas« 
7hs Oorporaticm intensified its sales aotivities by the Liberalisation 
of policy conditions, introduoticoi of Qroap Insurance and Superannuaticm 
and Salary Saving Scheme* A brief review of the new schemes the 
Corporation has introdttced,would indicate the steps which it has tabs«a in 
popularising life inswranoe in urban areas* 
After en intenalTe and expert scrutiny of the basis of tmderwriting, 
a thorough modification has been made so that people with service limitations 
and sttb>standard lives such as diabetic could now be insured. Although 
policy liberalisation would incrSaso the sale of L.I.C. yet the Corporation 
should make a very careful assessment of the possibility for it^ could result 
into huge losses. It would be desirable if the Corporation proceeds in this 
connection after revising tha Mortality Data which has become out of date 
with the iii^ >rovement in the general health of population since 1935. 
OrottP Insurance and 
Superannuation Schemesi 
For the first time in the history of life insuranoe in India, L.I.C. made 
the mass approach in the form of sroxxp insurance, fhis form of insuranoe has 
1* logakshemai Loc.Cit., p 14* 
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been popular in U.S.A. and otber industrialised countries but in ]^dia the 
3. 
Corporation has Introduced +.dt only in 1957, It ooastitutesnearly 1«5 per 
oent of the total business in India as,'against 33 per oent of total business 
inforce In ir.S.A, The total sum insured in group insurance in 1958 was 8«75 
crores against 206 lives «inoreased to ^ 1.70 lakhi against 7,046 lives in 1960. 
Salary Sating Sehafyyai 
The Corporation introduced the Salary Saving scheme in the middle of the 
year 1957« This scheii^  is intended to help salaried employees in paying their 
premiums regularly. In terms of this schemea the emj^ oyers agreet to deduct 
premoms from salaries and remit them to the Corporation* The Corporation on 
its part not only valves the usual monthly extra bat also givoo yearly rebate 
on the tabular promitims* As mai^ as about 7000 firms and institution intro-
duced the salaries savings scheme for the benefit of the staff during the years 
1957 to I960* The sum asstured under the Salary Saving Scheme inorecused from 
Rs 14.43 crores in 19S8 ^  Bs 27.20 orores in I960, while the number of polioies 
increased from 54,873 in 1958 to 1,03,849 in i960, 
b) -Sales Efforts in'Rural Areaa? 
Intensive development of business in rural areas being one of the primaxy 
objectives of nati<mali8ation, the Corporation's developi&dntlplans. includes " 
measures designed to extend the organisation and its selling programmes Sn 
nurel areas. 
The work of the Corporation in the absence of any eiqperienee of rural lives 
became more difficult* However, the Corporaticm took bold step in propagating 
the message of life insurance for the first time in rural areas. The Cori»ration 
1* Life Insurance issued usiially without any nedioal examination on a group 
Af poroons under a master policy is called Group Itisurance. It is usually 
Issued to an enqjloyar for the benefit of employees. The individual members 
of the group hold certificates as evidence of their insurance* (Gregg, Davis,W 
Group Life Instxranco - Rchard D*Irwin, Inc., Homewoodi i960, p 4. 
n.36 
was folly oonvdnoed that the slow and steady shift in inccoie from the urban 
middle olass to skilled and semi-skilled labour, village artisshs small-seale 
manufaeturers and agriculture beoominggr more pronounced* Rtiral saving if properly 
harnessed, oan produce significant and remarkable results for the L.1.C* As 
a pilot project, therefore, the Coz^ ioration undertook life insurance in intensi-
fied form in selected oommunity development IxLocks in Rajasthan and Mhar, 
tising rural panehayats as agents. Some of the si^ asures that have been taken to 
develop rural areas are given in the foUotrlng paragraphs. 
As a first step in building up anorganisation, field officers were given 
f 
exclusive territories with the respensiMlity for the intensive development of 
businoes from all parts of the area* They were asked to recruit local agents, 
train them and motivate them to write the largest volwe of business possible* 
A few field officers have been authorised to collect renewal premiums, this 
resptmsibility m ^ also be given to selected agents in the future* Lack of 
facilities for regular payment premitim is the handicaps of rural develoiment and 
the Corporation is alive to the need to evolve some pexnanent i^an. 
ifo 1958, the AJmer Ditisional Office introduced a scheme for intenatyelcdeve-
lopsent of rural areas with active assistance from community development officers* 
All help was given by HLook Development and Extensive Officers attached to 
community development blocks and village pan<auiyats« An interesting feature of 
the scheme was that the village panchaya^ were benefited financially by way of 
commission which they could utilise towards the development programmes* The 
success of the scheme in Rajasthan induced other States to take an active 
interest* 
Recently I, the Ministry of Community Development and Co-operation 
proposed a new scheme of development of life insurance in rural areas throu^ 
n.s7 
PanohajatB. The scheme vas sufamltted to the Corporation for ooxmnents and 
together with the viewa of the Corporation was circulated by the Central 
OoTemment.to all States QoTemnent for implefflentation. ^ e r the sdieme 
Field Officers of the Cojrporation will work in close cooperation with Block 
Development,National Ebctension ^ l^ioe and tillage Panchajat Officers* The 
Panchayats wiU be responsil^ e for not only development of business in the 
areas under their ccmtrol but also for the collection of premiums on the 
pdlioies issued to the people in the Panchayat areas* 
Increased publioity is telng organised through printed literattire 
posters etc*> in regional languages> films,broad-casting and participation 
in local fairs and exhibitions* 
Janata Policy* 
The Gorporaticm Introduced Janata Policy in 19S6 to cater the smaU savers* 
Because of proportionately greater esqpenditure involved in their sale they 
have been discontinued in 1960. In 1960 therefore only 23,919 policies were 
sold for Rs 1.82 crores as against 28,705 policies for Ss 2.01 crores in 19S9. 
Hon-Medical Insurancet 
As a further step to reach the * virgin rural areas* the L.I*C« has decided 
to extend life insurance without medical examinatitm to selected rural areas 
where the facilities for medical examination ae-re^ -poor. The new scheme was 
introduced whez« qualified doctors were not available within the raditis of about 
ten miles* The maximum sum for which one or more policies can be taken out 
under the scheme was initially limited to Bs 2,000 but it was subsequently 
raised to Bs 5,000 in I960, The policies are issued only to persons upto 45 
years of age* The maximum term of insiirance is 25 years and the maximum 
premium closing age or maturity is 60 years. 
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It insy IMS pointdd out* hors 'thai* tlbs ntain'toiianoo of propt T hoaXtii is ths 
basis on i^oh oon-ittedioal insuranoe has been developed in most of the advanoed 
countries. Bat there is i»rdly any such basis In the rural areas of India. 
To some extent L*I«C« would be justified in extendini^  the noiMnedioal insuranoe 
to enqplojnees in Qovemment or Qoasi-Gkjvenio^ nt services or in the services 
of reputed firms for assured sums ranging from Ss 300 to Us 5,000. Such 
en^ loj^ es oan be assumed to have a standard of living and also faoilities for 
medical treatment within a radius of ten miles. With these faoiUties life 
insuranee on a non-medioal basis oan bo built Imt to offer it without such 
faoilities at the rates applioable to ii»dioally examined urban policy holders 
seems to be carrying things too far. Presumably* the actuarial esgperte of 
L.I.C. are of the views that non-medical insurance on a mass scale oan pay 
for itself. Even so it will be a gamble and not a calculated risk. Over 
the years as the Corporation gains sufficient esqperienoe of non^medioal 
insurance I it will i^rhaps be able to process the premium rates to be charged 
for such insuranoe on the basis of coUeoted data and statistics. For the 
present» this venture in an unchartered field ean only be at the expense of 
the medically examined urban policy holders. 
The hope that the urban insurance will subsidised the heavier costs in the 
rural areas may not be agreeable to tirban policyholders. They might feel that 
they are being deprived of retxams from their Investment beoause of the L.I.O's 
oostly venture. let there is no escape if the L.I.C. is to persist in its rural 
i^ sux%nee policy. Equity demands that it keeps the two aeonunts separate as 
far as possible and ensure over the years a separate valuation of the results 
of the two sections. That wlLl enable both urban and rural people to find out 
the actuarial rettims they get from their invostments.Horeover,8teps taken by 
L.I.G. for rural development are providing increasingly fruitful results as 
11.39 
can be deduood from the figures of new basinese of rural branches from the 
1 
following Table. The Table shove that the rural business which was S7 per 
cent of the total business In 19S7 inoireased to 4B per caat in I960, 
TABLE 18 
RURAL AND URBAN NBU BUSBtBSS 
~ OF L I. C. 
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SOURCBi EstimatesCramitteey Op.Cit., pZ2< 
^ Effe9l; o^ th^ Efforts of th^ Corporfi^ j-on 
on the Quality and Volume of Life iHSuranoe 
Business undei^ 'written in India C;i986-60): 
i'he measures adopted have resulted into all round efficiency in serrLee 
and sales standard of the Corporation and spectacular increase in the new 
IxiBlJiess during the last two years of our enquiry are briefly r dLisoussed below* 
It is. important to not© here that the Corporation classified the business 
procured through branches located in cities vitii a population of one It^ 
or more as tirban and from branches at other centres as rural. This 
differs from the Census (dassifieation where a population of 5,000 or 
below are considered as rural. In my opinion* the Corporation should 
adopt the Census definition and the figures of rural business may, 
accordingly be ooag>il§dd and puWLished separately in its Ammal Reports* 
This would provide a better opportunity to Judge the results of its 
efforts* 
The Corporation» tiiy adininlstrative reforms^  has brought dovn the meval 
expense ratio from 15.46 per cent in 1998 to 12.90 per cent in 1960. The 
ttiqpense ratio has fallen from 2943 per oent in 1958 to 28.4 per cent in I960, 
j^r the improvement in the qiialit^  of the business tindervdrttten and throu^ 
prompt service it has also brought down lapse ratio from 9.1 per oenj^  in 19S6 
to 6.0 per oent in ISfiO. y^ tha vigorous sales drive in urban and rural areas 
the business of the Corporation has also inereased. The new business transaoted 
by the Corporation in i960 was higher than the peak business done by the 
insurers in 1955 whidi was only fi$ 240,51 crores. The business in 1958 vas 
22 per oent more than in 1957. In 1959 the (corporation registered an inorease 
of 25 per cent over previous jrearc figuroSfr and in 1960 it registered an inereaso 
of 18 per oent over preceding figures. The Inorease in sum assured in I960 is 
thus 75.4 per cent over 19S7 figures. The number of new policies issued has 
also steadily increased to 12.6 lakh in 1960 which is about 54.1 per cent more 
than the number issued in 1957. 
The average sm assured per policy in India has risen steadily from b 3 4 2 4 
in 1957 to Bs 3903 in I960. The period has also witnessed a spectacular inorease 
In Total Business In force. The total, business in forco on Slst Pecember^  1960 
was Us 2176 crores under 74.56 laKKs policies. In this short period* therefore^  
the business in force has increased from Ss 1128 crores in 1955 (last year of 
Private Enterprise)to h ZVJ^ orores in 1960. An increase of more than 93 per cent. 
The rapid growth of life insurance during the last three years, 1957-1960 
has important affect in raising the life Insurance standard of th© country. 
Table No. 19 v,isHowaov that the percentage of life Insurance in force to 
National Income; Premium Income to National Incomej Percentage of the population 
insujped and the per capita population insured has mad© much more rapid progress 
in the last two years than in any other previous years* 
tm£ 19 
IMPROVEMENT W LIFE INSORANCE STMDiiHD IK IH0IA 
Tears 
Percentage of Life Per<»ntage of Life 
jAsuranoe in force to Inaurance Pfei&itBa'^  








1951 7.9 0.4D 23 0.6 
19SS 9.4 0.49 29 0.7 
1953 9.3 0.47 26 0.7 
1994 11.4 0.S2 29 0.8 
1999 11.3 0.91 30 0.8 
1996 N.A. N.A N.A. 
1997 NJK. N.A. N.A N.A. 
1958 12.6 0.59 40 1.0 
1999 14.3 0.62 46 1.1 



















SOtmOBt O.S.Oi Eatimatea of National Income 1948-49 to 1960-61 
tr.H.O» Demographic Tear Book - 1960, p 137. 
I'.I.Ct innual Beports and Acooonta; Controller of Ineurersf 
I&euranoe lear BookSi Reaerve Bank of Indlat Banking and 
Monetaz7 Statietioa* 
Hotel (l) Ratio of Inauranoe in force, to National InC^ Kne, Premium Income 
to National Income ie on the current pricea of National Ineome. 
(2) Per oapita Life l^urance and Percentage ofpopalation Inaured for 
1991 ia on the baaia of cenaua/figorea. For other yeara it ia based 
ott the mid-year popolailon eatimatea in tf,N,Q, Demograpbia Tear Bdok* 
13) P<^ iQ3r ove:^ >•lap haa been aaatmed 2t3. See aXao Note on page 11*17 
, 4) Aa flgorea of Life Inavirance In force and Promitan Income for 1996 
are available for eight months and for 1997 for 16 mamtha they 
have iiot bew uaed. 
(5) The figures do not include the comparatively email amounts of 
iMsitieaa <m the books of poatal depaiH:;ment and a few State Qovemments 
(6) Na. » Not Available. 
IX.4R 
The inoreaeing life insuraaoe ooasoiouaness in Indiia and the growth of 
X 
Life JneorrnGQ in foroe led to the aoovumxlation of hugs life fund* This ie 
shown in Figure 12. Xha CoiTporation's Ufe Fund has registered a signifioant 
increase from Js 495 erores in 1959 to Is S60 orores in 1960. In the period 
1951 to I960 the life fund has increased isgr about fe 304 orores. In the total 
life fund of Bs 860 orores in i960, the life fund in India vas Ss 519.7 erores 
as against fts 457.S orores in 1959; These trends in the volume of nev business 
and the growth of life insuranoe in foroe and life fund indicates that in 
future I>,I.C. will beoustodian of enormous national resources. This will be 
clear from the study in the following Chapter. 
Summary and Conolusiont 
The causes of Urn slow growth of life insurant savings in India have 
been explained in the historical baokground of life insurance industrsr in 
this Chapter. It has been pointed out that the growth of life insuranoe in 
India is largely due to natural causes suoh as population growth, income growth 
and industrialisation and urbanisation of -Qtie country* While the natural 
faotors faave created the ciroumstances which favour the growth of life insurance^  
the persuasive efforts of the insturers failed to create insurance oonsciousness 
among tbe people. This ie evident from low percentage of the population 
insured in India and the low ratio of life insurance in force to national 
ino(Kie. Judged from any criteria India has the lowest life insuranoe standard 
in the World. This was mainly due to 6x|fanisationel and structural weaknesses 
of insurance offices in India, '^ he Sales technique, the service standard 
and the investment policy adopted tgr the insurers failed to motivate the peoi^ je. 
^ The erstwhile insurers did not make any attempt to mobilise the rural savings 
due to high cost involved in motivaing the rural population* 
Busiwtss Im To p c i • 
tt.lNCiious 
a 
JOUR.CE : L.IX ; AHNUAL L^ TPORTS AMO ACCOUNTS. 
B.LMCTORIS. 
too 




mi I9S? I9S5 ,4,6 l»»7 rt5« H59 1960 
3ooict; L.I.C.: AMNUAL HEPOHTS AHO ACCOUNTS, FIF S - IJ-
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Thus in 1966 th© Oovernoent of India decided to nationalise the life 
insuranee with a view to mobilise the urban and rural savings* After the 
nationalisation of life insurance» L.I.G. improved tiie sales and servioe 
standard of life insurance business. It intifoduced several types of policies 
to oaterpthe needs of the urahn populaiion. It also eaqplored the rural field 
for the first time in the history of life insuranoe in India. In this oonneo-
tion ths Corporation introdueed tfon-^dioal Insuranoe and has b»en working 
in olose association with ths Rural Panchoyats. In view of the lack of medioal 
faoilities and 4xtra cost involved in procuring rural teisiness, it has been 
suggested that in the interest of the medioally Insured urban population^  L.I.C. 
should ]Geep the two aeoounts separately. 
It has also been observed that the administrative improveinents and ths 
training Schemes of Field force have hdaltl^ influence m tho growth of life 
insuranoe in India. This can be seen from ths fact that the amount of new 
business figure increased from Its 240.61 orores in 1955 to Bs 487.84 crores in 
1960. Duxing ths ten years ~ 19S0*1960 - ths life business in force has 
trebled. To this remarkable increase, the contribution made by the private 
sector companies during 19S0-95 was Is 380 orores. During the following five 
years f the increase has been, as muc^ as 8s 1,048 orores. Bxpressed as a per-
centage of the national income, life business in force has increased in the 
country from 11 per cent in 195S to 18 per cent in 1980. The trends in the 
growth of life insuranoe also indioates that if the Oorporation continues 
to play its cards well, it wiH mobilise huge volume of personal savings in 
future. Some idea of its potential resources can be had from the study in 
Chapter III. 
CKAPTEA I I I 
M M B OP H M MSORAMCB SATIBSS V I S - A - V I S 
POTEKTIAI RBSOMCES OP U I . A 
injt 
(a) Populattcm twnde and tha Fatmfe of Life Inaaraneei 
It was pointed out in (Oiapier IZ that demographle factor has greatly 
eontribated to the growth of life insurance • As ooag>ared to 70 per cent of the 
population insured in 7.5.A. the ratio of insured population is very lov in 
India, Tijsrs is, thorefcre, suffioieat scope for tne improvement in the pev-
eentage of the population insureds Besides, eaqpansive growth of life insurance 
way still occur even if the proportion of the population insured remained 
constant provided the population itself increases • Here in my opinion is the 
principal avmiue through which future expansive growth may be anticipated. 
The future projection of the growth of the population have been prepared 
bf numerous authorities such as the Planning CommiesiQn« UJK.O.f C.S.0 and 
1 
national Council of Applied Economic Research. These estimates vazy with each 
other but all indicate that duo to sharp decline in crude Death Rate and 
increase in crude Birth Rate, ladia is bound to experience further rise in 
population. The foUowing Table indicates that the growth rate of population 
TAHLB 20 
FRQJECTIOH OF POPOUTION GROWTH 
Per 1(K)0 per annum 1956>61 1961-66 1966-71 1971-76 
Birth Rate 40,7 39.6 32.9 27.8 
Death Rate 21.6 18.2 13.9 12.6 
Growth Rate 19.1 21.4 19.0 14.7 
SOimCEi Third Five tear Plan Draft Outline, p 9. 
1. Gregory, Theodoret India on the Eve of The Third Five lear Plan -
Thacker Spink & Co. (l933) Private Uds Calcutta, 1961 
p 84. 
Ill ,3 
voold inereaae upto thd end of the fhird Five Tear Plan* From the Fourth Five 
Tear Plan tJbe grovth rate ia liJcely to decline beoauae ot late carriages and 
the Family Planning methods adopted during the Second and Third Fire Tear Plans. 
The increase in number of people would enable L.I.G* to expand its business* 
Moreover, a populatieu which Is growing rapidly due to excess of crude Birth 
Rate over crude Death Rate has an age distzlbution which is more fatraurable to 
life insurance. The decline in infant ]ttQ::!t&llt]r and increase in the e3Q>ectanoy 
of life would create depend»n<y at both ends of life and in this way the demand 
for life insurance would increase* Table 21 shows these changes in the 
coB^sition of population* The increase in the age group 15-59 which is 
1 
regarded as Working Age in India and in which insurers -a3?e also interested 
would provide ample opportunity to L.I.C. to expand its sales* 
TAME 21 
AC® COMPOSITION OF ESTIMATED POPUUTION 
1961-76 
Age Qvoysp 1961 1966 I9t?l 1976 
0 - 14 ' 
1 5 - 5 0 
60 - $9 

















All Ages 43.8 49*15 55.47 62*51 
Percentage of 0 - 14 ago Qroup 
to Total 
Percentage of 15 - 59 to total 
Percentage of 60 > 69 to total 

















100*0 100,0 100.0 100.0 
SOURCBSi fhs Third Five Year Plan, p 751* 
1, Wattal,P.Ki Population Problem in India - Minew^ Book Shop, Sew Delhi, 
1958, p 92. 
i n . 4 
A faotor of outstanding benefit to the life ^ saraaee indoatiy has been 
that of medieal advancement and zlslng health standards In India* In the 
Third Five tear Plan Increased eo^hasis viU be laid on preventive pahLio 
health services. As in the Second Plan* specific programmes have been foimola-
ted for the Third Plan for iH?)rove!!»nt of envirena^tal flsnitation, speeialV 
rural and urban water supply, control of oomzaunioable diaetaaea, organisation of 
institutional faoHitiee for providing health services and for training of 
apical and health personnel» and provision of services such as maternal and 
childt/welfare,health education and nutrition. The Third Five Tear Plan also 
involves a total outlay of about Is orores» as against outlays of Bt 140 
and Ss 22S croree in tho First and Second Plans respectively for the Improvesent 1 
of the health of population. These measures would conslderabOLy roduce the 
Death Bate and votiLd be beneficial to the life Insurance industry* Moreover* 
life Insurance policy holders oon5>rise a selected group within the entire 
population. Their oimership of life insurance usually implies .the-possession of 
certain superior moral qualities. An even more important faotor is tliat 
policy holders constitute a medically selected group* becatise of their need 2 
to pass medical examinations. It is not surprising* therefore* that the 
proportion of Death Claim to total business in force vould oonsiderably decline 
in India. 
In siimmation* the outlook for continued health improvement and gains in 
mortality appears to be good. L,I»0.and its policy holders should benefit 
1. Ibid* p 651. 
E. The mortality eatperienoe of non-medical policies will depend upon the 
underwriting performance of L.I.O. which la lllwly to improve dtie to 
general health of hhe population^ 
111.5 
aeoordl4{^« Reductions in premitm rates to refleot at least a portion of 
mortality savings laay be expeoted on new policies* Houeverf eonservatisn would 
suggest retention of a part of such savings and some lag in the adjust^ nent of 
rates* Moreover, rates on existing policies are fixed by contract and cannot 
be changed* Hence, full savings from mortality Imprevement viH be realised on 
1 
these policies aand life fund would have a steady growth. 
(Secular yrer.d in Iticoae and the iHature of Life Iht|wranoe Savijiga : 
Another measure of life insur^ce potential lies in the growth of per 
capita incozad* The increase in per capita income of the people would enable 
them to enhance the insurance protection* This would be reflected in the 
increase in the number of policies as well as by the improvement in the average 
size of policy, 
A synoitLio view of the future increase in national income and psr capita 
national income can be had from the following table. 
TABLE 22 
PROrEGTED GWWm OF NATIONAL BIGOME AND 
PER CAPITA INCOME 
I9®i-C8B to 
1951-58 1956-61 1961-66 1966-71 XQIUfS 
National Income (Ss Cropes) 10,800 14,500 19,000 25,000 33,000 - 34,000 
Per Capita Income 281 330 385 450 530 
Source t 'Kie Third Five Tear Plan, p 28, 
Notet Figusres of Per Capita IhcODie are on the basis of 1961 cenous of 
population and revised estimates of Population growth. 
1, The precise determination of the Increase eajming from this sause -is ^  
complex actuarial problem, which is beyond the scope of this sttuiy* 
XXI .e 
It la evident trm the preoedlng table that life instiranoe basinesa would 
sttbstaatially inorease in future even at the preaent ratio of life insurance 
in foree to national income along with the rise in income* 
However« in a developing ooononQr, where the per capita income is estimated 
to improve from Us 327.3 in X960-61 to Rt 530 in the period 1961^36 to 45G/in 
1966-71 and Us 530 in the period 1971-76 ^ t can be assumed that the per capita 
life insurance and percentage of life insurance to national income would consi-
derably increase* Thus apart from the growth through expansion of the number 
of policjrholdersf there are indications that life insurance business is capable 
of farther growth through intensifying its coverage in the market* 
This as8timpti<»i seems to be reasonable as the present low life insurance 
standcurd in the countzy is due to poverty.* prejudices and ignorance of the 
people* They are bound to be removed along with the increase in income, through 
education and persuasive activities of the Corporation* 
However, some uncertainty will remain in the future growth of life Snsuranoe 
due to the peculiar characteristics of a developing ecanonor. The inflationaajy 
methods of financing economic development erodes saving margin of the people* 
The fiscal measure adopted fay the State to finance development schemes and to 
remove the inequality of wealth are also important factors which influence the 
desire and ability to save* Besides the State Borrowing programme and the 
social security programmes are also competing agencies which influence life 
insurance* I have discttssed the impLioations of these factors on the future 
growth of life insurance in the following pages* 
(i) Effeot of Inflationary of Eoonomic Development on Life 
The inflati<mary methods of financing economic development which have been 
adopted in India affect life insurance savings in three wayst 
IU.7 
In tiie first inatanoe a constant ilsa in prices of the eonsuiosr goods 
affects the ability of the people to save and make payment of premiim difficult* 
This often results (although as a last resort) increase in lapse ratio, policy 
loans and surrenders. Daring the Sec?>nd Plan period, for example, the general 
price level is estimated to have increased IQT 30 per cent and the working 
class cost of living Index li^y 24 per cent. Inflationary pressures thus 
generated have begun to be reflected in the net lapse ratio of the Coi^ xjration. 
The lapse ratio which was 5.1 per cent in 1958, increased to 6 per cent In 
1960. There are also certain other disqinLeting signs which show that 
some policyholders with fixed Incon^ and increasing cowitoents are binding 
it difficult to save enou^ to keep t4!eir,.3 policies alive. Xioans to policy-
holders, which used to increase lay rou^ily Rs X orore per year till 1959, 
increased lay Ss 3 i^ crores in 1960. Outstanding premiums, which similarly used 
to increase by Ss 1 crore per year have increased in I960 by Rs 2*5 crores. 
Looking to tl^se trends the L.I.C. Chaiznan has rightly pointed outi 
** If inf lationaxy prossures increase during the period of the Third 
Five Tear Plan, it is bound to accentuate these tendencies and make 
it extren»ly difficult for the Corporation to keep down its lapse 
ratio." (1) 
Besides affecting the ability of the people to save, inflation also 
influence the desire to save in the form of life insurance. The fear of future 
loss of purchasing power discourages the 'rational savers' to save in such 
long-term contracts as life insuratioe. Moreover, inflation also affect the 
life insurance industry by increasing the cost of insurance and it may compel 
the Corporation to revise its premium rates. This will further affect the 
desire of the people to save in the form of life insurance. The increase in 
premium rates would, therefore, affect new business and hence income of the 
Corporation. Bat this tendency as well as the fear of the future loss of 
1. rogakshemat tol, 5 (Noa 6-9) August-September, 1961, p 13. 
III. 8 
money value ooald be eompeasated by parsuing a dynasdo Investnent polioy. 
In faot iATeatment polloy should oontinuously strive to balanoe these 
depi^ssing foroes of a developing eoonoBQr* In faturef there ulll be mox« 
pressure <m the investment management to aid the Sales aotivities of the 1 
Oorporation* 
hi£9 msarai^ ee Savings! 
The inereasing fiscal measures also erodes the savi^ aax^ in of tbe 
people. An idea of the increasing ratio of taxation ean be had from the 
faot that the additicmal taxation target aeeepted initially in the Second 
Plan was b 540 orores^  bat it vas suteequently raised to Es lOSS orores. In 
the Third Five ISar Plan Jia prpoeed' to mobilis© the rosouroes throu^ 
additional taxiH;ioa to the extent of lis 1710 orores. In this majoner the 
percentage of tax revenue to national income trould increase from about 9.9 
por cent at tte end of Second Plan (7.5 per cent at the beginning of the Plan) 
to 11.4 per cent by the end of the third Five Zear Plan. It is difficult 
to forecast the trends in the fora of additonal taxation but from recent 
trends it can be said that the proportion of direct taxes on hi^er income 
brackets trill be comparatively more than the proportion of indirect taxes. 
This is supported by the fact that one of the accepted objectives of fiscal 2 
measures in India is to remove the inequality of wealth. It is also difficult t<i 
1. Infra, P TIlI-17. 
2. Oovemiaent of l^ diat Report of the Taxation Enquiry Oommission 
1954-55, Vol. I, p S3. 
Also the Third Five tear Plan, p 16« 
III. 9 
measure the impaot of suoh policy on produotlon in general and on saving 
in particular, Iwt tl» redistribution n^ thods adopted by the State in the 
forms of taxation may be conducive to life Insurance at least in two respects. 
Firstly, the progressive rate of taxation is liiely to induce the persons at 
higher incomo brackets to use life insurance premium as a rebate from income 
taxj Estate Duty and Death Duty. Secondly, due to redistribution of income, 
the aavinga of the middle inoomo groups will be so small that they could not 
be invested directly in housing or in op;}porate securities. In such oiroums> 
tances the preference of the individual for life ins^ irsnce and other insti-
tutional savings would increase. The prospect for life insurance are better 
as it is both a method of protection as wall as a media of sairing* 
Prom tho foregoing discussicsn it is clear that the monetary and 
fiscal measure adopted by the Government to finance ©ccaiomic developaent 
would affect life insurance in one fona or the other. Soma of the effects 
could be mitigated by following a judicious investment policy by the 
Corporation. In other respects life insurance would suffer alcmg with 
other forms of saving. In a planned economy, however, it can be baid 
that the State would mato use of these devices carefiilly so as to leave 
sufficient margin for voluntary saving among the people. It can be 
concluded, therefore, that the new Employment opportunities to be provided 
to the middle class during the third and subsequent Five Tear Plans would 
raise an eternal desire amcmg this income group to make provision for 
their future in the form of life insurance, this seems reasonable to assume as 
the world's highest standard of living is^ in the North iAierica where the 
institution of life insurance has experienced widest public acceptance. 
III.10 
(c) Induatrlaliaatlon and Prbaniaatloo and Trends In Social and InetltntlCTially 
TOPPlled Security and the Future of life Inatirance Savings; 
The industrialiaatlan end urbanisation wMoh have been deecrlbod as a 
potent factor of the growth of life insurance would continue at atiH a h i ^ r 
speed than hitt^rto attained. The recent indices of industrial produotioa end 
shifts in populaticm show -t^t in future India shall witness a comparatively 
larger and greater urban population* For example in the paper entitiled 
unemployment in Urban Areas in India s included In the coUeotion 'Out-Look 
and Employment* published bgr the Plemxing Conunission as a Joint Study of tte 
Ministry of Wbour and Bi!qployment and the Labour and Employment Division of 
the Commission^  the estimated growth of the rural end urban population between 
1961 and 1966 will ba from 295 to 353 millions and from $2 to 104 millione 
respectively. T^e urban percentage will rise from 1 7 p o r cent to 22.7 i^r 
1 duo to 
cent. The growing urban population would reauire more insurance/disintegra-
2 
tion of Joint families. 
From these trends it should not be assumed that L.I.C. would have a 
non-oompetlng field. In fact a part of social security will also ba provided 
by the State. Besides the various savings propagated by banks and Government 
have to be taken into consideration bofore the basiness can becon» readily 
erateilable to L.I.C. An analysis of the influence of these factors is Important 
to estimate the potential resources of L.I.C. 
1. Gregory, TheodoreJ Op.Cit., p 8S. 
2. Some idea of the future growth of urban population can cOso be had from 
the following estimates of Brit^ .on Harris. 
POFUIATION IH MILLIcaiS 
Census 7ear Total Urban Non-tirban Decennial urban Inecnutse 
1951 560 6S 297 
1961 420 90 220 27 
1971 500 130 370 40 
1981 600 180 «0 50 
(The Eoonomio Weekly, Special Number, June, i960, p 875)* 
IHtXl 
Impact of Soelnl Seewlty 
on Life Inauranoe Savingt : 
The financial needs created by yotanger marriagea, more ohildr«a» increased 
dependency at both ends of life and increased longevity give us the basis for 
incentive for increased savings. This suggests that as economic development 
proceeds f sociid security and insurance will come to have high psioTityln State :> 
programmes • The first important step in this direfltion by the Government of 
1 
India has already been taken* Basidos a number of States also have compulsory 
2 
State Insurance Schemea. In the coviroe of the Third Five Tear Plan, the Oovera-
mont of India also proposes to increase the scope of the existing two scheiMS 
and to introduce a scheme of employment assistance for indiistrial workers and 
to make a small start with relief and assistance for destitutes persons, orphans 
aad physically heindioapped persons without means of sui^ort of livelihood. 
These social service and social security programme are the essential and 
integral part of economic development and the State will gradually provide the 
people much desired social security* The important question that concerns us •s 
here is its impact on life insurance. The importance of this question can be 
gauged from the fact that even with its limited scope the number of insured 
in the Employees State Insurance Corporation has exceeded the number insured 
for life Insurance on voluntary basis* In fact the affect of Social Security 
programme on voluntaiy savingp(of which life insurance is an important category) 
is not clear. In some respects the social security programme can be regarded as 
a substitute Sor life insurance^ en4 on the other hand the same social seooxlty 
1. Ooveiwment of India has started two Social Security Programmes, through "ttie 
Employees State Corporation and Employees Provident Fund Act, 1952* 
2, The States of Andhra Pradesh^rala, Mysore, Madbya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir have compalsoiy life instiranoe schemes for 
their own emplpyeoB (vide Estimates Committee,) Op.Cit, p 28* 
m.i2 
prograsuse of th& GoTexnment or Compolsoi^ r State Insux-anoe Sohames can also 
b© twed so as to provide a base to stiaralate life insuranoe savings. The 
effect of social seourity on the lifo insurance can be discussed in the light 
of the oxperience of the ad ^anoed economics whsro Social Security programmes 
and life insurance savings have cmde sitaaltaneous progress. 
In U.K. vhore a social security schdme embracing tte whole population 
from the 'd\iotiaan to the nillonaire* introduced towards the end of the 
World War II fostered the growth, of life i&auranco whioh increased several 
1 
times. This is indicated Ijgr the sinulteneous srowth of lifo insurance 
since the-tfoS-ldlHar II. Similarly in U.S.A. there is strong evidence to 
shov that Old Age Social Insurance Prograscae has operated without any affect 
on life jjs.-a-'^ie's. from Aaerioan experience, Porterfield writest 
"Social Security benefits serve chiefly as a base upon which 
adequate protection may bs constructed. It seems probable that 
they have given a glimpse of possible future security and 
independence to millions who might not otherwise ha^ ccaisidered 
the problem, or who had been reconciled to support by their 
ohildren or charity in their declining years. The incentive 
to supplement basic social security benefits with additional 
coverage of the types provided by life companies has unquestion-
ably been considerable. Life insurance companies have not been 
slow to see the possibilities of this and to utilise it as a potent 
selling aid. Therefore, it appears that up to the present social 
security has probably not hindered seriously the progress of the 
private life Insurance industry. It may ac+ually have aided this 
larogress to soii» extent. This conclusion is supported by the 
evidence of tJh® outstanding growth of the life insurance iiodustxy 
in the years sinw the Social Security programme was initiatod.*(2) 
Likewise the experience of Canada and Japan suggests that the introduction 
3 
of Social security programme has not hampered the growth of life insurance* 
1. Hood, Charles, Ft Life Insuranoe in the U.K. in the Post War Bra -
in the Proceedings of Ainerican Life Convention, 1937, p 246. 
A A 
2. Porterfield, Jamesi Op.Cit, pp 55-54. 
3. Hiroso,C}ent Life Insurance Business in Japan since the War -
in Proceedings of American Life Conventieai - ( 54th Annual Meeting), 
1950, p 229. 
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The tmderXylng featurea In Social Security programme which stimulate 
the growth of life Insurance are the improvement in the health standard of 
the insured population and creation of j48uranoe ocmsciousness among the 
people. The programaffl of compulsory insurance, as pointed out earlier, also 
mates the people 'habitual saver' which is the first ead foremost condition 
of keeping the life policy alive • 
In addition to the above factors, a programme of the social security 
even in the most advanced societies of the World does not cover all types 
of people and all types of risks. A large number of the people and a great 
number of risJM* of life remains unserved in social security and this leaves 
sufficient room for the expansion of life insurance. However, in India, 
the uncertainity regarding the effect of Social Security programme will 
reTijaln« If the Gcvercment Q£ India eventually reach at th» decision where 
it guarantees *eradle to grave security' for all or most of the population, 
the market for private life insurance may have been substantially pre-ei)Q>ted* 
For if the head of a family can be assured that the needs and wants of his 
dependants will more or less fuUy met hf governmental benefits after his 
death or retirement his incentive to purchase life insurance protecticm for 
this purpose would unquestionably be lessened. 
Will such an expansion of social security activities come to pass? One 
would require the qualities of a political seer to answer this question with 
confidence. It is clear that the trend of the past decade has umdLstakably 
in the direction of the assumption of vser larger and broader social respoosi-
billty by the federal government. This trend seems unlikely to be reversed. 
However, even though in a Socialist pattern of Society, State will make 
every effort to provide social security to the largest number of the people 
yet its activity for the provision of social security benefit will be limited 
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lay th0 resource B. ^ s e reeouroea remarkably fall short in the process of 
growth. Mithln the foreseeable future (and In this regard one's vision is 
necessarUjr lindted) it does not appear that Qovemfeont of India will be in 
a position to provlde'^ oradle to Grave" Security to all the osmbers of the 
eocletyr Thae la India the Social Security benefits have been aimed 
chiefly at meeting the minimum needs of retiired or disabled workers and 
survivors are entitled only to (l) Sickness benefit, (ii) maternity benefit, 
(iii) disablement benefit, dependant benefit, and medical tonefit. Hence 
in view of the limited scope the need fior additicaial protection from other 
sources such as life insurance will remain. It is clear therefore that the 
social security measures taken by the Government will raise the staiulard of 
living of the poople and Improve the health of the popalati«a. This would 
open a new and extensive vista for life insurance among a seotion of the 
population which is so far either due to indifference or lack of the capacity 
or inclination to save had been taking very little interest in life insurance. 
Moreover, under the Employees State Insurance Scheme and the Provident 
Fund Act while no worker is permitted to take loans from his contribution 
for the purpose of day to day needs or for ejqpenditure on wedding and 
^ celebrations, advances are persoltted for the payment of insurance premium. 
This will be sufficient inducement to take life insuranco. 
It will thxis be seen that although the social secxirity measure will in 
due course provide the basic needs of individuals yet the urge to supplement 
them tfjT life insuroaoe will continue as long as private property and its 
inheritance remains. In the iiumsdiate foreseeable futwre, a society based 
on the socialist pattern, which will provide increased employment and high 
standard of living, has no idea to abolish the right vested in private 
property. When the development schemes come to fruition in the near future 
the scope in the development of life insurance will pari paaau have oonsi-
erably widened as with the rise of standard of living there will inevitably 
come an Awareness and a desire m the part of eaoh indivldtial to see that 
his children are ensured at least the same standard of living that ^ t is 
as good as his good fortvine to enjoy/ 
However, the possibility exists that at sone future time govemiaental 
provisions for individual sesurity may have become so ocmplete that the need 
for private life insurance would substantially diminishwi. This is one of 
the major uncertainties in the longer range out-look for the life insurance 
industry. Even if it is assumed that the State will grant much desired 
social security to its citisen in near future« life insurance will continue 
to enjoy a privilegeposition in any scheme of social security in India. 
Since the life insurance business is also nationalised in this country an 
integrated systemfalthough there will be separate funds and administration 
in consonanee with types of benefits covered, will be oondxicive to economy 
and simplicity* 7he integrati<m of various States compulsory Xneurance 
Schemes may also be considered under the nati<mali8ed life insurance in the 
countzy* 
Impacft of the Government of .In^ ia Snail 
Savings Drive on Life Insurance Savieigsi 
Tha contribution of small savings to the suocess of the First Five 
Tear Plan may be judged from the fact that colleoti(«i8 l^ ve increased from 
Bs 33 crores in 19S0>SI to 65 crores in 1955-S6* h^e total collections in 
the First Five Tear Plan amounted to Rs 241 crores. At the end of Second 
Five Tear Plan the total collections were about 8s 390 crores. The Third 
Five Tear KLan target for the collection of Savings under the Small Saving 
Scheme is Bs 800 orores^  
The increase in the Small Savings brought about in the last few years 
is attributed partly to the vigorous Sales Drive of the Qovemment through 
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the National Saving Organisation and partl^ r Igr the finanolal induoements 
provided to investors hy the ^ overaiuent of India. For Instance, the rates 
of interest on the various types of small savings securities are quite high. 
Further a variety of Bonds to oate^t^ needs of various types of i^ople 
have bBfflft devised. Many new features have been added in these bonda to 
bring them on par with the life insurance policy. For example, the oontzl-
btttions made to the 10 and 15 year certificates will be entitiled to eana 
a relsate on inoooe-tax as in the oase of life insurance premia and contri-
butions to recognized provident ftinds, subject to the overall limit of 
Its 10,000 or 1/4 of the total tascable income, whichever is less* 
The 10 and 15 years accounts of the cuaulstive time deposit scheme 
have more or less been placed on par with the payments for life insurance 
premia and contributians to provident funds for purposes of earning a 
rabate on income-tax. Theae cancessions will enable self-employed persons 
or employees ^ ot eligil^ to coatribute to any recognised providcmt funds 
or persons who cannot undertake life insurance to claim relate on incooid-
tax* Thus the net return on the investo^t of life insurance fund is only 
3.55 per cent; while s<»Qe of the State Sponsored Small Saving Sobaaes eu<^ as 
10 end 15 years Cumulative would on maturity eaxn a return of 3.8 end 4.3 
per cent respectively. Furthermore the introduoti<m of so many varieties of 
boodfl with attractiiee terms has made the Qovemment of India's Small Saving 
drive a close rival of life insurance. It is, therefore, pointed 
out that in future the Corporation would not have an easy task especiall/ 
because Small Saving Scheme has all the privileges of the Government Steward-
ship (such as deduction of the contribution from Salary of the Qovemment 
emplt^es) while life insurance has been deprived. The fear is paiiily corftjot. 
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Bat it should be rensmbered that the capital market is highly inqoerfect 
where the rational saver would nake sharp distinction between the facilities 
offered to him by different Saving Institutions. The distinctive character 
of life insurance as was pointed out earlier is t • at it is not c»ly a media 
of saving bit a'oethod'^ Woteetion. • The Oevenaissnt^ 'Small Saving Schemeyin 
spite of -aie fact that they provide a better return with security do not 
have the Pontine'featxire. Life Insurance Savings will therefore be 'differen-
tiated* on the basis of their specific character as Schweam has pointed outi 
"Saving Institutions other than life insurance talk about protecting 
one's future life? talk about providing funds for education, 
providing for old age etc. They use life insurance slogans without 
giving life insurance protection. Nevertheless, these institutions 
will obtain millians of savings dollars, not because their product 
does the job as well as life Insurance but because they have asked 
the people to save and have made definite selling efforts to obtain 
the available funds. If our men would only see more people and 
explain to them the miracles of life insurance we would get a much 
larger share of available savin^.^Cl) 
Schweran, further gives the supremacy of life insurance over other 
forms of savings in the following words i 
"•..because these types of savings (Savings, Accounts, Federal Saving, 
Bonds etc.) truly have only the element of saving plus Interest 
whereas life Insurance, in addition to the matter of saving plus 
interest also makes available to the buyer: the ifflis^iiate ereation 
of an estate, the inclusion of income option which guaranteed 
principal and Interest, the granting of trust service to the bene-
ficiary without charge, an unbreakable will as far as the Insured is 
concerned, his ability to transfer pr<^rty Igr contract rather than 
by will and thus eliminating Probate costs and State Inheritance 
Tax plus freedom from attachment by creditors etc*••Therefore, life 
insurance is not subject to conqparision with any other fozms of 
saving and investnfflnt^ '*(2) 
It is true that life insurance characteristically differs from other forms 
of savings and its persuasive methods appeal to masses but it wiU be difficult 
1. Schwemm j^ arl Mi Development of a Selling Philosopl^  in Proceddlngs 
of American Life Convention, 19S7, p 316. 
2. Ibid, p 317, 
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to conv^ce the 'income motivated saver' entirely Igr argaments, % times when 
other saving agencies are developing their sales activity with sufficient 
financial inducement it will be special responsibility on the investment manage-
ment of the L*I«C* to support the persuasive activities of the Gorporaticm 
providing sufficient financial inducements Thus both is ccs^tition vith other 
saving agencies as veil as in affecting the desire to save among the peo|^e it 
will be Important for the L.I.O, to rationalise its inves^maat policy with a 
view to provide ^ protection' as cheap as possible and to satisfy the inccaoe 
motive of the people. In fact, as will bo shown in ChapterVClwithin its pre-
sent liability {dmraoteristic and legal frame work L.I.C. could direct its policy^  
in that regard and can successfully compete with other saving institutions on 
this account. Thus if the L.l.C- also rati<Mialioe its invast^t policy as 
suggested in this thesis the £:rawtH of postal saving with tho state drive 
will not have any adverse affect on the growth of life insxnranoe. 
Sft^ ffmwphifff Bp^ m 
PutttrewLife lasuraneei 
It was shown in Chapter I that lAere the 'products' are differentiated' 
the ability of saving Snstitution to mobilise the saving depends upon their'Sales 
effortst Although all the three factors via. Population growth* Income growth t 
and Industrialisation and Urbanisation of the country are favourable and con-
ducive to the growth of life insurance« the actiial growth will depend on the 
effort and technique developed ty t.I.C. in selling its own 'product'. If t,I»C, 
fails in developing a proper agenogr forced life tasuronce will again lag behind 
in relation to other forms of personal savings* 
The recent trend in the L.I.C. training of its agents and field force 
indicates that L.I.C. is aware of the aiiiqple truth* that life insurance is a 
type of product which is sold and not voluntarily bought by the people. For 
fixampOLe to opmoA the laessago of life inmrmw thraa^mmt the wmtry and In 
order to veaob its Jbeurget of new tmsinaaey L.I.G. ia takbag etepa to atreng^asn 
the field organisation liy cruising aor® agoBta and ajppointinf additional 
field of fleers and development officers. Agent's training has been organised 
in a U di'/isions vhicdi are equipped with troiaed instraotofVe Field Officers 
both e<mfinaed and nevljr recruited axe bein^ impartol training at tlse ^ mrio^ 
Training Centres. Training has been organised at the It.X.G. officers training 
College at ITagpur. t%re and offioos^ n are opened partlov^arly in mofVissil 
osntres* 
The movm efi^ient aorvitting of business would he ensured thmi^t 
IS A net work of officer all over the eouatry. ii) A gradual decentralisation of fimctiwio ouch as undorwriting^odvences 
of loane« revival of policieo* ^ ttlecent of dlaios etc* 
(ill) The Vim of regional liinsvvigoa in foroe and corrDopoadenoe ^whg^ retrer 
possible. 
(iv) The equipping of Bemeh Offieoo vii^ nocesoaiy md&inos like Adveoa 
set etc. 
These efforts of L*I,C. ere bovcod to ereote insoreni^ corasoioasness eotrng 
the people. Besiebs^ the spread of eduoaticm and li'toraor oaMig the people 
wotCLd ease the task of l.I.C. 
Horeover^ the nationalieation of life Insurance and the guarantee ^  the 
vitrei .Cbremesnt of the paymnt in cash of olaiias under the life pelioies 
has ereatcd isore coaifldenc® aciCMPg the people. The prospective policy holder has 
been relieved ^ ffthe trouble of having to cli&osea proiK>r life office to insure. 
Bquallf, the salessan is no longer worried about cenvtneing his elionts of the 
wisdoQ of the office he reprosents in pnifermce to others. Re can now conoen-
trate his efforts in bringing hone to his clients the advantage of life 
insnroaoe» its suitability as a c^ium of faiaily security and its effectiveness 
as an instrument of soall savings. ^  coporience of the sales staff sines 
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naticfnalieatloa indioates that the prooorement of new bosineas la easier 
and realatenoe to aalea la far leaa than before. TkLa nay not be due imtirely 
to the security provided by the guarantee of the Central Oovemment* It may-
be due to the inoreased popularity of Insurance as veil* It is oonfidently 
hoped that the corporation will be able to write an increasing volume of new 
business year after year* and l^t its new offioes« when they settle down to 
exeoutfe^ ^ smoothly the tasks witruated to then* will be able to render effioient 
and satisfactory service to pollc^hoMers. 
OonQlusiont 
In this section the future prospects of the growth of life insurance 
savingshave been examined with reference to the factor that havo facilitated 
its growth via. population growth, income growth, increasing trends in Indus-
trialisatiott, urbanisation and decline in natural form of security. It has 
been observed that although the inflaticaiazy methods of financing economic deve> 
lopment and the State borrowing programme will affect the volxune of life insurance 
but the urge of the people to save their future from being yorse oiT^  will be so 
strong at the latter stages of industrialisation that life insurance saving 
will not be affected oonsldvrabily. 
Similarly it ^ s been maintained that the Social Security Px^ grammes 
which will be provided in due course of time will not affect the growth of 
life insurance as both of them have different fields of operation* 
The inevitable conclusioB is that life insurance has tremendous oppor-
tunities of growth in future. The potential resources of L.I.C. could now 
be computed in the next section* 
nij2i 
SEGTIOIi 2 
pmiBcm) mohrm OF iim msumcs m msu - iwi-xm 
The eeonomio proepeota of life Insuranoe ijodustzy h&ire been disctissed and 
potential of life insuronoe savin^idn the eoonon^ have been exaoiaed in the 
previous section. In the baekground of the last seotion and in the historioal 
background of life insurance industry given in Chapter XZ^  I have eosqpatod the 
/ 
life insurance sevingsin the economor for the period 1961-1975. 
The main assumption under which these estimates have been prepared are 
those made the Planning Commission regarding the futuire growth of population* 
increase in per capita income and industrialisation and urbanisati<m of the 
country* ^ Applying theso Snfluoncoo upon ourrent trends of life insuranoe 
business the following figures emerge* 
(1) The ratio of life insurance in force to national income is likely to 
increase from 15-.16 per cent in I960 to 29 per cent at the end of Third Five 
tear Plan., 43 per cent at the end of Fotirth Five 7ear Plan and 85 per cent at 
the end of Fifth Five Year Plan. 
(2) The contribution of life insuranoe savings( gross premium inciHse) in the 
total saving woxild increase from 8.7 per cent in 1965 to 11.1 per cent in 1970 
and 16.1 per cent at the end of 1975. During the same period the ratio of 
premium iirioomr" to national income Is likely to be 1.4 per cent| 1.7 per cent 
and 2.9 per ccnt respectively. 
(3} The per capita life insurance would^increase from Bs 53 in I960 to Es 97 in 
1965| Es 195 tn 1970 and Bs 4S6 In 197S, 
yain Asy^ w^ptt^ """ th^ Estimates t 
The estimates of New Business» life Insurance in force; premium income end 
life fund have been prepared on the basis of the Projected Growth of the Bconony 
in 
gi-vm In the First Five Tear Plan end as modified in the Seeond and Third Five 
Tear Plans* While the basis is the Planning Commission's estimates of Popula-
tion, ilational Income, Saving and XQvestment in the Eoanoagr, the fcdlowing 
feattires of life insurance industrsr observed in Ohapter II have been given 
special consideration. 
The development and active merchandising of new forms of insurance have 
contributed greatly to the progress of insurance since nationalisation and 
have broadened the scope of the insurance services made available to the 
publio. Examines are group life insurance, non-medical insurance,the eictension 
of the field of insurable risks, family income and other combinations of term 
insurance with permanent forms of life insurance. Thus innovation and e3q>erienoe 
drawn on the part of the L.I.C.will \indoubtedly ccaxtlnue to make for further 
expansion in the amount and variety of insurance protection. It is presumed, 
therefore, that a very substantial increase in life insurance will come through 
the development of new forms of insurance and extensive and intensive sales 
efforts of L.I.C. 
^thod of Cottputfttioni 
(a) dumber of New Policiest 
l&k the oompatation of New Business only male population of the working 
1 
age group 15-59 years has been taken into oonGideration. Children below the 
age of 15 years have been excluded. Since L.I.C* is interested in children 
lives for Deffered Assurance and also for some extent for Endowment Assumnce, 
therefore children from 15 to 18 years have been included. Similarly L.I.C* 
Working Force is defined as all male population of the age group 15-99 
and half of th© number of females of the same age group living at amy 
time in the country (Wattal, P.K„ Op* oit«, p 92). 
in 
i0 not tntereeted in ttie lives of 60 or abovo 60 yoare of ago* therefore, th^ 
have been excluded* Besides the Corporation does not insure female lives 
except under special oiroumstanoes, tliey have,therefore, been excluded from the 1 
estimates* 
A reference to 4i>pendl* B-II wiU aho" that the sale popaLatian of age 
group 15>S9 would be 12.59 orores in 1961> 13.46 crores in 1965, IS.07 crores 
in 1970 and 16.99 orores in 1975. Out of this Increase in population it will 
not be possible for li.I.C. to insure all in ons y^ex, since some of the increased 
members in this age group will not require insurance at all, some of them will 
not be insurable, others mig^t not be having necessary saving mai^ fin. Alsb^ s^ 
it will not be feasible for L.I.C. to approach affectively in one lear to all 
the persons. It ia, however, assumed that at the end of each Plan period the 
Corporation could motivate increasing number of the people. Thus during tho 
Third Five Tear Plan it is assumed that L.I.C. will be in a position to moMlise 
the Saving of 1.2 per cent to 1,8 per cent of the male population within the 
age group 15-S9. The ntimber of new policies issued bar I>*I.C. would be about 
24.23 lakh In 1965, 
After the Third Five Tear Flan the rate of increase shall be comparativelf 
hii^er. The vigorous sales drive in the Urban and Antral areas during the 
Third Five Tear Flan would bring more bosiness to L.I.C. It is, therefore, 
assumed that during the Fourth Five Tear Plan L.I.C. would be in a position to 
mobilise the saving of 2 to 3 per cent of tho male population of the age group 
19-59. The number of new policies issued during the Fourth Five Tear Plan 
would therefore increase from 27.86 laldi in 1966 to 45.21 lakh in 1970* 
During the Fifth Five Tear Plan it is estimated tgr the Planning Commi8si<m 
1. Joshi, J.Ht A Method of Determining Life Insurance Potential » 
Togakahama, Vol. 5, K©. 10, October, 1961, p 17# 
2, Figures for 1961 have been ass«uned for 1960 and Flgares for 1966 for 
196S and so on for other years^ 
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that our eoonony would bouat 'Self-auataln' 1«/©1. People would be having 
euffioient saving margin. Many of the prejudices against life insurance 
would die bjr education, h^e task of the Corporation would become easier. 
The huj© urban population and disintegration in rural lives wouJJ present 
ample scope to L.I.G. to expand its sales. At this * self-sustain* level of 
o-or ecoriony^  it has been assumed that L.I.C. would 1B in a position to moti-
vate 3,S per cent to 5.5. per cent of the 15-59 age group male population 
of :&idia. '^ he number of new policies wiH therefore increase from S4.08 lakh in 
1971 to 93,15 laMi in 1975. 
On the basis of the above assumption the fate of increase in the number 
of new policies issued tgr L.I.C. is in conformity with the rate of growth 
achieved during the period 1956-60. The following table shows the rate of 
growth of number of policies during the period 1956-60 to 1970-1975 
.TABLE Ho. 23 
1 
RATE OF QROUTH OF NOMBEIR OF NEH P0UCI£S 
1956-1960 1960-1965 1965-1970 1970-1975 
100 60 64 73 
per cent Per cent Per cent Per cent 
^nmCEi Appendix D-IX 
Bote 1. ^he figures of new business in 1956 were depressed due to nationali-
sation. The x«te has, therefore, been calculated on the basis of 
1955 figures. The high rate of growth in this period is dxie to 
the fact that this period estimates the growth of six jears instead 
of five years in other periods. 
Average Size of Polie^ iest 
It has been oteerved that the increase in average siae of policies is slowi 
than the increase in the number of policies. It is, therefore, assumed that the 
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lnqaroveinont In th» average size of policies during the period 1961-1965 will 
not be more than It$ 180 per year, fh© average size of policiee sfaall be atoat 
Ss 4650 at the end of Third Five Tear Plan* The inoreaee will be more rapid 
diMPing the Poarth Five tear Plan and Fifth Five Tear Plan. It is aaeumed that 
in the period 1983-70 the average aise of policy will inorease fro® to 200 to 
Us 2S0 per year and in the period 1971-75 the Increase will bo from Rs 325 to 
h SB5 per year. On this baais the average &ize of poli<^ issued shall be Its 4550 
at the end of Third Five loar Plan,Rs 5775 at the end of Fourth Five Tear Plan 
I / 
and Us 7900 at the end of Fifth Five Tear Plan. The rate of growth is shown in 
the following TaKLe; 
TABLB 24 
GROWTH RiiTS OP A'fmjSB SIZE OF POLICIES 
1956-1960 1961-1965 1968-19ff0 1971-1975 
14 per oent 15 per cent 20 per cent 30 per eent 
SOURCE! As for table 23 
(o) Amount of Buslneast 
Tho amount of new business has been coaputod Igr multiplying the number of 
Hew policies with the average size of policies issued during the period* The 
new business of L . I .C . will be lb 112? erores in 1965; Bs 2611 crorcs in 1970 and 
Us 7383 orores in 1975« The following table shows the rate of growth is in^ litre 
with the growth rat© attaJjued during the period 1956 to 1960 
TABLE 2S 
OROim lUTB OF NEtf BUSINBSS - 1956-1975 
1956-(53)-1960 1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-1975 
1C8 per cent 84 per eeat 9$ per cent 124 por o«nt 
aaaaBsaaagagsacggssaa^^ „' •, i ^.ii r-sssassssssssssao 
SOURCE} As per table 23 
Note I As per table 23 
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(d) Boslneaa in Force* 
The amount of Life Iheuranoe in foroe has been dstjjoated on the basis of 
new baslness. Ija any one jear the entire emomt of boaineea written in that 
year does not add to the Insurance in foroe but a part is lapsed or wasted due 
to varidty of reasons* Sssides a part also goes off the books as dealh 
naturity claims and surrenders each year* The experience of the last three 
years stiggests that of the total business in force in the beginning of a^y year 
9 per cent goes off the books as lapse, surrender death claims aod maturity* 
The prospects of any improvemsnt in the surviving of business due to the 
inq>roirement in mortality rates ( fall in death claims ) has been asstuoed to be 
partly balance bf the intrmluction of non>medical insurance and liberalisation 
of policy conditicma by I<.I*C»3imilarly the introduction of Group Zhsurcncei 
Salary Saving Sghemes would considerably reduce the lapse ratio* B^ t the posi^ 
bility of the increase due to 'aggressive sales' efforts and spread of irourance 
I 
in rural areas vl^ re the lapse ratio is considerably high is also foreseen* 
It is therefore assumed that 10 per cent of the insuranoe in force at the beginn-
ing of' any year would go off the books as Death Claims^  Surrenders and lapses* 
The net addition to life insurance in foroe on this assunqpticm will be h 722 
crores in 1969; Bs 1700 crores in 1970 and h 5099 crores in 1970* The business 
in foroe will thus be Bs 4770 crores; Bs 10807 crores and B> 28510 crores at the 
end of Third, Fourth and Fifth Fire Tear Plans respectively* The estimated rate 
of growth shall be as follows) 
TABLE 26 
ESTIMATED HATE OF OROHTH OF LIFE IKSORAIICB IH FORCE 
19S6U5}-1960 1961-1965 1966-1970 1971-197S 
92 per cent 86 per cent 92 per cent 119 per cent 
SOiniGS: As per table 23 
Notet See note of table 23* 
1* Togakshama, Yd. 9 (8-9) August-September, 1961, p 13« 
mj37 
Hithofut aaalyslag fut«r« tread of develf^ sanent in gr6<»i»r: detiiUs,- it 
Is not poselble to estimate with mob. preoislon the pirobable annual premlm 
Income reqtiirod to support Bs 4»770 orores basiness in foree in 196S» and 
i 
lb iG«807 orores in 1970, and Is z8,»i0 orores in 197S. If the idea is to 
lactend life insuranoe cover mong a wide section of tl^ population, as part of 
social security programme, enqphasis will be on vhole life assurance, beoause 
tbejr provide maximam protection for a given premium. In such a case t)» ratio 
of premium income to sum, assured would be weU below 4 per cent, sudl a diatri^ 
bution of sua assured in whole life assurances form an important proporti<m, 
would be similar to the distribution in the United States and in Canada* On 
tira othtirr hand if saving aspect is to be stressed, endowment assurances would 
form a substantial portina of the sum assured and the distribution would be 
(Aoser to the ITnited Kingdom* The ratio of annual premium to sum assured in 1 
this case would be nearly 5 per cent. 
present ooiq>ositioa of the business shows that the Endowment Instiranoe 
forms the greater proportion of total Iwsiness lut it is gradually giving way 
to the whole life* Since in future Ii*I.C. is planning for a mass approach in 
the form of groo^ insurance and the Coiporatlon is also Intensifying its actio 
vities tov-sale uhole-life policies it is possible that the composition of the 
business might change in future* But the change will not be all of a sudden 
as the fable No* on the following page jiiid&oates that the proportion of 
awiowment policies to total business hxt bot liateYiilly^ dhaiiged sincts- 1914. 
IKiwever fortthe last few years it is observed that L.I*C* is making all attempts 
to j^ pttlarise the sales of whol&-life policies. 
1* tegakshama. Vol* 1, No* 4, Februaxy, 1998, p 16* 
Tim 27 
TJPBS or P0tICB£3 ISSOED BT BTBIiS OFFICES 
19X4-1960 
1914 1989 1960 
l^ovmdBt 76.8 72*4 66.17 
Hhole-lif« 12.9 8.3 8.96 
liialted Payimt Mhole-life 7.1 6*7 
Children's Gndovmoai 1*7 OJS 7«83 
Jglnt tite AosvamoQ • • 6.% 
Other olassee 1.9 12.4 10,^ 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
SOB 
SOtJRGEt (l) Reservo Biank of l^ diat %aetaz7 and 
Poking Statietioe. 
(2) Ii.I.C. Ammal Beport and AQooiintSf 1960. 
An idea of the L . I . C ' B efforts in recent years to moourage the sales of 
whole life policies idiioh contains the greater proportion of *lnsTaranoe pro-
tection* can be had from the fact that in its All India New Business eoiqpdtitlon 
for Agents Fore Sndowiaent naa. not taken into consideration iihile eiaiiltasis 1 
laid on whole life . The ratio of endoMiaent policies to total bosineso 
has therefore declined from 69.45 per cent in 1998 to 66.17 per cent in I960. 
The ratio of preiaium income to life Insurance in force has conseqttently falloa 
from 4.9 per cent in 1998 to 4JS per cent in i960* The Corporation schemes 
to spread insurance much more viMly and cheapljr would thus be an important 
factor in changing the ooaqpos&tion of business but it will not result Into r 
sudden changes as the choice of the policy largely depends upon the preference 
of the cottsumars. It is therefore assumed in the following estimates that 
1. logakshamaf Vol. 9»'Ho. 4, April, 1961, p 31* 
Illjg© 
dtodng tba Third md Foaft)i Five tear Flieiis tbo x^tie of ifmm to lift 
Zn0ttr8iiee In foroe elhoU b& abtmt 4, par eont. Xn tt^ Fifth Fivo Xoar FXea the 
inettrtm^ ^ oiOd largcdy eprsad thnni^ gfoup inaarcnoe. Baeidoe inoi^ saee d 
ooaBeioamesa aoong the pooplo would elso raioe Htm proportion of wholoolifo 
polioioo. X have I thox«foro aooius^ that the ratio of prmiun laoooo to life 
ifummneo in foros tfould foil to S.9 por cent doHug tho Fifth Five fear Plan. 
fhis seooe to ha a roasonohle aaaosiptioa fasoauso in B.S.&. ood Coneda tdiore lifo 
ioeureiiieo hao spread maoih ooro widely »tho ratio of ptGcdxBa iaocsso to life 
I 
immresiod in t&tm is cnly 8 por 
t havo elflO Bsevrnd ia estisatos that th@ id.th>profit polioloe which 
omstitttte GK>r@ then 80 por eent oi L.I.C. iK^crplu^ors HiH oo&tiniao to 
doadnato th@ boeineas of tho Corpor&tiea. / Hife indur^o votild bs d^Mbin^d 
hoth ae a eothod of protootioa as wOll a© (saviog. It lo ttorofore eotioatod 
that the otid of third Finro f^ar Flofi t.I.0*8 ^ a i m iaoooe ohall ha 191 
ororasf fo 4SS ororos at the end of Foarth Five leor Plim and h 998 eroros at 
the end of Fifth Fiv® lear Plan, 
(f) Betiiaftted larbwthaife Fund; 
The oonqpatatioo of life ftand depends vqpon the aaauG^ion of large immhor of 
eotoarial faotors. The oeneideration of thoao faotoi:^  is beyond tho aeopo of 
thie enquiry* In ^ noral it osn he said that the aooafimlation of life fiand 
depends tspon the saving from t!^ ^ eusned n^rtality rate^ igi^ >onoos» locdias and 
ftsstmd rate of Intoreet on isveetoeat of the funds* The oarpluB m aoooont of 
the stoHality rate of the Corporation will ha haXanoed ^ rtly tor the iatrodaotion 
of aonHBedioQl iaeuranoe end liberaliaation of ^ licy o(»>ditione and partly it 
will cscnrae to the Corporation* Sorplos froa tho o^engee rotio o i ^ inorease 
1* laetitQte of Idfe InsartfEieo (?.S*A*) f»ife Ineurenoo Faot Boim and Canadian 
life Xneurimeo Offiooe Aesooiation* Oanaditti ZQgorenee* Faote* 
xn.9o 
dm to ffieohanlaatioa and ratloaalisation of th« offioee bob thie ia likaly to be 
bala&oed ligr tbs inereasing adteiaifltr&tion cost dtis to tnfi&tloiiax;/ tendeneies. 
The denand of the Staff of the Corporation for the iaproveme&t of Pay Seale and 
more amenities ar© alao increasing. Thia vUl eaeert ooaaiderable preaanre m the 
eacpenae ratio of Oorporatlos^  Bseldee the launching of vigorous soalee driv« 
in tl;@ vii^ in rural areas requirea heavy esqpenditurea. the aavingn from thta 
acootmt are likely to f&U and in aome caaes it uill be ne^igiliLe. 
t^der the above olroumatanosa tho mala pressure ahall be on the inveatttent 
poliey of the L.I.C. fhia ia turn has sufficient scope for rationaliaation and 
in^ rovement. Aa auggeated in Chapter VIII, L.I.C. could e<Bi8iderab[|jr inoreaae 
ita savinga on thie aeoount. Baaidea different typea of policies have different 
saving elements^  Shengoa in tho eos^sition of business vould also influence 
the aoeumulation of ftaida* fheae factora would affeot the ratio of lifo fond 
to life inaurance in force. The average ratio of life fmd to life Insurance 
in force for tha period to I960 is 25.2 per cent. I have assumed ^ t 
together with the change in the ccnsopoaition of bosineaa and change in the premlm 
inconie of the Corporation, the ratio of life ftmd to lifo insurance in force 
would be 20 per cent. It ia, theTOfore, estimated that the life fund shall be 
fis 1199 crorea at th» end of Shird Five tear Plan; fls 27GS crorea at the end of 1 
Fourth Five lear Plan and fis 6272 ororee at the end of Fifth W-V® Tear Plan, 
(s) Eatia^l^ Oy^ yth,, 
fhe growth of assets depends «q;>an the a0omttlati<m of lif^ fund. Sinoe the 
ratio of life fond to life Inswraac® in force has been assumed to dliainieh the 
the ratio of total assets to life insurance in force would alao decline* 
Tha actual amount end the growth rate of life fund will depend tQMm the 
compesition of busineaa aa different piOiciea while ipegiatering ^  same 
amount of life insurance in force have different saving element (Of. p X.12)* 
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Tfaua from the period 19S7 to I960 due to thd ohaages discuseed above the 
ratio of total assets to life insurance in force has fallen from 30.2 per 
cent in 1957 to 27.5 per cent in 1960, The average ratio for the period is 
approximately 29 per cent. I have assusied that during the third, Fourth, 
and Fifth Five Tear Plans the ratio would to near about 28 per cent. 
It is, thsrefore, estinated that the total assets of the Corporation 
would be !is 1336 orores in 1943; Bs 30936 orores in 1970 and Bs 7128 orores in 
197 S. 
A Coaparative Study of tho Estimated Growth of Life Insurant 
with the Private Insurance Targets and L.I.C. targetsi 
It is important at this stage to compare the above estimated growth 
of life insurance with the targets fixed by- the private insurers tefdre the 
nationalisation of life Insurance and. the targets fiased bgr L.I.C. after 
the nationalisation of insurance, 
(l) Privf^ te Insurers Targetst 
Before the Hatidnalisation of life insurance in India in 1955 the New 
India Assurance Company Ltdl, fixed on £d hop ten year tax^et of h 8,000 
crores sum asaured, as a possible national objective, to be realised in 1966. 
The assumptions made were as foUovsi 
"There are nearly 8 orores of families in India, with an average 
income of about Is 1,325. If on an average, a life insurance 
policy is ta^en out for only Ss 1,000 bgr each family, the total 
life insurance in India should reach a figure of fis 8,000 orores. 
This is by no means an Utopian idea, when it is realised that the 
cost of h 1,000 life policy is only about Ss SO per annum, vihLeix 
is even less than 4 per cent of the average annual income of the 
family. It is not suggested that this business target is achieved 
in a year or two. It is, how4»vor, an objective, which is not 
unattainable within a decade."(2) 
1. Tho ratio of life fund to life insurance In force has declined from 
27.8 psr coat to 24.5 per cent. 
2. Togakshsma, Vol. I (No. 4), Pebruaiy, 1958, p 18. 
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The target of Bs 8,000 orotoe business to fore© to 1966 was not oiOy beyond 
the ability of th® Indian ingxireva bat it was toconsiatent with the'dearee of 
eoonoaie detreXopment of the aomtxy* Aa idea of the over estintates of business 
1' f 
potential to ir the' i target oan be had by eonqpartog the planned new bustoess 
required to reach the above figures with the actual bustoess underwritten durtog 
the period 19S7 to i960, Mr. Patel of L.I.O. has worked out the following 
figures of new bustoess which wouW be required to reaoh the target of h 8,000 
bustoess to force to 1966* 
TABLE 28 
BEH roSIKBSS POTENTIAL GOMPAlffiD WITH PATBL'S ESTIMATES 
( to Orores) 
Xear estioates Aotuai 
of Mew 1960 
Bustoess 
'Bsiii^ ted stobe 
1961 ' ** —^ 
Difference between 
,Patel's estimates, 
actual till 1960 and 
gstimated- (1961-66) 
1967 300 278 • 22 
1958 460 359 • 111 
19B9 420 • 205 
1960 775 488 • 287 
1961 875 632 * 263 
1962 925 699 226 
1963 975 793 • 182 
1964 1000 894 + 106 
196S 1025 1327 ^ 102 
1966 1050 1380 - 280 
SOURCES I l.IogakshaiDa Vol* 1 (Ko« February, 19^, p 18* 
2.Xi.I.Ct Annual Reports and Aoeounts. 
3* Appendix * B-IX« 
The difference to oos^ted business and actual bustoess clearly todioatea 
over estimates to the target. An toteresttog aspect of Mr* Patel*s estimates 
is that he has assumed a dimtoishing rate of toorease* The rate of tocreooo to 
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new Inuslnees flgurds aeeordlng to Patel's estimatee shall be ooly 2 per cent 
betireen 196&-66 as against 50 per cent in 1957-58. i^y own eatimateajit will be 
seeny assuisss an inore&sing rate beoaose of gradual rise in populatiott| per 
capita inooiae and other factors conducive to life insurance discussed in 
Section 1. 
At the end of Third Five tear Plan it will be seen that ny estimated 
figures becomes very close to Mr. Patel's estimates. The: only difference is 
that Mr. Patel has estimattsd new business of Ss 1»0(X> in 1964 while according 
to By own estimates L.I.C. would reach to this objective wily a year later• 
(ii) L.I.C. TargetI 
The Corporation has drawn up a tentative Five Tear Plan of phased develop. 
Sttfet of business covering the period 1959-63 with a view to reach by 1963 to an 
annu^ new business target of Us 1,000 crores* Anntial target of new ixeinoBB 
were also fixed for the year 1997 and 1958. The target fixed each year for 
new business upto t; 1965 are given in the Table below. These targets were Hxed 
o® ^  ad hoc basis, keeping in view past performance strength and quality of 
field force available and potentiality for life Insurance business in the 
country. 
TABLE 29 
L.I.C. Five Tear Plan 
( Bs In Grores) 
New Busi- Percentage Estimated Gross 
Tsar ness Target of Increase Total Premium 
Business 
in force 
1999 il5 21.00 1810 78 
1960 ses 26.55 2160 92 
1961 665 26.70 2470 106 
1962 820 23.31 2855 121 
1963 1000 21.95 3320 140 
Estimated 
2?ncoar 141 % 83.4 79.5 
1959-63. 
SODRCESt Yogakshama, 7ol .. 5, Kq. 8-9, August-September, 1961, p 26* 
111,34. 
It will bo observed from the previous taWL© that during the five year 
periodi L.I.C. Flans to expand its new Isisineos target to Increase ligr 141 per 
eent| business In force by 83.4 per cent and premium Income bgr approximately 
60 per eent* The rate of increase visualised for the increase in life insurance 
In force and premium income is vei^ close to hqt ovr estimates of the grovtl* of 
life insTirance in force of 86 per cent and premium income of 85 per cent for 
the whole Third Five lear Plan. There is difference In the rate of Increase of 
new business figure target fixed bgr t.I.C. and w own estimates* t.I.C* fixed 
the target to increase its new business biy about 141 per cent while my own 
estimates shows a moderate Increase of about 84 per cent. A coiiqparision of the 
actual business with Ii.I.C. target would indicate over estimates regarding new 
business* Table No. 30 shows that the corporation exceeded the targets of new 
business .d\iring the first three years of its working but its business f ^ short 
of the target by about St 37 crores in the year 1960* The target of Increase 
tt<m 1960 to 1961 is Bs 130 crores and from 1961 to 1962 Bs 165 cDores and from 
mSUS 30 
L.I.C. TAROET inO ACTUiL PERFCKRMAM6B 
(BS Crores) 
Tear Hew Business Bew Bttslxiess 
Bxcess or 
Target. Uritteo. Decrease 
over Targets 
1957 260 283.07 • 23*07 
1958 325 344.68 • 19.68 
fpn reap Plan 
1999 m 429.17 * 14.17 
1960 St5 487.84 - 37.16 
1961 655 6r2.00* - 43.00 » 
1962 820 699.00* -121.00 » 
1963 1000 793.00« -207.00 « 
0 
fiOURCEt Bstiaate Committee* p 16* 
fiotet * Estimated as per Appendix B*II 
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1968 to 1963 It is 8s 180 oror<es. This on an average for the three years works 
oat to Its otores per year* The actual l^ orease for the previous three years 
1987 to 1960 has been fts SQ ororespef year on an average, that is nearly a third 
of the anticipated averago Increase in the next three- years • In W opinion, 
unless the corporation isqproves on its present performance in securing new 
business Ify about three times, the target of business fixed for 1963 can not 
be fulfilled* This is also poiAted out hgr the Bstliaates CoBualttee as foUovst 
** • • tUnless Corporation improres on its present performance in securiaag 
nev business bf about S times, the target of business fixed for 1963 
can not be fulfilled. The likelihood of the t^ fe Xneurance Corporation 
even bettering this tar^t, as indicated the Fit^ce Minister seems 
rather donbtful* (l) The Committee hopes that the target of new business 
under the Five tear Development Plans wiH not have to be substantially 
revised and suitable steps wHl be taken to review it after analysing 
the reasons for short fall in 1960 and oveincoming them»"(2) 
If the figure of Ha 1,000 orores new busineso per year is to be achieved in 1963, 
revolutionary changes, both In the social structure and In life insurance 
technique would appear to be imminent* Hoiraver, at the completion of Third Five 
Year Plan>, L.I,C. would find conducive environment to develop its new huslness 
hy more than Rs 1,000 crores per year* 
According to the Chairman of the L.I.C. the objective of mobilisation of 
saving contemplated at the time of nationalisation of life insurance, woiild be 
achieved when the Corporation hao Rs 10,000 crores of business in force. Ify 
estimates show that I<.I«C. would reach W this objective at the end of Fourth 
Five tear Pian. 
1. During the discussion on the First .Annual Report of the Corporation in the 
Lok Sabha en 6th August, 19^, the Finance Minister (Shri Horarji Oesai) 
stated as follows} **I have even told the L,I*C« that even though the work 
is better, I am not quite satisfied. I should like to have it in a greater 
volunw and we should like to reach the figure of h lOOO orores in average 
as early as possible* They have an idea of doing it within five years. 
Hell, it is good for them, bfct I would say that it can be even bettered." 
X doubt this statewlit in the lig^ t of my own estimates as well as the 
observations of Estimates Committee* 
2. Ibid, pp 17-18* 
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Fature, Growth of Life I^ quranoe Ip 
Relation to Futmre Growth of National 
iBoome. Inveataent and Saying In the Eooaoimrt 
Figure It shows the absolute growth and Table Nq. 31 shows the relative 
growth of National Income, Jnvestment, Saving, life insuranoe in force, life 
fbnd, total assets in the Indian eoonoiqjr for the period 1960-1975* It will 
be seen that the ratio of life insurance in force to National Inoome would 
Inorease from IS per cent in i960 to 29 per cent nt the end of Third Five Year 
Flan and 43 per oent at the end of Fousi^ Five Tear Plan end 8S per cent at 
the end of the Fifth Five Tear Plan. 
TABLE 31 
ESTIMATED anOUXB OF INCOME, SAVHtQ, INVESTMENT ANS I.IFB WSURANCB 
(1965-1975) 
At the end At the end At the end of 
of Third of Fourth Fifth Five Xear 
Five Tear Five lear Plan, 1975 
Plan, 1965 Plan, 1970 
33,000 . 34,000 
National Incoise 19,000 25,000 (33,500) 
Oross Investment 10^0 17,000 25»000 
Oonestio Saving 2,185 3,875 6,198 
Population 49.2 55.5 62.5 
Life Insurance in force 4,770 10,807 28,810 
Premium Inoome 191 432 998 
Life Insuranoe Fond 1,193 2,702 6,272 
Life Insuranoe Assets 1,336 3,026 7,128 
Ratio of Domestic Saving to 15-16 18-19 
Hationl Inoome 11*9 (15.5) (18.5) 
Hatio of Life Ineurance in foro® 
to National InocHne 25 43 85 
Ratio of Premium Inoome to 
National Inoome 1.0 1.7 2.9 
Ratio of Premium Incon® to Saving 8.7 11.1 16.1 
Per oapita Inooow 385 450 530 
Per capita Insurance 97 196.5 456 
SOURCESi (l) aovermnent of ifodiat The Third Five lear Plan, p 27, 
(2) Appendix B-II 
Hotel Figures for 1966 have been assumed for l96S similarly for 4>ther years* 
LiTIMATt-D fittOWTH Of IwCOMIt. 5AVIN6 AMP lnvf-STtttHT. llFE IMSUHAWCE ^ lnrOBCL. LLF£ IHSUBMU FWO. L(ft fwSUCAWCt ASStTS. 1960-75. 
5^ooo 
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From the present ratio of 15 per cent of life insurance in force to National 
Income the figure of 85 per cent appears a staggering figure. But it should be 
remembered that "by the "end of the Fifth Plan the econongr will be strong enough 
1 
to develop at a satisfactory pace without being dependent on external assistance." 
At this 'self sustained stage' it is estimated that life insurance would be 
widely accepted both as a meth(^ of protection as well as a. media of saving. 
Besides the figure is still well below of 172 per cent in Canada and per 
cent in U.S.A. 
fifter fifteen years India would reach to the life insurance ratio of 
National income which is now enjoyed b^ U.K. (67 per cent) and Australia (74 
per cent). Besides the per capita life insurance of Ss 4Sd in 1975 will be well 
bslow the per capita insui-aiic© of Ssi'SS'SSln & 13,885 in Canada and 
2 
h S499 in tf JB». Similarly the percentage of the premium income to national 
income would increase to 1*0 per cent at the end of the Third Five Tear Plan; 
1,7 per cent at the end of Fourth Five Tear Plan and 2.9 per cent at the end 
of the Fifth Five Tear Plan. The figure is still below the existing ratio of 
3.79 per cent in U.S^. 
In the estimated domestic saving the share of life insurance would increase 
from 8.7 per cent at the end of 196 5| U.O per cent at the end of 1970 and 
16.0 per cent at the end of l97S. Thi® is well bslow the present level of 28 
per cent of life ijasurance saving to total personal sating in Canada. The 
increasing share of life insurance saving in the total domestic saving will 
affect both the form and volume of personal savings. Thus with this increasing 
share of life insurance savings in the total domestic savlngj,L.I.C. would l^c -u 
1. Third Five Tear Pim, Op.oit, p 17* 
2. Coi^ted from the mid year population estimates of .Demographic /ear Book 
and Life Insurance Fact BSeic, 1962 0 InstitutS of Life Insurance USA) Tho 
currencies have been converted at the 1960-61 Exchange Rates - Reserve Bank 
of India Bulletin - February, 1962, p 269). The figures for USA and Canada 
are for 1960. Figures of U.K. are for 1959. Coversion in Indian currency are 
approximate* 
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aooumtilate huge amount of life foad. ^ life fund which emouttted to Bs 519.7 
orores in 1960 in India, will jrow at an animal rate of h 135 erores per year 
dtaring the Third Five Year Planj aw>roxliaatel7 h 300 ororee per jeor during 
the Fourth Five tear Flan and about h 700 erores per year during the Fifth 
Five rear P I M I. With a fond of this inagnit^e, it is little wonder that 
Inflisene© ©f the L.ieC, •£»» gems ggetere of the capital jsarkfet ic often 
oonsidered to te dominant, while for the olaeses of eeotirity of uhioh this 
is not thought to to already true, the rate of inorease of life funds would 
aeein to euggeet a rapidly screwing significance. 
In order to detemins whether euoh presuBqption aa ttease have any laais 
in fact, I have deaoribad the capital market activity of L.I.G. in the 
following chapter. 
Svasmry and ConcluBionf 
the potential resources of L.I.C. have b3en computed in this Chapter 
in the background of the Planning Commission's estimates of the future growth 
of the Indian economy. It has te en shown that the increasing iMpulation, 
and per capita income accompanied with increasing degree of industrialisation 
and urbanisation of the coantxy will be conducive to the futua?© growth of 
life insurance savings. It is therefore estimated that the share of L.I.C. in 
the domestic saving as judged the premium income would inorease from BS 
per cent at the end of Third Five tear Plan to 11.1 per cent at the end of 
Fourth Five Tear Plan and 16.1 per cent at the end of Fifth Five tear. The 
increasing ratio of life insurance savings would effect both the volume and 
form of savings in the Indian econouyr. The substantial growth of life fund 
V will also have considerable influence on the voltune of es$>ital formation. 
In fact life insurance which is determined bsy the economic development of 
the oountiT i« itself an important factor in influencing the pace of econoxDio 
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growth. Both are interdependent and inseparable. The investment deoisions 
of L.I.O. have a profound effect on the rate of capital formation* This 
will be evident from the following sttidy of the oapital market aotivity of 
L.I.C. 
^APfEE IV' 
iirvEsifieHf B^viooR OF XiXi. 0. m m OAPifii. u m m 
(RAFTER 17 
IMVESTMEKT BEHAVIOR OP L.I.C. IN 1HE CAPITAL MARKBT 
In general, ineurors turn to Ooveniment eeouritlee (l) When thswj is a 
lack of higher yielding private obligations posaeseing eu^ flclent safety 
features and (s) When ehanges in the struetxire of interest rates result in 
a aafvoving of the spread tetween the yields on Oovemment ol>ligat:Si.on8 and 
those on private ohUgatlons. These two hiypothesis a» verified ixi the liglit 
of the Investsient behaviour of life insuranoe ocanpanies before nationalisation 
and investment pattem of L.I.C, after nationalisation of life insuranee In 
India. In the follovlng pages I have also discussed the status L.I.O. 
inherited from the ersttAiile insurers in the capital market and have demons-
trated that the deolslons of L.I.O. to shift funds from Oovemments to other 




SCSTORICAL RESUME OF LIFE INSURANCE INVESTMENT IN GOVERNMENT SECURITISS 
Idfe insurance savings flow in the various sectors of the economy accord-
ing to the legal frasMfwork and liability olmraoteristlo features of the Insurers. 
While the legal requirements prohibit the flow of funds In certain channels» f/ 
the liability characteristics prefer lnvestii»nt in fixed earning securities 
rather than in fluctuating earning securities. In India the fixed eamiJig 
securities where the insurers have largely Invested their ftmds are the 
government securities. This is shown in Figure 14. Even a casual or hurried 
glance at the Figure would show the outstanding position enjoyed Isy Oovemaent 
securities in the investment portfolio of Indian Insurers* As a matter of 
fact the dominance of Oovemment securities in the investment portfolios of 
Indian insurers was in existence by and large since 1914. It remained unchanged 
throughout the period as the ratio of government securities to life fund was 
1. In the following analysis the f^oreign Oovemment* securities held 
Insurers have teen excluded from the term 'Ck>vemment Securities*' 

VTJi 
90*6 per oent in 1914 and in 1960 it was 76.8 per oent* flue M ^ percentage 
of Investment In giovemsdnt seouTlties vas without any legaX oon^ nilsion on tlui 
Insurers. Before 1938 there vas no statutoxy regulation of investment and in 
this period insurers invested in government securities from 76.7 per cent to 
90.6 per cent of life fund and from 62.6 per oent to 78.4 per oent of their 
assets• 
The Ihaurance Aet 1938 required an investment of 85 per oent of life funds 
in (lovemment securities, but during this period insursrs invested more than 
89 per cent in government eeouritlea vhJefe was about 70 per oent of their total 
assets. The amendedjMoJ^ of 19K) further reduced the IJjait of Investment in 
Government seourltiea to SO per cent. Here again more than 65 per cent of the 
life fund continued to flow in goveniment seourities. This clearly shows that 
Law is in no way responsible for the dorcinane© of Qovemment securities in th© 
portfolio structure of Indian life offices. Insurance oompanies invested the 
huge funds out of their own discretion and ;Judg3^ ment. 
Life Ihsurance Companies ha\re used government securities for a variety of 
purposes in solving their portfolio problems. Primarily these securities have 
been used to meet the safety, liquidity and yield reguiremsntB of the insurers 
However, a variety of other investment motives stand out whan the life insurance 
company's Investment experience in this araa is reviewed over.aperiod of time. 
I have marked out the folloMng four periods to describe the Investment behaviour 
of life insurance companies In Oovemm^nt Securities. 
Ii Period comraeneing from 1914 till the establishment of the Heserve Bank of 
India - 1914-1934. 
lit An era of cheap Money Policyt Beginning sinoe the establishment of the 
Reserve Bank) of India - 1935-1950. 
III* Period after the adoption of Kew Monetary Policqrt The Troaeuay Reserve 
Bank Accord, 1951-1955. 
I7t The period after the Nationalisation of Life ^ uturanoe, 19S6-X960. 
It Period Cofflmenoing From 1914 till the Eetahllwhawff^  
of the Reeerro Bank of India. l9lA»lg34i 
Tahle ehows the inveetment of life fund in Qovenuoent seourities sinoe 
1914 to 1934* It will be seen that during these two decades vhioh eomprise the 
First World War and the depression of 1929, there was revf little change in the 
investment of life fund in OoTemment seourities* 1914 more than 90 per oeat 
of life fund flowed in Oovemment securities* ffais peroentage remained more or 
less constant throiighout the war period* As a percentage to assets the Oovem-
ment secttrities were 75*4 per cent in 1914 and 74 per cent in 1919* IQ the 
post-war decade frcsa 1919 to 1928 the proportion of government securities to life 
TABLE 32 
BATIO OF OOVERHMENT SE0ORITIES TO LIFE FOHD AND TOTAL ASSETS 
19l4-193f4 
-TSfT- Total Government Government Oovemment Securities 




ae peroentage to 
total Assets 
1914 6.41 7.70 9,8 90.6 79.4 
1918 6.8 8.22 6.2 91.1 79.8 
1916 7.0 8.90 6.3 90.9 74.7 
1917 7J8 9.44 9.9 81.9 74.8 
1918 7.4 9.19 6.8 91.9 73.8 
1919 7.9 9.82 7.3 92.4 74.4 
1920 8.5 10.96 7.7 90.9 73.4 
1921 8.6 10.88 7.9 91.8 72.9 
1922 9.4 11.76 8.9 90.4 72.9 
1923 10.3 12.70 9.0 87.3 71.1 
1924 11.5 13.74 9.8 89.2 71.2 
1929 12.6 14.86 I0t9 83.3 70.8 
1926 13.8 16.17 U.4 82.6 70.4 
1927 13.7 17.73 12.4 72.6 70.0 
1928 17 23.31 19.8 91.9 
1929 18.7 29.61 17.0 90.9 6e.3 
1930 20.5 27.68 19.18 77.0 £7,1 
1931 22.5 30.02 19.7 87^ :5 65,6 
1932 29.1 32.91 20.9 83,3 63.6 
1933 28.8 37.69 24.0 B3.2 63.$ 
1934 31.9 42.11 26.4 EB.'S 62.7 
SOURCES Reserve Bank of Indiat Bankijig and Hcnetaxy Statistics* Sec» II* 
III.4 
ftoid was 85 per cent and the peiioontage of Oovernment aeourltiee to total 
asaets was more than 70 per oent. In the depresaion years from 1929 to 1931 
over eo per oent of the life fund remained Invested in government seouritiea. 
If we divide the period 1914 to 1934 into two deoades* the decreasing 
tendeno7 of the Investment of life fond in government seoorities will bsoomo 
<iuite evident. In the deoade 1914 to 1923 the peroentage of life fund invested 
in Oovemment seoorities on an average was 89 per cent and the percentage of 
government securities to total assets on an average was 74 per cent* 2n the 
deoade 1924 to 1933 the percentage of life fund invested ia Oovemment securities 
on en average was 86 per oent and the percentage of Oovemment securities to 
total assets at an average was 69 i»r cent* It win also be seen that whereas 
in the decade 1914-1923 the proportion of government securities to total assets 
fell Isgr about 6 per oent* in the deoade 1924-1933 the proportion declined bv 
about 9 per cent. 
11* An Era of Cheap Monetary Policyt 1935-1950 
This period can be further divided into three sub-periods} 
(i) Pre-war period 1935-1938. 
(ii) War period 1939-1949. 
(iii) Post-war period 1946-1950. 
Py—way 
Since the foundation of the Beserve Bank of India as the Central Bonk of 
the country in 1935 to November, 1951, the Bank Rate was maintained stable at 
3 per oent» In the context of the special conditions ohamcterising the Indian 
econoogr (such as a low rate of savings and so the shoziiage of loanable funds, 
and a major sector of the money market i.e. the indige^ icufi m<»iey market being 
outside the purview) this rate tmetimed &a the embodiment of the (dieap fflane7 
policy. It was, in fact, followad by the monetary as an Instrument 
III.5 
of economio revival ftxm the oandltlons of th® depreseion. 
^nds Zed to decline in the yield on Qovenament aeoorltiea and otmaeqaently 
recorded & fall in iasurera' inveatment in Oov^mmsnt aeouritiea. Fig. ahowa 
the declining yield on 3 per cent tmdated Ctoves^ osient paper aince 1931« It 
will be aeen that the yield which waa 5,94, per cent la 1931 to 348 
per cent in 1935 and to 3*34 per cent in 1938. 
TABI.E 33 
R A T I O OP (mmsmm S B C O R I T I E S TO L I F E POMD mn TOTAL ASSETS 
1935-1945 
Ufe Total Oovem* Oovenment Qovemment 
Year Fund Aaaeta ment aeouritiea Seouritiea aa 
Seouritiea aa proport- propcortion to Total 
ion to Life Aaaeta 
Fimd 
1935 35 .21 48.8 28.0 79.5 87.3 
1935 40.30 50.5 31A 77 61.6 1937 45.00 55.9 34.1 7P,5 60.6 1938 50 .SO 62.0 38,1 75.3 61.5 
1939 56.30 70.0 43.0 76.5 61.4 
1940 62.40 76.3 46.6 74.7 61.1 
1941 68.80 84.8 52.7 76.6 62 « 1 1942 70.00 97.2 61.4 87.7 63.2 
1943 84.20 107 J! 72.2 83.4 65.5 
1944 94.50 122.7 82.0 86.8 66.8 
1945 107.50 138.3 95*0 88,3 ' 68.6 
SOURCESt Reaerve Bank of Xndiat Hcmetaxy and B^mking Statiatica, Op.cit* 
Talile Ng, 33 ahowa the in^ct of falling yield on the inaiirera* Inveatment 
in Qovenuaent aeouritiea. It will be aeen that the proportion of Qovenment 
aeottritiea to total aaaeta which waa 62*7 per cent in 1934 fell to 57*3 per 
eent in 1935* Aa a percentage of life fund the inveatment in Oovemmentv^ o..^ .. 
1. Aaaula, Nalinkumari Operationa of the Reaerve Bank (1935-1954) 
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aeearltiee foil from 88.6 per oeat in 1W4 to 72 .S per eent in 19SS. 
The insttrera need to earn at least 'asaioned rate* of Interest forced them 
to investment in high earning Corporate Seororities* Thus the fig* shows 
that the proportion of corporate seeorities to total assets has gradually 
increased vhile the ratio of gorenuaeut aeoarities to total assets hegm to 
decline alxmg with the fall in /ield on govexnment securities. 
The World tfar II fram 1939 to 1&4S 
During this period the <^eap money policy became an instrument of ttar 
finance* The goveDiment of India financed the var mainly by loans raised in 
terms of 3 per cent «ite of interest* In pursuance of its cheap money policy 
it progressiv'ely isqsroved its terms of borrowing through the reduction in ^ 
rate of interest and throuipbi raising the period of maturity of the loans or as 
veil as by increasing the issue prices of the loons* 
The maintenance of cheap mcmey policy had a marked effect in stabilising 
the gilt-edged market as well as in etimolatlng interest in it* In consequence^  
there took place a lowering of yields m existing securities and a rise in 
their prices* But the insurers increased their investments in government seouri* 
ties in spite of the fall of yield because of various curlHs on private investment 
«Meh controlled the demand fo^ '^  capital funds such as control throu^ Capital 
Issue Act. Besides* investment in private enterprises became uncertain and 
risigT;, during the war* The Qovemment also used moriO. pressure on the insurers 
to finance its war efforts as the insurers in other countries were also playing 
the similar role* Table No* 33> therefore» shows that during the war period 
the portfolio structtire of the insurers became very similar to the pattern which 
they had during the World War I period. Oovemment securities once again re-
gained their position. The proportion of Oovenaaeat seouri ties to life fund 
vMoh vae only 7S.3 per oent IA 1938 iacraaaed to 76*5 per cent IA 1939» 67.7 
per oent in 1943 aod 88«5 per cent in 1949« Similarly the proportion of Cbvexn-
nent secm'ltlee to total assets inoreaeed from 81*5 per oent in 1938 to 83«2 
per oent in 1942 and 68«6 per oent In 1945, 
The inoreasing tendenoy of investnusnt in Oovemment seourities will be 
mor« from the following Table which shows the net Inoroase in Total 
investment and the peroentage of net increase of Government securities to the 
not addition made in tho total investment. 
TABU 34 
NET CHANGES HI OOVERNMEHT SEOORmSS AND TOTAL IMVESTMISNT OP LIFE INSDHMCE 





Set Changes in 
Govennmont 
Seourities 
Hot Gh^ges in 
Government 
Securities as 
percentage to fiet 
Changes to total 
Investment 
1939 7.5 4.9 65.3 
1940 6.9 3.6 SZJi 
1941 8.8 6.1 69.3 
1942 10^8 8.7 80.6 
1943 8..S 8.9 1Q0..0 
1944 13.6 11.8 86.8 
1945 14.4 13.0 90.3 
Tota 70.18 57-0 "8-0.(5 
SOURCE; As for Table 33 
It will be seen that in the first three years of war only 65 per oent to 
69 per cent of the new fund flowed in Government seoorlties* 1943 when 
serious restrictions were imposed on private investment^  looroper oent of the 
1 
new Investment flowed in Government securities. 1944, 86,8 per oent of the 
nev investment flowed In Government securities and in 1945 it reached to 90,3^. 
1. This was mainly at the cost of mortgages. Real Estate and Policy Loans. 
III. 9 
Tha PoflWr Period (From I94fi to 1980^  
In tlu» post-war period^  the oheap money polioy vea oontiaued la Indiat 
"partly for kaeping the interest harden on ^ e;;)|iublio debt as low 
as poesibXe, bit aXeo to stlfflolate investment as a loeana of fall 
prodttotion«"(l) 
And also the polioy was employed by the Government ast 
''The oomsr-stone of borrowing polioy teoame the iM>billsation of 
funds required by government as (d»aplgr as possible without in 
Bxij way affecting the flow of investment into indU8tx7.'*(2) 
It nay be pointed out liere that in spite of the oheap money polioy followed^  
the straoture of interest rates in the money aarl»t of the ooxmtry tended to 
harden progressively and the effective rates of interest in the long-tem 
capital market tended to inorease the progressive fall in the prices of 
industrial securities. Thus the advantages of oheap money remained oonfined 
to the borrowing programme of the government and the? did not peroulate into 
3 
other sectors of the eoommy* This led to the flow of life insurcoioe funds 
in the private sector idiere the 'yield' on investment was increasing in contrast 
to the yield on government securities* Thus the insurers fluids gradually 
flowed in private seotor immediately after war* Talde 35 iMieates the 
falling I^ reentage of Obvernment securities* 
TABLE 35 
INSOBEBS Jsmsmsir W GOVERHMENT SECOBITIBS 
1946>1950 
Percentage of il^ ereentage of 
Life Total Govern- Government Qovemasttt 
Tear Fund Assets ment Securities Securities to 
Securi- to life Fund Total Assets 
ties 
1946 116.6 151.5 101.4 86.9 66.9 
1947 129.7 168.3 107.0 82.5 65.5 
1948 180.4 193.1 119.0 79.1 61.6 
X949 173.S 219.1 127.2 73.3 58.1 
19S0 iai.5 227.5 128.4 70.8 56.4 
SOtmCBi As for Table S3 
1* Report of the I2th General Meeting of Shareholders of the Reserve Bank of 
India,5th August<5 »p 44. 
2. The Budget Speech of the Finanoe Minister* Government of Indiai 
1947-48 (First Post-Indepe^enoe Budget)» p 18. 
3. Tripath7,R.Ki Fiscal Polioy and Boonomic Development, The World PressCPjLtd., 
Galoi]tta,l958| p 2a.9» 
IV,fl 
It shows that ih the Post-*var pdriod (1940-90} investment in Ckmimmsnt 
seeorities gradiuilly fell. the peroentage of Qov&tmmt seooritles to 
life fund was 88.3 per eent and percentage of govenuoent seoturities to total 
assets was onljr 68*6 per oent. the peroentase of govenunent seourities 
to life fund decreased to 82.6 per cent and as peresntag© to total assets it 
fell to 85.9 per cent* This can be compared with figure 35 which shows that 
the yield cm 3 per eent tmdated Qove«jaent securities declined from 3.10 per 
cent in 1945 to 2*93 per eent in 1947. 
The falling tendency of the insorers investment in the post-war peilod is 
store evident fr<»a the following tahle^ iwhich indieatee the percentage of Set 
increase in (kivemments to net increase in total investsent deolined from 75 
per cent in 1946 to 43.1 per cent in 1947 and 14 psr cent in 1950* 
lABm 36 
HKT CHAWaBS IH OOVEBKMSKT SEC0RITIE3 AKD TOTAL IHVESTMEJJT OF LIFE mSORAHCB 
COMPAHIES 
(The Post-War Period 1946-80) 
. (R$. CRcRES) 
Het increase 




Porcsutsge of net 
income in Qovem-
ment securities 






















Total 72 .8 33.3 45,7per cent 
SOUROBt As for Table No. 35 
The conclusion is, therefore« Inevitable that while the insurex^ s had been 
gmerally retaining the Oovemment seourities that they had already porohaaed^  
they had been diverting a substantially larger share of fresh imrestible funds 
to noxi'-goreramnt seeorities* 
IV: The Period of the Berlval of Monetary Polieyt 
Yharjiftasttry Reserve Bank Aceordi 
The First Five tear Plan imo laTjnohed on let April, 1951 imder inflationary 
conditions. Institutional preferences for investment in private sector were 
increasing due to decline in yield in government seeurities* Thus to create 
the favourable atmosphere for the hoxTovixig progratame of the govenunent^  steps 
were taken to enforce the necessary degree of disoipllno in the money market* 
On November 19» 19S1 the Bank rate was raised to per cent from 3 per cent at 
which level it had remained since 1939. As such it led to the end of an era of 
cheap money policy oa the one haMt * revival of monetaxy policy' on the other 
as effective instrument of control• But it ime soon realised that the necessazy 
be 
discipline in the mwiey market can not/imposed through traditional methods of 
quantitative control such as open market operatic* Reserve Requirements and 
regulation of credit* These control msasrares had focussed primarily on the 
behaviour of oommercial banks, but the growth of non-bank lenders made the 
problem of credit control considerabOLy laore difficult. Under such changing 
conditions in the monetary environment, it was n^cessaty to forge new to<As to 
cope with the new tasks. The moot promising of the instrument which had been 
brou^t to the forefront was not new since the core of the measure open market 
operation - had been a leading n»thod of Central Bank orodit Control for several 
decades* The new element in the matter were the i^entation and objectives of 
systematic activities in m<»iey end capital market* The focus of the new operas* 
tions was the structuxo of interest rates on Qkyvemment securities while the 
target was th© low of funds flowing from non-bank financial intermedi^es as 
well as the control of commsrcial banks reserves. Thus in 1931 the Reserve 
Bank adopted new ivmetary device to supplement its credit control through Q ^ 
Rate. It witlii^ drew support to the securities market and its public announceaent 
1. Almaula, Nalla Kumar: Op.Cit., p 168, 
resulted In a sharp fall in the prioes of gilt-edged* ^ Reserve Bank of T^Mn 
lUadest avmber of the Qovemm^t of India seouritles (base 1938">lC^ ) ( See .also 
:lFigure ,15 ) deoliaed from 98.0 for the week ended November 10, 1951 to 92.7 
dvoring the week ended Oeoember 1* The 3 per cent oonversion loan which was 
being quoted at the official support levsl of Ss 92.11 sinoe September 17, declined 
to h 87-8 hgr November 15, and to Bs 80 bsr Deoember 3. Sioilarly, the yield on 
3 per oent oonrersion loan whioh had stood at 3*09 per cent at the ^  of Manh 
19S0 and 3.24 per cent at the end of September^ 1991 rose to 3*73 per oent ligr 
the end of December* 19Sl« 'IRie inorease In the yield of other long-dated govem* 
ment securities was more or less of the same magnitiuie. This subsequently 
ehecked the tendency of the shift in insurers funds from i^Temment seoutities 
to other forms of seeoritios* 
TABLE dn 
LIFE IHSORANCB BTVESTMrar IB QOVEBNMENT SBODRITIES 
1951-1955 
Life Total Ooresument Perdent^ge 
Tear Bund Assess Seourities of (3) to(l) percentage of (3) to (i 
1 2 3 4 5 
1951 197.0 2Se.l 136.9 6:8*5 94.3 
19S2 231.9 295.4 156.2 67.3 83.8 
1953 255.6 318.2 168.0 65.7 83.4 
1954 277.8 343.0 173.4 6234 50.7 
1955 299.7 370.5 188.9 63.0 50.9 
SOURCBt Insurance lear Books. 
The above table shows that although the percentage of goreTmmt securities 
to life fund end the percentage of government securities to total assets conti-
nued to decline taxt the rate of decline ^ as considerably c jorrasted:: during the 
period 1951-95 • This would be evident firom the fact that whereas in the five 
year period 194'^90 the percentage of Qovemment securities to life fimd haii 
1. Repprts on Currency and Finance: p 34. 
17,12 
deelined bgr m n tiian 18 i>er o^t it doif^Mea tgr 8.7 par oent ia the period 
1981-95* SioUarly the percentage of goTerament seeoritiea to total assets 
vSolcdx deolined m»re than 19 per e^t in the period 1949*90 deeliiied onljr 
l:gr 6 •! jper cent ia the period 1991-99* 
The ine^ Peasing anKnmt of investment in government seoorities during this 
period will be aore evid^it from the felloifisg delate s 
tmz 
HBT GHANOBS IB INVISSfMSBT IK OOVERNMEKT SEOQHITIES AS PERCmAQE fO HET A0OITI(»I 
W fOTAL INVESTHEilf 
1991-99 
&et Addition In Net Addition in Percent^ [e of 
tear Total Investment Govenuaent 2 to 1 
Seettritiew, 
1 2 
1991 XM 8,9 48 JS 
1993 39.0 19,3 
1993 22,7 U,8 51,9 
1994 19,0 9,4 28.4 
1999 23,3 19,9 96,7 
Total 122,3 60,9 49,9 
SOOROSt As for Table 37 
It viU be observed that in 1991* the first year when the laimetax/ poli<qr 
was revived oat of the total amount of Ss 18*4 oreres invested fis 8,9 orores or 
per oent of the new amotmt flowed in Qovenmeat seearities* This was a sig-
nifieuit iiiq;>rovetD9nt ttm 14.4 per oent in 1990* Sjnee then the inoreasing 
amount bad been flowing in Gbveziuiient seourities ext^pt of oouinse in the year 
1994 when the percentage fell to 28*4 per oent as against 91*9 per oent in 1993. 
It wa8» however, a toa|>orai7 ohange as the percentage of Qovemment odouritios 
again iiaproved to 74 per oeaxt in 1959. Iioouag to the period as a whole it 
will seen that between 1991 and 1955 new stsa invested was Bs |22 eroresi of 
which Bs 60 aS ororee i.e* SO per eent flowed in Oovexnment seoorities as against 
49 per eent in period 194$*S0* 
Altho^h insorers imrestioettt iXi Ctovenunent seoorities/^t^ inoreased during 
the period* a change has oenared in the composition of their holding of different 
types of OoTemaent seeurities, these daanges are shown in the following tattle* 
39 
COMPOSITBB OP QOVERKMaif SECURITIES 
1938-1955 
Central State Oovem-
7ear Qovenutent stent Seoori-
Beoorities ties• 
CentralState Total of nS Staite^vem-
and other Oovemm^t Oovem*- Eient seeuri" 
Seoorities Seeoritias aent as ties as per^ 
pereentage eentage to 
to tpial total Ofovem-
(kftBtrmsacA stent Seeori-
Seoorities ties* 
1938 0.4 5.5 38*1 84*5 1*4 
1939 37.0 0.4 5.6 43.0 86.0 0.9 
1940 40.1 0.9 6.0 48*6 86.0 l.O 
1941 48 0.9 6.0 SS8.7 87.7 0.6 
19 S4JS 0.5 6.7 61.4 88.3 0.6 
1943 62.8 0,6 6.8 70.2 89.5 0.9 
1944 74.4 0.8 6.8 82.0 90*7 1.0 
1945 87 JS 1*0 6*9 99.1 91.7 1.0 
1946 92.8 1.0 7.6 101*4 91.9 1.0 
19 96.1 1.2 9.7 307.0 89*8 0.9 
V34S 106*8 2.2 10*0 U9.0 89*8 1.8 
1949 113.5 2*7 11.0 327.2 89.2 2.3 
19 SO MS .7 4.7 11.0 328*4 87*8 3.7 
1981 121*6 1*6 13.7 136*9 88.1 1J2 
19m 322.1 16*4 17.7 196.2 78*8 10*9 
1953 326.8 22.4 18.8 168*0 76*6 13.3 
1954 131.1 23.9 18.4 173*4 79*6 13.8 
1955 137.3 30*6 21.0 188*9 74*8 16.2 
SOiniCBt Reserve Bank of Indiat 
Insttranoe Tear Books. 
Banking and Monetaxy Statistics 
ni.u 
It will te observed that tlU X9$l investment was mainly in Central 
Government eeooritiea. The ratio of Central Government eeourities to total 
government securities held insurers was 86*2 per cent vhile State Government 
securities vas onljr 1.1 per cent* In 19S2 the percentage holding of Central 
Government securities fell to 78.8 per cent; and percentage of investment in 
State Government sewalties increased to 10.5 per cent. In 19S5 tha ratio of 
Central Government securities to total Qovomment securities fell to> 74.8 per 
cent iMle that of State Qovemaent aeourities Improved to 16*2 per cent* It 
can tterefore safely 1B said tiiat the increase in insurers investment in 
Government securities since 19S2 largely came through their inveetaaent in 
States. This is due to a variety of reasons. In fact, since the beginning 
of the First Five tear Plan the State Governments Isscaoe important boinrotier 
in the capital market. They, therefore offered a higher rate of interest on 
their securities. Th© risk on their pbligationatwas^ aleo rodacod as the loans 
were floated with the active coordination of the Central Government and tl» 
Reserve Bank of India. Further the State Qovenmients with the Gonsultatii>i| 
of the Reserve ^ k especially designed the'^ v^ maturity pattern of their 
obligations to suit the imrestment requiarements of the Insurers and other 
1 
institutional investors in the country* Those changes in the borrowing 
tedhniqw of the State Governments considerably infLuenceXthe investment 
policy of the insurance comapnies d\irlng the First Five Tear Plan* 
of Diti fferent Maturity Groupt 
An important reason of investment in goverment securities is the maturity 
distribution whi<fli enable the insurers to 'match the securities with the tem of 
their liaixllities. Thus Table ^ shows that insurers investment have been 
fairly distributed in Qovemment securities of different maturity. In 1955, for 
example, insurers hold 40 per cent of their fund in the maturity group 6 to 10, 
1. Tripathy, Op.Cit., p 219. 
'IV.21 
9.4 per osnt in 1-9 year^  16.4 per oeat la 11-19 yo&m, 12.8 per eent in 18 to 
20 fear giraup end 16.9 per oent irredeemalile. 
The exoesslve oonoontration in the mediuffl term loans vae due to limited 
secnurities available for inves^ oent in the market ae in the borrowing prograame 
TABLE m 
MATURITX 0ISTRIBOTIOJI OP MS0BM8 
HOLDlNa 
Percentage to total of Cbvemment 
Securities 
19SS 1953 1994 1959 
Avearage 
1st to 5th Tear U.1 11.3 6.8 9.4 , 9.7 
6th to lOth Tear 23.9 29.0 37.1 40.6 31.7 
Uth to 19th Tear 21.6 28.7 22,9 16.4 22.4 
16th to 20th year 8.3 1.0 1.4 12.8 9.8 
2lst to 25th Tear 11.9 na 12.7 2.4 9.9 
26th to 30th Tear 0.7 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.6 
Slst to 39th Tear 20.1 18.6 0.2 0.1 9.7 
36th to 40th Tear 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.9 0.4 
Irredeemable 2.9 3.0 18.4 16.9 10.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100.0 
SOtTHOBs Insurtmoe Tear Book«. 
of Gkyveronent of India long term eeourities wore paroportionately amall. In the 
absenoe of the long tern eeeurities euffioient in mmber ]bdian losurera largely 
concentrated on meditim term securities. HoveTer> the «trtttgen<gr of long teim 
seearitiea was sufficiently relieved at the end of the last year of the First 
Five Tear Plan as the Ctovemoent reoriented its totrowing progr^ iame and intro-
duced eecuritieo of v-aeying matU3fity group to suit the investment requirements 
2 
of the institutional investors. 
1* The sudden increase in irredeeoahle securities in 19S4 and drastic decline 
in the category of securitie* maturity between 31st to SSth lear does not 
represent any real shift because it is dtui to change in tho mothcd cdoft ed 
by the controller of Insurance in preparing these figurds. See The Indian 
Insurance tear Book» 19S5 (Selhi^  1959), p l8. 
2. Tripathy,R.K: Op.Cit., p 222. 
It will also be clear that inaurere invested a y&ry oaall enountf nearly 
9.? per cent in short-tempgoTerHiaent eeouritiee* Their main attraoti(»a waa 
the redeeaaKLe longai and as the Table ^ oira they chiefly invested in redeeoable 
longs oattiring between 6 and IS years^ vhioh amounted to 53. i per cent of the 
total gowTtjfflenfc securities held by them. Long-dated seoiirities mataring 
after 30 years eaae to 21.2 per cent of the total. Ke*t in ioportano® laevo 
redeemable longs of 18-25 year group whi<^ olaiaed IS* 4 per cent of the total. 
Sintff of Li^ Inyiranoei 
Sinee the adopti<»i of new poMoy in 19S1, the Beserve monetaty 
poli^ has been one of controlled exipnsion' * a policy of general restraints 
alongside action to augiaent the flow of credit into specific sectors. Honetaxy 
and credit policy was» therefore i goverued by two considerations of assistii^ 
grotiing eoonooy aod restraining infl.ationary pressures caused ty deficit 1 
fin^cing during the two Plan Periods. Under this policy of credit controls* 
the yield on go-fenotent securities oontinued to rise. Figure 16 shows that 
the yieM on government securities of various maturity grotq;» bns steadily 
increased since 19^. ratio of dnvernment seotirities to life fund €»nse* 
quently increased ttcm 61.7 per cent in 19^ to 65*7 per ceoft in I960* The 
ratio of govemimt securities to total assets also inoreased front 56.6 pst 
cent in 19S6 to 58.t per cent in I960, 
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FBRCENTiUIiE OF OOVERMIT SBCQHITISS TO Z.IFE F0ND akd fof All mms 
1956.1960 
Tear Xiife Fund total Assets Total Oovem» Percentage of 







19S6 380.6 415.0 234.9 61.7 56.6 
1957 410.4 465.0 260.6 63.4 54.0 
1958 447.8 504.8 292.8 65.4 58.0 
1959 SS3.9 316.7 63.9 87.2 
I960 560.4 622*5 365.4 65.2 58.7 
1. U p o n n o n Q ^ n ^ ^ S ^ ^ r ^ S m ' ^ i ^ ' ^ ' ' ' ' ' ^ ' ' 

In 19S7, th® imi^ii^of the Reserve Bank rate from per coat to 4. per 
oBAt further hardened the yield on government seoiiritlea. 7he yield (riat) 
of the 8 per cent conversion loan of 1946, for example * rose from 3.91 |)er 
cent to 4>.04 per cent* In the ease of State loans also tte) inoroase in ^ riold 
was about i per oent. Xn 1958, therefore, the ratio of net increase in OoYern-
ment securities to the net addition to the total investment increased to SO .5 
per cent from per cent in 1957* 
t 
It will be ttoie be seen that after the nationalisation of life insurance, 
Ii.I.O*s investment in government securities oontimied to rise in vies of the 
increasing yield on government securities* fat^ c 4& also shows that out of 
of 
the total fresh investAble fund Is 2S2 crores during 1956-1960 nearly 70 per 
cent flowed in government securities. 
7ABLB HO 
ms mCRBASE in GOVERNMEHT SEOUEITIES AS PERCENTMB 70 INCRE&SE IH TOtiO. 
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Total 2S2.0 176.5 70.0 
SOURCEi Annual Reports and Aeoottnts, It.I.C. 
IV.X'B 
Another inportant iraaooin for the inoreaae iuvestmentjt^ Oovdms^nt seeurl-
ties, was the policy of regional development and OeoifraiMcal diiwmifioation 
which the Ciorporation followed throo^ the State Qovemnent securities* Since 
the Industrial and eoonomio de'velopomt of the Tarions States and Regions was 
uneven and apportunities for investosnt therein were eonrespoodlng^ unequal* 
the Oorporation io^emented its poli^ through State Government securities* 
This ic evident from fable 45, tAiich shows that during 1956 and 1960 the 
ratio of Qentrel Qovemraent seovtritie« to total goremmnt seourities has dec* 
lined from 7s ,6 per cent to 62.5 per cent; the share of State Govenunent 
securitios has increased from 14»5 per oant to 25*9 per coat* 
fABLE 43. 
COJlPOSmON OP OOVERIJMEHI? SBGMITIgS 
HELD BY L. I. C. 1956-1960 
{ Rs Crores ) 
Central State Oovem- Monioipal Total Peroeno Perewi-
tear Government ment Seouri* Seourities Qovem-" tage of tage 










19S6 170*7 34.0 30 JS 234.9 72*6 14.4 
19^ 185*6 42.9 32.5 260*6 7148 16*3 
1958 200.4 59*4 37.0 292.8 68.9 18.9 
19S9 212.2 64.1 39.9 316.7 67*0 20.4 
1960 228*3 94.9 42 365*4 62*4 25.9 
Per^Atage 
inoreaBed(>) 'or- +35.7 
decrea sed ( - ) - ' ' I I — 
+179.2 +S3.1 "^ 55,6 -14.e +79.8 
SOORCBt Xi.I.Ct ixmual Bdports and Aooounts. 
Hat^ tfitv Distribution of 
L^I.C^a Investmentst 
table No. 414 oompares the aatnrity pattern of L.I.C, from December 1957 
to March I960* 
t&sm m u 
H A T i m i T i mimmm o p k L C a mmssmsr n aommmr 
S E C U R I T I S S 
199? >1960 
( PiS Crores ) 
JSndistg Peroen- HcdiEig Peroenr- Ending Sndiag l^ erowk-
Beoem- tage Oeoem- tege Hareh tage Itareh tage 
ber ber 1959 1960 
1987 1958 Amount Amount 
^ount Amount 
0-5 years 26.07 100.6 53.66 19.5 53.44 19.0 76.78 25.1 
5-10 yoars 106. # 43.3 91.80 33.4 92.8S 33.0 67.65 22.1 
10-15 years 58.87 21.5 68. SS 24.9 70.56 25.0 91.52 29.9 
Over 15 years 22.87 9.3 23.50 8.5 27.U 9.6 31.96 10.4 
Kon-Tenoinable 57.79 15.4 37.80 13.7 37.82 13.4 37.88 12.4 
Total 246.09 100.0 275.14 100.0 28 1.81 100.0 305.73 100.0 
SOUEOBi Beservo Bank of India Salldtin, febraarsr^  1930 am Marmi, i96a.« 
The salient feature of inv^ estment in t ^ (i^ oimrment seeorities 
is the oonetanoy in tlie proportion of obligations of &»10 aatixrity groups. 
Pigare 17 whi^ ^ o m the average of the different maturity groups of govern-
oent seouirities held Igr Ii.I.C. duriag the period 195?->1960 also hring out 
these tendenoies sonewhat irivCLy. In 1937, it viU to observed froa the 
table that 411 per eent of the li.X«0'e holdings of government securities vas 
in the laaturit.y group 5-10 yiarsj 21 p r eent in 10-lS ^ arsj 9.S per eent 
in over IS years maturity group* <uad about 10.8 per cent in 0-5 years maturity 
group. Zt will also be seen that during the four year period the situation 
has oonsiderahly ohanged. At the end of ^ taroh^  I960, the highset o(»roentr»-
tion ccmtinued to be in 10-15 years group i.e. about 30 p>r cent, the next 
highest eoneentration was in the 0-S year sndJUMiO yeegs Interval i.e. 
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diminishdd. Investment in non-tenBlnable maintained its old position. These 
changes in the conoentxution of diff^z^nt mat\irity groups reveal oertain 
peculiar feature in gssotp fts agaisurk of life insurance tnuiness. They 
show clearly that L.I.C** because of the character of its operation and 
Investment needs« is primarily interesbed in owning long*term securities as 
distinguished from short or intennodiate term obTlgntion. It also sviggests 
that L.I.G. has a continuing demand for a moderate amount of short and medium 
term Issues with maturity or eeH dates of less than ten years. PresumabOly 
suc^ holdings serve as a source of ready cash and as an eld in adjusting its 
investment policies. Xt seems that this demand has increased in 1960. Finally 
the data also indicates that as' time passes and as the longer term securities 
held fey L.I.C. becen^  Sorter dated these holdings were reduced. Besides^  
the Corporation also increases its ho]^ ing of short-term securities when the 
expestations regarding long term interest rates are imcertaln. These ^Ihifts 
on t oe part of Ii.I.C. even though are based purely upon its internal requirements| 
have important reperci^ ssion on the bond prices. X have simplified this aspect 
of L.I.C6 InvestBBnt in the next section. 
* SECTIOH 2 
IMPACT 0? THE GROWTH AND FLOW OP LIF6 FOMD IK THE BOHD KARE T 
/ 
the last section has shown that the insurers have invested growing volume 
of life fund in govsmaent securities. This has not only made the I».I.C. as 
an important 8ot»rce of supply of capital funds to the Public Sector bat has 
aliso made it an iapertaat Institution in the gilt edged section of the capital 
market. In the following pagee X have explained the significance of life 
fxuid in financing the borrowing programme of the government during the First 
and Second Five lear Planaj tns comparative position of L.I.C. in the Bond 
Market; the relation which Ii.I.C. has established with tha Treasury and th® 
Monetary authorities* 
'IV.21 
Pftrtloipatlon of jtosurore la Flnanolmt the 
Frogramaa of the Qoyamment dxixdng thfl let.Five Tear Plani 
Th® First Five lear Plan had visiialiaed an aggfegate long term borrouing pro-
grmm amounting to Is US eroree for both ths Oentral and the State QoTdrnments for 
finanoing the dereXopment expendittare. Mt the aggregate net borroiring logr the 1 
Central and State Clovemisenta during th$ pl^ period aiBounted to h 202.8 orores* 
A number of factors have oontribated to the auooess of the borroviag programme 
of the pttblie authorities. 3!he reorinetation of the teolmiqoe of paKLie borrowing 
during the Plan has oonsisted not only in the linking up of Oovemment borrowing 
and pablio investment bat also in Iranohlng together of shorty medium and longer 
term issues with a view to seeuring hotter response from different categories of 
investors, especially the insurers. Ths yield on the securities of the State Oovezn-
ment was made progressively attractinfts. Interest on State« Loans were raised from J 
3 psr cent to per cent end then to 4 per cent in response to the new monetary 
• 2 
policy. The period of their maturity was also shortened* The reorientaticoi of 
borrowing prograsmKi wfaidi was on example of close coordination of the State Qowva-
ments* Cmtral Qovexnii^ nt and the Heserve ^ k attracted the flow of life fund 
since 1951* This will be eivdent from the table which shows the contribution made by 
the Insurers in ths borrowing programme of the Central and the State aovemments. . 
during the First Five Tear Plan* TABI£ fiO 49 
COHTRIBOTIOK OP IHSORBRS IH CEHTRAL AND STATE OOVERNMENTS M>AKS - 1951-55 
t Ik Orores) 
Central Qoymment State Oovemment Percentage of 
tear Rupee Insurers Percentage Perma- Insurers Insurers holding 
Loans Investm^t of insu- nent Investment of State Cbvem- ' 
rers to total Debt. ment. 
1981 1,438.4S 121.6 8.4 133.71 1.6 1.2 
1982 1,403.51 122.1 8.7 145.00 16.4 11.3 
1953 1,403.58 126.8 9.0 179.94 22.4 12.5 
1994 1,364.27 131.1 9.3 190.53 23.9 12.5 
1955 1,474.89 137.3 9.3 264.48 30.6 u.i 
SOURCEt Report eaa^i Current end Finance 
1. report on-ths-Proves, of tha Plan - 1954-55> pp 24-2d» 
2. ¥ripatby> R.Bt Loc.Citt pp 219*223. 
It will be seen from the above table that insurera have fiiioaoed tbe bonr«fiH> 
lug pregmnm of the Central and the State Qovexnments at an inereaaing rate 
during the First Five tear Plan. The progress is more iiotevorthy in the State 
Qovernment seonritiee t^ere the insurers oontrlbation eharpljr inoreaaed trm 
1.1 per eent in 19sl to 12.5 per eent in 1064 and 11 per oent in 1955. The 
sharp inoreass in State seoorities due to the faot that during the period 
State ^ z^tflng c inoreased at a tm^ higher pace than the Sentral Ctoveroment 
bcoToiriBgs* Thejr also offers a better yield and maturity pattern than the 
1 
CbQtral Ckyvemment* 
of the Qovemment duriag the Seoond Five lear Pla^ t 
During the Seoond Five Tear Flan the aovemment proposed to raise h 700 
ororea from pubaiic borrowing but it aotually ooUeoted Is ,8 ororea tgr the end 
of I960. That is to Bay before the oon^etion of the Plan the aotual amount 
jcalaed exoeeded bgr Bs 4S.8 ororea ligr the end of April-February of I960—61. The 
total oash receipts of the Gtoveran^t of India during 1956*57 to 1960-61 were 
& 872*4 orores againat whioh it paid a sum of Bs 125.6 arores during the same 
period. The Het receipt during the period thus comes to 8< 743.8 ororea. Out 
of the tote^ amount of 8$ 872.4 ororea raised by the Ckivexnment during the 
period 1956-60, |he contribution of Xi.X.C was more than 18 per oent* 
Table Ho. 4^ duiwa the oontribution of in FjUoanoing the borrowing 
programme of the Oovemment during the Seonod Five Tear Flan. It will be seen 
that L.I.C. haa <Kmtributed about 11.8 per cent of the total Central Oovemment 
Loans and about 18.2 per eent of the total State Oovemment loans during tito 
year 1957« The proportion has gradually inoreaaed both in the Central and the 
State (Governments securities and in 1960 there was a sligfht fall both in Central 
Ckyvemo^t securities as well as in State Oovemment Seourities* 
1. Tripathy* RJIi Op.Cit, p 229. 




L. i: c-'s'-eoNTRrEOTior' i» CEBIRAI. M D swrn m m m m SECORITIES 
( Rs Crores ) 
tear CEKfRAt <M3WmESf STATE QOV] Krfnl-ia.' 
Gk>vem9e9ttt L.I.C. Percent State Qovem- L.I.C. 
Seourities Investment ment Seouri- Invest— Pera 
ties. laeat 
Seourities 
1956 l'508.6t 212.38 14.? 273.95 39.96 14.2 
19S7 1699.50 2tiL.26 11.8 294.67 44.83 15.2 
1958 1880.96 217 .t)8 11.5 355.44 58 16.3 
1999 1880.96 221.48 U.8 356.82 SS.33 16.9 
1960 2138.23 233.82 10.0 442.30 71.91 16.3 
SOBRCBf Reserve Bank of India Bt^etini Partem of Oimershlp of Qovemment 
Debt* Felnuazy 3L960« pp i36-6i> March, 1961, pp S28>SS. 
p^^^jir^ j^ofmoB P^ i^ft? f^ys^p 
The Tatae m the next page and Figure 18 tdlX show that of total rupee 
debt of Bs 29^1 orores (Central and State) as at the end of Maroh« 1960 (^(dud-
ing the ftmding issua of h SOO orores^in July, 1958), t ^ Reserve ifenk and 
Cbvemo^t togetlier held a little over one fourth or 28 i»r eent, Commeroial 
and Co-operative Banks another 28 per eent and Xi.I*G. is only next to the 
ootuBdroial and Covoperative Banks holding about 12.8 per oent. Thus the insti-
tutional investors in the eountiy together hold about three fourth of the total 
rupee debt at the end of March, I960 and L.I.C. tras only next to ooameroial 
banks. If we ex<aude the ownership of govestunent debt tgr Reserve Bank and 
Oovemnent h<dLdiags, we find that of the total institutional holdings of fis 1851 
orores, nearly 40 per t^t was aooounted for tgr Goimnerolal and Cooperative 
Banks, L.I.O« eoning next with 10 per cent followed W Provident fond 9 per o«nt« 
L.I.G's holdii^ of the OovenuBont Seourities have been adjusted from the 
Calendar ^ o financial year ligr the Resesnre Bank Study* The data for 1956-58 
are for the year ending Secenber, the Data for 1959 and 1960 is for the 
year ending Mar*^* 
IVJS.'A 
TABtB 'W 
v m m w O M S E R ^ I P OP tbe G E S M L ANB STATES OOVERHMENTS S B C O R I T I E S 
(AB peroentage to total) ITebi) 
1 9 5 7 - 1 9 6 0 
^disg ^ing Ending finding 
DecenH Qecem- Oeoea- Oecenw 
bar 19S7 ber 1958 ber 19S9 ber 1960 
1. Oovamnent. It) .9 10.1 10.2 10 Ji 
Heservtt Bank of India. 18.6 13.7 14.0 18.1 
3* Contmeroial and Coopera-
tive Banks. 24*0 28.6 27.7 28.4 
4. X.I.C. 22.3 12.3 12.6 U.8 
S. Other Insurance* 1«2 1.2 1.2 1.1 
6. Provident Fand< S«S 6.0 6.3 6.7 
f* Industrial Finanoo 4 
and State Flnaaoe. e.2 0.1 0.1 0,1 
8. Reserve Bank of India 
held m account of others 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.6 
9. Non-residents. 1.8 l.S 1.5 1.5 
10. Other residents 2t«l 25.0 24.6 20.7 
Total 1-10 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOO.O 
SOURCST R£3ES7E BAlK OF IROU BULI^ BTIlIt March^ 196X, 761, p 531. 
A break down of the Qovaxnmeiit seottzltiea into Central and State Qoveznments 
Seouritles showe, that out of tl^ total rupee debt (C^tral and State OovexBaients 
combined) of Bi 2|S8X orores at the end of Mar6h» 1960^  the Central OoTsxnment's 
debt aocottnted for Bs 2»138 orores or 83 per cent* It will be observed that 
the share of Central Qovenunent in the total debt has steadHy deolined from 
88 per eent at the end of IJeoenber 3.987 to 84 per oent at the end of Harehf 
1999 and to 83 per eent at the end of Maroh* I960* The pattezu of ovnership 
of the Central Oovemnent securities shovs the relative position of Institutions. 
The Table No. indioatos that Commeroial and Cooperative Banks with their 
holdings of loons^ shares the largest portion of 27#3 per cent of Central 

17.26 
Qoveniment holding and Reserve Bank (ovn Aooount) of 21,8 per eent, L.I.C* 
11 per cent, Oovenunent 10 per oent and Provident Fund 8.1 per eent. The 
residual group sooaunted for 17.3 per cent. 
major oategories of holdings of State securities were fianks» L.I.C. 
the State OoTemment themselves and •others.' Of the total State Qoverament 
securities of Its orores outstanding as at the end of March, 1960« the 
Commeroial and Opoperatlve Banks held R$ 148 orores, whioh represented 33 per 
oent of the total. The Reserve Bank of India does not hold a]^ State Oovem» 
ment seouritles. ^he Insuranoe group aocounted for b 77 orores or 17 per eent 
a share whloh was larger than that in the Central Government securities (12 
per oent); the L*I.C« itself owned 72 orores or 16 per cent. The Reserve 
Bank held Bs 9 orores of State Government securities on aooomt of 'otters'. 
Provident Funds held just Bs 51 lakhs^  thsjr owned as much as Bs 173 orores or 
@ per eent of the Central debt. The Residual group aooounted for U 163 erores 
or 'other* one third of the State Government debt, whereas in the ease of 
Central Government debt the share of this group was less than one fifth as 
at the end of Harch, I960. The importance of L.X.C. increases in the sense 
that the entire holdings of Ks 584.8 orores of Central Government Bs 147.7 
orores of State Government securities in 1960 owned bgjr the Commeroial Banks 
were distributed among 381 scheduled» non-scheduled and oooperative Banks. 
This gave them average holding of Bs 1.5 orores per bank of Central GovemmMit 
debt and about 0.4 orores of State Government debt jer Bank. In the oa<^ of 
the L.I.C. the entire holdings were controlled l)gr a single inatitvfci<mf . 
Maturity Pattern of State Government 
Loans by Categories o^ Investorst 
The holdings of the various oategories of holders of State Government 
debt among the different maturity groups are set out in Table Bo. 49.©f the 
total State Government debt of Its 4^ orores outstanding at the end of Maroh>1960, 

VfJt^ 
about one half ( Bs 223 orores) vas due to nature within 10 years» 30 per cent 
(Its 132 orores) betireen lO-lS years and nearly one fifth (Bs 67 orores) after 
15 years. 
An analysis of the relative share of the various categories of holdeirs 
in respoot cf eaoh matturity group reveals that at 'tiie end of Maroh, 1960^ a 
major part ($1 per e^t) ef the debt fflaturing within 0=5 years was h ^ fey 
Coas»reial and Cooperative Banks (30.5 per cent) ead the residual group 
'others* (36*0 per cent), ^portant holders of laedium dated loans (5-10 years) 
were 'others' C(»Bia»roial and Cooperative Banks and their respeotive 
shares being 33 per cent* 30 per oent and 30*6 per cent respeotively* Kearly 
one-half of the ddbt falling mder the medium i^p-group (10*15 yeax>8) was held 
by Oommeroial and Cooperative Banks ( ^ per eent)end I>,1«C. 15 per oent. Over 
per oent of the debt mattiring after 15 years was hold by 'othors', L.I.O, 
holds about 10 per oent in this category. 
Loai^ g ^  Qat^gor^es o^ Ipvestoypl 
Details regarding the distribution of holdings of Central Oovemment debt 
by the various categories of investors among the diffeirent matwity groups as 
at the end of December 1957 to ^ rch^ 1960 are given in Table So. 50 • Out 
of the total Central Qoverament debt of Ss 2yl38 crozes outstanding at the end 
of Marohf 1960, Bs 811 orores or two-fifths were due to mature within 5 years 
and about one-third (Bs 662 orores) within 5-10 years, the two groups together 
aooounting for as mut^ as 69 per oent of the total Central Government debt. 
Medium loans (10-15) years) came next with h 305 orores or 14 per oent, followed 
by non-terminables with 2{Kt ci*ores or 12 per cent and longs (over 15 yeara) 
with 8s 103 orores or 5 per cent. 
An analysis of the relative share of each category of holders in each of 
the mattirity groups at the end of March, 1960 revealeg that in respect of debt y 
ir, 29^  
falling vithin tlie iaatm>ity range 0*5 ye&rB Coaimsreial Banks and Cooperative 
Bonka were in the lead|ao!coc>^ 6 for about one third (ZB per oent) • Sext in 
ijiqportanoe were 'Othera* and the Beserve Bank (own account)» aooounting for 
25 per oent and 18 per cent* reapeotively. The share of govemfflants in the 
total debt ia thia mattirity range was 12*1 per eent^ L.I.C. ahare waa the next 
i*6» 7.2 per oent* the aaturiV group S*lO /eare also, the pride of plaoe 
went to Coomeroial and Cooperative Banke whieh held nearly two^ fifthe (41 per 
cent) of the total. Other important categoriea in thia group were the Reserve 
Bank (28«4 per eent)» 'others' (l2 per oent)« and L.Z.Cls holdings were 6*5 
per oent, Qovemments 8.5 per cent. Coming to the maturity range of lO-lS 
years it is noticed that about three quarters of the debt in this range was 
held more or less equally among Ooamreial and Cooperativo Baaks (14.2 per amt), 
L.I,0. 25.5 por oent. Ia the long dated matiurity group (over IS years), aooounted 
others (21 per oent), L.I.C. (22.8 per oent) and government (27.6 per oent) were 
important holders. Ii^ portant holders of the irredeemable group were 'othe»* 
Reserve Bank (own aocoimt) and t.Z.C. whieh hold 23 per cent and 14.7 per oent 
respectively. 
Figure Id shows ^ t in the oombined Central and State Oovemments loans 
the holdiaga of the L.I.C. were more or less evenly spread amongst all the four 
maturity groups. As regards Provident Pimde, one^ half of their holdings were 
in medium longs (lO^lS years) and a little over one»ei£^ th in longs (over IS 
years). The holdings of the Finance Corporaticm were concentrated in the 
meturity ranges of 10-15 years (49 per oent) and S-lO years ( 40 per oent). The 
maturity distribution of various investors was not inoidmital. The i preferenoet 
are partly governed tgr the structure of their liablliiios* Changes ia the 
maturity pattern of the Qovomment debt also occur oa accoimt of repaymsnt of 
loans and new issues as well as on aooount of the i^ ift of oertain loans frm 
IV.SGv 
one naturity group to anothsf with the passage of tlse. An idea of the liqui-
dity requli*eisents of the ComnieroiaX and Oooperativa Banlw oea be had from the 
faot that loans matiirltng within 10 years aooounted for as ouoh as 9l per cent 
of the total holdings of Coomereial and Cooperative Banks i^ iile L.I,C.» Provi-
dent Ptmd and other members of &i6uranee Groups mainly have their holdings of 
loans iiiaturiftg after lO yewrs euaounted 69 per oent and 34 per oent; oorrespond-
in^ly their share of the holdings of securities maturing within lO years vas 
smaller, bali^ 31 cent and 4S per oent respeotiwely. 
The Joint atook banlcs, as it will be seen, are obviously the dominant 
source of short term finance, and the Xi.I.G*, pensl<»i funds, of long-term 
finanoe. B^t, it will also be clear, thsTo is no firm lino of division, such 
as is sometimes supposed to esist, between Hhe market for credit' and the 
'market for oapital.' The Banks, for eicample, do not limit themselves to 
holding bills or making advionees to cover seasonal and short-term requirementsf 
their investment range from short bonds to undated Crovexment securities and 
their advances include for five or even more years. Vlhile most financial 
institutiois are unwilling to make a big change in the maturity distribution 
of their assets but nearly aU of them are pi^pared to switch some part of 
their funds to take advantage of unnsually favourable opportunities of short-
term or l<mg-term invests^nt* Ps>e8attre in one part of the market soon makes 
itself felt in other parts, fhus I>.Z.C*s holding of securities of different 
maturity and its shift in different maturity groups have important 3fei»roussions 
on the 'short', 'aedim' and 'long-dated' market* 
iHrnact of L.I.C. on D^ bfc Managementt 
During the war period Treasuxy received the life fund and other instittttlonal 
saving with ooaqjarative .'ease as the invescnont opportunities in the private 
sector were Halted and the Insurers oould Qake v&ry little shift, &)t in the 
IT. 31 
post-war period the poslbilitiea open to the authorities in aianaging the debt 
are conditioned bgr the habits and preferences that have been developed tiy the 
ijustitutions. This has be«a primarily due to three reascms. Firstly the rapid 
growth of the institutional saving during the post-war period aade the Institu-
tions important source of ftoids* Seoondly« Investment opportunities have beoone 
available la the private seotox' and thexv had b@6n ccwBiderablo change in tiie 
1 
investaont theoiy and practice during this period. IMrdly, throughout the 
post-war period the dcaainant motive of the authorities in their management of 
the debt has been the desire to *fwd', i.e. to lengthadthe avorage life of the 
seourities outstanding, fhis has become moro prorssing since the beginning Of 
the Five Tear ^^^ growing requiremonks of the Treasury and its urge 
to keep its *obligations' in the *strong hands* has considerably increaaed. Thus 
as the largest investor among the *Fifm hands,' the investment requirenents of 
L.I.C. have conoMerable influence. In order to attract tho L.I.C. to suteoribe 
to its oblig&ticaisi the Treasury had to maintain on yield structure and a maturity 
pattern to suit its investment requireiaents. 
The Figures 17,19show dose reeemblenoe in the distribution and cos^sition 
of public dobt and the percentage distribution of L.X.C's investment in Qovom-
ment securities of different maturity groups. It is olear# the3?efore, that the 
flow of life fund in Oovemoent securiiies and preferenoe of L.I.C, to execute 
its 'matching' policy through government securities has largely facilitated en 
even distribution of the composition of public debt in Jiidia. Sn idea of the 
aiffiifioanoe of insurers investment on the Publio Debt structure can be had 
from tho fact that in USA wfa»re the insurer <»aly invest about 4 to 6 per cent 
of their assets in goreitmezit securities the maturity structure of govexnment 
obligation has a hi^ proportion of it.s debt in the short term area. Over two 
fifths of the miirketable debt in that ocmtjy as on June 1959 was due to oatur© 
1. See Chapter VI. 
I?.® 
within GOB je&rj eind about three fonrth dtw within five j^ ears despite government 
efforts to lengthen the laatiirity struotixre^  the proportion of short tern debt 
rose fr<aa 43 per oent in 1946 to 75 per <^t in nid 1959« This is attrily^ ed 
partly to the shift of insurers investoent from gpvQvment seourities to Gorporate 
1 
and other forme of investmnts since 1948. In tf.K. on the other !»«d where the 
insurers invest relatively greater amount in goverznaent securities, only about 
one«-third of the pabUoly held aarketable debt> as en Karehi 1958» was dm to 
mature within 9 ;^ars. 
Impaot of lt.,1.0. on the MoRgtftfy 
It was fel*— Section I that 8in«9 the Treasury and ReseilTO Bank aooord in 
1951, debt'managettest has teocffie the fundamental task of the Central Bank. Thus 
the ownership of the Fublie Z^ ebt by the saving institution^ in vailing proportion 
and its sianagement by the monstaiey authority has established a direct relation 
between the Beserve and the non-bank institutions. 
In this new set iq? whereas the nonetaiy policy affects the 'liquidity rei^ uireiaents' 
of the institutions! the investment requireoents of the institutions have considerable 
inflv^nee on noaaetary manageiaent. For eacaiaple in the investnent of life finds 
'there is broad bias in favour of natdiii^ liabilities with secuxdties,' and these 
liabilities are jKredominantly eaamitiaents to pay fiawd or substantially fixed sums 
at dates many yeaxv ahead. 4t first sight this should seem to point to immediate 
investment in l<mg.term bonds, the yield on which have been reflected in the rates 
of premium diarged. But a large of the policies of the Corporation axe 
'witb-profits' which increases its urge to earn oaxlmiaR possible interest in ordefi-
to give hi|^ dividends or bonus to poli^ ]rh(^ dex>s. this aspect m is of increasing 
importance as 'inflation mindedneea''spreads among the policyholders. Even without 
inflation mindedness the 'frustee^ip' duties assumed by Ii.I.O. at the time of 
1. Aldjett, Charles Cortexi The Federal Debt Structure and Impacts The Twentieth 
Century Fund, Hew fork, 1953, p 3.96. 
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natloiialisatloa to earn the maadntm possible interest oonsistent vith iKkHog^ lialders' 
i^nteirest* can batre profoo»d effeot on moaetaxsr menageioeat. 
Wowover, ia the tttvestment of life fund, in giXt-odgod, and to some extent 
ia deciding hov audi to |nzt into gllt>^ged» the Corporation leans heavily on the 
priaoiple of natohing assets to liabilities, and therefore go ffiaiiOjr into the 
l<»ig end of the oarl^t. It maaTt ho«rsver> take a viev on the course of gilt-^ dged 
prieesy and go shorter if it thinks that yields are likely to rise. If loog dated 
bonds are avoided, the tfindenegr is to ptzt the stoney into short bonds or into aom 
other securities, (e.g. local authority mortgages), or to shift towards equities! 
the presstare to invest tbs fands ljB®ediately is veiy strong. 
The inclination to oomit the fmids at onm tV> long-texsi jj^ vestmont does not 
imply that the bonds viU be held to maturity. A long bond eventually becomes a 
mediuia bond, and a medium teeoxaea a short. Its broad preferences being for loi^. 
T^he Corporation takes opportunities, when markets seem favourable to sli^the 
bonds vhich have become ^ ort and reinvest, in longs. It also, as large * curator* 
lookjfor *svit(diiag* opportunities when prices of individual bonds get out of linsi 
though always vith the matching principle at the back of its mind. In these various 
t^ ays the investment behaviour of t.I.C. can have rathsr i^ rious implications on 
the investment policg^  pursued hy the Heserve Bank of India* 
As part of the movement into equities and other industrial securities, the 
insurance OcoqiMaaies have facilitated the gvovth at and esipansion of Corporate 
Sector in India. 
Suamarv and Conolnsiont 
In this (%apter I have described the behaviour of li.I.C. in the Gilt-edged 
section of the capital market. It has been shovn that in solving their j^rtfolio 
problems insurers have used Qovemment securities for a variety of puzposes. 
Pfimarily these securities have been used to meet the safety, liquidity and yield 
requiremente of the insurers.Government securities have also enabled the insurers to 
follow a m^atching poliqr. Since the nationalisation of life insurance 
L.I.C. has also used the States Qovemment Securities 
In Older to earry on Ita policy of Regional eoonomie dov«tlopment* Zt was 
in faot dtie to these oharaoterietiea features that the ineurers have iirrasted 
huge amount in Ctovenm^nt securities without asy legal oa!spal8i(ai« 
Xamediately, after the first World Mar urge of the insurers to inv9«t 
in Cbverment securities for safety yield and liquidity was considerably 
weaiffiBssd rim to a fall in th® yield on "w- saahisnt securities and the a^il-
ab-'lity of alternative investment outletst The funds therefore shifted in 
the private sector uhiob offered oomparativdly higher yield, ^he diversion 
of the life ftinde towaxds tho private corporate sector exerted consideraKLe 
pull on the interest rate and f^ &rced tho Mc»etazy authorit^ |£i^  increase the 
interest rate on Qovenaaent obligations to iceet the investaisnt requirements 
of the .Inaursace companies. 
fho above remarks supported the fact that aiaong tho institutional 
investors in the eeuntfy, Ii.I.O, holds the second position in the Bond Market 
and that in tho ownership of loijg- tera debt Ii,I«C. holds the unique position* 
L.I.C. does not c8nfino its investment in long-tera securities, although they 
are staple to its reqaireaent^, imt spreads its investaaat in nearly all 
maturity groups to follow a 'match^ polioy' with its liabildty. Tho Corporation 
also look for switching opporttmities when prices of individual's bonds get 
out of line. In this way tl» investment behaviour of L.I.C, especially when 
it foUows a ffi^re active investiaent policy^  has rather serious implications 
for the successful ejcscntion of annetary policy* 
This position, the Corporation has acs!|uired from the steady growth of 
life fNmd and its continuous flow in Government securities. Thus the need of 
the Corporation to earn on adequate rate of interest assumed in the insurance 
contract with the pollc^ yholders and its ability to shift the fuiwis in the 
alternative outlets especially in the private Corporate Sector exerts considerable 
pull on the interest rate. Moreover the *shiftability* of life fund, since the 
post war period is an iiaportant factor in the development of private Corporate 
Sector in India. This is evident from the discussion in Chapter 7* 
CE&Ff^ 7 
PiHfflGIPAf lOH AKS IMPACT OP fHS IBSURiHCE COMPAKIES 
m FHE mmmsms OF THE CORPOBATE SECTOR I N I S O I A 
CHAPtiSR ir 
PABTIOIPATIOB AHO IMPACT OF THE IKSURMGB COMPAtllES IB THE J^VELOFMEMT 
OP 1HE CORPORATE SECTOR IB IHDIA 
Corporate securities are the second important outlet for tbe life Insuranoe 
f^ md in India* These relatively hi^ eamizig seourities have ooite Into promi-
nence in the portfolio structure of the insurers only after the second World 
Has)i(when the yield on Qovemment secuxdties has deolizied and private sector 
in India has ooneideratily e3cpanded« Again* due to their legal framework and 
liability oharaeterlstios, insurers have natural preference for the fixed 
earning securities Issued by establishsd concerns as against the fluctuating 
earning seourities of the 'nev' and small ventures. But in India InsureznE} 
have not Invested sufificient amount in Corporate seourities because of the risk 
Involved in equities non-availability of sound indxistrlal scrips and also the 
yield on debentures aid preference shares is very close to that of Qovomment 
seourities for relatively much greater risk. This has serious repercussion 
on the growth of Coi^rate sector in India. In this Chapter* I have* therefore* 
shown the contribution of insurance companies in the expansion and development 
of Corporate sector in India. The impact of the Investment Policy of the L.I.C. 
on the Stock prices, new issue marls t and the Capital Structure of the companies 
has also been exemii^d. 
SBCTIOII I 
mVESTHBHT OF LIFE F013D IS CORPORATE SECURITIES 
Corporate securities occupy a position only second to gilt-edged securities 
in the portfolio structure of the insurers. This is evident from Figure 14 . 
In 1914 Insurers invested only fis 0.1 crore in corporate securities. The 
Investment in corporate seourities gradually increased sines then but it was 
below Rs 1 crore in 1929. Before the Second World War the total investment of 
the insurers in corporate securities was only 4.2 crores in 1938. After the 
termination of war the insurer's holding of corporate seourities increased 
from h 15.3 crores in 1946 to to 59,S crores in 1955, 
V.2 
Table 51 shows the absolute growth and relative growth of Corporate seoari. 
ties In the portfolio structure of the i&tdlan iife office from 1914-1955. 
TABLE NO 51 
dVESTHMT mSB BT IfiDlAN mSDRERS ZH COBPQI ATE SBCimiTIBS 
1914*1955 
'Amount As percen- Amount As percen-
its Grores tage to Ibi Grores tage to 
tear total Tear total 
Assets Assets 
1914 0.1 1.8 1936 3.3 6.8 
1916 0.2 1.9 1938 4.2 7.1 
1918 0.2 1.7 1940 5*3 6.9 
1920 0.2 2.1 1942 7.9 8.1 
1922 0.3 2.3 1944 11.5 9.4 
mA 0.3 1.9 1945 15.3 10.0 
1926 0.6 2.5 •1948 24.5 12.7 1928 0.8 3.4 1950 3S.2 14.6 
1930 0.7 2.7 19S2 41.8 14.2 
1932 1.2 4.2 1954 55.4 16.2 
1934 2.2 5.4 1955 59.S 16.1 
SO0RCESt 1. Reserve Bank of Indiai Banlcing and Honetaxy Statistios* 
2. Insurance tear Book. 
It will be observed that the corporate securities have ccnae i^to prominenoe 
only after the tteo(nd World War. The ratio of CoiTwrat© s^ Mi^ t^ie^ o total assets 
in iijk 1938 was only 7.1 per eent» it inoreased to 9.4 par cent in I9i4i and in 
1955 the ratio reached 16*1 per ocoit. This steady increase in the investoMit of 
tbe ooi^ orate securities in the po8t*war period vto partly due to the growing 
accunmlation of funds available for tavestment by the life Insurance companies 
and partly due to the modification of their l<mg established investment principles 
in favour of industrial securities. Besides the dediaing yield on government 
securities also forced the insurers to increase their investment in high eaxniag 
industrial soripi Among the various forms of corporate securities insurers 
invested largely in equities. This is evident from table on the following page. 
VI.3 
TABLE No 52 
MAIXSXS OF GOmmHE SSO0RITXES KECJ) BT BIDIM lUStmERS 
From 1983 to a.955 
< fa ffJroyfB ) Peroen^ i Percon-
Amount tage to Amount tage to Astomt tage to Amount tage ta 











1954 1955 ties 
OMinaix ffiwree lt,8 42.6 19.9 
Prefesrenee Shares 10*9 25.0 11«S 
Bebenttures 13.1 3S.4 14.6 
total 41.8 100.0 45.6 
43.4 22.7 40.8 
26.6 11.9 21.S 
29.8 20.e 37.7 
100.0 S5.4 100.0 




SOURCE} b^ieur&nce Tear Books. 
It wUJ. bo obs«j?vBd from the above talal® that tt the end of 19SS ordinary 
Bharea oonstitatod noarly 40 per cent of the total corporate eeouritios or 6*6 
per oent of the total assete) 24 per ccnt of the ooxporate seouriiies were in 
preferenoe eharea (3.8 per oent of assets) end 34 per cent in debentiires (3.7 
per cent of the assets). 
Insturors inTestment of 16.1 per oent of tl^lr assets in oorpoate seourities 
in 1955 is in strikiog oon|pfast to the adranoed countries of the world. In 
T7.K. and U.S.A. for example in 1954 the ratio of corporate seourities to total 
assets was 33.6 par oent end 44.4 per oent respeotiveljr. The small peromitage 
of Corporate securities to total assets in liadia was mainly due to the oanserro-
tive out look of insurers towards these securities! and non-availability of 
good quality of corporate securities. Besides the frequwat « threats of the 
nationalisation of Industries also fiafluenced their investment policy. 
Ii.I.C*s investment in Corporate securities 
since the Rationalisatian of Life Insurance* 
After the natlonaisation of life ii^ surance in India L.I.C's investments 
in Corporate securities have largely increased due to the growth of life fund 
?.4 
xttthoy thBU dti0 to asgr ohenge In tlie iaimstment policy*, thia is evident irm the 
fact that the ratio of Corporate seouritiea to total assets baa deoLined ttm 
16.x per oent la 1055 to 14.8 per eent in I960} "bnt the amotrat invested in Corporate 
seeuiiities inoreased trm fit OTOxee in 1995 lis 92.1 oTores in I960* 
i m S NO 83 
FERSBHTAaE OF C0RP0K&1S ^ CmiflES fC fCfM. ASSETS 
1986-1960 
Ifot^ Assets fotal Ooi^mte^ Percentage of Corporate 
& Crores ties, ts Orores Seotirities to total Assets 
tear 
1956 mS.O 86.9 1S.7 
1987 465.0 69.1 14.8 
1958 80^B 76.2 15.0 
1989 883.9 81.6 14.7 
1960 622.8 92.1 14.8 
80iRCi!t L.X.C'e Anmal Reports and Aooomts. 
IdSe the erstirhile insterers* also invested maSMly in ox^ iinarjr shares. 
Jxk faot its preference for ordiziarT' shares in relation to the other forms of 
Corporate seotirltiee has inoreased dxxring the period 1986 to I960, the Tahle No. 84 
shows that whereas the ratio of ordinarsr shares to total Corporate seoiatitieo has 
inoreased from 40.4 per oent in 1956 to 81.1 per oent in I960, the ratio of 
preferenoe shares during the sane period has declined frcm 23*6 per o«nt tc 22.5 
per oent sad that of debentures has fallen down from 36 per oent to 28.9 per cent. 
TABUS BO 84 
Z..I.C*s XtrmiKEKT Hi 7ARI005 fobms OP COBPORATB ^ CURITZES 
( h Crorea) 
1986 1960 
Categoxjr imoont reroentage io Amomi i^ eroeniage io toai 
total Corporate Corporate Seonrities. 
securities 
Ordlnax7 Shares 23.0 40«4 47.8 51.6 
Preference Shares 13*4 23.6 20.7 22.8 
Debentures 20.8 36.0 23.9 28.9 
Total 86,9 lOO.O 92.1 100.0 
SOtmcSt Resenrs Bai& of India SoUetin, Novenber, 1961* 
7.S 
This an indioatlon that has made mse of the iodiiBtrial se<mrities 
prijiteril^  to seoure hinfh yiolds. 2t ha« not pMferxea deberattires beea^ ua thoir 
yield is wiy olose to goyremmnt soourities for cwnparatively aucsh greater risk. 
Again by Hrtw of its liability characteristics and legal frsaework, L.I.C. 
has to prefer snvestoient in shares and debsnitires of old eonoema as against t!» 
new ventures, this is evident from the following fahle which shovs the distri-
bution of Jnves^nts aade bgr the Corporation dtocing tha year 1959 between the 
shares and debenttunes of nev and estaKLished J^ oint Stoek Companies* 
TABLE NO SS 
DISTRIBOTIOH OP l..I.C*s HTVESTMEHTS AMOH0 THE ESTABLI^D AHD THE HEW COHCSHHS 
19S9 
C R S I ^ J 




(a) Xn shares and 
debentures of newly 
blasted Companies* 
(b) In new shares/ 
debentures floated 
by <ncistiDg Cos. 
(o) shares/debMtturss 
of existing ooDq>enies 
other than the aaotnt 







8.87 103.78 3»d9*39 





SOOERGBt Estimates Goiamittee, Op.Cit.* p 49* 
It would be seen that out} of en anomt of 7.04 orores ^ vested in 1959 in 
shares and deb^turesi h 4.81 orores i.e* 68*5 per ^ nt was invested in shares^  
already in the narket. Only Ss 17*15 lakhs^i.e. 2*4SS was invested in shares end 
debentures of newly floated oonpanies while a little over 29j? was invested in the 
shares/debentures floated by the eadsting eospanies presumably for expansion or 
v.e 
modernisation. Tha fact that t.I.C, could bay only R» 17.18 lakh worth of shares/ 
debentures of nevly floated oompanles and Es lakh worth of shares/debentures 
floated bjr existing oompaniee also indicates the inherent lljaitations of I>.I.C*8 
role in taking risk of eeonoaio develofeiettt* L.I.C. has» however, aided the 
growth of now ooneems tndireotly bgr ptirohasing the eh&res and bonds of Ind«s== 
trial Finanoe Corporation^  Industrial Credit and Investnent Corporation of Sodia . 
and State Industrial Finance Corporations, which assume risk of eoonomio develop-
ment ^ en thqir finanoe the new undei^kiDgs* 
Table 56 gives the indirect partieipation of L.Z.C. in the Industrial develop-
ment through Secondaxy Finanoial Institutions tM direct investiaent in new lndu»-
tries from the period let September, 1956 to 31st December, I960. It will be 
fABLE S'6 
DIREC7 AND INDIRECT PAR7ICIPATI0N OF L.I.C IN THE DSVELOFMEHT OF NEW INDUSTRIES 
IN INDIA 
iAmount Net &Lves^ 
Ini^ sted ment fr£«i 
Categorr as <m 1«»8»19^ to 
1-9-19S6 31-12-1960 
1. Shares of Cooperative Housing Fiiuoce 
Societies. 23/54 
2. Shares of Ware-housing Co»perati<m* - 15^00 
3* Shares of Heflnence Corporation 
for Industry (?) itd. - SO^ OO 
4. Sharest 
(a) Industrial Finanoe CorporatiosQ ^18.79 
(b) State Finanoe Corporation 131.44 2 4|S0 
(o; Madras Industrial Investment Corporation 3.7d 
5. Bonds oft 
^ a) Industrial Finanoe CorporaticA 93.00 443.41 
,b) State Financial Corporation. - 139.02 
o^) Hadwis Industrial Jjivestment Corporation - 18.94 
6. Housing Xioans to State Oovemnents and 
Apes Cooperative Housing Finance - 1,380.84 
7. Direct Inves^nt in new Industries - 187.29 
TOTAL 367.82 2,258.96 
Percentage of above Investment 
to total Investment. 0.97 12.86 
SODRCEi fogakshema, 7ol. 8, Nos. 8-9, 1961, p 57* 
VI.7 
observed that whereaa on let September^ 1956 investment in the above eategorles 
was only 0.97 per eent of the total of the set additional lavestment made since 
that date upto Sist December, 1960, as lauoh as 12.86 per cent represented Invest-
ments in the above eatesories« 
ff^dernntlNg Ppoya^^qn by hM' 
As a means to aid the development of nev ladaatriee is tho private sector^  
the Cojfporation taiderwritten about 63 ismies for 8s 8.16 orores daring the period 
1 
let September, 1957 arji Slst fleosmber, 1960. The following table gives details 
of issues underwritten 1)y L . Z . O . 
TAM.B Sn 
mDEmimQ mimt OP L,I,G 
t Id Crores ) 
1957 19S8 1959 1960 Total 
Debentures and Z«ans 0*23 2*21 0.30 I.IS 3.89 
Preference Shares 1.20 0.43 0.70 O.Sl 2.84 
Ordinary Shares 0.44 0.10 0.21 0.68 1.43 
Total 1.87 2.74 1.21 2.34 8.16 
Number of IssTties written 
during the year. 21 19 9 14 63 
SOVRGEt li.I.C. Annual Reports and Aooounts 
The Corporation has taken this function because it fitsin with the general 
2 
investment policy. Under en underwsriting agreement the Corporation mdsxtskes 
Jii consideration of a stipulated commission, which must not be more than 5 per 
eent of the issue price of shares, tw tal^the whole or a portion of such of 
1. Between 1st September, 1956 to SOth Juno, 1957, the Corporation underwrote 
the following issuest Ordinaiy shares 15s 2.50 laid*} Preference Shares Es 58 
laldi and Debentures 18 laWi (Vide Interim Report on the Aotivitloo of Life 
Insurance Corporation of India, August, 1957, p 22. 
2. Reserve Bank of Indiat Bulletin, February, 1961, p 174. 
r.8 
1 
the offered shares as aay not be subsorilsd for b;^  the pablie. In the afireraient 
the Coz^ratioB guareuatees the sale of securities within a certain time; and 
whatever is not taken up b^r the pubilio is purohased b^ it. Thos out of nine 
issues underwritten by in 19S9 six were i^ aoed in the aartet in the 
same year and the remaining three were oarketed in 1960. Similarly out of the 
14 issues underwritten in 1960 cmljr ten were marketed duH£g the year, 
writing whieh l^s assumed muoh importanoe in western countries was in its 
infancy in India when the Corporation has talcen this task. In this way 
2 
Corporation has filled a lacuma in the industrial finance in India, fijjr unde-t^ 
writing the shares and debentures the Corporation relieves the companies fr(ai 
the uncertainties of subscription and on the other hand by putting its own 
'hall mark' of quality on the securities it removes the uncertainty and risk 
from the point of view of the inraetors. this has increased tbs aobHity end 
fluidity of capital* 
The above didouasion reveals that l>«I.C* holped the development of the 
Corporate sector in India by purchasing the shares and debentures issued bgr 
the companies. This is limited to the securities issued by the old and 
estatilished ooncems. Only a small amount the corporation has invested in 
the shares and debentures issued by the new ooncems. ^ Corpoiution haSf 
therefore^ helped the growth of new enterprises through the secondaZT' Financial 
institutions such as Industrial Finance Coi^ratiob; State Finance Corporation 
etc. It has also helpd the developaent of new ventures by underwriting their 
shares and debentures. In these various ways Ii,I.G. has acquired an important 
position in industrial finance in India. This will be evidence from the 
following study* 
1. Shukla^ M.Ci Business Organisation and Management > S.Chand & Oo, ,De3M,p 137 
2. Before the L.I.C, some other specialised institutions such as the Industrail 
Credit and Investment Corporation of India Ltd.,established in 1994, and 
National Industrial Development Corporation( established in 1954) wore doing 
underwriting opa rations.But their activities in this field gained prominence 
only in 1956(Pareldi,H.Ts The Putiwe of Joint Stock Enterprise in India -
Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 19S8, pp 79-83) Also See Table 61. 
v.a9 
Slgnlfioanoe of L,I.C's Inveetnent 
in Corporation 
It idXL be observed^  from 'tho abovo anaXysls 'khat thd r&tio ot Corporat«6 
sdourlties has oonslderafaily deolined after the imtlonaliaatiim of life insuranoe* 
But the rapid growth of life fund has enatxLed the Corporation to increase its 
share ia the paid up capital of Joint Stock Oompanies from S.9 per cent in 1956 
to about 7.9 per cent la I960. During the Second Five lear ^ lan period the paid 
up capital of Indian Joint Stock Companies has increased tigr about & 161 croxes 
L,I.O's holdings of ordinary «nd prefensnce shares hare Increased ly about 31.8 
croras. Its contribution thus comes to about 19 per cent in the additional paid 
up capital raised bar the companies during this period. 
The extent of L.I.C's boiatribution^ i In corporation finance at the end of 
1960 is given in the TkKLte-N'o.-SS It will be seen that its contribution to equity 
TABLE 9L8 
1 




( Bt Orores) 
Held by L.I.C tPercentage of 
( % Crores } fTotal Issue held 
Ity L.I.C. 
Ordinaiy Share Capital 







Total Paid up Capital 876.1 08.2 7.9 
Debentures a7.6 23.9 27.3 
SODHCESs 1. L.I.C. ^ual Report and Accounts. 
2. Ikdia^  1962. 
3. Reserve Bank of ]&idia Bulletin^  September« 1961* p 1436. 
1. Total ordinary and preference share capital of 6473 public limited companies 
in India in 1960-61 was Rs 876.1 orores (India 1980)(2) Figures of ordlnaiy 
and px*eference share capital have been calculated at 82 peHcenti 18 per cent 
of the paid up capital respectively, the proportion disclosed by the Reserve 
Bank survey of 1001 selected Public Limited Companies in 1959 (Vide Reserve 
Bank of India Bulletin, September, 1961). Debentures are q^ lsaified as 
borrowing in the above survey. The Ratio of debenture was approjcimately 
10 per cent to the paid up capital In that survey. The same percentages of 
ordinary shares and preference shareshave been applied in the computation 
of the figuz^ s* 
V.io 
oapital (wMoli amounted to 52.«6 par oent of its totaX ooxporate aeouxdtiaa 
held 117 it In 1930} vaa 6.6 per oent of the toi^ relm of auoh oapitiO. Isaued 
^ pitli^ o limited oonqpanlea in India. The preference i^re held L.I.G. 
(though only 22,3 per oent of the total oorporate securitiea hsld by L.I.C. 
in 1960} amounted to 13.1 per oent of the total Yalue of such aharea* In the 
case of debsnturea, L.X.G« vaa an active participant and held 2iK>re than 27 per 
cent of the total outatanding debentttrea in the year 1960 (thougb debenture 
constituted only 25.9 per oent of total cotporate aeouritlea held Isy L.I.C.) 
Relative Poai^ tion and Eole oj^  I..I.9. In 
^^ ancj-pg , ^jtft'* 
Since 1948 a number of Secondary Financial intermediaries, such as Indua-
trial Finance Corporation (IFC), State Finsnce Corporation (SPC)i Industrial 
Credit «id Invostiwnt Corporation (ICIC), Hatlonal Induatrial 0e7elopmeilt 
Corporation (lilOC)^  Befinance Corporation of lodia CBOX)« have come into 
existence to provide long-term finance to industry. They are called Secondary 
Financial Inatltutions because their resources are largely provided by the 
primary saving*inatltutlons in the country* sutdi as L.I.C. Commercial and 1 
Cooperative Banks etc. A brief review of ttas activities of the above mentioned 
financial intermediaries in financing industrial development in the countzy 
during the priod 1951 to I960 has been given in Table S9. 
At the outset it is noted that during the years 1952 and 19S3 the net 
/ 
oontrlbation of inten^laries was veiy small. It was to the eactent of 
8s 8 oToroB and Bs S croree respectively. In 1950, net flow of tnole from banks 
to industries was Hs 21*5 crores, whereas in 1951, it rose as high as Ss 41«4 
crores. This resulted in the repayment of these loans during the next two years 
and hence the figures for 19S2 and 1953 were negative at Bs IS.8 crores and 
Rs 12.1 crores respectively.While these 2 years accounted for negative oontri!»-
tion from intermediaries,another 3 years > 1956,1997 and 1960 have showa brisk 
1. In Table 99 the position of L.I.C. in industrial Finance has teen dis-
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activity. Dating these three years the net oomtribtttion of flaanoial intezw 
mediarles had been 6Z,2 per cent of the total of fis 584.8 orores over the entire 
period. 
If we look into the break down of the total assistance provided into loans 
end investments tre notice a healthy change over the period of eleven years. 
The proportion of investments in shares ete^  had increased eQnsiderahly from 
17.6 per cent in 1900 to 36 per cent in 1960. It was hi^st in 1958 at 40 per 
cent. This is chiefly due to investments of L.I.C. in the shares of industrial 
concenis. In 1958^  out of fis 16 crores of total net inveetiaents in shares etc. 
Is 10 orores were from L.I.C. and Bs 4 orores were from Banks. For the period of 
eleven years as a whole the proportiont of loans was 83 per cent and that of 
investments in sliares etc. was 17 per cent. On the loans sMe^ i the major contri-
bution came from commercial banks of 73 per cont of t>ie total assistance^  while 
the next major intermediary was the Industrial Finance Corporation whose share 
was 9 per cent. As for as investments are cancenned« 14 per cent of the total 
assistance came from insurance companies and L.I.C.* while baxika and ICICI con-
tribited 2 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. The Finance Corporation's 
contribution was highest at 29 per cent in 1958« when the major funds came from 
the lFCIi_ to the extent of 21 per cent. 
Amongst the Finance Corporations* IFC:' which is the oldest end more experie-
nced oontribated 7«3 per cent of tho total ftmds in 1950* while it went as 
high as 21 per cent 1958>. it\shoued A decline in 19S9 to 10 p r cent. The 
oontribution of the ICICI was 4 per cent lii its very first year 1955, which rose 
to 8 per cent in 1958 and came down slightly to 6 per cent in 1959. Their 
contribation in 1960* although showed increase in absolute torms indicated a 
steep fall in the relative proportion. This again is doe to tremendous increase 
in bank loans during that year. The finance corporation's contribution has 
shown definite improvemant since 1957. Insurance Companies accounted for about 
11 per oent of the total assletanoe in 19S0 1989 the corresponding peroenta^ 
rose to 18 per oent. It was quite high at 27 per oent in 1954 and 26 per oent 
in 19S8, After the establiehstent of L.I.C. it has ehovn eonaiderahle increase 
fTOm 7.2 per oent in 1956 to 25.6 p r oent in 1998, 
Main oontribution from oommeroial banks had been in the fom of loans 
du3ring the period of eleven years, althoiigh the banks had also increased their 
investments in shares etc. considerably. Net investments vhich were negative 
in 19S1, continued to be so till 1957, with en exception of a very small amount 
of net positive investments in 1954 and 1955. Kowover, it went up to te 4.2 orores 
and fa 8.3 crores in 1958 and 1959, respectively. 
The final position as it emerged in 1960 has been shown in Pig. 20. It is 
evident that the financial Intermediaries have provided financial asaistmce to 
induotrios to tho timo of 8s 822 ororos at the end of Booember, 1960. Oommeroial 
banks have been the most ia^rtant type of intermediary as they have contributed 
about Rs 591 orores or more than 71 per cent of the total. The banks funds fa^p^ 
the industries not only for their short-term requirements but also for their 
medium-term requirem«ato« 
Uext to that importanoe is the L.I.C. which has alone provided Rs 9Z orores 
or 11 per cent of the total funds. Tho Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
has provided funds to the ext^t of fa 83^6 orores or AK>re than 10 per oent of the 
total. General Insuranee Companies have provided fa 28 orores or more than 3 per 
cent of the total funds. These are followed bgr the ICIGI which provided about 
12.0 crores or 1*4 per cent of the total fund. The remaining 1*8 per oent or 
1 
about 14 orores are provided by RCI, NIDC, and two investment trusts* 
The break down of direot oontribution into loans and investments in shares 
etc. shows that fa 665.8 orores or nearly 81 per oent is in the form of loans 
whereas the remaining nineteen per oent is in the form of investments in shares 
1, R.C.I, has provided fa 2.3 orores or 0.3 per cent of loansj N.I.D.C. has 
contributed fa 6.6 crores or 8 per cent of total loans. Investment Trusts 
have invested fa 5.2 orores whioh is only 0.6 per oent of the total assistanoe 
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and debsntures. In case ot loans 89 pr cent have ooote from oommeroial banks 
and about 13 per cent from the XFC'.« These tvo together constitute about 98 
jBT oent of the total loans. Amongst thd remaining the ICICI's shave^ ia 
the largest at 8s 6.6 orores or one per oent. In case of investments In shares 
a»l debentures more then 59*1 per cent of the amount is contributed bgr the 
L.I.O. This shows the importanoe of the L.I.C. as the largest single insti-
tutional Investor in India. Bext to it are general insurance com«a)nies and 
commercial banks which contributed Its 26 orores and Ss 24*3 orores or nearSj* 18 
percent of tho total investment respectively. The contribution of ICIGI is 
4 psr cent. In case of coamiorcial bonics about 98 per cent contribution is in 
the form of investment in shares etc* Tho IFOZ« RCI ard filfiO have provided 
all their assistance in the form of loans, vhile on the other hand the L.I.C* 
General Insurance Companies and Investment Trusts havo contributed in the 
form of investment in share etc* In case of ICICI» the contribution iSf both 
v&yB, bjr loans and bsT investment» 47 per cent of its assistance is in the 
form (f loans and the remaining 93 jpe r cent in the form of investment in 
shares etc* 
It is evident from the above account that L.I.C. has not only plajred a 
dominant part in financing Indust:^^ development dlrectljr but it has enabled 
the vatious financial agencies to finance the industrial growth. The element 
of risk in such investment has been eliminated by Qovommsnts« Central or 
State, having guaranteed the princli^ and interest on the capital of such 
corporation* The specialised institutions discussed above^ not mobilise the 
public saving themselves Isit their, ability to finL^ nce the industrial develop-
ment depends upon the resources provided by the L.X.C* commarciol Ixinks and 
other primary saving institutions in the country. This clearly indicates tto 
vlltal role that L.I.C* has played in industrial develoioisut in^ the country. 
V.H5 
Similarly in undervriting operation L.I.C. holds en Important position. 
Table 6:0show8 the arolative posl-fclon of L.I.C. in the underwriting of the new 
shares and debentiires from 1956 to i960. 
TABI^ 6.X) 
AMOUNT ONDEftWRITTENt BJSTIOTTION WISB 












1956 211 77 20 73 5 36 
(^ 56) (9) (35) (2) (18) 
1957 365 85 10 «w 12 258 
(23) (3) (3) (71) 
1958 775 213 110 75 186 71 120 
(27) (14) (10) (24) (9) (16) 
1959 1057 155 47 88 225 189 354 
(15) (4) (8) (21) (18) (34) 
1960 1112 162 175 387 128 261 
















SOUROET Reserve Bank of Ijidia Bulletin, Februaiy, 1961, Table 18, p 184. 
KOTEJ Figui-es in brackets are percentages to total. 
in lakh 
It will be seen from the above Table t h a t t o t a l amount of Us SSSQ/underw 
written in the period 1956-1960 the share of I.C.I.G.I. is 19 per cent, that of 
1 
L.I.C. is 10 per cent, I.P.O.,5 per cent. Bankers S5 per cent. Investment Trusts 
12 par cent and other Brokers 29 per cent. 
1. The total amount underwritten by L.I.C, during 1957 and i960 as shown in 
Table S3 was Rs 8.16 orores. The amount underwritten bgr it in respect of 
issues covered by the Reserve Banl: 'Hudy for the now issues ia only 3.6 
orores or 10 per oent« 
v.re 
It i.8 evident froa tho ubovo study tliat L>Z«C* holds a uniqus position 1A 
the Industrial <3finiino© - of: - tho coontiy. Further, the large scale transactions 
by L.I.C« en tlae etook market havxs oonsideralile influence on the Sto(^ Priccs* 
I have discussed this influence of L.I.C. in the following pages. 
Impact of L.I.G. on the Stoote-Ejcchange Prices» 
The significance of L.I.C*e investiaent through Stecfe=EKchangss can be had 
from the fact that before natiornlisatlon 243 private Insurance offices used to 
operate independently with, differ-dfit impolses and Incentives, the operation of 
these companies had iofluenoe but it was not so effective as that of a single 
in8tituti<»i which combines the resources of 243 independent offices and invest 
nearly 3.0 lalch of rupees par day - the largest amount invested by any investor 
in India. ?he inveatmont of such a considerable SUXK and operation of such a 
large organisation In the market where other constituents are too small exerts 
considerable influence. i\n idea of the relative size of the market and operation 
in that market of l I.C. con be had from the fact that in India there are only 
two important Bt8.rl:ei8 namely Calcutta and i^ mbay. The other markets are too 1 
small to be of any significance* The total membershipf active and inactive, of 
the Bombay Stock Exchange, which is the principal financial market of the countxy 
is about 479, as against 1100 in Kew ITork and 4000 in Londcm. The aggregate 2 
volume of transaction is coiiqjarably small. 
In 1960 out of the total Bs 2,500 crores of Cenjral Government Securities 
offered in Stock Exchange, L.I.C. approximately held 12.9per cent and out of the 
total Municipals and Post Trusts Securities of Bs 1,800 crores, L.I.C. held 2.3 
per cent. Similarly of the total industrial scrips of Hs 695 crores quoted in the 3 
Stock Exohanges» L.I.C. held more then 13.2 per cent. Thus any attenq?t on the 
1. There are In fact only seven recognised Stock Exchanges An the Official Booksi 
Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Hjrderabad., Delhi, Indore and Ahaadabad. 
2. Amula, Halinkuma, It Op.Cit., p 
3. Hlgam,RaJ.K» Scope of Stock Exchanges Vis-a-Vis The Oorpprate Sector in 
India-Ooaaerce, Annual Ho. 1960 (Golden Jubilee), (Tol. OL. No, 259S(Bombay), 
p A 106. 
part of L.I.C. to unload a large stock oan have serious reperoosslons on the 
whole financial and investment mechanism. It is true that L.I.C. in vezy rare 
oases sells its sorips but the possibility of sales due to changes in the internal 
oireomstances of its business which requires some adjustment in portfolio struo^ 
ture are not oanpletely ruled out. Thus even though L.I.C. does not speculate 
in the market but its operations in the market are a cause of speculation. The 
extent to which element of speculation is present in L.I.C'a 'buying' will be 
evident from the following instm ces quoted fajsr the Estimates Committee in their 
iHjportt 
there is aji^ al danger that L.I.C's purchases in the share market 
may lead directly or indirectly to speculative activities. The Committee 
have referred earlier to the representations made before them to the 
effect (snd the admission of the Chairman, L.I.C., that their operations in 
share market thoiigh not speculative In themselves may be the cause of the 
speculation, ^ero is at least one case relating to a mining concern 
where the availability of ore was not substantisl reason. There as a 
result of L.I.GU purchases, the shares showed a rise and then filmed up 
during the third month and it was later found that the di«/ldends fell. 
It is admitted that substantial purchases by L.I.C. cannot be kept secret 
and they are bound to have a bullish effect on the market* The Committee 
are not sure whether a olor-e investigation may not bring any other such 
cases to li^t.'^Cl) 
It follows from the above that pexiiaps more Important than even the volume 
of operations is the investment activity of L.I.C. which constitutes a factor of 
considerable influenoe in the investment market of the country* With its massive 
strength as an investor the Cooperation's investment activity is al^ e to exercise 
stabilising influence In the Stock Market. Operatioas of a single Investor, 
how§ver, powerful can have Impact but they of course cannot alter the market trend 
But from day to day the positive Influence which the Corporation is able to 
wield must be regarded a pillar of strength in the building up of a suitable and 
buojrant investment market* This suggests that the responsibility on the L.I.C* 
for judicious investment is indeed voiy heavy and oapaM.© of far-reaching conse-
quences. Tiie vigllanoo srpect^ d of the L.T.C. in following closely the fortunes 
of individutil industries and Industrie concerns must bs of a. high order. 
1. Estimates Committee: Op.Clt, p 53. 
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fact it is inevitable that Igr reason of its substantial ovnerahip of joint stock 
enteiprtsee the Corporation must act as a watch dog of oorporato enterprises In 
the bountry. Not onljr can it afford to make ill considered investments but when 
investments turn out to be bad or are subsequently discovered to be unsound the < 
responsibility would be thrown on the Corporation to take initiative In regularise 
ing such defects as may be discovered, whether re?-atiag to the quality of manage-
rmat or due to any other ' reeeon. It also follows from its position that the 
private sector wovild need to be alert aa to its standard of management because 
where such management is fotmd to be defective or lacking in important qualities, 
it will not be able to survive because of the pressure which tha L.I.G. would 
legitimately excrcise for the safety of its investment. At this point it is 
perhaps well to comment tai a much diacusced aapect. of L.I.G's purchases of 
ordinary shares. There is a possibility that L.I»G.'s purchases, might through 
equity interest, exert a dominating influence in the management of the well estalv 
lished concerns* 
A significent part of Stock Bxchnnge Securities in the hands of L.I.C. can 
normally obtain tbe decision it nante against an unorganised crowd of individuals 
who are dispersed and have very little iateraat In the affairs of their company* 
It is, thiMtefore, said that L.I.G's ownersldp of'equity ^ hkre'^ ', exerts dominate 
ing influonce in the joanagamsnt of Ljading Joint Stock Companies. This fear has 
r J . 
been strengthenecl since the famous Mundhra Deal. Actually, there appears to be 
little basis for t}iis apprehension today, for L.I.C. among all the public 
enterpriaea is more sensitive to puW.ic opinion. It is doubtful whether the 
management of L.1.0. trould ever allow themaelves to get into a position where its 
ownership of ordinary shar'^ e In a given company cotild provide influence (real or ' 
IjBagirary) in any oompaoy's affairs. Besides, aonsiderafciLLe uncertainty is asso-
ciated by the nationalised atructura o£ L.I^ C. Its oontinuad operation in 
v.a9 
'equity' also creates suBpiclon in the minds of investors that since L.I,C» is 
interested in the sound securities of the established concern, its purchases of 
such securities night result into back door nationalisation. 3^ it this uncertainty 
has bee:^  eliminated considerably iDgr the promises made by the Hon'WLe Finance 
Minister in the Parliament. The law on this point is more specific as L.I.C. can 
not Invest in excess of 30 per cent of the total issue end oiit»t«iiding ordinaigr 
shares of any company, ^e idm here is to eliminate fear from the public mind 
and to keep away L.I.C. from the resporaibllitles of mevnagement. 
Immct of L.I.O. OP the New Issue 
Market and Demand for Capital Funds» 
The Increasing participation of L.I.C. through Secondary Financial Institution 
is an important factor in evoking demand for Capital Funds as the cost of the 
Capital provided W the specialised financial institution was only on an average 
5.S per cent to the industry^  as against 7.5 per cent earned by the industry. 
Besides the special finance provided by the intermediaries also relieved the 
firms fjpom the high cost of borrowijfig from tho xmorganised sector of the ecmoisy* 
Rose'has remarkably stated tho impact of the financial Inetitvitions on the Demand 
for c.ipital funds la the following wordsi 
"Kith the special credit institutions long-term credit became available 
at ratec conaisteut with otlior long-term rates and yields; esimultaneously 
a demand for this greater supply of finance arose, in part becauseof the 
v»ry existenoe of the credi"!; inotitAitions. Enti-eitreneurs, attracted by 
the expected profits arising from government eaqjenditures ^ d the Five 
toar Plans, were Interested in oxpundiiig or starting new firmsj at the 
same time the ^ vemment expendii.ures created new depSsits in banks and 
thus in turn lidditional supplies of bank oredit. Many of these firms 
coxad meet part of their financial needs from the special institutions -
and wotild not have bsen ables to do so unless these institutions existed -
and they could do so at rates consistent with long-term mtes for oompai^ 
able securiti.os. The fact that they ware aMe to get finances/from speoisl 
institutions had effects on their demands for other oredit.«(2) 
1 ® 2. In 1958-59 the minimum rate of the ICICI was 6^ 55, and its rates for foreign 
currency loans 7^ 58; the IFC charge a rat® of 1% with a robato for proa^t pay-
ment. The State Finence Corporation charge approximately the same rates;Commer-
cial banks which i^finance medium term loans through the Hefinance Financial 
Corporation charge atloast For the borrowing firm thcro aro also additional 
charge and stamp tax that raise the effective rate to the borrower by i to 
depending upon the size of the loan.The average yields,tax free,an outstanding 
private debentures Ijti 1957-59 was about 4,1-4.258; on fixed dividend preference 
shares the yield ranged from 5.9 to 6 %} end the variable dividened securities 
from 6.3-6.The weighted average of these oharges to ths induatiy has been 
calculated by Rose as 5.55S as an overall cost to Industry.(Rose,Oeorgej 
Struct\ire of interest Rates in India-Economic Weekly,May 28,1960, pp 799-803) 
VI. 221 
As regards ^  the ^ ffeot of these speoialieed Institutions, on Interest 
rates, BoseHias pointed outt 
".. .not that the additonal special finance led to lower interest rates 
in this sector{ bat rather to tqpvard shifts in the stq>pl7 and demand 
curves of finance, bat at apprcncimateljr existing rates .Hi) 
The fact that the firms were aKLe to get finance from the specieO. institution 
increased their demand for working capital, to make the special finance usable. 
Banks with higher deposits and special credit from Refinanwa Corporation were in 
a position to finance the demand for short-tena and meditm term loans* At the 
same time the increased demand for credit also resulted in raising ^ ield on private 
obligations. This attracted the Individuals and Institutions to subscribe the 
shares and debentures of the companies.^ The;undorwritlng^ o^perations of L.I.G, and 
other specialised institutions also created the confidence among the Investors to 
subscribe to the new issues. This is revealed from the fact that out of the 314 
new issues, 109 issues for its 45 crores were over subscribed, the amount applied 
for in respect of these issues aggregating Bs 220 crores or nearly five times the 
2 
amount offered. Some of the new issues were quoted at substantial premia, even 
prior to their actual flotation.. Somo, idfea.of tho effect of direct and indirect 
participation of L.I.C. in the new issue Aarket can be had from the fact that in 
the period 1951 (Januaxy) to (Jtme) 1960 new amount floated b7 the companies was 
Ite 256 crores. Of this, Bs 171 crores or two thirds were floated in -Uie last 5 years 
i.e. broadly the period oommencing from the estabLlshment of L . I . C . It can, there-
fore, be safely concluded that the direct and indirect paetlclpating) of L.I.O. 
through Secondary Financial Institutions and the iinderwrlting of shares has been 
an Important factor in tte increasing capital marSet activity during the period 
1956 and 1960. The finance provided by the L.I.C. and other financial lnte*»-
mediaries has not on3jr helped the development of the estaHished oonoom but also 
U 
1. Rosen, Georgei The Structure of Interest Rates in India, Economic Weekly, 
May 28, 1960 (Vol. XII, Ho.22), p 801. 
2. Reserve Bank of India Bulletini February, 1961, p 172. 
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aided th® growth of new firms. The following table which showa the distribution 
bet%reen 'farther issue' (capital issued Iff existing companies); and 'Initial 
Issues' (coital issued ty the new firms). 
TABLE m. 
HEW ISSUES - miTIAL AND PORTHER 
Initial Farther Total 
Tear 
No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount 
1956 10 3.5 54 4L.6 64 45.1 
(16) (8) (84) (92) 
1957 5 0,4 53 24.4 58 24.9 
(9) (2) (91) (98) 
1958 9 6.1 47 19.8 56 25.9 
(16) (24) ( 84) (76) 
1959 14 12.5 71 30.6 85 43.2 
(17) (29) (83) (71) 
1960 12 18.9 39 13.2 51 32.1 
(Jan.- (23) (»9) (77) (2a) 
June) 
Total 50 41.5 264 129.7 314 171.1 
(16) (24) (84) (76) 
SOraCEt Reserv® Bank of India Bulletin* Op.cit, p 180, Table 9. 
Note: Figures in bracl®ts are percentage to total. 
It will be observed from the above table that the proportion of 'initial' 
issues to total issues rose from 8 per cent in 1956 to 29 per cent in 1959 and in 
the period January to June 1960, it was as high as 59 per cent or three fifth of 
the total new issues. The share of 'further' issues has correspondingly declined 
from 9St per cent in 1956 to 71 per cent in 1959 and further to only 41 per cent in 
the period January to June, 1960. For the period from Jantiaiy 1956 to June, 1960 
however of the total issues of b 171 orores, 'further' issues accounted for Bs 130 
orores or 76 per cent, and 'initial' issues for Bt 41 crores or 24 per cent. 
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It is cl«ar, therefore, that the direct and Indirect partloipation of L.I.C. 
has been an important factor in stimulating demand for capital ftmds and also in 
increasing supply of capital ftinds through otter sources* In a less-developed 
econongr where the ejapansion of Corporate sector largely depends upon external 
resources, the investment practices adopted tgr the Saving Institutions have 
significant influence on the rate of capital formation. This has been shown 
through a Sources and Uses of Corporate Funds in India in the following section. 
Conclusiont 
It will be clear from the foregoing analysis that primarily due to the growth 
of life fund and also due to some modifications in InvestmMit principles, L.I.C. 
has become an important source of industrial finance In the coontzy. Whereas the 
operation of If.I«G. In the Stock Market is important factor in stabilising prices 
the growth of life fund has created serious problems in the new Issue Market. This 
is due to the fact that the liability characteristics of L.I.C. and other similar 
saving institutions favour investment in fixed earning securities of well-estab-
llshed concems as against the sectirities of new and untried forms of business* 
Thus with the growth of life fund and other institutional saving^  a wall may be 
created which becomes more difficult to scale l^jr 'venture' enterprises particularly 
for relatively small buslneses. To a certain extent L.I.C, has overcome this 
obstacle through the Secondary Financial Institutions. Ija recent years the 
finance provided ty the L.I.C. and other financial institutions has become an 
important factor in stimalating the demand for capital funds and Increasing the 
rate of capital formation ixi the private sector. In fact in a growing economy the 
rate of capital formation largely dependd upon the external sources provided by the 
Primary and secondary Institutions. In this way, as the largest Investor, the 
investment policy of L.I.C. has considerable Influence on the capital structure 
of the eompanios. This I have fully discussed in the next section. 
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SEOTION 2 
IHPAC7 OF LIHE ismmm Mf^wmmB OF on THE 
CAPITA OF !{HE GQMPiSIES 
fha extent to L.I.O. <»aist partlei^ ate in different t^ pea of ^ tporate 
Seomrities ie lisiited fay tto #9isr--ell ay&ilabilltT- of sucth inveetiaent out^ lets* 
fhe &v&iX&bSXitsr of inveetieant out-lete» ae a matter of faoti are tbemsolvee 
detemined \ssr tlie roquirements of iasuranoe eoo^ anies beeause tboy ave Xaz'ge imreetorsi 
If, for escanple^  L.X.C* is not going to eabaorllse for a particular t^snp® of 83<mri1^ « 
eoxi)orate aenagesteat isost be aware of tbe faot> end should not loaud i^oh ^ooifiritios 
at all or isstie them relatively voder nnfavottrabiLe oireumstanoeo. This ineidenoe 
of the partieular req^reoonts of an instittxticm is not important in advanesd 
eo<ntomie8. as oertain types <it securities uhidi mates litt:^ oppesd to insuranee 
oosq^ anies can be in demand bgr other investors. In India« x^re the capital 
formation in indnstxy lax^ly depends ^ p^oa thf Fextomal seixroes* and vhera oi^ 
limited (ihoi^ e is availattle to industr^ r regarding the availability of reaoardies» 
the investment polioy of I..X.C* is bound to esert oonsiderable influenoe on the 
type of securities issued fey the oompaiiies. Zn this section X havo pointed out as 
to hov far the oapital strueture of the oToint Stook Cosqpanies has been inflosnoed 
bgr the intpt»staent requirements of I*«X.<}* ithioh eontrols a fairly large amount of 
resources* Finally an estimate of the fcrture oapital requirements of the private 
corporate seetor has also been given. 
^n^mal 
gmida of 
The demand for oapital funds in the private corporate seoter usually arise 
from the new oonoeims as veil as from established companies. Hew conoems require 
oapital for fixed assets as well as foir working oapital.Establirtied ooaqpanies need 
capital for modemisationtexpansion and replaoemsnt of assets .Xn nev entoxprises the 
basis for long-term financing neoessarHy oalls for external ftnds. Where suoh a 
unit is organised, not by merger or reorganisation of existing oompanies, the fund 
mast be external bscauso no past savings are available. Henoe the growth of sueh 
enterprises, depends upon the availability of *external resooroes'. 
In caab of established businesses where 'internal savings* are available, the 
demand for external capital ftmda depends upon a large number of oiher faetors audi 
1 
as 'expected yield' and 'cost of supply.' But in less developed countries like ours, 
where the 'internal savings' of the companies are very small in relation to their 
requirements, it is not always a question of choice. The companies usually rely on 
'external sotirces' amd the rate of capital formation largely depends upw the avail-
ability of those funds. An idea of the reliance of the industry on the 'External 
Resources' in India can ba had from the Table 62 which shows the Estimates of Financ-
ing the Fixed capital investisents during the First and Second Five Tears Plans* 
It will be observed that during the First Five Tear Plan, external resources are 
estimated to have financed fixed assets formation to the extent of 54 per cent* In 
the second Plan period external resources have contributed to the extent of 47.2 per 
cent in fixed assets foraation. During the two plan periods as a whole per cent 
of fixed assets formation is through external resources. 
A study of the Reserve Bank of India on Company Finance for the period 19S6 to 
2 
1960 for 1001 companies gives a closer insight of the role played by the 'external 
funds' in financing fixed assets formation. This is shown in Table 63. 
1. Kuznets, Simoni Factors in Demand For Capital Funds - in investment of 
Life Insurance Fmids. Edited hy HcCohan, Davids University of Pennsylvania 
Press, Philadelphia, 1953, p 19. 
2. Reserve Bank of India Bolletin, September, 3.961, p 1403-1457 
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7ABL& HO 62 
MALXSIS OF USES m SOimCBS OF FOBOS OF CORPORATB SEOTCR 
OUBINa THE FZBST ABD SBOOHD FIM l&AR 
,,, (^ .(iiyyep) 
Total of 
First Seeond I and ZX 
Plan Plan Plans 
Uses 
Total 
First Sooond of 1 Souroes 
Plan Plan and II of funds 
Plans 
Total fiaced oapital 
reilutrements 
(a) On eag;>ansion (New 
Investments) 





Total funds to 


















ported to have 
oooured during 
Ist Plan and 




















SOURCES: Nigam,Raj K.eund Joshl|N*I}t TreMs in Company Finance with Particular 
Befsrenoe to the First and Second Plan Periods > Department of Compan/ 
Law Administration^  New Delhi* I960, p 
. It will be observed from the table No. 63 (appears on page 7.26} that during the 
four years period( 1956-1959) »the total finance of 1001 Companies together amounted to 
fis 830 ororesfof vhtdti external resouroes amounted for 8s 485 crores or S8j5.In other 
words the total assets formation has 1» en financed to the extent of 58^  by external 
v . r e 
TAHLB 6 <3 
SOimCBS AND USES OF FOHDS OP iOOl SELECTED POBLIG LIMITED 
COMPANIES . 1956*1960 
( 8s Cyoree ) 
1956>1960 1996-1960 
Ii SOURCES OP POHDSj 
A- External Souroeat 
(a) Paid up Capital 
(eioXMing oapitalieed 
Ee'Tisnue) 
(i) Ordinary sharea 
(ii) Proferenee shares 
(b) Borrowings! 
(i) From Banks 
(ii) Prom Industrial 
Finanoe Corporation. 
(iii) Other Mortgages 
(iv) Debentures 
(v) Others 




Ill USES OP P0HD8» 




General and other 
Reserves 
Orend total of A and B 
485.38 A- arose Fixed Assets 568.82 
99.04 B- Inventory 164.12 
c- Receivables 85.66 
81.22 
17.82 
D- Investments 10. <49 
E- Advjjnoe of focome Tex 4.42 
F- Misoellaneous Assets -2.51 


























External Sources to total 
sottrces. 58*9 
Ordinary shares to total Sources 9.8 
Ordinaxy shares to exteznal 
sources 16.7 
Ordinary shares to fixed Assets 14.3 
Borrowing to total Sources 30*1 
Borrowing to external souroes SI. 5 
Borrowing to Fixed Assets 43»9 
Debentures to total souroes 0.8 
Debentures to External souroes 0.9 
Debenture to Fixed Assets 0.8 
SOURCEi Reserve Bank of India Balletin, September, 1961* 
Vol. XV (No. 9) pp 1124^ 1436 - Table 12 and 17. 
1 
soaroea. In the Five Tear Plan Period 1951-55 (in respect of 750 companies surveyed 
1. Reserve B^k of>iIniiili Bulletin/^ September,-1961, p- 1433-; 
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the Reserve Bank of India) external sources had been less important accounting 
X 
only 40 per cent of total funds as against 58.3 per cent during 1956-59. 
It follows from the above study that the volume of capital formation as well as 
the capital structure of the con^ anies will be greatly Influenced by the Investment 
policy of the institutiiais supplying necessary finances to them. This is dear from 
Table which shows that the financial structure of the otmpanies is burdened with 
top heavy debt provided by the Banks and J^ dustrial Finance CJoiporation. The Katio 
of borrowing accounted for SO.l per cent of the total funds* Banks alone accounted 
for 14.6 per cent of total funds. Trad© dues formed 15.9 per cent and fresh capital 
and other mortgages 11.9 per cent. Debentures have played relatively insignificant 
role In the total resources of the companies as they have only e<mtributed 0*3 per 
cent in total assets formationj G.8 per cent on Fixed Assets formation* In the total 
External Resources the contribution of Debentures is only 0.9 per cent while borrowing 
collectIsdgrfoirms about 51.5 per cent of External Resources, .^ iadlarly-<» - the 
Ratio of equities is vezy nominal. Out of the total resources of Bs 829.79 crores 
raised during the period; ordinary shares accounted for only h 81.22 crores. In 
other words ordinary shares have finance total, assets formation to the extent of 9.8 
per centi and fixed assets formation to the tunei of 14i.3 per cent. In the total 
external resources, ordinary shares contrtbution is only 16.7 per cent, llhis shows-
that the financial structure of the e<»kpanies has high proportion of debt. The 
existence of top priority debt in the financial structure of the companies is a 
1. According to the Department of Company Law Administration Study of 128/168 big 
«ized public companies having a paid-up capital of fis 50 la^s or over for two 
groups of years 1956-1957 and 1957-1958, the total funds raised by these 168 
public companies amounts to ts 127.33 ovores dxirl^ 1957. New issues (including 
bonus shares), borrowing and other liabilities and provision i.e. sources other 
than the retained profits accounted for as louch as Bs 112.45 crores or 88.3 per 
cent or total additicmal funds raised during the years as against 81.1 per cwt 
for the year 1956. (It may be pointed out that the paid capita of these 168 big 
companies in the above survey constitutes nearly 53 per cent of the paid-up 
capital of Indian Joint Stock Companies excluding having, insurance, inviostment 
and Government Companies) - Nigam,Raj.K and Chaudhari, N.C. - The Corporate 
Sector in India, Op.Git, p 67. 
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sign of veaknoas tor a doirBX<^ iDtg ooxporete seotor. Baeaiaae tn oaso of *hieav;sr debb* 
the offinpanlee vill havo to p ^ iatorost ohax^a on the torrowed oapital irrespeotlvs 
of their profits. Moxeover, Kith the horrowdd oapital tha ooi^ anios oan not take 
the risk of oxpanelon and Innoiraitlan. It is only through the 'eqtiity capital* that 
1 
the eooQomio zlsk ie asetmed and the prooess of growth is initiated. 
These trends in coa^aa^ fintmoe have net dewlopsd out of the freje ehoiee of 
the ooBtpanleSf bat thojr have teen diotatefl Igr the ohonging oonditicms on the ei^ pljr 
side. Doring thS period 195$ to 1960 as explained in Ohapter 11, there oooured a 
furt^r deoline in idie is^rtanoe of the rich private investors lAio mre the main 
sotiroe of fonds for lQng->tesn flnanoes. The growth of life insitranoe savings and 
other institutional savings are themselves an indieation of the doeline of the 
direot investorant of tho ii^viduals in the industzsr. With tha grotirth of institu-
tional savings the reUanee of the industzT' on the institutions is increasing. 
Some idea of the increasing dep^enee of the industry on the institutional resources 
can be had from the sise of ne«r issues. Shares of small sise are issued to attract 
individual Investors while shares of large siae are issxied to facilitate institui» 
tional investments. During the period January 19S€ to 3\ma, i960| out of 211 
ordinary shares issues (amomt Is 122.8 crores)* 107 issues (amount Is 49 crores) 
were of lb 10 denomination and ?3 issues (amount Bs 48.7 crores) of 8s 100 den<»ainati<»9i. 
The remaining issues (amoimt h 25.1 crores) were for denominations other than 
Bi 10 and Is 100. 
As regards the preference share issuey of the total 76 issues (amount Rvgpees 
29*1 crores), a very large number^  namely* 60 issues (amount h 27.7 crores) was of 
the h 100 denomination. Only 13 issties (amount Is 91 laMis) were of ts 10 denominatian 
and 3 issues (emmtn Rs 44 laldis) of denominations ether than Ss 10 and Bs 100* 
Debentures issues were mainly in the denominations of lis lOOOj h 600 and Bs lOO 
of the 27 debentures issues ( amoont Bs 19.3 crores )» eleven (amount Bs 9 crores ) 
were of tho Bs 1000 denomination, seven ( amount Bs 3.31 crores ) of 
1. Souvain,H.C: Some Economic Considerationa Affecting Investment Policy - In 
Proceedings of the American Life Convention,42 Annual Meeting,Chicago,1947,p.310. 
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1 
fe 100 denomlnati^ and other s ^ (aooimt Bs 3.66 ororee) of the Is 500 denomiiiatlon. 
The aboiw facte dearly indloate the growing reliance of the indiustxy on the 
But 
inatltutionsf/bhe saving institutions have their ovm liDitati<»i8* Coimnerolal Banks 
for example, hare 8lior1>»term liabilities under which as a rule they provide only 
the working capital requirements of industries on the security of floating assets, 
and eschew long-term advances against fixed assets and. inveatnwnt in shares and 
2 
debentures of the coaponies. Savings mobilised by cooperative banks have largely 
financed the agrioulfcurists, saall traders, artisans, weavers and cottage industries. 
Large scale industry is ooajpleialy out of their purview. Land mortgage banks also 
have got lit Lie coimsxion with industrial finance as the/ are mostly engaged in 
meet3a»g the requirements of agriciilturists for long-term credit. Other important 
source of savings are Pensions Funds and Provident Ponds and Post-Offices but they 
have been utilised by iba Government for the develojxnent of the Public Sccto5.Bnder 
thceeoircufflstances, L.I.C. is the only investor which has provided long-term finances 
to the corporate sector. . But it has restricted its investment in equities <to jonly 
7.6 per cent of its assets. This limited participaticm of L.I.C in equities is 
partly due to its conservative out look towards these investments and partly due its 
limitations in providing capital to the industry. L.I.C's small investment in 
debentures (nearly 3.8 per cent of its total assets) which is due tq low yieldr. 
of such securities in relation to Goveftiment securities for comparatively h i ^ r 
risk, la one of the most important factor^ for the insignificant role of debentures 
in the financial struotiure of the companies* 
Even L.I.C's participation through the Secc»idary Financial Institutions has 
not succeeded In solvijag the problem t>f 'equity capital* of the industry because 
1. Reserve Bank of India BuLletto, Februaiy, 1960, p 171. 
2. See Table 60. 
3. Rosen, Oeorgei The Structure of Interest ^ ates in India, Op.Clt, p 801. 
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It is evident from ths table cm page V.SQ that till the end of i960 the 
important financial intermediaries have provided assistance to the industiy in the 
form of loans while their contribation in shares and debentures of the companies is 
negligible. Thus it carl^ be jsacfeiy ©oi^t^ed that the Prtaary Saving Institutions 
have in a manner encouraged the personal saving to take the form of Loan Capital 
rather thaa equities. A serious gap therefore exists between the demand for 'equity 
capital' and supply of equity oapitel. This has also bean pointed out by the 
Coamittee on Finance for the Private Sector In the following worjfdsJ 
"...so far es equity capital and long^ terra finances are concerned aH classes 
of industries^  whether large scalet nsditint soale^  or sr 'U soalsi are eoqierien-
cing difficiilties, except perhaps the loading companies who are able to raise 
moderate aaoimts of such finance ."(l) 
The above findings are also supported by sosno of the surveys recently conduoted 
2 3 
by the Reserv«' 3ank of India and Department of Company Law Administration. Some idea 
TAELE 66 
C A P I T A L I S S U S S C O H T R C L J C O N S E N T S G H A N T E D A N D U T I L I S E D I 9 5 I ~ 5 9 
(Public Limited Companies) 
(lis Crores ) 
tear . Amotint Sanctioned Amount Paid-up 
Shares* Debentures Total Shares Debentures Total 
1951 29.41 4.08 33.49 11.16 3.13 14.29 
199S 16.63 2.99 19.62 9.78 2.$30 12.08 
1953 36.74 11.57 4S.31 27.84 9.41 37.25 
1954 60.72 20.00 80.71 33.85 16.97 90.82 
1955 55.96 10.26 66.22 22.18 6.06 28.24 
1956 87.02 9.90 96.92 4B.95 3.75 62.69 
1997 42.38 9.21 51.59 20.25 7.27 27.82 
1958 37.96 17.49 , 55.45 19.78 10.59 30.37 
1959 78.40 12.30 90.70 14.96 4.40 19.36 
Total* 
1951-59X 368.82 85.50 452.22 193.79 S9.48 253.27 
NOTE 
SOURCE! Roeervo Bank of India ftilletin, February, 1961, p Iff* 
Figures of aaoxmtspaid up fiM shown afjainst the year in respect of whioh 
consents for those issues uero given and not against the year in whioh the 
amounts were actually raised. Thus Bs 22.18 orores shown against 19S5(other 
than bonus iasu9c)were rais«d not in 19S5 but ty Cos.which wero given 
consent for the issue of capital, 1955. 
Other than bonus issues. 
Until recently the cousenla were valid for a period of two years. For this JQ^aon the figures of capital raised against consents grcnto in 1959 ore partial. The figuMs relating to 1959 hare therefore not been included in the total. 
X 
1. Report of the Committee on Finance for the Private Sector,Reserve Bank of India 
Bombay, 1954, p 35. 
2. Ibid, pp 14-33 
3. Ibid, p 67. 
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of the diffloolties in raiaiiig tbe oapital Igr tin eonpanids ean tdso 1» bad fron 
the fi^ ttres in Tablo 65 , of tho oonsents granted for now issttes and of tbe actual 
amounta raised V auoh companies. It will be observed from these fLgturee that 
during toe eight years period a^ at-JltSS, total consents granted tgr the Controller 
of Capital Issue for the issue of shares (other than boxms issues# and delssntures 
of pttblie limited companies) anwunted to Is ASS orores, comprising Bs 367 crores 
(or 81 per cent) of shares and te 85 orores (19 per cent) of detentores* Against 
these consents, a sum of b 2S3 crores comprieing Its 194 (79 per cent) of shares and 
Rs 59 ereres (23 per cent) debentures nas actually/ raised, (That is to say ^aft 
coapanies could raise only 56 p r cent of the amount sanctioned during the period). 
The diffierolty in raising the necessary capital is not entirely due to the overall 
shortage of saving la the eceaoa(7 but' also due to t}& indifferent attitude of tl:» 
L.X.C. and other saving institutions. 
I«.X.G. being the most Important institutional investor can ^  «ritiGised for 
oontriimtlng to these deficiencies of the capital market on the ground that it has 
been too cautious in the choice of its investment. Its preference for fixed 
interest securities has favoured the veil established firms as ggainat the new and 
untried enterprises and the small firms« whose position it has done veryl little 
to alleviate even in other directions. In defence of the L.I.C. it may be argued 
that as Insurer^  it is freed from all responsibility and is prevented by its 
obligatione to provide solution to the problem of 'equity finance.* Bat t.I.C. 
can not ftsoape the responsibility In view of the growing voltinra of life fUnd and 
increasing dependence of the industry on these resources* 
It is true that with the growth of Corporate savings i the reliance of the 
industry for exAemal resources will decrease, but this is not likely to be at 
least In foreseeable future for an expanding eoonoiqy. An idea of the potential 
demand for external resources of the Corporate sector for its future o3q)Qnsion 
can b© had from the KLanntng Ccamlssioa eatimtee. In the Third Five Tear Plan 
the total requirements for finanolng esqpanelon in the Private Sector has been 
at 
estifflate4/Rs 1335 ororee. The following Etol&nce Sheet of Requirements and the 
Sources of finance indicates that the external resources which will be required 
tqr the industry for financing fixed assets formation are 55 per cent of the total 
resources as against 47.2 per cent in the Second Plan. 
. f ABLE 
RBQUKUSMEaiTS OF PINANCBS FOR THE THIRD PUN PERIOD AS ESTIMATED BI THE PLANNIMO COMMISSIOH 
( Hs Crores ) 
Estimated requirements Amount Sources of Funds Amount 
Total Flated Capital Requirements 1335 
(ju) On Expansion 
(New Investments) 1185 
(b) Replacement ISO 
Total Funds to be raised 1335 
Internal resources 
(Het of repayment liabilities) 600 
External SourcesJ 735 
(i) Institutional agencies 130 
(ii) Direct loan participation 
by Central and State 
Govwmments and other 
assistance. 20 
Ciii) New Issues 200 
(iv) Direct Forei^ Credit 
participation in oapital 300 
(•) Gap between requirements 
and reaowreoB 85 
Ratio of External Resources 
to total resouroea. 55^ 
SOURCE t The Third Five Tear Plan, pp 459 and 464. 
In addition, the requirements of new enterpriooG, especially from small 
1 
oonoems which have no past aavings will also increase. The small finas have 
special significancs in the economic development of owe country because they 
1 
pioneer eaonoaio growth end bring eaonomio change, Ko doubt, the finsacing of 
such enterprises involves extra risk but that has to be assumed by some agency. 
I. The Third Five Year Plan, p 449. 
VI .34 
This la also observBd hy one of the Ztttomational Oomparatlvo Study for Investudiit 
in newly developing countries. It sayst 
'birth rate* of nev industrial establishioents is of great inportanoe 
for eeonomio growth. If adequate growth is to ooour» new industries must be 
established» and existing ones most generally esipand. New industries injeei 
added o(»ipetitive figour into the sjatem^  as well as assist the total rate 
of eoonomio growth. Xet It is generally agreed guiding it through its 
early diffioultiee is far more difficult and demanding than is managing an 
older industry that has goi^  throu^ these trials 
It is trae, ae tho above remarks have pointed out> that tbat the financing 
of small and new conottrne Is h&ssardou8« but for the sake of eoonomio development 
that responsibility has to to boxT» fey institutions. responsility «fliall 1» 
/ 
indeed v&r^  heayy on £>.I.C. which is expected to mobilise huge amount of personal 
savings in future. J^ cause of thds^  situation L.I.O. has frequently been urged 
to depart from orthodox investment channels and to invest sutetantive proportions 
of funds in equity and in small concerns, the chances of succesa of such public 
pressuros are appredsed in terms of investment requirements of L.I.C. in the next 
chapter. 
She analysie in this Ohapter has shown that insurers participation in Corpora-
tion finance is entirely a post-^ war second phenomena, ifofore the World War II 
insurers investment in Corporate securities was less than 7 per cent of the total 
assets. In the last ysar of the private insursmoe companies the percentage increased 
to little cfver 16 per cent, fhs steady increase in the investment of the Corporate 
securities in the post-war period was mainly due to the rapid growth of life fond. 
The decline in the yield on Ctovaniment securities also forced the insurers to 
modifjr their approach towards indtistrial scrips. Among the various types of 
Corporate securities insurers mainly invested in ordinazy shares. Their investment 
1. International Comparative Studies - Investment Series Z, Private United States 
Venture Capital, For Investment in Hewly Developing Countries - International 
Industrial Development Centre, Stanford Research Institute, CaUfomia, 1998, 
p 1. 
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in prefiarenee shares aad detentures was limited due to nofi>avellability of good 
qUfillt/ of sttob seoorities. After the nationalisation, L.I.O's investments in 
Corporate securitiea have largeJcf increased due to the growth of life fundj 
vMlji the peroentage of Corporate seourities to total assets has declined. This 
is evident from the fact that the ratio of Corporate securities to total assets 
has deelined from 16.1 per ^ nt la 1935 to 14.8 per cent in 1960| but the amount 
invested in Corporate seourities has increased from f!s orores in 195S to 
5s 92.1 crows in 1960, Even with the liadted participation, L.I.C. holds the 
significant portion of the available Corporate seourities. ^he caaparative study 
shows that among the institutional investors, I<.1.0. is the largest investor in 
the countxy. 
Again, the analysis shows that in view of its liability characteilstice and 
legal fremsHork, L.I.C. has u natxiral preference for fixed earning secxurities of 
established concern as against the scrips of nsw ventures* This has serious 
repercussions on the growth of new concerns which are the main source of econooio 
developB^ nt. has tried to overcome this obstacle Igr financing the indus-
trial growth throTii^ i the Secondaiy Flminoial Institutions. However, this has not 
w 
fully solved the problem of 'equity capital' of the industiy* h^e capital structure 
of the companies is over burdened with debt. This is considered to be a sign of 
weakness for an esqpanding Corporate Sector, t^ich requires equity capital for 
innovation and growth. In this way the Institutionallsation of savings often 
runs against the interest of the small and new concern which coold not provide 
adequate security to the institutions* Since the growth of life insurance depends 
upon the degree of eoonomio developKint, it is suggested that L.I.C. should 
rationalise its investment policy. The extent to whidi L.I.C. could finance the 
eoonomio development has to 1® examined with reference to its investment framework. 
CHAPTER VI 
m e IBVESTMEKf IBASEWC^ OF ULC. 
CHAPTER VI 
1HB nnmSTNB^T FRA»BljORI OF L. L 0. 
It has been pointed out that a flisnifloant prof^rtion of the total capita 
both in the PubLlo Soetor ea noil ao in th» Prlveto Soetor has hem proHded bgr 
L.I.G. From the graving volvm of life fund It has been oonolndsd tlmt even a 
larger portion of the total individual savings will be ohanalised through the 
t.I.C. Thee© facts have inposed on L.I.C, a eoeio<»eca:oaie reoponsiMlity not 
only towards the polioyholdors for preservation of policy rooervos bat also 
to ^  nation for investing its assets in a izuumer otmsistont with pubSlio interest. 
Its responsibility to protect the •pjrfxlio interest has all tho aor® increased 
because of its nationalised status and tho pro&iaont role it ploys in ot^ital 
fonsaticm. Bat the ojctont to which the L.I.C, can share this responsibility is 
circumsciril^ by legel stipoletions on the one hand cad tho nature of its liaM* 
litieo on tho other. Tha latter oalla for the naintenmoe of oortain propo?ti<ai 
of assets in a form which can ha readily oonvortoTale into cash without oonoidteiv 
able oapital losts while the fonaer oxdudes insuranoo fonds from the investo^at 
in oertiiin fields. 
In tho following pages I have disouosed tho factors thet determine tbs port-
folio structure of L.I.O. i.e. tho logal fraaeworlti the iseture and character of 
lis liabilities^ and the * Internal and Gxtemcl* restraints. 
SBCTIOH I 
WaXL FlUliEWORS OP LIFE IBS0R/1ISB ®yB8Tt4E!JT 
the growth of life iKSuranoo, govemasnto of a cunter of oouatries 
have insisted the insurer to invest a portion of thoir life floids in government 
seourities. J» India, the l^uronoe Act of presoribsd for the first titae 
such a co/idition. Qader seoti<a) 21 of this Act, as azoended ia 1990 life companies 
were required to invest a taJnium of 25 p^r cent of their funds in govemoent 
securities* a further 29 per o«mt was required to be invested in approved scemrities 
i.e. securities-generally guaranteed ty the Central or Provincial/State Qovemoents. 
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Thus 90 per cent of investment was to be in government or gilt edged securities* 
Of the sremaining SO per oent of investibie funds« a minionim of 35 per cent could 
be Invested in Approved Ijivestments which include besides approved securities 
mortgages, immovable property, policy loans etc. Investment in joint stock 
companies was also permissible provided the companies had been paying dividend 
regularly for a number of years. Investment of the balance of 15 per cent was 
left to the discretion of the life insurance companies* These statutory require-
ments were not properly observed fcgr certain companies which was one of the reasons 
1 
for nationalisation of life insurance business in India. 
On nationalisation, government did not immediately apply section 27 A of 
the Insurance Act, 1958 to the L.I.C. ^ Investment Committee to guide the 
Corporation in making its investments was constituted under section 19(2) of the 
L.I.C. Act. It was stated that the Corporation shoiild follow the principles as 
laid down in the 1938 Act in respect of its investments till the matter was further 
examined* 
In 1957 govezi!uoent introduced a bill in the Lok Sabha to create en Investment 
Board. The Board was to consist of the Governor of the Reserve Bank as Chairman, 
the Chairman of the Central Board of the State Bank and the Chairman of the Corpo-
ration as members* In effect, this bill contempt|lated taking away the work of 
investment frcm the Corporation and entrusting that function to a separate body on 
which the Corporation would have been represented by the Chairman* Before the 
bill was further proceeded with, th® Mundhra episode and the enquiry into that by 
Justice Chagla intervened* Considerable discussion took place in Parliament 
regarding the policy and procedure to be followed by the Corporation In respect of 
its investments. The bill proposing the constitution of an Investment Board was 
not proceeded with, liistead, in Au^st, 1958, section 27A of the Insurance Act 2 
was applied to the L.I.C. with slight modifications. 
1. Estimates Committee Report, p 38* 
2. Lok Sabha Debate - Second Series, Vol. ZIX, Mo. 11, 25th August, 1959, 
columns 2674^ 2677* 
n . 3 
Under the nsv IsgoX froiutniOTis.f 'tto invss'fcinen'fcQ of l^ he oon^ raULed ftmds of iilie 
Corporation are divided* as before * into three broad categories, nameljr^  (a) Oovem^ 
sent and approved seoaritieB (i.e. mostly govenuaent and eemi-govemment seoiirities 
(b) investment approved toider new seotlon 27A and (o) 'other' investments. Simi-
larly, as under the old provisions, 25 per cent of the oontroUed funds should be 
held in Qov^msssRt Seourltiee, a further sum equal to not less than 25 per cent 
in government securities or other approved securities and not more than 15 per e-ent 
in 'other' Investawnt. The balance of about 35 per cent is to be held in 'approved' 
investments as defined in the amended section 27A of the Insurance Act. Tvo 
Important modifioationshave been made in the old seoticoi 27A regarding approved 
investments. First, in terms of sub-seetion( 3) and (4) of the old section 27A, 
an insurer could not hold more than 2 per cent of the subscribed share capital 
and debentures of a banking or an investment company and 10 per cent of the subs-
cribed share capital and debentures of any one ccanpany (other than a banking or 
investment company). This has been modified / so as to allov the L.I.C. to hold 
upto 30 per cent of ths equity share capital of a cosqpany, vith a furthar provision 
1 
for exceeding this limit with the prior approval of the Central Oovemment. 
Second, under the old section 27A(S), the insurer were completely prohibited from 
investing in private limited coo^ panles) but under the modified section 27A(7) 
the Corporation is permitted to invest in private conqpanies as well with the prior 
approval of the government. 
' As regards the 'other' investiMnts, the L.I.C can invest upto 15 per cent of 
its controlled funds on unanimous recommendation of the Investment Committee 
(Constituted tinder Section 19(2) of the L.I.C. Act) or on the resolution of the 
Corporation passed by a majority of at least three fourths of the members present 
1. The increase in percentage from 10 to 30 was caused because of the inheritance 
of the L.I.C. The L.I,C. with 243 companies, found itself with percentages of 
holdings in many compares moire than 10 per coat. So it was necessary to resort 
to the modification (Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol. IXII, No. 10, 29th 
November, 1958, Columns, 2160). 
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at the aeeting. Farther, under section 27A(8)« the Central Oovenusent has reserved 
the power to require the Corporation not to invest its funds in any Investment 
specified by it, or whether it has any existing Investment to realise them In a 
specified time. 
lav is more speoifio in the selection of Corporate securities. Provisions 
regarding such investments are given in clause l(a) to l(g) of section 27A, For 
example the lav preseribss that the Corporation can invest in such debfmtures only 
that are secured tgr a first charge m any tomovable property vhich has paid interest 
in ftili for the five years immediately preceding and that such debentures are at 
least three times more than the value of the property e^ alnst the seonrity of which 
they have been issued. Similarly in case of Preference Shares, lav permits invest-
ment only in such preference shares which have prior right both as regards income 
and capital and that vhere the dividends have been paid for the five years imaedia-
tely preceding. The Corporation is permitted to invest on],y in such ordinary shares 
of any cos^any on vhich dividends of not loss than four per oent including bonus 
have been paid for the five years immediately preceding or for at least five out 
the seven years immediately preceding. 
Qy Section 6 of the L.I,C.Aot and also br caluse 1(A) of Section 27A of the 
Insurance Act, the Corporation is empovered to invest in immovable property 
situated in India or in any other country. Provided the property is free from any 
encumbarences. It is also empovered to invest in first mortgage an immovable 
property sittiated in India under any Housing or Building Scheme of a PubLic Iilmited 
Con^ pany or a Cooperative Society registered under the Coi^rative Societies Act, 
1912 or under any lav for the time being in force. The Corporation can also extend 
loans to the policyholders for housing construction. 
Valuation Requirements» 
The above logal requirements are direct and clear cut in oircumscribing the 
L.I.C*s investment in different outlets. Over end above these the valuation 
requirements under section 26 of L.I.C. Aotj the requirements regarding presentation 
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of accounts under section 27 and the aethcd of raluation of assets required under 
First Schedule of the Iisuriaice Act 1938 also tnflusnc© luI.C's ljavest®ant decisions 
in different forms of investments* 
Thus the biennial acttiarial Taluation tmder section 26 of the L«I.G.Act end 
valuation requirements of assets at the market or cost price under First Schedule 
of th® Insurance Act 1938. create!^  preference for mortgages Debentures and Btmds 
as against ordinary shares. This is due to the fact that fluctuation in market 
values in the case of bonds and debentures is not as serious as in case of stocks. 
Besides,in c<mtraot with ordinary shares which are characterised by wide oarket 
fluctuations* mortgages are usually entered at their book value as there are no 
established market values for mortgage debt in India. The mortgages can therefore 
be shown at stable prices* 
Similarly, the irequirements of section 27 of the L.I.O. Act whorelgr the Corpora-
tion is expected to submit its accounts annually in a prescribed form at the end of 
each financial year to the Central Qoveroment also ineifeases the preferences for 
fixed earning security as against fluctuating earning securities. Because a purely 
av 
temporary depreciation in values often prove very embrassing if it occxurs at a tine 
when the fund's accounts have to be presented. 
Both these factors do not influence the solvency of the funds and tedmically 
speaking the effects of both can be mitigated by maintaining an Investssent Fluctua-
tion Account or by a Reserve Fund. But these -va].uation requirements and the 
requirements of presentation of accounts considerably effect the Investment policy 
of L.I.C. 
The various logal requirements of L.I.C. as regards Investment have been dis-
cussed in this section. It has been shown that the statutory requirements regarding 
Investment in stocks, preference shares and debentures of a prescribed standing 
prohibit the corporation in taking aiyr risk of prcKOotioa of untried form of businesss 
71 . 6 
The legal requirementa create a prefei^ enoe for the shares of well eeiatiLished 
concerns. Besides the statutory requirements of valuation of assets of L.I.C, 
also favour investment in fixed earning assets« against equity investment in 
shares of Joint stock companies. 
The legal provisions are ess^tial to maiJitajUi the insurance business on 
sound lines in the interest of the policyholders. But the legal requirements 
of L.I.C. ttoay leave wide field open whereby the corporation could exercise its 
judgement in the selection of investment. fact the liability characteristic 
of L.I.C. as the study in the ftOlowing section will 8hov« suggests a cautious 
approach towards the selection of various investment outlets. 
SBCTIOK Z 
KATlffiE AMD GHARACmiSTICS OF L.I.CU LIABILITIES 
The investment policies of L.I.C, are conditioned Ity financial circumstances 
and by the terms on which it holds the funds of the policyholders. In order to 
appreciate these facts it is essential to know fully the nature of the life insurance 
business and the terms of life insurance policies* 
An ordinary life insurance policy as already explained in Chapter I is a 
contract whereby the insurance company agrees to pay a stipulated amount to a 
beneficiary upon the death of an insured person in consideration of certain periodic 
payments to the corporation. When the corporation has entered into a number of 
such contraots it h&B, in effect, set up a system whereby many persons pay into a 
fund and many beneficiaries draw out of the fund upon the death or maturity of the 
insurance policies. The size of the payment (premium) made }»riodioally into the 
fimd for each insured person for any given amount of insurance is influenced by a 
number of factors such as mortality, rmte of interest, and expenses. The surpluses 
on these accounts result in the aeounraLation of fund* 
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The aoeuimilatl<m of life fund at a stipulated rate is an essential and inte-
gral part of the life insurance business* In this respect life insurance differs 
from other forms of insurance* 3n life insurance, for examine» the event which is 
contemplated is certain, the only uncertainty being the time of actual occuranoe* 
In general insurance on the other hand the event insured against may or may not 
happen* For exanqplOf a vessel insured under marine poli^r may or may not be lost* 
a vorkman covered by a workman compensation policy may or may not be injured* 
In contrast to this eveyy life contract results in a claim* An intelligent regard 
of this aspect of the contract Igr the Corporation is important in determining its 
rates of premiums and in dealiag with the management problems regarding the dis-
position of funds* 
Moreover* in most of the insurance business other than life insurance, the 
contract is for a term of <sie year and often cancellable by either party before 
the expiry of the term. The life insurance contract on the other hand is a long-
term contract which can neither be cancelled nor modified or altered by the 
Corporation at option. It| therefore,requires a considerable care in t|is computa-
tion of premium rates and In upbuilding of the fund to enable the Corporation to 
discharge its obligation on due dates. Thus Fig 21 shows that the life fund is 
the main liability of the Corporation. This fund which accumulates under level 
premium method described in Chapter I belongs to the policyholders. It constitutes 
about 90 per cent of the total liabilities of the Corporation. Reserve and other 
contingencies are 9 per cent, less than 1 per cent f^ ^^ ^^ '^f.ff^ f of the assets 
serve as capital cushion. This means that L.I.C, has veiy limited ability to 
absorb loss of princii^ l* Losses equal to only a small fraction of the total 
amount of its Invested assets can easily jeopardise its solvency. In this respect 
its position is very much like that of commercial banks which have little ability 
to risk their capital. Thus in 1862, on English Aotuaiy, A.H.Bailey propounded 
a < ^ M 
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five principles to safeguard the investment of life fund. He gave top priority 
to the preservation of capital.' His canons are Important and worth mentioning* 
as they have been the guiding principles of life offices for a considerably l<mg 
time. Thus according to Baileyi 
1." The first consideration of a life office should be security of capital. 
2. The highest pfacticable rate of interest should bo obtained, but this 
principle should always be subordinate to the previous one, the security 
of capital. 
3. A small proportion of the total funds (the amount varying according to 
the eircumstances of each individual case) should be held in readily 
convertible securities for the payment of current claims, and for such 
loan transactions as may be considered desirable. 
4. The remaining and mudi larger proportion may safely be invested in 
securtiies that are not readily convertible; and that it is desirable, 
according to the second principle, that it should be so invested, 
because such securities, being vnsuited to private individuals and 
trustees, command a higher rate of interest in consequence* 
5. As far as practicable, the capital should be employed to aid the life 
insurance business." (l) 
The above principles were reaffirmed by WsPenmeai in a paper contributed to the 
2 
Institute of Actuaries in 1933. But there is bex>tain degree of incompatibility 
between the First and the Second canons of Baily's principles, for if security of 
capital is made the overriding suucim, it would involve the Corporation to invest 
in treasury bills and shortest possible bonds. The'highest practicable rate of 
interest' from such Investments may be so low as to lead to insolvency. In fact 
the need for liquidity is not so great as stressed by Bail^. This is mainly due 
to three reasons i Firstly contractual liabilities of life Insurance companies are 
IN. long-term in nature. The investments can be and usually are long-term nature. 
Secondly, since the cash inflow of life insurance companies has always exceeded 
of 
the o^h out flow, the liquidity factor ii^ minor importance. Lastly, Ihe life 
insurance income is largely retained and reinvested at compound interest. 
1. Bailey, A.Hi "On the Principles on which Funds of Life Assurance Societies 
should be Invested." - The Jouxnal of the Institute of Actuaries, Cambridge 
(England), Vol. 10 (l862), pp 142-4r7. 
2. The Journal of Institute of Actuaries, Vol. LXIV, Ft. Ill, p 387. 
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providing an Inexorable growth of oapltal which ^ givea- euffloient liquidity to a 
life office. 
It is often pointed out that insurance contracts oontain surrenders and loans 
options which can disturb severely a balanced Investment position. Generous 
surrender options can embarrass a life office when interest rates are high, while 
generous settlement options csn cause corresponding eabarrasmeat when inteirest 
rates «r© low. 3at In India the policyholders have rarely exercised those options. 
This la evident frow the following- Table. 
TABLE 67 
PEROHiTAGE OF SOPJIENBESS TO NEW BtJSlKESS ANS TIIB PERCEHTAGE OP POLICI 
LOANS TO T O m ASSETS 
Criteria 1940 1945 1950 1955 1958 1959 1960 
Percentage of surrenders 
to New Business. 1.9 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 
Percentage of Politgr Loens to total assets* 9.3 4.9 5.3 7.6 7.9 7.3 7.0 
SOtmCESj Reserve Bank of IndiaJ Banking and Monetary Statlatlos. 
L.I.Ct Annual Heports and Aoooimts* 
It will be observed from the above Table that the percentage of surrenders to 
that of new business has been less than 2 per cent. The highest percentage was 
1.9 per cent in 1940. After the nationalisation of life insurance the ratio of 
mundnders to new business has been less than one per c^t. Similarly the ratio 
of policy loans to total assets is only TO per cent in i960 as against 9.3 per 
cent in 1940. 
The foregoing observations bear testimony to the faot that by its nature the 
life insurance business does not require a sd^ificant liquid position. Besides* 
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the policy to 'match assets* with the 'term of liability' oonsiderahly reduces the 
liquidity requirements. The following Table, therefore, shows that the 'liquidity 
ratio' i.e. the percentage of cash to total assets has been on an average 5.2 per 
cent between the period 1939 to 1995. After the nationalisation of life insurance 
business the 'liquidity ratio' has further gone down. 
TABLE 6'8 
LIQUIDITT RATIO 
OF LIFE OFFICESIIN INDIA 
Tear Cash as percentage 
to total assets 
•Year Gash as percentage 
to^ 'total assets 
1939 3.7 1950 5.4 
19^ 4.6 1351 6.3 
1941 3.9 19SJ 5.9 
1942 4.6 1953 5.2 
1943 5.0 1954 5.9 
1944 4.9 1955 5.5 
1945 4.6 1956 3.3 
1946 3.8 1957 4.5 
1947 5.7 1958 3.7 
1948 5.3 1959 4.9 
1949 S.2 1960 2.9 
SOURCESt Reserve Bank of Xndiat 
1. Banki^ and Monetary Statistics. 
2. Insurance Ze&r Book. 
3. L.I.Ct Annual Reports and Accounts. 
This faU in the liquidity ratio is partly due to rapid aoouiaulati<»i of 
life fund and partly due to the efficiency of the corporation in keeping its 
funds fully invested. In fact in case of rapid growth of life fund the liquidity 
requirements are further reduced, provided the portfolio managers are fully aware 
of the rate of growth of the life fund. Table shows the impact of the rapid 
1 
growth of life fond on the liquidity preference of L.I.C. 
1. Column 2 of the Table shows the annual increase of life fund. Coltznsa 3 shows 
annual increase {*) or decrease {-) in cash. Column 4 shows the change in 
cash as percentage of the change in life fund. 
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TABLE B9 
LIQUIOm FREFfiRENOE OF INDIiUl LIFE OFFICES AND LIFE ItiStmANCE 
CORPORATIOfi 
1959 - 1960 
O^ii-fe^) 
Annual Annual Addition to Annual Annual Addition to 
Tear increase change cash as a tear increase change sash as a 
in funds in cash percentage in funds in cash percentage 
(• or -) of additional 
to life fund* 
(+ or -) of additional 
to life ftind 
1939 5*7 + 0.1 • 1.8 1950 8.3 + 0*8 + 9*6 
1940 6.1 •»• 0.9 •14.8 1951 15*5 + 3*6 +23*2 
1941 6.4 - 0.2 - 3*1 195B 34*9 + 1.1 + 3.2 
1942 7.2 + 1*2 +16.7 1953 23*7 + 0*5 + 2.1 
1943 8,2 • 0.9 +10.9 1954 22*2 + 2*9 +13.6 
1944 10.3 • 0.7 • 6.8 1955 23*1 + 0,2 + 0.9 
1945 13.0 • 0*3 + 2*3 1956 79*2 - 6.8 - 8*6 
1946 9.1 + 2*4 +26*4 1957 31*5 • 7.^ + 23*5 
1947 13*1 * 0.8 • 6*1 1958 37*4 -2 .8 - 7.S 
19 48 20.8 • 0*6 + 2.8 1959 47.5 + 6*4 +13*5 
19^ 22*8 • 1.2 + 5.3 1960 65.1 - 7,9 -12.1 
SOURCE} 1. Reserve Bank of India: Banking and Monetary Statistics. 
2. Insurance Tear Book. 
3. Ii.I.O. Annual Reports and Accounts* 
NOTE: ofadditionto life ftoid for the period 1951 
to 1955 are based on unrevised data. 
2» Figures for 1956 are for eigpit monthsj figures for 
1957 are for sixteen months. 
3. The sharp increase in life fund in 1956 is due to 
integration of life fund of all insurances» Indian 
foreign and Provident Fund socUities, while figures 
for 1955 are for Indian Insurers onD^ r* 
4. Cash incliides, deposit, cash and stamp but excludes 
remittances in transit* 
It can be noted from the above table that in most of the years 'cash balances' 
of Indian life offices have increased as a restilt of the rapid increase in the 
life ftmds. The percentage varied between 1*8 per cent in 1939 to 26«4 per cent 
in 1946. This might also be due to the Jnabilij;y of Indian life offices to invest 
1 
their funds pronqptly. After the nationalisation, the percentage considerably 
declined with the rapid accumulation of life fund* Thus, if the investment 
1. Agarwala, A.Nt Op.Git, p 342. 
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management continues to be alttrt> the 'liquidity preference* of the Corporation 
eould be reduced with the rapid growth of life fund. 
The need for liquidity does not arise from the demands of policy holders but 
from internal coosideratlona relating to portfolio management* According to Wlnnt 
"Although overzealous investment commitments in ejqpectations of large not 
cash inflow have oeoasion given rise to liquidity upon the security jorb-
folio, Hhe primary liquidity requirements have arisen trcm the desire to 
shift the portfolio from one area of investment to another* This shift 
has frequently been made In order to obtain Investments which, at that 
moment, appear to provide the best solution of the investment problem," (i) 
These liability requirements arise In an internal sense. In that investment 
opportunities are continually changing and the changes occur at irregular intervals • 
Consequently, the demand for liquidity arises from the desire to remain fully 
invested, yet at the same time to have the ability to shift the composition of the 
portfolio at any time without incurring a loss on securities sold. 
Thus L.I.C. may remain fUlly invested in the sense that the chances to hold 
Cash in anticipation of rise in interest' rate are very remote; while it may main-' 
tain some cash for shifting funds from one investment to another* ^t even under 
most uncertain conditions of l«ag tenB_4ntere8t-rate8-LHTC;~keep"itself fully 
Invested in short term securities as it has been shown in Chapter IV* frtm the 
above dlsou8si<m it follows thatt 
1. L.I.C* has little need for liquidity* 
2. It keeps its/i^ funds fully invested at all times. 
3* It is not a trader in securities bat in fact a true long-term investor. 
4. It does not hold funds in anticipation of therdse in interest rates nor 
borrows or otherwise ever commits itself in expeetations of rate declines. 
If the above generalisation are literally true, the Investment behaviour of 
L.I.C. would indeed be a routine process* It would occupy an in-active role with 
respect to Interest rates, passively teddng what the market provides in the way 
of long-term rate. But the nature of life Insurance contract that Is assumption 
1* Winn,Hilli8,Ji Qoverament Seouritlesi In Investment of Life Assuranoe Funds -
Edited by Me Caban, Davldj Ihiiversity of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 
1953, p 90. 
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of earning at least an assused rate of interest makes the L.I.C. interest 
oonsciotts* Jn the interest of the basiness it haiA to follow a p81ie^ and has to 
reshuffle its portfolio struoture in order to earn a guaranteed minioun ]%te* 
This is another eiiaraoteristio features of its liabiUties which needs discussion 
in detail. 
to ft SHPy^UiM Rate of InterestI 
It was pointed oat earlier that there are two features whioh distinguish 
the basiness of life assuranoe from that of other financial undertaldLngs* The 
first is that a life assurance office, in return for contribution or premium 
fixed at the outset, enters into contracts whioh may, and do on the airerage, run 
for maxQr y^ars. The second is that the promius received under these contracts 
are calculated Togr a mathematical formula which assumes that the offioo will he 
able to invest the funds which it accumulates out of these premiums at a definite 
rate of compound interest* 
Tbs ability# therefore, of a life office to conduct its business on a solvent 
basis depends, apart from other factors which do not effect its financial policy, 
on its ability to invest its funds and keep them invested at a rate of interest 
not less than that on which the premiums are based. For example, let us assume that 
the premivens charged are calculated on a 3 per cent interest table, assuming morta-
lity to follow the latest expsrience with a loading to cover the expenses or over-
head charges of conducting the business and, in the case of with profit policies» 
an additional loading calculated on the same assumptions to provide a revisionaiy 
bonus at a certain rate per aimum in addition to the sum aseumed. If, therefore, 
the Corporation experiences the rates of mortality and expenses assumed, it 
is necessaty for it to earn interest at the rate of at least 
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3 por cent after deducting Income tax and any depreciation that may have to be 
written off, in order to meet ite life assurance contracts and pay a bonus which, 
though not a legal obligation, is in, normal times a moral obligation because an 
additional premium is charged for this privilege. The urge to earn a minimum rate 
of interest is not so Important in short-term contracts of general insurance but in 
case of life insurance the earning of minimum rate of interest is a necessity. Thus 
Peglar has rightly pointed out: 
"For temporary contracts interest-earning is something of a luxury its 
absence would sadden the shareholders but not ruin the fund-while capital 
preservation is of paramou]^ t impoztance. For offices with permanent 
contracts, however, and moreover contracts in which interest has been 
taken into accoimt in calculating the premiums, the earning of interest -
and, indeed, an adequate rate of interest is a vital necessity* The 
penality for failure is insolvency at best the earning of progressively 
lower bonuses on profit contracts, and ultimate extinction."(l) 
The ptirpose, therefore, of life assurance office is twofold. In the first 
place, it is necessaxy to obtain as high a rate of interest as is consistent with 
the quality or class of investment considered suitable and in the second place, it 
is necessary, as far as possible, to guard against changes in financial conditions 
in the future by having regard, not merely to the rate of interest that can be 
obtained at the time being, Isit rather to securing this rate of interest for such 
terms as are likely to cover the duration of existing contracts. Peglar, has, in 
this connection ooncl\ided» 
"It would be th^ '^ aim of life office investment policy to invest its funds 
to earn the mayimtun expected yield thereon." (2) 
In propounding this principal, Peglar argued that capital and interest are in 
f-act Indivisible, and that with any particular investment it is the degree of the 
security of the income both present and future which determines the capital value 
of the Investment, In order to provide for varying degrees of security of income. 
1. Pegler, J.B.H: The Principles of Life Office Inves ment. Journal of the 
Chartered Insurance Institute (London),Vol. ^  (1958), p 153. 
2. Pegler, J.B.Hi The Actuarial Principles of Investnent. Journal of the 
Institu e of Actuaries, Vol. LXXIV, Part II, No. 339, 1948, p 181. 
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Pegler introduced the concept' . of * expected' 2rield vhtdt combined the contractual 
payments due on an investment vrith the probabilities that such contractual paonsents 
would be forth-coming. Peglar thus criticised Bailey^ s principle on the ground that 
the preservation of capital leads to the virtual insolvency of a life office. In 
another paper published in the JToumal of the Chartered Insurance Institute; be saysi 
; "For many years it was videly j^aehed and commonly believed that for this 
type of funds the prlaaz^ consideration (to which ali^ cathars were sutordinate) 
was the preservation of capital. Even d^dr this principle came to be almost 
universidly ignored among the practical exponents of life insurance investment 
iip-servioQ was nevertheless j^d to it, presumably baoauee 'safety of capital' 
SjQunded lilte a cautious and cmservative aim« and thus in line with the best 
traditions of British life assurance. It has already been seen* however^  
that for life assurance funds (and the oam applies to similar concerns 
dealing in long-term contracts | such as pension ftmds) an adequate y1.eld on 
the investments is a vital necessity, lb general, the safer the capital is 
from the risk of depreciationf the lesser is the yield obtaina'ble « thou^ 
there are exceptions in times when there is an expectation of a general fall 
in interest rates before long • so that the consoientious pursuit of capital 
safety could not be relied on to produce an adequate yield. In fact, the 
apparently safe and consejrvative coi*rse is a jroad to disaotor.'*(l) 
It will be clear from the faregolng discussiwa that the primary need and 
hence the first objective in investment of a life office is to earn an adequate 
yield with the pt^ K^/^pfsfs/fi^  'safety' of capital. 
3. A Life Contract is in Fixed Monetary ITnlts and 
hence L.I.C. is Immune against Purchasing PowSr RisK* 
Just as the deposit liabilities of banks are payable In rupee without reference 
to their purchasing power, so are life inaurance oc»tracts denominated solely in 
rupees. An insurance policy is a contract to pay a fixed sum of money upon the 
death of the insured persons, larMths L.I.C, apparently undertakes no respoaslbllity 
whatever for the purchasing power of that sum at whatever time in the future it 
may be paid. Similarly, annuity and pension contracts require only the payment of 
specified amounts in rupees. Therefore, the liabilities of the L.I.C. are not 
exposed to purchasing power risk. Similarly the Osorporation itself is immune to any 
adverse consequences from a decline in the puridiasing power of investment income. 
Moat of its investment income is applied to increasing poli<^ Reserve under the 
1. Ibid, p 159, 
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a88umed<-rate of interest 8yatem« and this system requires only that the monetaxy 
•aliie of polio^ ' reserve be inoreased* Some small part of its Inoome is required 
for oi^ rating Menses and these eaqwnses vould undoubtedly inorease in a period 
1 • 
of inflation bat this ocmsideration alone does not seem suffioi^tly important 
1 to exert a matjgdi^ l influence on investoQent polioy* 
4. THE HEED FOR MOM.RISK 
CgARACfERISTlCS OP I^ QimiTIESi 
(a) The nature of the liability also suggests that L.I.C. has little need to 
seekottty the more h i ^ y marketable securities. A life insuranee is a long-term 
oontraet;, the danger of forced sale of securities to obtain cash for payments to 
policyholder is negllgibile, and polloies in management of the portfolios are 
generally such as to place no particular premium on hi^ marketability. Tim fact 
that L.I.C. investments are made liy well qualified oxperts reduces the value of 
incidental advantages of marketability such as ready availability of information 
and expert opinion. A peculiar coaidltion affecting the larger compfoiies is that 
they frequently hold such large amounts of the Issues they select for investment 
that they cannot liquidate their commitment in an issue by sale in the market in 
any short period of time without greatly depressing the price. This is true even 
of Issues that are generally regarded as highly marketable. Thle point Is of 
special slgntfloance for L.I.C. which is a big monopolistie institution. 
(b) Tax Exemptiont 
Tax exemption is not a particularly attractive - characteristic of sectirlties 
for L.I.C. The IncoBie tax provisions concerning L.I.C. although changed from time 
to time in particular have z^ cognlsed that most of the< incomei frcHS investment must 
be credited to policy-holders reserves ar<d this does not constltutei dncomei in the 
usual eanee. The method of conpatatlon of income tax does not raise any problem 
of choice for L.I.C to prefer one investment in favour of another. Currently, 
the taxable incoao of L.I.C. is computed either on the basis of its investment 
1. See also page VI. 19 
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income or on the baeie of Its valuati<ai suri^us (acttiftrial surplus). It is oonoi-
dered that tl» oomputatlon of the profits on the basis of the valuation report Is 
the most i^liable oethod of the oonynitation in the ease of L,I.G, vhereas the 
amount of interest earned on investment is not itself a reliable datum for suoh 
1 
asoertainment. Whatever methods are adopted for the pwpose, the tax feature of 
any security would not influence L.I.C's decisions. 
Stamaary and Conelusiqn* 
It has been pointed out in this section that the financial characteristics 
of the life insurance business largely determine the broad investment pattern. 
For instance, the contractual liabilities of L.I.G, are for long-term period and 
its oash inflow exceeds cash outQ.oy. consequently the investments of L.I.C. have 
also been in long-term securities. It has, therefore, been emidaasised th^t the 
long-term investments per s^ are more suitable than short«tem investment because 
thc^ correspond in time element to the long-term contractual obligations of the 
life insurance business. It is also observed that the s^afety' of L.I.C does not 
lie in the 'preservation of capital* but in earning the 'maximum possible income.' 
The safety re<iiirements of the investment triangle (safety, yield and liquidity) 
is met if the investment holdings give assurance of producing sufficient funds to 
meet all policyholder claims when they fall due. 
Finally it has been concluded that since life insurance contracts are in fixed 
monetary units, the purchasing power of mraiey is not a significant consideration in 
the formulation of investment policy. Apart from the liability charaoteristics 
which impose severe limitations on the investment pattern of L.I.C. there are a 
number of other factorii which g6vem its investment behaviour . These factors are 
discussed in the following section. 
1. According to Rule 2 of the Sdbedule of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the profits of 
life insurance business are taken to be either of the following two amounts 
whichever is greaterj (a) The gross external incomings of the preceding year 
less management expenses of the preceding year, or (b) The adjusted annual 
average actuarial surplus of the last valuation period ending before the 
assesment year - Oupta, Rup Ram and Oupta, Vishnu 'Sarant Inoome-Tax Law and 
Practice - Agra Book Stores, Agra, 1962, p 540. 
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SECTION 3 
IHTERNAL AND EXTiMAL RESTRAIHTS IN k L C a INVESTMENT POLICZ 
Besides yield, safety and liquidity, as stated in the previous seotion, there 
are a number of other objectives of the Investment policy of L.I.C. which have 
assumed importance after the nationalisation of life insurance- I have ncmod them 
•Internal and External Restraints of L.I,C*s investment policy for want of a better 
term% these factors are classified as under (a) The Element of Trusteeship and the 
Expectations of Policyholders; (b) The responsibilities of Broader Trusteeship due 
to the Sooio-Economic Statue of L.I«C> (o) The impaot of the planned econony on the 
Portfolio structure of L.I.C. (d) The aut<momy of L.I.C. (e) ^ he quality of invest-
ment maaaagement of L.I.C. (f) The Influence of 'monopoly* of underwriting life 
insurance business on the Investment Policy of L.I.C. 
(a) Element of Trusteeship and 
Expectations of poliovfaoldersi 
Strictly speaking the life insurance policy is a written contract between the 
insured end insurer. Thus in a legal sense, life insurance management in its rela-
tionship to the polioyholder is not that of a trustee. in praotioe, however, the 1 
business is carried on with all the characteristics of a 'Trust.' Thus in the Lok 
Sabha, speaking on the life insurmoe (Emergency Provisions) Bill on the 24th 
Pebruaiy, 1996, the Finance Minister, laid gr»at emphasis on the oonoept of trustee-2 ship idiich should be the *oomer-st<»ae of life insuranoe*' Justice Cha|^ in his 
report also emi^sisedt 
wThe funds represent the savings of millions of hard-working people of the 
country and there is special obligation oast tapon those who administer those 
funds to administer them for the benefit of the policyholders."(3) 
1. Magee, John,H} Life Insurance} Richard O.Irwin, Ino.Chioago, 1951, p 753. 
2. Lok SaWiia Debates - 29th February* 19S6. Vol. 1-No. 12, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 
New Delhi, oolumns, 1159• 
3. Report of the Ronourabile Mr. M.C.Cha^^, Chairman of the Commission of Inquixy 
Into the Affairs of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, New Delhi, 10-2-1958, 
p 2. 
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Dealing with th« polio/ of investments Mr. Destamokh/ the then Finance Minister 
has ri^tly pointed out that the funds most be invested so as to secure the maximom 
yield for the poliojfhol^ ers that it may be possible to secure caasistent with the 
safety of oapital. 
The doctrine of guardianship of policyholder's interest also implies that 
beside providing a degree of 'social securityi' L.I.C. will also protect the 
'«5<aso!nie Interest'of the policyholders against the falling value of the purchasing 
power of noney. This view has gained considerable importance in recent years due to 
X 
rising prices* Thus Dr* 7.K.R.V* Rao has pointed out* 
B...this trend (falling value of the rupee) will continue because of the 
country's econoiigr - i^erefore, it is iaperitivo that the inaurod persons 
must be compensated for the loss of mtmey's value.^ Cs) 
L.I.C, can not i^ore the cl^ging expectation of the policy' olders because of its 
•Trusteeship duties'- whidh/has aesumad at the time of nationalisation and also 
becauset 
"«..there is a general awakening among the peojpie. In the years to r'^'nei they 
will expect more and more out of their investment in the Life Insnrenoe 
Corporation. Tho idea of Ifoying a policy to cover risk has become outmoded. 
The L.I.O. should be prepared to meet this challenge."(3). 
The foregoing remarks of Dr. Rao are justified because the composition of L.I.C* 
business shows that in Indiar people not only consider life insurance as a method of 
protection but also as a media of saving. As such they are obviously interested in 
1* Day has explained the popular view point in the following wordst 
"Whereas before the war a with profit polioyholdor thought that if he was pre-
pared to take the rou^ with the smooth then on the whole he got better benefits 
from a with-profit policy than from a non-profit policy^  now^ -a^ days the with-
profit policyholder also has in mind the possibility of inflation and the thought 
that a with-profit polijqr may prove a hedge, albeit slight, against inflation. 
The man who takes out a policy partly to provide some life cover for his wife and 
partly to save money, pexhaps M t t ^ to pay school fees or against his old age, 
definitely seeks an investment sergice in that he want a with-profit polioy to 
provido eom proteotion against possible inflation*..In theory en of fice has 
only to pay claims to satisfy its obligations, tut in practice unless soi&s pro-
tection is given against inilation, it could kill or severely reduce a large 
part of 'fixed money* life insurmee business." (Day,J,ai Developments in 
Investment Poli<^ During the Last Decade - Journal of the Institute of Actuaries 
Vol. 85, Part II, Ho, 870, 1959, p J27, 
2* Eastern Economists What People Want from the L.I.C. Today, September 1,1961, 
p 408, 
3* Eastern EconomisttLoMv.Cit, p 408* 
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the futture purchasing power of money. Sinoe the life insurance is a long-term 
oontraot there ie therefoire a moral obligation on L.I.C, to protect the interest of 
its uith-profit policyholders. 
Besides^  the*general awakening* among the people to which Dr. Rao has pointed 
oat can have aerioiis implications cm the investment i^ lioy of L.I.C, due to its 
nationalised status. Before the naticnlisation of life insuranoe, the poliiqrholders 
of a private life insurance oongoaay hapiDjr examined the portfolio structure of their 
company. They never raised a voice against a particular iavestawnt policy followed 
by their company, in case of a nationalised institution, the situation is however 
different. Here 'public opinion* and 'polioyholders' opinion have conaiderahle 
influence on the investment policy, '^e extraordinary interest which the publio 
has taksn in Mundhra episode and the deaision of tlM Qovemment to regulate the 
investment policy of L.I.C. thereafter through section 27A Instead of the appointment 
of investment committee, as formerly visualised ^indicates the importance of puhlie 
opinim in regulating the investment policy of £>.I.C. Justice Chagla appreciated the 
public feelings in the following wordst 
" I am viSry happy to learn that the public has shown a great Intejwst in 
these proceedings, -i^he fierce light of publicity has be&ten down upon 
all the actors in the drama which I had to investigate and I think it is 
just as well. The puhLio is entitled to know how the persons in high 
positiMi act In a given situation and to what their ea^anations are 
with regard to matters which require investigation* The onqvdry has been 
an education for the public. It should also act as corrective to cdminia* 
trations all ovef the oountry# because in future they wiU act with the 
otmscicmsness that thoir actions may bo aubjectod to publio scrutir^ .^  (l) 
These remarks clearly indicate the fact that in future the 'public opinion' and 
'polioyholders pressups' will not only make the L.I.C. vigilant but they will also 
exercise considerable influence on its investment poliqy. 
Apart from the reasons adduced above, the Insuring public Unelets- on reduction 
of premium rates because this was an ucderstandlng which was given by the Qovemment 
at the time of natiGUalieati<ai. Sinoe 'surplus earning' is an Important element of 
1. Report of the Honourable, Mr. M.C.Qhagla, Chairman of the Commisaiwi of Enquiiy 
Tnto the Affairs of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, New Delhi, 1958, 
p. 1. 
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coat, the changing expectation of the people towards life jnsuranee will exert 
considerable influence on L.I*C. to follow <an active' and more enterprieing invest-
ment policy, with a view to conqpensate for increasing cost involved in spreading 
insitrance in rural areas. The objective of L.I.C. to spread insurance much more 
widely and cheaixly can only be achieved when it will discharge its Trusteeship duties 
accordlBg to the expectations of its clients the policyholders. 
(b) 'he Responsibilities of Broader 
grusteeship due to the Sooio-
Economio Stattts of LlI.C. 
The primax7 obligatlcm of L.X.C. is towards its policyholders. Bat the 
'effective mobilisation'of saving/entails enormous respoisibility on L.I.C. It is 
important that the •Cbrporation should invest its funds in the larger economio and 
social Interest of the country. Moreover, with the increasing life insurance conscious-
ness, policyholders will torn important eegmwat of the total population. Investment 
for social advancement of the country will therefore be of ultimatex banefit bf^  the 
policyholders. Thus the nationalisation preamble has laid down* 
**L.I.C. will invest in ventures which further the social advancement of the 
1 
countxy? To aohievo this objective the then Finance Minister also called upon the 
L.I.C. to keep its investment p&licy alive to the following factst 
"(a) The corporation will never lose sight of the fact that as the single 
largest investor In )^dia, it has to keep before it the interest of the 
community as a wh<^e. It will, therefore, invest in ventures which farther 
the social advancement of the country* 
(b) It will take no parodiial view. Its ftinds are drawn from all over India and 
they will as far as practicable consideraticais allow, be invested for the good 
of the entire countzy. Thus there shall be a studied diversification of investlble 
funds which is an essential requirement of any insurer, particularly the sole 
insurer of a countty. 
(c) There is not the slightest intention that the L.I.C. should Indulge in 
speculation and thus take advantage of temporary fluctxiations in market prices* 
It ffittst necessarily invest on a long term basis."(2). 
It is clear that the investment for the larger economic and social advanceii»nt 
of the country has become an important objective of L.I.C. This is in faet not an 
exception to L.I.C. as it is in confermity with popular view on the subject* 
1. Estimates Committee, p 82. 
2* Pe8hmakh,C.D} Speech in Lok S&Ui&, qooted in Estimates Committee Report, p 41* 
For instance in propounding hlsFburtli Principle of Ihvestment Feglar has stated in 
1948t 
" Offieesr should endeavour to orlent&te their investia&nt policy to 
socially econofflieally desirable ends.**(l) 
The logic of this objective has been dearly stated by Pe&lar in the following 
wordst 
"This is not the place to discuss the ethics of investment policy or to 
what extent offices should sacrifice the narrower Interests of their 
policyholders or shareholders for the wider putalic good. It nay be 
doubted whetherf in view of the very large funds iMoh life offices have 
available for investc^ nt and the influence lAiich the eaployBient of these 
ftmds must havsj, they would want, or be able* to escape the responsibility 
for using thea In the wider public interest» so far as this is not idiOLUly 
inc<Matsietont with the Interests of their policholders. Offices eertctiaftly 
failed to escape that responsibility during the war. Nevertheless« v^ther 
or not this Principal is justifiable on purely moral grounds* it is 
contended that it is essential purely on the grounds of e3i^dlency**(2) 
The above stated objective has considerable influence cn the investment policy 
as it ime to be acliieved 'coisistent with the interest of poliegfholders.** This 
araans that the problem can not be Tiltiraately solved by investment in Qovenuaent 
seoTirities because the yield on such investnents is very low and this will mortgage 
the poUt^olders interest* i'he solution in fact lies in pursuing an active invest-
ment policy* In less developed eoonoiqy the investsnnt opportunities have to be 
•unveiled* before the investment could be diversified *in the larger interest' of 
the commmity*. It is only in this way that the life funds wiU flow into the 
different sections of the economy and the policyholders will be benefited by 'higher 
yield. * Moreover* a pdioy tending to increaee economic end social welfare wiU not 
only benefit the policqrholders but in the long run, promote the prosperity of the 
ooi^ tify as a whole, and tlds will react favourably on the prosperity of the 
Corporatidn. Thus those for whom ultimately investment policy is planned will 
benefit directly and indirectly* 
1. Journal of the Institute of Actuaries - Vol* L m V , Part II, No. 339, Op.Oit., 
p 186* 
2. Journal, of the Institute of Actuaries, Vol. UZIV, Part II, Op.Qit, p 186* 
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It might also be mentioned* peziiapsy that the fortheranoQ of the imblio interest 
has good pttblioity value, and such a policy may therefore be considered to confom 
to one of Bailty's minor oanons, wliich advises that investment policy should, whewver 
possible, aid the business of life insurance. It is, tborefore, cleex that in its 
broader trusteeship duties L.I.C, has to Invest for the economic and social advancement 
of the country. In a planned ocoaoacr it means thai tra invostacfiiit policy of 
should harmonise with tha eaonomic mad Social Policy followed hy the Govamment. 
(c) l^e I^ tpaet of E^onoi^ 
on the Portfolio Structure of L,I,Ct 
The increasing participation of the Oovemmeat in the planned economic develop-
mant of India affect the portfolio structmre of L.I.C. in several ways, ^e fcOJlowing 
are son^ of th@ factorst 
1, Physical control on Pfivrate fevBstteont, 
2* Debt Management Policy* 
3. Direct Agreement with tit® 5oveniment» 
4. Monetary Policy. 
A brief review of each win be relevant to the study. Physical control over 
the deaond for capital ftmds of the Private Sector are exercised by the capital 
Issues Pontrol Act and the Industries (Development Regulation) Aot» "these regulations 
impose restrictions on private outlay and in this vay infl-uence tho outflow of funds 
from the saving institutions in the specifio areas of the ec<moij|y« Similarly the 
Qoverament can also encourage the flow of life fund in sane specific areas, which are 
in oonfAraity with the planned prograsnme, tgr creating faveorable oonditians. This 
can take several forms. In the first insteoice the Qovemment mij^t cushion the *ri8lt* 
by providing equity capital to the small industries on the basis of whi<ii institutions 
extend additional loan. Secondly the Govarumont can filso enooiwago the flow of ftads 
iy extending its own guarantee for planned investments. In this oaee 'Oovemment 
Quarantee. • considerably reduce the risk and life fund will flow in specified areas. 
Oo-renuaent hae extended such facilities to the institution for grantSag loans to 
Industrial Estates and small industries thr<mgh 'Querantoe Organisatitaj' attached 
with the Reaerve BarJc. Thirdly^ Governfflent also reduoes th© risk in Investment Isgr 
establishing si^ ecialisod Institutioas such as the National Small Industries Corpora-
tion, State Flnjsnce Corporations* State Small Induotries Corporation, Industrial 
Finance Corporation and National Indixstrieo Development Corporation eto. These 
inati^tioBs wJoieh OAise into exieteac® with the aotivo aoordlnation of tho Qovemment 
and the finonotal Institutions sdeo influence portfolio struetwr^ of L.I.C. 
Tre&ggyy Policy and 
L.I.C'e InvestMentflii 
The principal way in whloh the Treaotwsr laflTifiaces L.I.O's investments is throui^ 
ite debt management policqr. This is largely a (lueation of the type of seourities 
offered fcy the Treasmy, either for new money or for re-fundlng. For example the 
reorl'ynte.tion of the tecshnique of puhlle botrowSag auring the Firat and Second flans 
has consisted not only in the linking up of government borrowing and public invest-
ment, but also In the bunching together of short, medium and Icmger term issues with 
a view to securing a better response from the Inatitutional investors. It was ex-
plained in Otopter I? that this had beon an important factor .In tho of life 
fund to (Jovemmsnt securities einoe 1951 . FiSrtKeV,"' the Stater. Oovemmsnta throu^ 
the coordination of the Centrel QoTemraents and ReserfC Btaak have sleo designed 
eecurlties to suit the Instittttional reqiiiremente. The borrowing programmes of the 
States is therefore an important factor in Infltienclng tho investment policy of L.I.C. 
Another avenue through which the Qovemment exerts scree influenoe over L.I.C. 
ia throui^ 'direct negotiations' or through 'moral atsasicn.' This has been done in 
the ces© of Housing Programme of the Qovemnent »Aere L.I.C. ia expected to provide 
during the Tidrd Five tear Plan Rs QO erorer, for the Housing Schemes. He 36 orores 
for the Acquisition of Land. Besides, L.I.C. is also e3q|>oot^ d to contribute a 
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eigniflcant amount in the State Boxrowing Progranuae for raising Rs 600 orores during 
the Third Plan. 
These Housing Sohemes and *iBoraI suasion' desorifaed above to finance the 
planned programme of the Qovemaent influence L.X.G's invesiaent policy. 'Horal 
suasion* iniMlve sudh things as efforts lagr the aovemment to persuade L.I.C. to foUov 
this policy or that oa© with respect to its holdings of Qovenunent seourities^ or its 
acquisition of Oovemiaents. L.I.C. in its &roader Trusteeship duties described in 
(b) above has to confora to ther. moral peinauasiwi. 
igfPftff^, 9l .M^ p^ ifmr m the Portfolio Structure of t.I.C 
In recent years the Hesenre Bank has been exercising a growing influence on 
L.I.C*s investments. A particularly good example of this influence is the open 
market operati<ms in Oovemment seouritioo of the Reserve Bank. The crux of this 
influence is that through affecting th^  availability of credit the Reserve Bank can 
affect interest rates and yield spreads t^ rou^ o^ut the entire capital market. 
Due to the fluidity of the genenil capital market* actions by the Reserve Bank 
in either restricting or easing the availability of credit have their ramifications 
on yields in the market as a whole | etad have a great deal to do with the direction 
of life insurance investments in response to changes in yield spreads. As eaiplained 
in Chapter V this type of influence has been exerted since the adoption of New 
Monetary Policy in 1951. Its increasing importance with respect to L.I.C's invest* 
ments stems partly from the greatly expanded national debt and the eocaiomlo signi-
finance of its ownership, (See Chapter V), as i»ll as foon a strong tenden^ for the 
Reserve Bank to Play a more active and more comprehensive role In the capital market^ . 
d) The Autonomy c^f L.I.C. In the 
Investment of Life Fondt 
The Corporation investment policy is influenced fey the Treasuzy policy and 
monetaiy policy in a * business lilw 'manner. the investment of its funds even 
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thou^ the Corporation is owned by the Qovexment, it enjoys full autononyr* 
Section 5(2) of the L.I.C. Aotf for exaiiqple> confers power on the Corporation to 
invest the funds t subject to the rules^  if any ^  the central govemnent* in such 
manner as the Corporaticm may think fit and to take all such steps as may be 
neoessaiy or expedient for the protection or realisation of any Investment. She 
Finance Minister while speaking in the Lok Sabha in 19S6« has also e^ qiressed the 
intention of the Qovemsi^ nt regarding the autonomy of the Corporation in the 
following vordst 
"It is our intention to indicate in a broader manner what type of Investment 
the Qov^ration should avoid and which particular type of investment it should 
view with favour. The investment in ventures established in pursuance of 
the Plan would be given preference over others and the investn»nt policy 
would be governed in the main by the major consideration such as the Interest 
of the policyholders and the l^erest of the development envisaged in the 
Second Five tear Plan and subsequent plans."(l) 
It is olear« therefore ^  that tho Gbvexnment desires a restricted control on 
/ 
the investments of the l.I.C. Funds, ^e only control» that Gkivemment could 
exercise directly is under Section 21, and that too is restricted in matters of 
policy involving public interest and what is equally importiant is that the c<mtrol 
can only be exercised ty directicms given in vriting. Thus^  interpreting the s6ope 
of Seotion 21, Justice Chagla lays down, 'In toy opinion. Section 21, embodies the 
ideal compromise between the autononiy of a Statutory corporation and the control 
which must be exercised by a welfare State over such a Corporation. Uhile 
leaving the Corporation oonplete independence to manage its own day to day adminis-
tration, while leaving it free to investt^  its funds in the interest of the poli<^ -
holders, Qovemment could only contrcA its discretion when a question of policy 
involvi^ public interest arose. Government could not tell the Corporation that 
it should or should not invest in any particular shares, it could not tell the 
Corproation that it should invest its funds in certain Industries whio^ir were 
essential for the successful working of the Second Five tear Plan or to give 
effect to a particular economio or financial policy laid down l^y the aovemment*"(2) 
It is clear from the above statement that L.I.C. has fUll autononQr in the-
inves ment of its funds. According to seotion 8(3) of L.I.C. Act the (Corporation 
will function, pui^ iy • on * business principles.' Thus except the legal regulation 
1. Quoted in Cha|^ Report, Op.Cit, p 2. 
2. Ibid, p 4. 




It will be clear from the above disoussion that the Investment Menagei^nt of 
L.I.C. is free from any Gbvemment control. Even in the Investment Committee^  
constituted under section 19(2) of I>.1.0. Aet, it is not offiapalsoiy on the part of 
L.I.C. to elect any person from the Qovemment. 
The Investment CcHnmittee of L.I.C. can also get the services of the fully 
organised Investment Beseareh Department of L.I.C. LjlI.C. as a lari^st Investor in 
the country is in a position to bring to bear <m its investment problems about as 
good investment management as is to be found in any type of investing institutions. 
In other words L.I.C. l^r its huge resources could afford the eicpenses of Investment 
Research which is a pre-roquisite of an 'active investment policy. ' 
It can be safely concluded that the investment policy of L.I.C is not materially 
restricted by coneiderstlons of the eoiiq;>etenee of management to execute them. The 
Corporation holds the significant part of the assets of the country seem well able 
to appraise iavevtment risks and to carry out whatever policies may be decided upon 
as appropriate in the interest of the p81icyholders as well as in the larger interest 
of the country. 
CVPW of 'M^opoly!, Of 
life Insurance Business on the Investment 
Policy of L.I.C. 
case of private enterprise ^ccH&petiticn among the ccmpanies is a deriving 
force to follow an enterprising investment polioy in order to earn hi^er dividen^ d^ 
so that the premium cost may be reduced, this had been an important aspect of U.S. 
Life Insurance Coii^ «nies as Conklin has described! 
"The life insurance Industry has been characterised over its histoxy A 
degree of coiqpetition and free enterprise...The net cost of life 
insxirance is a factor of major importance in this ccg&petition...one of the 
significant elements of the net cost of a life insurcaice policy is the rate 
yi.g'S 
of r«ttM» earned on policy r&Beme, Comeequantly there ia a peraistent 
pressure upon the investment side of the business to earn as high a return 
as is oommensurate with the unquestioned ability of the oonpany to oteet 
its obligation at all tioes. As a result of this pressura the life 
insurance industry has oontiaually demonstrated a disposition in investment 
policy to aooept the risk of the private seotor of the eoan<»iQr raUier than 
to seek the riskless safety end low yield of Ibited States Qovemment Bonds* 
•. .This has been a healtby trend and has made life inetiranee investra^ t 
oonsiderably more enterprising in oharaoter«<»(a.) 
This factor of great inportanoe has oeased s to exist after the nationalisatioaii 
of life insurance business ia our country. It is possible that« shorn of ooiqpetition 
the corporation may take a defensive end modest view towards investment. Since the 
corporation has the monopoly of underwriting life insurance» it is felt that it 
might reduce the investment process into a 'routine*, h^e fear ia strengthened by 
the views expressed by the Chairman of L.I.C. who find no objeotion in handing over 
investible funds of L.I.C. to the Government at a stipulated rate. Be remarked before 
the EstimatesCommitteef 
It The only thing is that a reasmable rate of interest will have to be 
assumed to the Corporation, ife will be rid of a lot of bother." 
Obviously only a monopolist who has no other aim in the invBstnffint of funds can hold 
such views* I«et me say at the very outset that these are only personal views and 
it wUl be clear violation of the aias and objectives of L.I.C's investment as 
explained in (a) and (b) above, the Corporatfion has more positive aim Af investing 
the ftmd in the interest of policyholders as well as for the larger economic and 
social advancement of the countxy. 
IRi reach ^ ^ those objective the corporation will endlvour to earn the highest 
possible interest. This is enou^ to keep the corporation active with regards to 
its Investments. 
X. Conkliny George T(Jr.) Factors Determining the Investment Policies of Life 
Insurance Companies - %e JToumal of the American Society of Chartered tdfe 
Ifoderwriters* Winter 195e, VeH* XI, No. 1 »pp 
2. Ibid, p 59. 
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Xt will te oldftT from the abovo disoussion t^t besides the 3egal n»qaimti»nt0 
and liabilities oharaoteTietios, there are a atamber of other faetors which ix^ lueno* 
the Ittveetment Poliojr of L.I.O* fheee faetora have aesuned importanoe due to the 
'effeotive Sioldliaation'of aaviBga bsr Xi*X«0. and due to it-s nationalieed etatos* 
Most of them are iifiiiociated with the oonoept of 'froeteeehip* • The eonoept of 
'Troeteeahip' whioh ie the oomemtone of tife Ixumrimoe suggests thatt 
the fund must Is invested so as to secure the maadmum 7ield for the poliogr-
holders that it itusgr be possiULe to secure eonsistent with the eafety of the 
eapital. 
(b) lit I.e. is morally isouni to proiride some protection against possiKle inflation 
to its with-profit poliogrbolders. 
(q) the funds should te invested in tlxe larger interest of tho oeonomio dev^op-
ment aM social advancement of ti» oountZT* 
(d) In the investment of l^ e funds the Corporation will tal«» no paro<Mal view 
as its funds are drawn from all over India, fhus there shall be studied 
diversification in its investments. 
(e) the aotivB investment polioy of L.I.G. must harmonise with l^e EooncHsic 
Policpr followed bgr the 60-vemment. 
The above adms are positive and give sufficient resilience to the investment 
j^ olieiy of L.Z.C. Although the deriving force of coaqpetition to adopt an active 
investment policjr has ceased to exist after the nationalisation of life insurancsf 
in India the 'Trusteeship* duties assumed by the L.I.C. will force the Corporation 
to pursue an enterprising investment policy, the investment objective of the L.I.G* 
have thus been defined. Xhe next consideration of an investment policy is to 
appraise the nature and characteristics of the various tyjee of investment media> 
their elements of strength and weakness in relation to the investntent requirements 
of L.I.C* (This I have discussed in the following Chapter. 
fonclusioni 
In this Chapter I have shown that the investment policies of L.I.C* are 
conditioned tgr its legal requirements^  nature and characteristics of its liabilities 
vi»3:o 
and a number of other faotors vhioh bare been described as 'Ijstemal and Sxtemal' 
Restraints of the L.I.C's Investment policy. An analysio of these faotors has 
enabledus to mark the following objectives of the ittv^ atment policy of UI,G$ 
In the first place it is importoat that L.I.C. should Invest its funds In ouch 
a manner so as to ensure duo flulfilment of its ocsitraotual olsligations. This 
6L 
implies that L.I.G. must endevour to e&m the oaximua possible yield <jORsistsnt with 
the safety of its funds, the contractual oHigations of L.I.C. are in fixed mcnetaxy 
unit and the Corporation need not worry about the depreciaticn in the purchasing power 
of money. But the doctrine of guardisn^ip of policyholder's interest suggest that 
the Qtorporation has also aesumed a *mor&l obligation* under which it has to provide 
s(Hae protection against possible inflaticoi. The analysis of liabilities also 
indicates that the corporation is a long-term investor^  3Lt has very little need for 
liquidity, '^ hio is duo to the fact that the inflow of funds from premitras^  interest 
and dividends, and the repayment of loans have normally exceeded the outflow of 
funds for payoients to policyholders and for all operating espensas. The oontiDuanoe 
of the relatioftship between the Inflow and outflow of £\inds can be predicted for 
the foreseeable future* Besides the liquidity requirements are further reduced 
by pursuing a 'match policy' i.e. by matching the tera of lisbility with the term 
of assets. 
It has also bsSon observed that the effective mobilisation of saving has given an 
enormous eoonomlo power to L.I.C. which should be harnessed for the larger eooncmiio 
and social interest of the countiy. In invosfciag for social advanoomswt, the corpora-
tion will take no parochial view. Its funds are drawn fron ell over India and thoy 
will, as afar as practicable consideration allow, h& invested for the good of the 
entire country. They should be diversified for regi<mal development. Finally, the 
investment policy of L.I.C. should as far us possible harmonise with the objects 
of our planned econoiny. This is important because the furtherance of the pubOUc 
n^ n 
interest hae good publloity value, which is oonduclve to the growth of life 
insuranee basiness* 
These objectives will form the basis to Judge and to evaluate the investiMint 
polioy of L.I.C. These will also help VLB in assaying the 'investiaent value* of 
investment material in the following Chapter* 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE PORTFOLIO STRIICT0RE OF J^LC. 
It has been pointed out in the last Chapter that the investment aetivltiea 
of L.I.C. are oirouaisoribed by legal stipalations and the nature of its liabilities. 
Its liability characteristies oall for the 'maximisation of yield within the 
Qonfine of safety and liquidity' while the legal requirements collide insurance 
investment from certain fields. Within the 'Investment Framework', the portfolio 
structure of the L.I.C, will be determined by the available supply of investiblo 
instruments, their relative 'yield' and relative 'risk'. It is, therefore, essential 
to examine the 'yield* and 'risk' characteristics of different types of inves'toent 
material and their suitability to L.I.C. 
'field' and 'Risk' Characteristics 
of IhveBtmentsi 
The word yield is ambigtious and conveys different meanings. Since I shall be 
concerned with the word throughout this Chapter, it is worthwhile to clarify my 
conceptfoi of 'yield' on which I have based the arguments. I have more or less 
used it in the sense in which Peglar has defined itt 
"It is the net rate of interest (or its gross equivalent) at which the 
sums invested are e»iotly equal to the present value of all future net 
interest or divident payments piLus that of capital returned, whether this 
takes place by drawings or repayment In a lump sum, tgr return of part or 
all the capital on liquidation, by sale or transfer of the investment, or 
in any other way. 3j!i this calculation allowance is made for expenses, and 
for the tax on incme or capital increments bo me by the fund or funds 
for lAich the Investment is made." (l) 
It is evident from the above conception of yield that L.I.C. is not only 
interested in current level of dividends but also of the chances of the long->term 
appreciation in the value of investments. In investing for capital appreciaticm 
L.I.C. does not take advantage of the short-term changes in the prices of the 
securities, but at the same time it does not hesitate to realise the 'capital gain' 
after a 'longer or shorter wait.' In this respect its position differs from the 
1. Peglar,J.B.Ht The Actuarial Principles of Investment, Op.Cit, p 181. 
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opeeulator. This is also olear from the following etatament of the Chairman of 
L.I.C. before the Eetimatea Committees 
"...It (i.I.C.} inirohased iavestmente not for the purpoae of selling bat 
holding, their iOTestnents for capital appreciation did not amount to 
apeoulation. In every rare oases where the book value of the shares was 
wrr Xow and the market had rL^d up the prioe to an extremelT' high level 
as a result of speoolative aotivity, thej ooold cash on it in the interest 
of poli^hoMers "by selling the shares, fiat the Corporation irgnored nonnal 
and temporal^ fluetuations in prices such as were due to labour trouble, 
lock-out or some other special cases like paucity of saw materials."(2) 
It is evident from the above statement that the investment operation of li.I.G* 
is not speculative. As a true 'long-term investor^ ' L.I.G. will endeavour to 
*maximise yield.' fiat in the maximisation of return L.I.C. has to assume risk as 
yield'varies Inrersely with 'risk*. The greater the risk the hi^er -ttie yield 
is the rule mther than the exception. Apart, perhaps, from short-term gilt<-edged 
securities and bank deposits there is no ouch thing as a 'safe* investments, though 
there are varying degrees of risks which earn varying degrees of income. 
In a developing econony, 'risk' is not only inevitable but also it appears in 
the widest and most unpredictable diversity of forms such as scientiflo 4s^ vance^  
israrc, catastrophes of nature, fraud, monetaxy debasement and an endless variety 
3 
of political, industrial and economic changes. The central problem of an investment 
policy, therefore, is the allocation of the available funds aa^ ng the various types 
of securities including variations in such proportions under changing conditions, 
where the Corporation could maximise its income and 'minliaise risk. * The Corporation 
has the choice of several alternative policies which it can follow in organising its 
1. For the traditional view on this point, see Graham, Benjamin and Oodd, David Lt 
Security Analysis (New York and London - Ho Qraw Bill fiook Co., Inc., 1951, 
Chapter IV), 
2. Ibid, p 51. 
3. The risk are also classified as Pinancial Risk or business cycle risk which are 
caused due to the changes in the financial ability of the issuer. Another type 
is the risk of gain or loss caused by change in the level of Interest rates in 
the market, known as the interest-rate risk. A third influence upon the out-come 
of investment is change in the purchasing power of the monetazy unit; this 
is the purchasing ipower risk. (See Seuvain,Hamy - Investment Management 
Prentlcelall, Inc., Bnglewood, Cliffs N.S. 1959, Chapter V). 
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portfolio etruotiipe for protection against the basis risks. It can, for oxaaplo, 
eliminate many idLnds of risks through oarefol selection of individual issues. This 
involves the esq^ loyment of fixed-income ofoligaticms to produce a steady, peiliaps 
modest, but relatively safe income return, xisuaUy requiring a aininum of super-
vision. But in pursuing auch a policy, th® Coiporation could not achieve the 
1 
best results. 
Another, common approach is that the Gorpoiration like a fwise investor' as 
Williams has used the term, mi^t select after a thorough analysis, of 'margin of 
safey only such securities tAiich are selling 'below their true worth. • The merit of 
such an investment is that 
"a large inoooe payments are received in subeeeequent years because things 
turn out better for the security than most people expected, a landsome 
return on the principal can fae» enjoyed."(3) 
Such an approach tends to be speculative in nature and relies heavily on 
success in forecasting future trends. Cautiously employed, however, it is one 
answer to the problem of protecting an investment fund against certain risks whic^ 
cannot easily be avoided. In pursuing this policy, two conditions are implied. 
In the first place the Corporation should accumulate a Reserve from the income or 
profits on appreciation in anticipation of inevitaliOLe losses. The otber is to 
spread the investments widely within each class so that the total Sffeot of the 
errors is likely to be representative rather than extz^me. In practice both are 
employed to protect the fund from 'uncertain events.' 
1. The Betum from such an Investments programme are limited and the Corporation 
could not earn the 'maximum possible yield.' For the in^ct of sudti a programme 
on 'yield' see Dotrrie Qeor^ tf and Fuller, Dottglas,Rt Investments - Joho-Wllley 
and Sons Inc., New tork, 1950, p 114» 
2. Investment theories recognise that the margin of safety concept is essential 
to the choice of securities.In the case of debentures or preference shares 
investment this marglji is usually represented by the excess of earning power 
over interest or dividend requirements, or of the value of the enterprise above 
the senior claims against it. In the case of an ordinary share it shotOd bft 
represented either by the excess of calculated intrensic value over the price 
paid, or else by the excess of expected earnings and dividends for a period 
of years above a normal interest return. This concept of margin-of-safety 
is also used as the touchstone to distinguish an investment operation from a 
speculative one.(For further details see Graham BenjamdLnt The Intelligent 
Investor - Harper and Brothers Publishers, New Xork, 1959, Chapter 16, 
3. Wllllams,John Burrj The Theoiy of Investment Value -Horth,Holland Publishing 
Comoanv ineaterdam > 1956. o 4* 
nu 4 
The polioy of diTOraification which is largely folloiied Igr the Insurers la 
realistic in racof^slng that at least aone of the inveatora jidg^ments will prove 
wrong. It aooepta the premises that no aeourity- ia safe beyond queation and that 
analyaie of investment risks oan not weed out all valnerable securities. It 
acknowledges the reality that the Goi^oration isust be ready for the unforeaeen 
aM unps«diotable losisea. 7hua diveraification is recognised as an ii^rtant 
tenet of investment policy in order to secure the advantagea of favom-able martet 
condition on the one hand and to stiniisiae the diaadvantagea of wae&raaTeMle, 
political and econonio treoda on the other. 
A policy of diversification requirea that the portfolio should be spread among 
different slaases of inwatment e.g. government aecuritiesfdebentures^  preference 
shares, ordinary shares* propertios and mortgagoo otc. This form of spreading is 
desirable to protect the fund againat unforeaeeable change of an economio or 
political character which may affect aome classes of investments to their die-
advantage compared with other classes. Furthermore, the effect of existing oconomic 
and political factors on the varioua clasaea of investmenta may not have teen 
correctly aaaeased, and spreading the investmenta in thia way will at least tend 
to achieve a repreaentative experienoe of these effeota. 
Again, in connection with olaases of investment such as debentures, preference 
end ordinary shares and stocks, it ia deairable to spread the investments within 
these classes among a wide range of diffeirent industries and within each industiy 
among a wide range of different con^anies.The reasons for this form of spreading are 
aimilar to those given in aupport of apreading according to claasea.It ia difficult 
to aaaesa the effect of industrial, economic and political factora on individual 
induatries and companies, and the combined acttial experience of a largo number 
lo 
of investment less likely to deviate to any great extent from the expected 
experience than would bs the case with 3pelative]^  few investments.Moreover, 
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iinforeaeeable changes in Industrial, polltioal and eoonomio factors may affect 
individual industries and oompanios in different directions to differing degrees 
so that a more representative experience is litely to result if the invostiBnts are 
well spread. Por similar reasons, Geographical diversific tion is also desirable. 
Portfolio atruoture 
of L.I.C. 
The foregoing discussion gives support to the reasoning that the investraent 
policy of Zi.I.C. is like the underwriting of life insurance husiness. In under-
writing of life insurance business, the corporation aeoepts risks of varying degrees 
in ^ ret^ iwi for premiums at varying rates. Some risks it considers so taicertain and 
hazardous that it cannot calculate an adequate rate of premium sufficiently accurately, 
and it declines to accept them. Of those it does accept it cannot be sure that any 
one contract wiU prove profitable at the rate of premium quoted, but it relies on 
the averaging of a large number of risks, and, if the corporation makes a wise 
selection it earns a net profit on the total* In much the same way in the invest-
ment of the fands the corporation puts its money on a number of risks of varying < 
! 
types and degrees, for which it expects to earn a varying rate of yield, the greater j 
the risk the higher the yield it will require. Some risks it regards as too great 
to allow an accurate assessment of the yield required, and it dodinee to invest in 
them. For the others, it relies not dn the profitability of each and eveiy one, bat 
on the process of averaging to give a good returns on the investment portfolio as 
a whole. Thus Table 72 shows that L.I.C's investments are distributed in four Inroad 
categories of investmentst (l) ^^ o^venuoents whi<^ include Oentral aovenim^it. State 
Qovemmsnt, Municipal and approved securities} (2) Corporate securities lAldh 
include debentures, preference shares and ordinary shares; (3) Mortgages, iiscluding 
real -estate owned. It wiH be observed from the Table that at the end of December, 
1960, the bolk of L.I.C's portfolio structure consists of Government securities. 
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TABLE 70 
PORTFOLIO STRirCTURB OF L.I.C. 
( Bs In orona) 
August 31fl956 OeoeiBber 31«1959 Deoember 33., 1960 
Class of Investment Amount Percent Amofunt Peroen- Amount Peroen* 
tage to tage to tage to 
total. total total 
1. Oovemnent of India 
Seourities. 171.0 49.0 212.2 4S.5 228.3 43.3 
2. Indian State CtoveroK 
ment Securities. 33.7 9.7 64.7 14.2 94.9 18.0 
3. Foreii^ t 14.8 4.2 11.5 2.5 13.3 2.5 
(a) Oovemment,Municipal, 
etc. Securities. 13.2 3.8 11.1 2.4 12*8 2.4 
(b) Debentures and 
shares of Joint Stock 
Companies. 1.6 O.S 0.5 o a 0.5 0.1 
4. Municipal, dksvexstment 
guaranteed and other 
approved Seourities* 30.2 8.7 39.9 8.8 42.3 8.0 
5. Shares and Debentures 
of Companies. 56»9 16.3 81.6 17.9 92.0 17. S 
(a) Ordinazy Shares. 23.0 6.6 41.6 9.1 47.5 9.0 
(b) Preference Shares. 13«4 3.8 18,5 4.1 20.7 3.9 
(o) Debentures. 20,5 5*9 21.4 4.7 23.9 4.5 
6. Loans on Mortgages. 19.0 4.3 10.5 2.3 9.2 1.7 
7. Land and House Property. 19.3 5.5 23.2 5.1 26.5 5.0 
8. Other Investments. 2.2 12.5® 2.7 20.6® 3.9 
TOTAL 34S.7 100 456.0 100 927.0 100 
* Xn<dudes amouiits due from State Qo-rsviuaents in respeot of their oontrolled 
busineae taken over (fo 7 Crorea)* 
@ IbicXudea, among othars, (i) loans to State dovetnniente for Housing $<dieae8> 
(li) loans to Co-operative Housing Finance Societies, (iii) amounts due from 
State Governments in respect of their controlled business taken over. Poli<ar 
loans and loans on personal security are other investments, vhidfci are treated 
as dissaving in Chapter I, are not included in the above investments* 
SOtmCEi Beserve Bank of Xndia, BulletjA, November, 1961* p 1S39* 
(eonqfirising centre^ Oovemment to the extent of Bs 228.3 orores, State Qovenment 
Seeurities - Ss 94.9 orores, and Municipal and other approved securities amotaiting 
vn.7 
to Ss orores).Corporate Seooritios (whioh eonsists of ordinaxT* shares of Ss 47.S 
eroreSf preference shares of Is 20.7 orores end Debentures of Bs 28.9 ororos) are the 
second important avenue of iavestmsnts. Investment in Mortgage is only 9.2 orores. 
leal Estate investment are 26.5 crores. Other ^ vestments amounting to Ss 20.6 orores 
includes among others^ loans to State Governments for Housing Sohemesi I«oans to 
Cooperative Bousing Finaaoe Societies and amounts due fron State Qovemments in 
respect of their controlled business talron over. Policy loans B« 43.65 orores and 
loans on personal seeorities amounting to Is are other is^rtant avenues of 
investments but they are oonsidered dissaving from the point of vieij of this study. 
The relative share of each type of investment on the portfolio struoture of L.I.C. 
depends upon a large number of factors of whi<^ the following two are most ixD$>ortantt 
(l) fhe relative ability of different *invostasnts' to n»et the Investment 
requirements of L.I.C. 
(2/ The availability of suoh investiEaiits. 
Xt is clear that the * investments* which have * greater strength* end ability to 
/ 
meet the invoBtrnfint requiremwits of L.I.C. will weig^ heavily in the portfolio 
structure of L.I.C} while investments th&t have weaker element to suit the investment 
requirements of L.I.<3. will have little appeal to the coiporation. On the basis of 
the above oritejda en analysis of the various classes of investment material is made 
in the foUovlAg pages. Each Investment has been assessed with regards tc^  the follow> 
ing features s 
[a^  Safety of Principal and dependability of income. 
>b} Chances of appreoiation. 
10) Marketability. 
d^) Problem of Investment Management* 
The analysis Is important as far as it enables uo to assess the investment 
policy of L.I.C. in proper perspective. 
Analarsis of Investment fielAi 
(i) Qovemment Seouritiesi 
Ocr analysis of investments begins from ^OovemQcnto SSouritios not only beoause 
they constitute about 69.3 per cent of the totel investesnts of the Corporation in 
m . 8 
I960 but also thdf ar« the priaax7 atajcdard in terms of whioh the iavestnont qualities 
of aXteinative investmiite oan he judged. I have already pointed out in Chapter V 
that t}» Tields m OoiremiaeQt ohligatiooe are the key Interest rates In the mooey 
and capital oarliets* These key rates serve as anohors to jrieldr ^  private instrvu-
ments Khieh genereOly aoorae higher yields than OoTemment securities. The different 
tial s are based on the credit worthiness of private issues« their jaarketaMlity, the 
cost of inirestigation and the rates of taxes etc. It to, therefore, iajportant 
to examine the nature and charaot«riQtica of Govemrasnt securities as they largely 
determine the inv^ cfcmnt behaviour of t.I.C. 
I 
Kature and Oharfvoteriatdca of Ooverwaent Set^ ritiest 
The terra *gov©miaent securities* atfrnda for a grwip of aeijurities which « » 
homogonsouB only in th® sense of their oomiDion origin. Actxially, the term describes 
a h@terogrrecus group of securities vith videly vayying oharaoteristios. It Includes 
all the obligations of national govemsients and of their several suhdivisicme such as 1 
States, Hunicipalties or Corporations etc* 
Qovgroasint of Jnd^a Seeuritj^ ai 
SecuTitiea issued by the Treasury Department of the Government of India oay be 
4 
described in terms of security tjnpesi maturity provisions, teterest rate <daaraoteristioi 
market»ability, or tax features. Broadly, government of India obligations are oLassi* 
fied into Unfunded Debt and Funded Debt* Unfonded Debt of the Qovemm^it is 
composed of short-period obligations and is oalled floating Debt. It is represented 
by Treasury Bills, Post Office Saviags Bank Account and cash certificates. There 
are also short dated securities or »shorts* which ore generally redeemable within 
five years. Tte Ponded Debt includes loog-tena obligations lAich may or may not be 
1. t.I.C's investments in ^ foreign government* securities are largely due to its 
foreign business written in those countries* Besides the charaoteristics of the 
issues of foreign govemments, idiether national or political subdivisions, are 
on th© uhole quite siniler to 'govemaent eeouritiee* diecussod in the subse-
quent pages. They are, therefore, not separately dealt wit^ i. 
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redeemable* The Funded Debt vhich is redeemabXe is called Redeemable and that is 
not conopwlsorily be redeemed is denoted bjr Irredeemable Longs. The essential 
/ 
differences mong government obligation^  of different types is in the maturity 
oharaoteristios at times of issuance. 
The maturity characteristics of outstanding securities not only reflect the 
type of security used ly the treasury in its refunding operations or for new offer-
ings > but also the mere passage of time. Oonsequently, the maturity characteristics 
are oonstontly clianging. this is of course true for all types of securities* 
In addition to the final ccattraotual m&turity provisions on all Cktvemment 
securities, some of thes© issues provide for retireaent prior to final maturity at 
the option of the borrower - thft Treaauxy - whereas others carry provisions which 
give the investor the option of eetablisiiing the maturity date at ej^ time prior to 
the eraatractutil dates at tlae of ismie. the former, the oallor option' i. maturity 
provisions I carried by some Government issues are quite distinctive. Ihey permit 
the freasur?' Department to oaU these issues for retirement, at the earliest, only 
a few years prior to fine! maturity date, or at any interest date within the inter* 
vening period between the call «tnd final maturity date, thus unlike the typfiaal call 
provisions on corporate securitios, which are keyed to the price behaviour of the 
securities, the call provision used on Ooverament securities which is based on a 
spsoific date, assures inrostora that the securities will be outstanding for a 
definite period of time, irrespective of what happens to market prices of the 
securities in tHe intervening period. 
fhe latter forras of optional maturity features asntioned above are offered on 
only tt few Qovommant issues. In contrast to all other types of maturity options 
to 
granted/invBstors, th-oso are not related to any action by the borrower. They simply 
give the investor the option of stepping up the maturity considerably in advance of 
the contractual date. In a few instances the option gives the investor the right to 
redeem his holdings at any tiao prior to maturity, and in othor instances, to shorten 
m a o 
materially the contractual mattirity dates of hia holdings. Such options, ±f 
exercised^  usually entail a sli^t sacrifice in the annual income ftom that 
provided if the issues were told to final aatvuriLty. 
The interest coupon features on Ck)veminent securities are determined by the 
prevailing yields at the time of offering. The coupon featxures selected are 
inflaenoed ly the practice of aalcing new offerings at par, except those few issues 
which are offered on a discount basis* A.t the ezd of X9S0, the interest rate 
coupon or its equivalent on issues which could be held by L.l.C. varied from 2*5 
per cent to 4 per oent» However, from the point of view of portfolio management, 
the prevailing yields on individual issues, at times of purchases and currently, 
together with the yield maturity relationship of all outstanding issues, are as 
much mox*e significant a^ asure of the interest rate feattires of Ctovemment securi-
ties. At the end of 1960 these yields varied from 3.26 to 4.08 per cent, fhey 
are determined by the market price, the coupon feature and the maturity provision 
of each issue. At the time of purchase the prevailing yield becomes the expected 
or book yield to the investor. If the security is sold prior to final maturil^, 
the realised or effective rate of return or yield may differ substantially from 
that entered on the books as at the book yield. Consequently, the yields are 
important considerations to the sale, purchase or switches in Oovemment security 
portfolio of L.I.e. as well as an important guide to the treasury in the determina» 
tion of the characteristics of new offerings. In fact the current yield oharao<» 
teristics are perhaps the most important considerations in the investment analysis 
of Indian Government. issues* 
The marls tability features on outstanding issues vary widely. Many issues 
are fully marketaU^, that is, they may Me purchased by all types of investors 
and contains rostriotion upon their resale at any time. Other issues are freely 
but not fully martofctable . They may be purchased by all types of private 
investors, except of course, specified ownership groups (namely, commercial 
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banks), and may be freely traded among the eligible Investor groups, but may not be 
purchased by other investors for a number of years. A few issues have only limited 
marketability, both vith respect to the number of eligible investors groups and wi-tti 
respect to the amount of any Investor's annual purchase of these issues. Further-
more, these issues often contain resale restrictions limiting their marketability 
to resale to the Treasury Department on demand at fixed and predetermined prices 
or to the exchange of such holdings into a different type of security which has 
full marketability. Finally, a number of issues of Indian Government securities 
have no marketability in so far as L.I.C. is concerned because they cannot be 
purchased or held by L.I.C. at any time. However, these issues may have resttioted 
marketability from the stend point of those investors eligible to own them* 
The income on all Indian Oovemment securities offered is subject both to the 
normal Federal income tax and to surtax. Several issues are still outstanding with 
partially tax exempt status; the interest Income is exompt from the normal tax, and 
a few issues are wholly tax exempt in that the Interest income from these issues is 
not subject to eit^r the normal tax or the sur tax. 
These characteristics of Indian Oovemment issues have been used in a variety 
of combinations by the Treasury Department In providing issues which would appeal to 
the many potential investor groups with their numerous investment requirements. In 
I960, L.I.C's portfolios alone contained over twenty five separate issues, eacdi 
having slightly different characteristics. Even for the characteristics described 
above, there are infinite possibilities for issuing securities in the future which 
differ materially from the issues currently outstanding, and in addition there is 
\ 
al\ta:yo the possibility of adding new ebaraoteristios. 
State. Municipal and approved securities! 
There are several significant differences in the characteristics of State and 
municipal issues from those associateid with Indian Government issues. Although 
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States and Munieipalties often rely upon short-term financial instruments suoh as 
tax anticipation notes^  oertifioates and warrants to meet their finanoial needs^  
the bulk of their outstanding debts consist of b^ds. In contrast to Federal obli* 
gations, the majority of State and JIunicipal issues are of a serial tjrpef that is, 
a specified proportions of the outstanding issues matures at regular intervals 
throughout the life of the oM^ igationt In addition, s«sac term oKLigatioa have been 
offered by those issuers. Little use, however, has been made of the call option on 
the serial or term issues either in terns of price or of fixed optional matxirity 
dates. The ooupon t^raoteristics and yields of State and Munio&pal obligations 
vary over a somewhat wider rai^ than do yields of Government of India securities. 
This Inflects, in part basio differences in credit standing of State and Municipal 
obligation vax^ over a somewhat wider range than do yields of Indian Qovoznment 
securities. It also reflects wide variations in the credit factor within the former 
group as well as special tax consideration which existecl at the time of original 
offering and others present in our tax structure today. There are Ao restrictions 
imposed by the borrower on the marketability of these issues; that is, all issues 
are fully marketable. 
Sinoe 19S1, a definite change has taken place in the torrowing technique of 
the State Oovemments. States have beoome largely long^tem borrower and they offer 
securities of vazying maturity and yield. In certain oases the yield of State 
Qovemment securities is mudi higher than the Oentral Govemmmit Securities. There 
is also certain uniformity in State Qovemment seourities since 1951 because of the 
active oooiniinatiQn of Central, State and Reserve Bank. 
Besides, the seourities issued ly Municipal bodies, pert-trust or improvement 
trusts are called semi-government securities. These seourities do not have the 
support of the Reserve Bank of India in the ma^tenance of market valtie. They are 
included in 'Trustee Investmant' under Section 20(d) of the Indian Trusts Act of 
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1882 which allows investment 'in debentures or other securities for owtiey issues, 
under the authority of any Central Act or Act of a Legislative of a Part A State, 
or ty it Oft behalf of any Mtmieipal Body, Port Trust or city Improvement Trust in any 
Presidency town.• They are included in the approved investments of L.I.C. Besides 
bonds of Central Land Mortgage Banks; shares and bonds of Industrial Finance Corpora-
tion and State Plnaac© Gorporations are also Included in the 'approved list•of L.I.C 
investment. 
Investments attribates of 
Qovemmfflttt Seouritlesi 
The Liidian Qoveznment and State Sovemments obligations enjoy a imique invest-
ment status, superior in several respects to that of other trasses of securities. 
The safety aspect of these issues in the sense of certainty of repigrment at maturity 
is the highest. The repayment of an internally hold debt pos^s. no problem to the 
Treasury, since the Federal Govexvn^nt has both the power to issue money and the 
power to tax. The credit statxis of the Government of India and the State Oovemment 
is considerably hig^ both at home and abroad. The Oovemments both at the centre and 
as well as at the State have never repudiated any debt and they are always willing 
to hMiour their obligations. However, In contrast to Central and State Governments, 
the financial conditions of munioipalties is still weak and their ability to pay the 
principal and intez^ st depends upon their limited resources. The rate of retuzn in 
case of Fort Trust and in5)rovement8 Trusts is better than on Government securities 
They are so much in demand that fluctuations in their prices are cushioned and 
statbility insured. 
arise 
"Hie liquidity attributes of Indian Qbvemment securities/in several ways. The 
short-term issues and those repayable on demand may be regarded as contractually 
liquid that is, their maturity features assure repayment within a short period of 
time at predetermined prices. To the extent that these short-term issues are 
marketable, theif maturity characteristics also greatly limit their price fluctuations 
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with a change In Interest rates. The broad distribution of ownership of central 
government obligation, both within and among various types of Investors, is another 
important factor contributing to the high degree of liquidity of these obligations. 
Since all investors are not motivated by similar factors in the management of their 
portfolios, the sales of issues which are widely held are more likely to be readily 
absorbed by other Investors than the same ssles pressures were conoentrated upon 
Issues narrowly held. Moreover, the fact that these securities represent a sizafaOLe 
proportion of the Investment holdings of a very large number of Investors creates 
widespread end extensive self-interest, both in the administration of our Federal 
debt and in the price stability of outstanding issues. Finally Indian Qovenuaent 
securities have acquired a further degree of liijiidity througji the investment acti-
vity of the bank system and market support of Reserve Bank. 
The Reserve Bank does not ato at freezing the' price or the yield of these 
securities but it does control price movements within a reasonable range so that 
stability of prices may not be seriously disturbed. The methods employed may be 
natural or artificial; bat the value of securities is in practice maintained within 
a narrow range. 
The fact that the price level of Cbveroment securities in India has shown steady 
tendency is clear from Figure 22 . It will be observed that the price indices of 
Qovemment securities is quite stable than the price indices of variable yield of 
Industrial securities and cost of living indices. 
The yield (and hence the price) of marketable Oovemment securities varies with 
the rise or fall of the Interest rates on short and long-term money. Because Central 
Qovemment securities are the closest to being riskless of all obligations, the yield 
represents the nearest thing to 'pure interest' known to the money market. The yield 
on these securities, reflecting in part, their safety and liquidity feature, have 
generally been lower than those regarded by investors as the prime or highest quality 
rates. The yields on Indian Government securities have fluctuated over time, and 
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short-term yields have varied more widely than those on the long-term issues. The 
differentiaUi in yields between various typos of seourities and Oovemment issues» 
measux^ d both in absolute and relative terms» have varied oonslderahly over time* 
Investment Manaafement of 
Qovemment Seourltiest 
The supervision of the Qovenment Securities portfolii is the easiest. The 
entire investment operation from planning to execution is the ultimate in simplicity. 
A variety of issues is always available to the Corporation in virtually unlimited 
quantities. The secTurities oan therefore be acquired at any time. No credit investi-
gations > or extensive field trips entailing evaluation of the technical efficiency of 
the borrower, the ability of management, the competitive position of the firm and 
industzy, the business cycle hazards, nor even simple analysis of balance sheets and 
income statements are required in recommending the purchase of these securities. They 
oan be confidently recommended with respect to the ultimate safety of the principal 
and with considerable assurance about their markBtabllity in case of need. Moreover, 
the recommendations are usually characterised such terms as 'conservative* 'sound* 
'safe* 'patriotic* - none of yhidh is designed to disturb the ulcers of the invest-
ment staff. Little time or effort is required in the supervision of the holdings, 
and they provide a batteress against the normal errors which occur In any large 
investment account. Little, if any, staff is required for investment activity in 
this aroa, irrespective of the size of the portfolio or the volume of tumover. It 
was in fact this ease in the management that suited to Indian insurecao who do not 
generally employ expert investment staff to plan their investment* 
In another sense, however, the supervision and management of the Qovemmi^t 
securities is more difficult. In case of Qovemment securities there is no basis 
for credit analysis and there are no other types of securities which can be used as a 
standard of comparis|fon. Xa pursuing an active investment policy L.I.C. is confrented 
with the problem of the outlook for interest rates. Any investment action in 
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8dctt!ri.^ ids> or dvsxi 'tho faiXure 'to oons'fci.'tiu'tios "bho invos'tors itoTOO&st 
of interest rates. In faot the purchase of long-term or ahort*term Gtovemisent 
seeuritiea* the maturity eompositlon of a portfolio, and the eligibility features 
of the Issues held that Is their marketability to other type« of Investors all 
represent a taolt forecast of interest rates. Even the shifting of QoTsmment 
hcldlni^ into ether types of securities at substantially higher yields involves & 
forecast of interest rates* not only interest of possible future differentials In 
yields but also because of the very teslo differences in the call features of OoTem-
ment and other types of securities. The problem of interest rate forecast is 
esctremely difficult in that it requires the assessment of a number of intangibles. 
It Involves the consoioas formulation of opinion with respect to the policies the 
Treasury will follow in the manageiaent of the Federal debtj the demand for funds for 
insurers purposes, housing and oonsuaer goods| foi^ign Investment of all types| the 
level of government expenditures, the supply of savings, and the credit policies 
adopted bgr the Reserve Bank and Commercial Banks, the level and character of the tax 
structure, and Investment policies of all types of investors. 
Finally in Investing in Ctovemment securities the Corporation comes face to faoe 
with the monetary authority. Bi the context of the wider trusteeship duty, of the 
L.I.G., consideration must be given to the possible economic effects of sales or 
purchases of these semirlties. This problem should be anilysed from all points of 
view with proper recognition given to the faot that the same policy may be quite 
desirable at llms yet quite tmdesirable tinder different economlo conditions* 
One of the re&l difficulties encountered here, quite aside from that of reaching 
agreement about consequences of any given policy, is the m^aintenance of perspective 
on it in terms of the point of view of the investor, the poll<^older, and tl» 
public. Another public policy oonsideraticaa enjountored is the question of the 
proper eiae of the central government seouilty portfolio. This problem should be 
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flov of life fund laf the Oovernment at the tine of natianalisatioii of life insuraaoe^  
it la desirable to analysjb!. the •inveatmant -value' of private corporate secvurities 
from the point of view of the 'investment requirements' of L.I.C# 
Mature and Oharafeterlstlos 
of Corporate Seguritjeat 
The Corporate seourities are custoaarily divided Into two niain groups - debentures 
and shares, with the latter sub-divided in Preference Shares and Ordinary Shares. 
The first and basic division recognises and conforms to the fundamental legal dis-
tinction betiroen the creditors' position and partners* position. The legal ri^ t^s 
attached to different types of securities have important affects on the movement of 
security prices. Thus Pigareg 3whioh portrays the price movements of seourities from 
1992 to i960 indicates that the price of deb^ tuires where the borrower has guaranteed 
the payisent of spacified rate of interest have moved with stability. Ordinary shares 
on the olher hand, where the return is conditioned by the general profitability of 
« 
tbe business have boon noted with erratic fluctuations. The debenture prices are 
largely influenced by the fluctuations in interest ratosj while the 'equity prices 
are influanced by the medium of profits. From the investment point of view each 
type of corporate security presents entirely a different investment problem. They 
hav©# thei-efore, been separafcely exatalned, 
(a) Suitability of 
Pebentuyes to L.I.Ct 
Debentures constitute^  nearly 4.S per cent of the total investments of the 
Coiporation. This may be due to the lack of availability of 'good quality' debentures 
in India otherwise they should have been en ideal type of inveatn»nt for L.I.O. 
because they represent long-term corporate debt. They are fully seeur&d against 
the property of the issuing company. They possess maiqr attributes which qualify 
them as an ideal type of life insurqpoe inTestment. They have a fiAdd maturity 
and generally carry a fixed interest rate representing a constsnt claim which must 
be met regularly by the issuing congjsny in order to avoid insolvency. These charao-
teristics of company's long-term debt also make debenttires most adaptable in the 
ni,x9 
aotuarial end of the life insurance bosinesa vhere the assumption of oonstenoy and 
i*egaalrity of inoome return is most important. 
Even the more ii^ poribantf hoveverf from the stand point of the safe-^ dl^eotive 
in life influranoe investnjent* is the faot that corporate debt constitutes a prior 
elain on the assets of the ooiiq>an]r and is protected fagr the subordinate interest of 
others in the nature of a secondasy lien and the proprietaxy ownership such as to 
provide a cushion against loss in the event of finaneial difficulties of the ooogpanies. 
Othar things being equal, a debenture secured by a mortga^ or a deposit of collateral 
offers a greater safety than an unseciu^d obligation, bat the (fcrporation must be 
sure that 'other things' are really equal, ^oatise these obligations differ with 
respect to the legal security offexvd by the bBKn^ trer* Mudi more important is tho 
difference in th« finsnolal sti^ -gth of issues. The type of business and the 
legal form of the obligaticai are aignificont only as thoy have a l»aring on the 
abiHty and vdlUjigness of the oaapany to meet its oanmitiaents to the Investor. 
When the ^rporatioa chooses cozporato debentures, it should do so beoause of 
syperior claim they have on the euminga and assets of a •sound' company. In 
order to receive a surer retuwii the Corporation accepts a relatively low fixed incons 
ai5d is deprived of the rigfit to participate in the higher return that will be received 
in the stock if the ampauif prospers. The Corporation, as a debenture holder» has 
no voice in the mimagement of the cosapargr* and if the debentures are oaUalile, they 
geneitOly cease to bo attractive investment on any interest date. Furthornwre, the 
chance of appreciation in debentv^ res is relatively snail. 
It follows froa the above diocuseion that only hi^ grade deb^tures in the 
portfolio structure of L.I.C. should serve as a backlog that will produce inoome 
depepdability,even in depressitm, and they are not likely to undergo a serious decline 
3n marJoet value. Sfnoe sctm degree of marketability ia desirable, listed debentures 
of well established concerns should be preferred to snflXL unlisted issues. Xt can 
not b© repeated too often that the debentures should not luU the (Corporation into 
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a feeling of false security. Xt shoftad not eaorifioe altogether the allureaent of 
higher return and greater chanoe of appreciation associated with investment in ecpitiee 
(b) Suitability of 
Preference shares: 
At the tisie of tbe nationalisation of life insurance business, preference shares 
constituted ooly 3.8 per cent of total Investments. After the nationalisation of 
life insurance preferences shares remined about 3.9 per cent of the total investment 
The reason for their xmpopulority is to be found in their investment attributes. 
PrefereEce share is a kind of hybjiid ' security that partakes xsf some of the ' 
features of debentures aiid sea© of ordinary shares. Stooe the tendency of the eozapangr 
management is to belaacG preferences given to preference shares within limitations, 
most prefe once shares haTS been described as 'neither fish, fowl, nor good red 
1 
herring." For life offices pi'sf®3?ence shares possesses the Incom© veafenesses of 
debentures, vithout their elements of safety} llltswis®, it shares much of the risk 
of ordinary ohai^ e, without falljr partieipatijag in the Inoow distributions of 
proeperouc! years. 
Preference siuires have also been discarded as investments because they lack the 
security and steady yield of debentures and yet are deprived the right of xmllnited 
participation in the profits of the compoiqr which goes with ordinary stock ounership* 
Besides,from the stand point of stability in market price and certainty of income, 
as a olaes they have not eo good a record as deb^turee. (Soc Fig. 23 ), If we, 
therefore, were to apply the same rigid tests to preference shares as in the case of 
debentures, we would find that orily relatively few of the fonaer would qua3-lfy as 
high grade Invoataeats and that, as a consequence, their prices would a3.so be eo IxLf^  
that the yield would be little, if any, hii^er than those obtained on debSmtures of 
the <,sa4e' 'quality. 
1. Hoagland, Henry Si Corporation Finance - Motrraw Hill - Book Go^any Jxio*, 
New Jork, 1947, p 153. 
la the light of the above features it would be desirable for the Corporation 
to favour those preference shares vhich have no other obligations ahead of them in 
the capital strueture of oompany. Besides in the selection of Investments the 
portfolio managers of L.I.O. should subject preference as a class to even more 
rigorous standards than they apply in the selection of del^tures. "n^iis is mainly 
due to the mandatory natuspe of interest payments as opposed to the discretionaxy 
pomre customarily possessed ligr oompant^ management vith respect to declaring pre-
ferred dividends. It is true that the directors must psy the preferred dividend 
before peering anything to the ordinary shareholders * bat usually nothing bindex« 
them from passing over both l^e dividends, Whereas debenture holders^ when denied 
theif interest^  may take prompt 
action to foreclose or at least work out a coiqtromise 
reorganisation f the preferred stock holders who do not receive dividends most mark 
time until e^mtegs x^ vive and the ordinary sharehi^ ders are pleased either to 
recommence dividends and eventually pay up those arrears or else to offer a plan of 
conqpromise distinctly to their own advantage. 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that it would be in the best 
interest of L.I.C. if it invests in cumulative preference shares of first rate 
quality. The cumulative preference shares that are selected should yield satis* 
factory rate of return somewhat higher than debentures and at the same time the 
certainty of dividend should be hi|^ * (o) j^^ lfftW^ i^ y of 
Ordinary shares to I..I.Gt 
la the list of corporate seourities^  ordinary shares have always enj<qred a 
superior position. In 19S5 the ratio of ordinary shares to total corporate seouari-
ties was 48,5 per cent. After the nationalisation of life insurants the ratio of 
ordinary shares to total corporate securities has increased to about 91.6 per emit 
As percentage to total investments ordinary shares are 9 per cent as against 6.6 
per cent in 1956. The importance of ordinary shares has increased in the past war 
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period because they have provided inoome dependability to the insurers at a tiine vhen 
the iacoae on all other fixed obligatione has oeoisiderabliir declined. 
In jfuture^  in viev of the rapid eoonomio development» the need of the oorporate 
sector for 'equity oapitaL' is likely to increase. Since L.I.C. will also become 
an important source of capital fmxds in prospect^  it is essential to examine the 
eictent to which the Corporation could provide this form of capital to the industxy. 
Vihether, and to what extent* ordinary shares are suitable investments for life 
insurance companies has been a much debated issue. The arginoents against ordinary 
shares are veil known. It has been claimed that such investments mig^t tend to plaoe 
L.I.C. in the role of industrial mana^ment and give it an undesirable amount of 
economic power. Since life insurance assets are in the nature of Trust funds« it 
has been argued that its invesments should be confined to senior securities which 
have a substantial eqiiity cushion to protect it against losses in case of adversity< 
It has also been enqphasised that since life insurance oontraots are payable strictly 
in fixed monetaxy units the investment behind thea should also be confined to the 
fixed mcmetaxy unit. 
A practical deterrent to such ordinazy share investments is that since L.I.C. 
liabilities are rigidly defined and since its surpliis is equal usually to only a 
small fractim of assets^  L.I.C. cannot afford to have any substantial proportion of 
assets in securities whose oarrying value tends to fluctuate widely. This seems 
more an argument for limiting ordinary share investment rather than for total pro-
hibition of sucdi investment. The prtnoipal limiting factor in faot is the necessity 
under present ocmditions of carzying sudi stocks at market values. Assume that the 
corporation has surplus funds equal to ^  per cent of its assets and has 7 per cent 
of these assets in ordinary shares. Assume further that such shares suffer a 90 
per cent shrinkage in market value in the course of a year • an unlikely but not 
impossible oocurrance in the light of history. This factor alone can reduce 
6orporation's surplus by a significant amount in the course of a year* and under 
oireumstan^a when there might be other drains on that surplus Its solvencsr 
would be considerably affected. Obviously, L.I.O's ability to Invest in ordinaxy 
shares depends heavily the relative strength of its sixrpl^ position, unless 
some method of ordinaxy share valuation is evolved to cushion the sharp aarl© t 
declines. 
Proi»nent8 of ordinajy shares on the other hand, have elaiised that due to 
growth both absolute and relative, in £i.I.C*s assets and its increased importanoe 
to the ooonotny, these assets have tended to outgrow the traditional invostm^t 
channels which consisted of debt type of securities, the hig^ proportion of 
individual private savings accumulated by L.I«C. had especially strong appeal for 
ordinary shares during ti® recent period of rising prices. 
Investo^ nt in equities enables the L.I.C. to do somewthing for its pSliey-' 
holders, even in a oodost way, as an offset to shariLakaage in the value of the 
currency unit in which its contracts are payable. It wouM not be out of place 
to remark that ordinary shares serve as a hedge against inflation. This is parti-
cularly important when administrative costs are rising due to rising prices as 
well as in expanding life insurance in uneaqploited rural areas. In this connection 
the example of U.S.A. is often cited. 
Xn recognition to the policyholder's interest against rising prices, teachers' 
Insurance aM Annuity Association of An^rioa, which sells retirement contracts to 
University teachers, introddeed a new o^ annaity contract. Under this contract 
half of the contributed reserve may at the option of the party purchasing the annui'^ 
be invested in ordinary shares, with the benefits payable depending upon the 
investment results achieved ly such fund. It is said that this plan has proved 
1 
vexy popular among the university teachers* 
In the context of the above disctission the suitability or otherwise of the 
ordinary shares can 1» summarised as follows! 
1. Xi.I.C. holds large investmsnt funds, it can, minimise risk by investing in 
ordinary shares throu^ a diversified holdl^s of such securities. 
2. L.I.C, being a long-term investor, can afford to weather the larger cyclical 
price variations found in ordinary shares for the greater security against 
1. Sau:gJn,Hanry I Investment Management, Prentice Hall, Inc.,Englewood Cliff e,l955. 
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failure and greater oertainty of laoome to be derLved from the ordinary stook of 
seasoned debt^ free oonyjaniee. 
3. The vxgd of an insurance office to eamy maadnnim inoon^  is is^rtant and vithin 
the area of safety and liquidity it tries to maximise its return. Beoause of low 
yieldj lifd offices place a i>ortion of their ftuods in higher grade seourities* 
The reminder is di^rsified among a variety of securities and ordinaxjr shares 
ere one of them. Its avera^ rate of return is comparatiirely mutoh higher than 
other types of InrTestiMnts. 
4. As interest rates rise* hi^ grade debenturos and preference decline to 'lock 
in' existing commitments. Ofdinazy share is not so affected. 
5. Ordinary shares serve as a hedge against inflation that is in a period of 
rising pricesi they supplea^ nt the aU too lifted return received on debentures 
and they offer a better chance for appreciation. Investinent in ordinary shares 
could therefore compensate for rising cost of expenses and it could also enable 
the 6orporation to protect its poliojfliolders against the 'purchasing pover risk. * 
The main argunent against ordinary shares is that vide fluctuation in its 
prices as shovn in ^ ig. 22 presents a valuation problem for L.I.G. A purely 
temporaxy depreciation in values may have no effect on the ultimate ability of the 
fund to meet its liabilities but can prove very embarassing if it occurs at a 
time vhen the funds accounts have to presented. From this point of view, there* 
fore I equity lAnares are avoided f3K>m the portfolio of a life office* In this 
connection it may, however^  be pointed out here that modem ooxporate security 
technique has teen improved by corporate management in re^nt years. It has 
provided some safeguard against the advance potentialties of ordinaxy shares to 
suit the investment requiresnents of institutional investor. Firstly the 
requirement of stability in price and steady income has forced the company 
management to create a Divisional Equalisation fund. Equali-
sation of dividend has had a steadying influence on the yield and 
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market value of good ordinary sharea. Secondly, the eize of the * operating unit' 
has inoreaaed, and therefore« fluottiatione arising out of the limit on the size of 
the company have become exception^, though fluctuations arising out of the vicissi* 
tudes of the industry as a whole are not cosqf^ etely ruled cut* Institutional Ijavestors 
in ordjjaary shares have also developed two techniques as safeguards. In the First 
place I they maintain en investment fluctuations funds. Capital profits made 
selling investments accumolate in this Fundsto which a dlverjslon is also made from 
valuation surpluses« and this takes care of any capital losses that might be incurred 
in future. Secondly they have begun to diversify their investments as between fixed 
income investments and ordinary shares. In a period of rising prices, the market 
v^ue of fixed-inccffiis investments tends to decline and ordinai7 share tend to appre-
ciate in market value. On the contraiy, in a period of falling prices, the oarkot 
value of fixed interest^ bearing sectwities appreciates and that of ordlnaty shares 
declines. Thus in a well 'balanced fund,* having a combination of both types of 
securities, losses in the laarket value of one can be compensated to soii» extent IDQT 
gains in that of the other (See Table 73 )• 
In view of the modifications in the Corporation finance policies coacemlosg 
equities that have taken place in recent years and the 'safeguards' against market 
depreciation of ordinary shares that investors can themselves adopt, the equities 
have lost some of their forbidding character. The Investment Reserve Fund of L.I.C. 
which amowted to Re 13.41 crores as at Slat December, 1960 cushions su<^ market 
fluctttations satisfactorily. Nevertheless, in view of the erratic nature of ordinaZ7 
shares, it is necessary that the corporation should on3x invest in high-quality 
ordinary scrips and that too when the market is depressed. Heedless to repeat 
that such holdings should be fully diversified. 
m.2« 
The i^ romeitt of InveBtmant Ai^lyaiq 
emd M^agea&nt, in Oorporata Secorltieai 
Investment in oorporate seeuril^reqairef a oareful analysis. This is due to 
the faot that the legal rights given to the various types of seourities do not joake 
them a ' safe investeent.' From the point of view of Investmwxt safety depends upon 
and is aeasvured entirely Igr the ability of the debtor comparor to meet its obliga-
tions. The soundness of the best investments most rest not upon legal ri^ts or 
remedies but upcm the ample financial oapaoity of the enterprije. For exan^ xle in 
9xobang6 for limiting hie participation in ftttore profits, the debenture holder 
obtains a prior daim and a definite premise of payment, while the preference share 
obtains fflaly the priority, without the promise. But neither priority nor promise 
is itaelf an assurance of payment* This assurance rests in the ability of the 
enterprise to fulfill its promise, and mnst be leolidd for in its financial position 
record and prospects* The essence of proper selection consists, therefore, in 
obtaining specific and convinoing factors of safety, which is measured not tgr 
specific lien or other contractual ri^ts, but by the ability of the issuer to 
meet all its obligations in fall. Thus the normal cidteria of investment is not 
the legal form but the normal behaviour of the issue after parchases. In other 
words, its risfc-and-profit characteristics as the investor would reasonably view 
them. It means that eorpore^te securities must be purchased only after a carel^ 
analysis of security forms, corporate aocountingi the basic elements that make for 
the success of various kinds of business, the general working of the economy* end 
fInally the characteristics of security markets* Xet^  in addition, the investment 
in ordinary shares isQwses more respfibslblllties on management* The process of 
analysing and selecting debt-type investment is relati^ e^ly easy* Such investments, 
in-duding debentures and preference shares promises a series of fixed amount pay-
ments, covering interest, preferred dividends and principal* Regardless of the 
suoceas of the issuer of these seeuritiea, the promised paym^ts will not be 
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exoeeded. Therefor© all ths efforts of the Inveator must to diraoted towards 
making as oertein as posslblo that such payments will In fact be luet on sobedule. 
fhe situation Is one demanding oonseTvatlon and a constant quest fo? seourity 
rather than laaglnation and willingness to take (|ulte substantial risks. 
In the seleotion of ordinary shares | however, imagination and broad risk 
taking saast play an iaportant pai^. No definite scale of payiaent is promised or 
guaranteed and no limit is set on the return obtainable. Timing of the purchase 
is of great importance, ordinaiy share prices tend to sweing widely. Waves of 
opinioni bullish and bearish, affect investioent decisions. This requires oonstaat 
watch of tba investment marks t. 
The Problem of Availabilityi 
Bctsides the problem of seleotion of Corporate Seourities of standard siso 
and 'safety* most bs considered in the baokgroum of the loss developed economy 
of India. The importance of industrial securities in the imrestment portfolio of 
L.I.C. depends upon the extent of industrialisation and the degree of expansion of 
the private Oorporate Sector, It is evident that the greater the measure of 
industrialisation brought about through private enterprise, the more would be the 
bulk of industrial securities listed on stock exchanges, and other things being 
equal, the largez?^  would be their holdings on the part of L.Z.O* 
In India the number of Qovemment securities registered in stock exchanges 
far exceeds the number of industrial scrips* In 1960, for example, it is computed 
that a total number of nearly 2,200 Govercoiffint securities aocounted for Bs 2500 
orores; the total number of 6entral and Provincial securities, loans and debentures 
floated Itir certain Port Trust authorities and Municipal Corporations,State KLeotri* 
city Boards and State Transport authorities is found to be 195,accounting for a' 
total nominal value of Us orores. As against this the number of indxxstrial 
scrips is found to be 2,000 including scrips of some of the foreign 
companies also* The said value of Indian companies add up to 
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1 Bs 695 orores issued fajy 1«150 Indian Joint Stock Public CcH^ panies. 
Am<mg the industrial securities, Issued ligr Indicun Joint Stock Ciompanles 
ordlnazy shares accounted for Is 912 orores) preiPerenoe shares amounted to 99 orores 
2 
and debentures accounted for 84 crores* Out of these L.I.C* already holds a subs-
tantial amount. Roughly on the basis of the above estimates L.I.C. holds about 
9 per cent of ordinary shajres; 21 per cent ef prefsrsnce shares and 28 per cent 
of debentures registered in the Stock Exchanges* 
It is clear that the Corporation already holds significant portion of Indus-
trial scrips registered in the Stock Exchanges. Its additional investment in such 
securities will therefore be limited ty the over lOl availability of these securi-
ties. Besides^  in the early stages of economic development» the corporation finance 
is hazardous because of unorthodox and unscrupulous practices adopted in several 
oases. Thus the magnitude of corporate securities desewUng of Institutional 
patronage is seriously oiroumscribed. 
The above review of the corporate securities clearly indicatea that they do 
not fully solve the iav^ estment requirements of L.I.C. It is true that tlrase 
securities offer a 'hl^er' yield bat ttie risk associated with them is also 
considerable. Debentures offer a yield which is very close to Qovemment securities 
for much greater risk. Preference shares are '^ brid/-securities which offer better 
yield but the risk involved is also considerable. Ordinajy shares provide adequate 
inooo» with possibility of appreciatimi. They also protect the investzoent against 
inflation. But iiiv©a.tm6nt. in thepj entails heavy responsibility on the investment 
management of the corporation. Besides the L.I.C's investment in ooz^ orate 
securities is limited by the over all availability of these sScurities* Hence 
1. Nigam» Raj Scope of Stock Exchanges vis-a-vis The Corporate Sector in 
India, Commerce, Annual Jubilee Kol Op.Clt, p 106* 
2. The total number of industrial sotips comprising ordinary, preference and 
debentures issued hy Indlm Joint Stock Companies is placed around 1,990 
out of which the detailed breakdown data are available for 1983 scrips 
(Commerce, Op.Clt., p 108. 
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Oorporate seowritids euit() the Corporation oe3y otter a oarefiil iawstigation* 
nx. MojEtgagsgi 
Mortgai^s hare been rather negleoted form of investment in India* Their 
ahare in total investment has gone down to 1.7 per cent as against 4.3 per eent 
in 195fi, This is in great contrast to the insurers in other i>arts of the world 
where Mortgages have heen largely used as a *aafe' outlet for the life fund. Thus 
in U.S.A. aooording to the Itife Insurance ?aot Book 'Life insurenoe companies held 
1 
over one-fifth of tl» nation's entiire mortgage debt outstanding.' In U.S.A. 
Mortgages today constitute nearly S4.9 per cent of the total assets. Since the 
nationalisation of life insurancQ, there has been a growing pressure on L.I.G. to 
inerei^o its investment in mortgag^ s^  particularljr Residential mortgages and 
'Farm gwrtages.' A very strong case is made tir quoting the exeo^e of II.S,A* 
liet ms therefore examine as to how far the mortgages suit the inrostment require-
ments of L.I.C.and to what extent 'economic climate' favours such investments of 
t-I.O. 
Suitability of Morterages to L.I.gi 
Mortgages are generally classified as urban and Farm Mortgages. In India 
Ii.I.C. has confined its lending only to the urban mort§ages. Real Estate mortgage 
loans other than farm mortgartes fall into two general classes namely residential 
loans and other loans. The latter, commonly referred to as comn^rolal loans« 
which include mortgai^s on co«a»rclal and industrial buildings and apartments. 
Without going into legal technicalities, a mortgage m^y be defined as an 
InstnOTsnt under which real property is pledged as security for a loan. The 
owner of the propertyi the mortgager, borrows BK>ney from a lender, the mortgagee, 
under a contract wherely the property is pledged as security for payment of interest 
I, Institute of IdJfe Ineuranee, Life liisuraRee Paot Book, 1962, p BB» 
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and priAoipal. Title and possesaioa reiaaiii^ with the mortgagor until suoh BB 
default may occur, in which event the property is sold throiigh foreclosure proceed-
inge for the eatisfaction of ti® debt* 
The Mortgageu has the riglit provided in the eovenenants, to issue several 
series of bonds cm the security of the same mortgaged property* In -Uiat case the 
First mortgage ihao.. a prior daiffl apaa the pledged jaropsrty. Subsequent aort^gee 
have subordinate claims* payable only after the first mortgage claim has been 
entirely satisfied. Therefore L.I.C. is permitted by to Invest only in 
First Mortgagss. 
It will observed tvm the above definition of Ewrtgage that the safety of 
an investment at^ first; < t aortga^ is seoured basieally bg^  the value of the wader-
lying real property and the credit standing of the mortpi^r. Properly made and 
carefWJLy seleoted mortgage loans provide on aUsiidfaia® ef eocarity. In the: first 
place, the investor possesses a lieu upon what is presu]:;^  to be a valmULe piece; 
of real property* the value of which has been detezmined by careful and espert 
appraisal. Secondly, the value of the property exceeds the amount of the loan by 
a sum estimated to be sufficient to permit shxtekage in value, and at the same time 
leave a margin of protection above the unpaid loan balance. In high ratio loans 
where auoh margin is oongq>iooftts by its absence, the lender enjoy? the protection 
afforded by insurance or guarantee. Finally, a presumably carefully selected 
borrower of character, with good debt-paying record, with other assets con^ nsurate 
with hie position, and established earning power of all of whidi combine to establish 
beyond reasonable doubt his ability to care for his oWLigaticn - provide ample 
safety to the loan. 
Moreovei:,,, mortgages offer a comparatively hig^r rate of return than the return 
on other fixed otiligation of the olmilar quality and maturity. Generally speaking, 
the spread in net i&cm» between mortgages and debenture of similar quality is 
usually S/4 per cent to per cent. In contract to per cent bonds, L.I.C. eams 
about 6 per cent on mortgages* 
i. Jordon,David P and Bcmgall, Herbert E, Itongall; lavestaaents - Prentice- Hall 
had, Etoglewood (^iffs, N.Jt 1950, p S91* 
VII. 31 
The aatuiritjr of mortgage loans adds greatly to their inveetment appeal. The 
'Tena of mortgage loana,' the quarterly paymanta or otber patteraa of araortiaatioa 
can be adequately matohid idth the tens of the UafaUltiee. Moreover* a mortgage 
portfolio of an Inveetor investing its funds on a nation-wide basis derives 
additional investment strength from the geographical diversification. A large 
lending territox^ r enables tba Coz^r&ticm to select areas of eoonomio growth and 
promise) and to avoid areas and cities wlaioh appear to have attained oonomio 
maturity or over which eoonomio adversity in^ pends* The selection of a lar^ number 
of promising investment areas endows the portfolio with an element of insurance 
l^ c^ use barring a national eoonomic cataglVsm* it becomes difficult to believe that 
all or a substantial portion of the areas in which an investor has made loans will 
suffer adverse eoonomio conditions at tbs same time* Mortgage loan investments 
serro very useful social purpose* They aid the acquisition of homes end it fiaanoe 
building essential to the productive capacity of the nation. Thus in U.S.A. 
"Mortgage investments bf life companies hare had an ijqpact on the eoonomio 
and social patteztis of American life. Besides helping to met a post«war 
housing shortagey they have stimulated many thousands of jobs in the builds 
lug trades and real estate. They have aided in rejuvenating American cities 
and in opening the way for families to mi^te from congested citief to the 
suburbs." (l) 
These soiMrwhat glowing advantage of mortgage loan investments in no way be 
allowed to oonceal significant disadvantages of such investments which, unless 
expertly coped with, can reduce or eliminate entirely their appeal. One of the 
attributes of mortgage loans which contributes materially to their liquidity is 
their comparatively short life due to paya^nts of instalments which previously 
has been mentioned. However, at the same tima thit this reveals on obvious 
advantage, it creates a great disadvantage by aggravating the problem of reinveet-
ment of the realisation of dues in instalments. 
Moreover, in th© wake of esry serious depression there is likely to be an 
abnormal number of defaults and foreclosures among the real estate loans of life 
insurance companies. Falling agricultural prices, increasing uneaq^ loymeat and 
decreasing inoomes increase the difficulties to both agricultural and urban 
1, Life Insurance Paot Book, 1958, p 88. 
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borrowers in iseeting the prtnolpal end interest pe^ nsents on their loans. Znsar^oe 
Companies« as & result* are faoed with the choice of taking over large emtounts of 
mortgaged properties* or of introducing methods of relief for borrowers which will 
obviate foreclosure* These proULems require a careful study along with the prolslem 
of Management involved in eudi investmwts* 
Management Problem 
in Mortgateei 
The purchase of mortgage loan Investments totails at the outset heavy aoquisition 
and serving exjmses* lAietber the mortgages are procured through Zcmal Offices or 
Divisional Offices* an active and efficient field organisation must be maintained to 
originate and to service loan applieations. Thus to cope with the administrative 
requirements of this type of investment* L.I.C has established a legal and Mortgage 
Department under the charge of the ^ nt^ Manager. The main items of work of tbs 
legal and Mortgage Depar^ent relate to the administration of the existing mortgages* 
new mortgate loans* loans to policyholders' for construction of houses* the scheme for 
grant of loans to housing cooperative Societies and various other matters relating to 
leases of the Corpoxstions* properties situated in various pOLa<^ s in India and the 
legal work pertaining to tWI investment of the Corporation. 
The greatest disadvantage of moftga^ loans ensues fjrom the problem of fore« 
dosures. The experience of United States in this ooonection tend to submerge into 
©blCiarioft/ the gravity of the foreclosure problem which arose in that countxy during 
1 
the last fifteen years* Three very serious problems always arise in connection with 
the fore<£Lomire of a loan by a life insurance company. One is the costs incidental 
to foreclosure, the second is the adverse public relations* and the third is the 2 
liquidation of the real estate acquired. 
1. Mehr,Robert Ii tiortgage Foredosures and Property Management ly I»ife Insurance 
Companies* University of Pennsylvania* 
1944* Chapter II« 
2. Mehr|Robert*It Op.Clt.« pp 1*2. 
fhe esipehses of foreolosore not only inrolves court and legal feea^  but loss of 
intereat end posaible daoage to or negloet of the property during the period of fore* 
eloaure. The latter» of oourae, depends tipon the attitude of the borrower and the 
length of tiaie which 
intervene a front the date action is instituted until the property 
is aoquired. The publio relations incident to foreclosure can become very coioplex* 
One hardly expects to make friends evicting or threatening to evict people from 
their homes, but the responsibility of a trustee in dealing wiidi a delinquent borrower 
allows no choSoe. tAien foreclosure results in property acquisition, a problem of 
Real Estate Managoment and liquidation imiaediately arises* 
In view of these defects in mortgages life insurance companies in U.S.A. and 
other parts of the world often pondered this question, "which is safer, to start 1 
with ownership or to end with It.** In other words, as an eltemative to making a 
vory percentage loans against a property owned by the borrower, some insuarers 
are experimenting with direct ownership of income property* 
In spite of these obvious draw backs, mortgates constituted nearly 34.9 per cent 
of total life insurance assets in U.S.A. Let therefore, examine the conditions 
under ii&ich these assets have assumed importance in U.S.A, and to what extent such 
conditions are present in India* S2£6SBgLia5ai22 
in U.S.A. 
The mortgage finance of insurers in U.S.A. has increased due to the dii^ot and 
indirect participation of the Federal Ooverziment.in mortgage lending. This participa-
tion has been evidenced by the activities of the Federal Housing Administration, the 
veterans Administration, the Federal National Mortga^ Association, imposition of Z 
BregulationTCby -Uie Federal Reserve ^ ard and various related acts of Congress. 
The Federal Hoxising Administation represented a novel undertaking vrtien created 
by the National Housing Aot in 1934. The F.H.A. provided at the outset for loans 
1. Hoagland, Heniy 2» Real Estate Finance, Richard D.Irwin Inc, Homeword, IlUnois, 
1994, p 244. 
2. Boai^and, Real Estate, Op.Clt., p 
VU.34 
to be made ty private lenders who are linanred* against loss W FHA which in turn 
eolleote a * mortgagej^nsaranoe* premium from the borrower. Ja the event of trottttLe> 
the lender foreoloaes and then aeeigns the property to the FHA in exchange for 
debentures guaranteed as to principal and interest ligr Qovemment* 
fHA and VA loans haite limitations on the interest rate whidh may be charged. 
They also provide for level monthlor payments which completely liquidate the loans 
over their terms. This plan of monthly payment loans was popularised particularly 
by the IHA at its inaugration and has bacoao an integral part of mortgage financing 
to the great advantage of borrowers and lenders. From the borrowers* stand point» 
the monthly payment atoot equals rent; frwa the lenders* point of view, the borrowers 
need never be permitted to accumolate a large delinquency without having it brought 
to hio attention. 
These agencies have provided oufficient 'liquidity' and 'safety* to mortgage 
Finance in U.S.A. Thus out of billion dollars lended in i960 against 
mortgages; loans throui^ FHA constituted about 2Z per cent; VA formed about 17 per 
cent conventional loans were about 54.5 per cent. The remaining 7 per cent were 
Farm Loans* ^ e higb percentage in oonventioiial mortgages was due to the greater 
yields in such loans in relation to Federal ^ tgencies. In case of the Imding 
throui^ Federal Agencies Uie yield is comparatively low because of 'security* 
provided by the specialised agencies. Bat extension of the ocmventional loans 
has been made possible only due to the liquidity provided by the specialised Insti-
1 
tut ions. * 
Farm Mortgage 
Finance in U.S.A. 
in U.S.A., life offices have beon oontribating sutetantial finance for agri-
cultural' expansion and progress in the shape of farm mortga^^s. Farm Mort^ gages 
toaaiS are regular form of long-term borrovinee an the part of the Amriom farmers. 
1. Boagland^ Beal Estate Finance>p 23Z, 
m . s s 
Tbeee loans asunrnted to about 3«9QS MUioti dollaira or 7 por eent of Hm total 
nortga^o. This aaonMWs lOBectem asriouitural fiaanoe Hoinii trm c&rUdn govam» 
matol aa& noQ-govAxmontal agenoiea* govenuaeiital agenoioa em tlut Fodlal 
lead BmikBg Federal ^rtga§e Faxiaars Hoa» Moiniatrntioo. Hhilo 
th0 aoa^govemmentai agenoies ere t)u» oosoiaerolal banka and izuilvldttal landera. 
soae oases losisranee oooj^ies ma&e loans diiraotJi^  thressli tboir offieos* 
and In otter oases tl»7 fmrohaae trm laortgag^ s baators and otbers. Even oosmarolal 
banlts soastiiBss pori^ hased agre^smts tdtli lify Insttronoe omap^les Igr tbo 
bank laajr bold a eiortgago i^r a short period of tiae as imcb as two yeitrs aad tlii»i 
off dispc^e it to as issnreaoe oonipeiii7» 
la additloas to thsso featiiresf coccierelolieed au^ steciuiaiaed fona of ogrteol* 1 
tare in O.8.A. ha-ra enabled the insurers to Flaanoe Forci t^rtg^tes. 
H ia turn possibiLe to enlist t!ie oamses of ^ all psremtago of ]!H>rtg&ses in 
the portfolio stractwe of they oaa be classified as f^owsi (l) Ziii^  of 
btisiness deoand for mHgo&Bu, (2) teOl sitse of tbe eratuhile iasttrsrs to bear iim 
eofft involved in mvtgagoe, (3) of as regards siort^t^St 
(4) ilhacaee of spooialieod Agcatolos#( d) I^ouliar oharaoteristios of Agriaultttre ia 
Xndifiy (6) Dbsatiofcotorsr fiaanolta^  positions of the cnredit Ageneiee* A brief 
review of eaeh of th6 above f&otors is givi^ * 
In l^ia Joint Stock Co&q;>anies do not use this fans of finanoe to mty aiatorial 
esitont. Thio is evident froa the f&ot that ia 1001 o<H^ >anies snrv^ jred bOT the 8 
Tlesorve Bc»k tho ratio of mortgages to total resotaroes was onlor 6* 4 per cent ia 19^ 
Table TTL wKic^ oolflos porpossewise stud/ of tlie oortgage loans saaotioned bST the I».I*C* 
Also indieatoo that 4D per o®nt of the loaos granted W isoBolnsiveljr for 
buS^ding ooastruotian, IS cent for s&p^ iynimt of existing l<mns« IB per osat 
partly for bailding otawtruoticm aad partljr for other ptupose end only about 19 
por cent for basiness. 
t* For a fttU disotissioa of Life I*iflur.4HJ0 Activity in Fam lidaas. See Hoaa^aadt"" 
Bosl Estate Fiaoaoei Op.Cit* Chapter XXZI. 
Resemr Bi^eih: of India Bi]lletia« Sopteabor^  p 1483* 
¥11.36 
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AHAiarSIS OP MORTQASB liOAHS SAlimOlBQ.J3r..L.J..C. 
( PD!tPOSEtfI6E0 
Naise of No.of Total HiiUdlng F&BXy 
2kmel/ appli- eaoont eonetrao* for 
Diri" oatiowa sano* ti<m oitly.baild-







Basinese Ropegnosnt Mlsoellaaeoaa 
of ©xlet-
lag loans. 
Bombay 24, 20.19 7.49 6.10 3.45 3.19 fill 
Calcutta 46 22.70 17.38 3.31 0.70 1.31 fin 
New Delhi 37 25.73 11.33 1.95 6.05 9.40 1.0 
Madras 11 10.45 0.59 0.65 4.75 4.90 Nil 
Hyderabad 10 3.38 2.80 0.28 0.30 Nil 
Banglore 1 0.S5 Hil Sil »il Nil 0.55 
Ahmadabad Nil Hil Hil Sil Bil Nil » U 
Kanpur Kil s n Hil sa Nil Nil H H 
Total 129 82.96 39.51 12.29 15.29 14.36 1.55 
SO0RCEI fogakflheiaa, 1961» 7ol. 5, Soa, 8-9«p 
Another important cause for the low pereentage of investment in nortgages is 
the fflanegeaftfit proW-ea Involved in these Inv^ aotment. Mortgage finance requires a 
oarefttl analysis of the property, supervisitm of Loans and also entails oostly fore-
olosore proceedings in case of defa\ilt, Many of the snail izusiirance offices before 
nationalisation oouM not afford to hear the expenses of these investments. After 
the nationolisaticm of life insurance, the corporation found itself in a very 
embarrassing position sBtrsgards this type of investment* Because it was noted that 
a number of these loans had been granted cn inadeqtiate security of property or on 
property the title to which was not dear. Instances lAiere mortgages had been 
fraudulently created were also not wanting. The Corporation first of all took all 
possible steps to regularise the defective mortgage transactions end to realise its 
m . 3 7 
dues. la oonseqtienoe the amount doe la reepeot of old mortgagee has p3N>gre88ive]^  
gone doim> fjpom year to year, as shoiiB hereunder* 
TABLE 72 
U L C*S BSrVESTMENTS XEI MORfOMES 











SODRCB: L.I.Gt Annuel Heporte end Aooounts 
The Corporation rightly felt that its first task was to re&Iiee as many as 
possible of these bad and doubtful advances and put the ooUeotion maohinery in that 
regard in proper shape before it embarked on fresh advanees on the security of u 
immovable properties. This stage was reached liiy the end of 1959 when the outstand-1 
ing amount of loans stood reduced to 10.48 orores* Thus it was only after 1959 
that L.I.C. started its scheme of Mortgage Finance tigr estabOLishing a Separate 
Mortgage and Legal Department in the Zonal end Divisitmal Offioes. Since it had the 
painftdL experience of inheriting large numbers of unsatisfaotozy mortgages from 
various insurers, the oorporatim oiroumsoribed its role in granting loans. It 
adopted very strict soruMnjr of the security offered. Out of the 700 api^ ioatimis 
received for Bs 740 laKh, the Corporati<8i had sancticmed only 129 loan applications 
for Rs 82,96,000 the end of 1960. 
Another potent factor respcmsibOLe for the unpqpnCLarity of mortgages in Jaidia is 
the absence of any specialised agencies or Qovemment guarantee throu|^ which such 
1. logakshema, Tol. 5, Ho. 8-9, 1960, p 60. 
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loans could be axt«aad«d% This is in grsat eontrast to U.S.A. where official and 
tmoffioial agenoies provide ample Boiupe to insturere to take this finance. Farther-
more Farm Ijoans offer an entirely different sittiatioa heocHue of the peculiar 
characteristtos of agxlcultore In Zjatdia. TbB 'subsistanoe character of forming as 
distingoished from 'commercialised* a:<Tioc^ tcire offers no ^ cority to the Corporation. 
The small 'operative tJnit of the faiem' due to excessi^ '^  fragasntatien does not 
provide enough security, tn many production is dependent oa the vagaries of 
the seastm. The creditworthiness of the farmer therefore fluctuates with the 
'vagaries of the monsoon.' fiesides^ the products of agriculture are perishaUU and 
provide no satisfactoxy security for long term debt. Moreover» there is ^ e qwstion 
of yield on capital Invested as "The faner does not fix Ha prices of his produce 
they are imposed i^ pon him« so that his profits are limited end he often suffers a 
lossi and consequently the ra'e of interest on loans granted to him should be lover 
than <m oredit granted to merchant. As long-term capital brings in an lower 
yield than short-term oi^ italf it is necessary that the rote of Interest on long-
term loans should be lower than on short-term loans* although this is contrary 
to normal banlclng practice .^ (l) 
Obviously Ii.I.O. is the trustee of the poli<^<aders can not endanger 
its funds. Bscaase most form^ ;^  ore 'family operated*' the personal equation In 
form loan is particvOLarly signifioant. The lender gives great weight to the moral 
hasard. In analysing the moral hosord* the fanners personality plays a vexy Important 
part. India the farmer is uneducated who could not even recognise the te<dwicali-
ties Involve in mortgages. Besides In India the farmer is already overlmrdened In 
Z 
debt and he has very little |6ree property to offer as a 'First Mortgage to L.I.O. 
State Cooperative Banks* Central and Primaxy Lend Mortgage Banks* could hove 
been ideal agencies for the distribution of li.I.C. Loans* But* unfortunately these 
agencies in India hove not given any satisfactory proof of financial standing* This 
is evident from the following observaticm of the Agricultural Finance Sub-Committee 
1. Report on Svstems of A^icultural Credit and Insurance by H.Lovis Tardy* League 
of Kations (1938* p 8.) Quoted In the All India Rural Credit Survey* Vol. 11* 
Bombay* 1954* p ISg, 
2. Report of All Ijadia Rural Credit Survey* Chapter 3. 
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.^..Ooopex^ tlire banking ox'ga&isatims in all the provinoes axe not equally strong* 
Ixi aom e.g. Bihar» part of tha Coc^rativa Straotture had to be eompleteljr rs» 
boiltf in othersf tbe orgonleatione are etilX we^k or are in the prooesa of 
rehabilitation...In many of the Provinooe* the Movement was in diffioultiee in 
apite of the riae in {^ ricea of agrloultural prodi^. •. A large number of sooietiee 
are faoed with the probOLem of frozen asaets and have atopped funotioning 
ithoUjT or in part...Cooperative land mortgage banking in liidia ie not suoh 
developed except in Madrae..." (l) 
The Sural Credit Survey not only confirm mex^ of the above obaervationa but 
alao reveals that the finanoial records of theae agenoi^ a is inaignifioant cuod 2 
unsatisfaotory. The findings of tbe Agrieuitural Fiaenoe Committee and that of the 
Rural Credit Survey are still true as Kulkaxni has also pointed outt **...It satisfies 
neither of the requisites of good eooperation or sound oredit."(3) 
It is tdear from the above analysis that under the present oonditions of Agrioulture 
credit in Xndia» ti.I.C* oould not employ these institutions to a greater extent* It can 
therefbre u be eonoluded that the dbjaraoteristios features of the Farm and non-farm 
mortgagee do not provide ultimate solution to the life ftmd. ^he strong and weak 
paints of the urban mortgages are summarised as foUovst 
Mortgages provide abondant seourity in the form of real property and debt 
paying oapaoity of the debtor. They offer attraotiro iaoomej a hig^r yield than 
on other fixed obllgatians. Their duraticm oan be planned with the term of the 
liabilities of the oorporation. They offer a high possibility of geograjMo diversi-
fication and credit risks. Funds Invested in mortgages perform a veiy useful social 
functions. 
The other side of the picture indicates that mortgages involves hi^ cost of 
origination and of servi«ing.The Realfe ation of principal and interest in instalments 
1. Quoted in Report of All lAdia Rural Credit Survey» p 227. 
2. Ibid, 228. 
3. Eua^mit ^ 0 3 7 and Fraotlce of Cooperation in India and Abroad* 
ni» Co-operation's Book Depot, Bombay, 1958, p 1S2* 
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ieqttires the rd^ investmeuit of the funds, ffortgagas rftlQee the protileQ of oo6t and 
lengthy forooloBfflw i>roceedi»«B with possiliLo adveree palxLio relations. Similarly 
Farm loans involves extra hazard vithout ooapenaating yield for the sjaiae. let ue 
now examine the Inveetoent attributes of direct ownership of Beal Estate. 
Beal Estate I 
Real estate was a nlnor fossa of Snvestmant for life insurance offices before 
nationalisation. This viU he clear from Table 7ID. la 1956 Land end Bailding 
fomsd only S« 5 p-r oont of total investments, flor^ jover tiio insurers confined this 
type of iavectaont only to boildiaga and offices tluii they require for housing their 
Head and Branch Offices. 
Thus on the natianalisation of life insurance^  the L.I.C. Inherited real estate 
consisting of 541 properties, ^he total book value of these properties was ts 19.27 
orores as cn 1st. September| 1986. Amongst the acquired properties were several 
monumental and woll«-planned buildings» residential flats end house a« and valuable 
unbuilt open plots of lands throughout the i^ole of India and in s<me foreign 
countries as well. Since 1957, the Corporation extended the construction of office 
accooDddation and Zonal, Mvisional and Branch Office aooommodation throiii^  a 
building depairtmsnt. The Building Department has got seven offices at in^ portant 
cities, vis. two each in Bomtoy and Calcutta and one each in Delhi, Madras end 
Sanpur. Each Divisional Office is under an %ecutitrB Btogineer assisted Igr adequate 
technical and administrative staff. The buildlJig departm^t besides assisting the 
construction of office accommodation has also constructed 264 Staff Quarters for the 
effl®>l^ os of the CoiTporatico. 
It is now suggested that since the demand for 'housing* is increasing in the 
cotntxy and since diaate for 'mortgages' is not yet favourable, it will be desit^ 
able if the corporation couad the 'direct financing of housing*. In otiier words 
L.I.C. should Increase its 'equity investment in housing. This will also enable 
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th© corporation to diversify its inveatiaents in hitherto neglected 'Rural areas' 
irom where the corporation is esepeoted to mobilise huge saving* In this way the 
Corporation can also invest its ftmds for social advancement* It is, therefore, 
dfflportant to examine the suitability of Real Estate to L.X.C. 
S^t^a^^ij^y of Real, 
Kstate to L.I,G> 
Again a study of the real estate investment portfolio revolves around four 
important factors! dependability of prinoipali Realibility of Inooao,marketability 
and 'investment management.' Safety of Principal, when funds are used to acquire 
real estate whether residential or cosmerciali for incoms, is much different than 
that of property obtained through foredosurs* In the latter instance the investor 
has acquired the MltU^ of the property as last resort, vheroae in the former case 
Mtlc to the property is deliberately sought because of the inherent value of the 
property. 
The factoz^ affecting the safety of funds invested in housing develoj^ents are 
mainly associated with the ability to rent the project. The ability to rent depends 
not only on the desirability of the living accommodatiGns provided in the de^ relopment 
and the rent charged but ^ so upon neig^ bouziiood conditions surrounding it, location 
with regard to places of es^loyment and accessibility to facilities such as sdiools, 
shopping areas, and tisanaportation. In addition to these factors, consideration 
siust be given to the total supply of rental housing with the project must 
collate, and possible government rent oantrd measures. Thus the extent to whiidi 
a housing inxmetmnt viU coa^are with o ^ r authorised inveotmsntst on the basis of 
safety of principal, will depend upon the amount of control that L.I.€. can esKtrcise 
over these factors affecting the safety of housing develoimmt. 
Investment In roal estate are txsually considered to posaaas a ntinimum degree of 
liquidity. Not «ily is thoro no price cartalnty from the sole of the asset, but 
there is not readily marJcetable, even in periods of hi^ level eccmooic acitivity* 
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This is expXal&sd in part b(jr the absence of organised real estate markets* and in 
part lor the large indivisible units to be transferred. In periods of depressed 
eoonomie aotivity« this ncgr result in real estate being umnarketable at virtuallj 
anjr price. 
If liquidity is thought of as an attribute of an entire portfolio, hovever, real 
estate Bay contribute greatly to the liquidity of L.I.C, through the planned amortisa^ 
1 
tion of real estate inveetment. The rental of most long-term leases Is based on an 
amount wJdah vill retram a predetermined yield and amortise the Inveataent within 
a given period, tltus reducing the need for liquidity, nevertheless, the lack of 
liqvdditjr in real estate is an la^rtant Inrestraent eatsideration. 
To compensate for risk and lack of liquidity In th® ownersMp of real estate, 2 
the acticipated yield therefore is frequently higher than the alternative investnsnts. 
In addition, investsisnt in real estate often provides an opportunity for capital 
appreciation. This may be obtained in the residual valoe of the property whose cost 
has been fully aawrtised, or throu^ a rising price level. Because the retttm in 
most cases is deferred for a long period» its affect on investaent is limited, teit 
nonetheless signifiefint. 
pci 
Investment in Real Estate presents a management probleiii which is absent in 
other types of investment. In case of ownership of a real estate L.I.C. most set up 
some form of management department to carry out the operation of the project. This 
in effect involves establishing a separate business within the organisation, and if 
1. Meredith, L.Donglast Liquidity; A Orowlng Attribnt«i of Mortgage Loan Portf<Aios, 
The JToumal of Fimincoi December, 1950, pp 516-23. 
2. Sdhults, Robert Ei Life ^ suranoe Housing Projects - Richard D.Irwin 
Bomewod, Illinois, I956,p 21. 
VII. 43 
the project la to be ooDatmoted liijr Corporatioa« tTa& addlticmal prolxLeiiis of eontraet-
ing and platmJiig are inoozred. 
An adninietrative eanaiddratlon vhieh ia aeldom stated eai|d>lci21y» and yet may 
be very iaportaati ia the impact of the preaent aocial dXiniate on safety» yield* end 
liquidity. Besides the SGciel legislation of ««eent years tends to favoiir tenants 
over laad-lorda. Rent eontrol providing oooe evidence of this tendency. The eatten-
tion of this social attitude could seriously undermine the desirability of real 
estate as dn investment. In addition to the proWLeas of tenant selection, the 
Corporation in capaoity of a Land Lord has the ^roKLems of patting rent increases 
into affect when they are warranted, evicting tenants when neoessaiy, and of estab-
lishing and enforcing rales and regulations cwinected with tenant conduct, all of 
wbidi can become sources of unfavournbld mil33.1city. 
Thus the j^bajem c(HQnected with managing and operating housing development are 
generally ctmeidered a major disadvantagej having the respensibility of managing the 
project. The advantage of the real este-te Investment on the other hand is that the 
corporation has direct eontrol over the property. Moreover, bousing cocstruotion is 
a great social servlcef in view of the housing shortage in the country and this form 
of Investment might bring a good name for L.I.C. which would be a sourco of great 
buainesa. Moreover, the managerial problem involved in real estate ownership are 
ustially overcome through the organisation of Real. Estate Itepartment, whose efficient 
working minimises several rislc In this particular type of Investment. 
It is dear, therefore, that the investment in real estate investment can foTa 
the basis of an attractive segment of L.I.C's tavestaent portfolio and stand dioalder 
to shoulder with mortgage leans, preference shares, d®t®ntur©8 etc. The amount 
invested may never bo great because of the administrative problems involved and 
restrictive legislation, taut these ccnqjaratively new sources of investment could 
prove a profitable venue of investments. 
m , u 
Poli93C i M ^ 
and othey Loanai 
'Loans* vbi^ oonslt of policy loans* loans m Stocks and Shares and 'other 
loans' are other important avenues of investtrants of Of these the most inportant 
are the policy loans within their surrender valtie. They aocounted for b 43*6orores 
in 1960. these loans are considered as a form of 'dissaving' from the point of iriew 
life insurance saving, ftit they are higjily satisfaotoiy from the insurer's point 
of view. They are imquesticiMtbly secure because they are given for en amount below 
the surrender value of policies. Moreover^ the investment is profitable beoanse they 
yield about 6 per cent interest which is more than the market rate. 
This type of investment should not be encouraged lay bhe insurers in a developing 
eoonomy because they lead to 'Consumption finance.' Under the terms of ooatraot* 
however* the corporaticm is bound to extend ea<^ loans when dem^ed lay the pc^ioy-
holders. 
General 4ppra^e^| 
It is obvious from the above analysis of investments that safety^ liquidity and 
yield which are ijiqwrtant investment ol3||eotives of L.I.C. are not a<diieved any one 
form of investments. Bach investment presents a peculiar type of 'risk'.c To :en8U£>e 
against the 'risks' of investment*/^ / the corporation has no other alternative than t< 
diversify its investments in fiised earning seourities and ordinary shares so that 
the voltality of the one can be oospensated against the stability of the other. 
Xn a period of rising prices, as pointed out earlier« the market valus of fixed 
income investments t«ids to decline and ot'dinax7 ^ r e tend to appreciate in market 
value. Under defLationary ccmditimst the market value of fixed interest bearing 
securities appreciate and that of ordinaty shares decline. The Corporation should 
therejfore have a proper miacture of seourities so that under different eccuomio 
oonditions the loss in the market value of one typo of seourities oould be balanced 
to sosffl ttxtent bT gains in that of the other* 
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Thns Table 73 indioatds the manner in the ooxporaticm haa protooted Itself 
from oax'ket fluotuationa fcgr apreadizig ite invisstiimnt in fixed interest beai^ ing 
securities and ordinary shares* 
TABLE f 3 ii 
VARIATION BSTHEM BOOK VALtlOS AND MARKET VALUE OF L.I.O's IHVESTMEKTS 
AS AT 31ST D E C m m , 1960 
* 





Qovammeat and other 
approved securities 
end Municipal Loans. S9S.48 394.03 -1.43 3.67 
Debentures. SIS. 96 23.^2 -0.44 5.10 
Pireference Shares. 20.73 17.98 5.55 
Ordinary Shares* 50.88 56.36 •5.51 6*77 
Total 491.OS 491.89 •0.83 4.15 
soimcst togakshema, 1961, Vol. 5 Nos* 8»9» A>igast*Sept6mber, p 54. 
Notes^ lAoludes investoent in foreign ooontries iM the differemt categories of 
inYdstxents* 
The above Table whidh gives the oombination of Stook-Erohango saourities as on 
Slst December, I960 indicates that depreciation Mhioh oociir;^ d in the Talua of 
Oovemment securities and fixed earning corporate securities, presuasabiy du? to the 
fluctuation in interest rates, was atore ttian covered b/ appreciation in equity shares. 
This resulted in a net appreciation of Es 0.83 crores in the total invostaonts. 
Besides this, the corporation also zaaintains a Investment Heoerva yand to iwet any-
adverse situation in tha fluctuations of asaeto. The Inveatmeat Heservs Fund 
amounted to Bs 13.41 crarea as at 31st Daoeabsr, I960. 
Another advantage of diversificaticm has been shoim in PigAre 2 4 • ^ 
figure gives comparison between the •assumed rate' and the * actual jrield' realised 
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bgr the oorporatlom from varioiia investnents. It will be observed that in the Second 
1 
valuation as at 31st Deoembery 1959^  the rate of Interest assumed was ^  per oent 
(represented bgr the dotted line in the Figure). As against this the Corporation has 
aotually earned a gross yield of 4.15 per oent (represented b[ir thick unbroken line 
in the figure). This rate the corporation could earn only by spreading its invest-
ments in different forms of assets, the rate of interest, as shown in the Figure 
on the Gbvemment and other approved securities and Honicipal loans vas as low as 
S.67 per oent» the hig^r yields of 5.10 per oent on debenturesf 5.55 per cent on 
preference shares and 6.77 per cent on ordinaxy shares, have resulted in raising 
the yield <m the above categories of itovestownts as a whole to 4.15 per cent i.e. 
nearly half per cent above that was earned on Qovemment and other approved securi* 
ties and Municipal loans. Besides the 6 per oent yield on mortgages and 6 per oent 
yield on Policy loans, the interest and rent incoiEs havo further rison the gross 
yield on the Life Fund to 4.58 per oent for the year 1960 as against the assumed rate 
of 2f per cent. This 'suppoMja- Hayues eanclu8i<»u 
"An investor who has spread his capital over both fixed interest-
bearing seourities and good ordinazy shares is in a safer position 
than one who has ocmfined his investments in the former category, 
both as regards income and market value of his oapital.*(2) 
It is clear trtm the above that no sini^e security alone oan solve the problem 
of inves^nt of life tm&. It the corporation would have invested its funds in 
Ooverment seourities only which are 'safest* of all Investment, the resultant 
yield trtm such Investment would have been so small that the corporation could not 
have discharge its obligations to the policyholders. It had to spread its invest-
ment in different forms of securities in oxxler to 'miUiinise risk' and 'maximise 
yield.' This was one specimen of the iaves1»Gent policy throu^ whidi the copporation 
reached its ultimate goal of earning an 'adequate yield.' 
1. In the valuation report of 1959, the yield of per cent has been assumed except 
where the liability was determined by aocumulaticn of office premium in whidx 
case rate of interest was used 3 par cent. Pitman 
2. Rayres, H.Bi Insurance Oompanies Investments -Aondan, 1935, p 125. 
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Ths investment dletrlbation of proaeat assets does not dispose of the probl^ of 
the investoent of the further growth of the life fund fcnr existing basiness mid this 
problem poses the continuiiig risk of ^ eoonomio change.* The oombination of the 
Isvestoent attributes not onljr r&vf videl/ amcmg different issues within the same 
general oategor7 of seourities as well as among the various elasses of seourities 
bat also change materially throui^ time on any single issue. Consequently there is 
no simple nor easy solution to the portfolio problem. No single policy is soltable 
for all purposes and for all times. In a developing econonQr the relative 'yie^ jd* 
X 
and *risk* eharacteristios of the seeoritles raries with the 'eocmomic change. * It 
is* therefore» Important that th^ eozporation mast chart its eaurse in advance not 
only to earn the maicimum possible Interest bat also to protect itself from the 
*eoonomio changes' that are underway, lii other words the corporation has to f<^ow 
a flexible investment poLicsr which is In ccnsistent with the economic dovolopmsnt of 
the countxy* 
^e economio changes^  are izQ)ortant and have considerable influenee on the 
portfolio structure of the insurers. I have discussed this In the following dbapter. 
Conclusj^ oni 
this chapter the nature and ^ laracteristics of different forms of assets 
have been discussed with regard to thsir suitability for Investment by L.I.C. Xt 
has been noted that sioiily no security justifies the entire Investment oriteria of 
safetyi yield* liquidity marketability and ease of management etc.»eto« Qovexument 
seonritiesf for exan^le, provide safety of 'capital* and 'incoDte* bat poses'^  the 
problem of forecasting the interest rate. The return fron Qovemment seourities 
is also inadequate to meet the cantraotual obligations of L.I.C. Vftille 'Mortgages' 
provide maximum degree of 'safety', they have poor marketability. The procurement 
stqpervision, control and |»roeedure of foreolosure in case of failure of the borrower 
to pay the principal or interest, entails heavy i^ esponsibilities on I>.I.C. Besides 
1. Ccnklin, Oeorge, Tt A centtucy of X>ife Ihsurance Portfolio Management in 
Investment of Life Insurance Funds, ed. by Mc Cahan, David, Op.Git., p 248. 
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the realiaatlon of pxdnolpal amount and interest In inatali&ent also presents the 
problem of the constant rein^stment of small sums of money. Iai;e8tment in Real 
Bstatesf espeoially in 'housing* besides providing adeq^te yield with possiULity of 
appreoiation, enables the corporation to perform a tiseful 'social function.' Bat 
this type of inirestment also involves the problem of management vhioh Is oonsidered 
•foreign to a life office Inisiness.' 
Among corporate securities debentures produce inoons dependability bat they 
require careful analysis of the financial worthiness of the issuing conqpany. Simi* 
larly* only few high grade preference issues compare favourably viih sound debentures 
as far as stability of inccme and 'safety of principal' to the corporation are 
concerned. Equities serve as a hedge against inflation. In a period of rising 
prices* they supplement the limited return received on debentui«8> and offer better 
chances for appreciation of capital^  ibwever, the yield trm ordinary share is 
more cyclical. In order to Insure an adequate ino(»se in tine of depression* L.I.O. 
must have a substantial portion of its funds in fixed income secxtrities. 
All the arguments for and against a particular type of investment lead to the 
oonolusion that risk is inevitable. In a developing eoonoa^ it is ideal to dream a 
'care free' investments. This requires '^t the corporation must diversify its 
investments in order to maximise yield and to minlMse the ohanoes of losses, ^y 
spreading its risks both geographically and industrially and by distfibuting its 
investments over a wide range of business* it would earn oonqpensatian for losses in 
one direction through profits in another. Such a policy besides protecting the fund 
becomes one of the important sources of flow of fundo or 'transmiting of capital' 
in different sections of the eoonoiqy. If wisely followed such a policy will not 
only bring the larger return for the policyholders but would also help the economic 
growth of the country. This aspect of the investment policy of t.I.C. has been 
examined in the next chapter* 
CHAPTER VXn 
RATIOHAIJS OP INVBSJMEMf FOUOf OF L L 0. 
CHAPTER VIII 
R A T I O N A L E OP I N V E S T M E N T P O L l C t OPL.I.a 
In the previous Chapter I have oonflned oy remrlsk to the problemB of lavesting 
life Insurance funds in relation to the life insurance business. However, it should 
constantly bo borne in mind that the aggregate funds af L.I.C. and their continuing 
turaover and growth are of very great importance in the overall capital formation and 
financing of the economy. Indeed, as shown earlier, in some sectors of the capital 
mar&et the Influence of ths inves+iaent policy of L.I.C. nay be regarded as decisive* 
It is therefore important that consistent with policyholders interest, the funds must 
be e]B|A<^ d in the larger economic and social interest of the country. This was the 
main objective of the nationalisation of life insurance. In this Chapter, therefore, 
I have exeislned the improvements that appear to be desirable in rospect of the invest* 
ment policy of L.I.C. 
T^he Chapter is divided into three sections. Section first doals with the 
effects of the changing economic conditions on the portfolio structure of the 
insurers in different countries of the world. In the light of the conclusitms of 
this section the investment policy of L.I.C, Is examined in section Two, The Third 
"section sums up the discussion and broadly suggests the rationale of the investment 
policy of L, I. C. 
SECTION I 
EFFECT OP CHANGIHO ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON THE POHTPOLXO STRUCTORE 
OP INSURERS 
Life insurance investment policy Is affected not only by the internal oharaeteris-
tics of the industry but likewise by the exteroal oconomic forces. History has 
proved that the changing economic conditions have direct bearing <m the portfolio 
structure of the insurers. Por the verification of this statement the investment 
pattetnof the insurers in countries such as U.S.A., U.K., Canada, Japan, Australia, 
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Norvajr and Sweden has been discussed in the following pages* h^e sleotlon of thest, 
countries has been made purposely because insurance in each of these countries is 
of 
highly developed and eaoh one/them offers some unique feature of life insurance 
investments. 
Investment Pattern and 
Economio Ohangest 
It has already been pointed out that one of the signifioant elements of the net 
cost of a life insurance policy is the rate of return earned on policy reserves. 
Consequently there has been persistent pressure on the investment policy of the 
insurers particularly in developed countries, to accept the risks of the private 
sector of the economy rather than to seek the riskless safety and low yield of 
Government Bonds. Whenever possible, life Insurence funds have directed away from 
•Oov©mj!»nlB and w«re chanelled in the privets sector. 
In addition to avoidance of Oovemraents, there has been an increasing tendency 
9 
among the insurance con^ panies to t&ke fiillor investment advantage of their lack of 
need for liquidity and marketability. This trend made the life insurance Investment 
enterprising in character. In tT.S.A,, life ftoada have flown into those sectors of 
the economy which needed them most and offered higher yield in relation to the risk 
asatjmed. The life fund for instance, flowed Into rail-road bonds till the end of the 
19th century and thereafter into public utilities, as well as in housing through 
mortgage loans. During the years of depression, insurance funds supplemented personal 
credit needs tjy Policy loansf while during the war, they supported the Qfovemment 
needs and as much as 4& per cent of total assets of all companies in 1945 were in 
U.S.A. Bonds. As soon as the war needs were over, the funds were gradually withdrawn 
from Government Bonds. They now constitute only 5.4 per cent of total assets. Thus 
4 
to earn the highest possible 'yield ' the life funds have flown in different sectors 
of the eocmos^ '. ^e search of *Jnive8tTO0nt opportunities' has enabled the insurers 
to locate the areas of growth and relative acarcity. This has also encouraged the 
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insttrera to device methods to finanee the eoonomio development aooording to their own 
ability. What haa been noted in ease of U. S. A. is practioally- eoBunon to all onntriea* 
This ia^oun in Table 7f4* 
TABLE Mo. 7'4 
INVESTMENT' PATTERN OF LIFE INSllRAfiCE COMPANIES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
to jot^ Afy^ffjis) 
Goantxy 
Pr®-War Poriod»»» At the end of 1945@9 At the end of 1960@@S 
Qovezn- l^ dus- Mort- Loans Qovezn- Indus- Mor^ Loans Gbvem- Indus-Mort- Loans 
nent & trial gage on stent & trial gage on ment & trial gage on 
Semi- Seoo- Loans, oooqpa^  Semi- seouri- Loans.Compa- Semi- seouri- Com> 
Govern- rities. nies Govern- ties. nies Govern- ties. Loans paniesi 
ment poli- ment poli- mmit poli-
Seouri- oies. seeuri- oies Seouri- oies. 
ties. ties. ties. ^ 
Ijndia 62.8 6.8 2.9 9.1 69.7 9.4 1.0 4.8 60.7 14.8 1.5 7.0 
Australia 50.9 2.9 27.1 9.8 Ta.i 2.0 13.6 5.0 32.8 19.7 35.3 3.6 
Canada 36.4 30.2 13,0 10.5 61.7 20.4 7.7 5.1 5.3 41.5« 36.2 5.0 
Japan 11.1 45.6 4D.2»» 16.5 - • 2.1*« 21.7 • 13.4^ 
Norway 25.0 6.8 52.7 7.1 50.5 6. 1 26.1 1.9 35.3 N.A. 49.7-»- 1.8 
Sweden 42.7* 2.0 42.6 N.A. 55.7» 1.8 31.5 N.A. 55.2» 2.3 28.2 N.A. 
U.K. 33.3 34.3 11.4 3.1 50.1 27.0 6.6 1.2 26.7 40.3 14.9 1.3 
U.S.A* 26.7 29.2 19.4 11.1 50.3 24.7 14.8 4.4 9.6 43.7 34.9 4.4 
SOtmCBSi 1. Reseifare Bank of India Bulletin* November, 1961* 
2. Gregg* Davis, W. and NoGill M,Dav,(ed), World Jasuranoe Trends. 
•Mei Figures in toackets relate to ordinaz^ r loans in Japan, N.A. « Not Available* 
e « 
At the end of X935 for Japan, end 1937 for U.K., end 1938 for Sweden and 
end 1939 for other eountries* 
At the end of 1948 for Australia. 
At the end of 1955 for Sweden,as data for later years are not available. 
Inoluding local authority bonds for whioh separate figures aire not available. 
Hunioipal loans, bonds and debentures. 
Inoluding debtotures of companies. 
Inoluding industrial seourities for whioh separate figures are not available. 
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It vill be noticed that only two ooantriesf namely» India and Australia had 
a high pfoportion of inrestments in Qovemment and Seoi-Qoveniment securities in the 
1 
pre-war period. "The proportion of sudi investment of the J^ apanese, British and U.S. 
Companies in stock and shares were relatively large« being 48 per cdnt, 34 per oent 
and 29 per oent respeotivelyf of total assets. In addition, ordinary loans, i.e* 
loans to industrial enterprises formed IS p«r cont of total assets of Japanese 
insurance companies. Although investment in industtial saouritios in the U.K. and 
the U.S.A. were hig^^r than in the gilt-edgyd investments, a ocaasiderable poriti<m 
of investments in industrial securities was in the form of debentures and preference 
shares. In India, Australia, Sweden and Norway tlrie pre-war investments of life 
funds in stocks and shares were small, being only 7 per oent each in India and Norway 
3 per oent in Australia and Z per oent in Sweden. 
Mortgage bonds in Norway and Mortgage loans in Australia and Sweden were more 
important than industtial securites in the portfolio of life insurance companies. 
In fact, they were the biggest item of investments in Norway (53 per cent of total 
assets), while in Sweden they were as important as investments in government securi-
ties ( 43 per cent). In Australia, mortgage loans stood next in importqnc only to 
govemment.and semi-government securites, forming 27 per oent of total assets. 
During the war, investments in Government and semi-government securities, had 
risen in all countries. This was the result of the mobilisation of resources Isgr 
Oovemment to finance the War and the strict control exercised by Qovemment over 
new capital issues in the private sector during the war# The percentage increase 2 
was the largest in Japan (from 11 per oent to 40 per oont) and in Norway and the 
U.S.A. the share of such securities in total assets had nearly doubled. At the 
end of 1945, the proportion of such investiasnts was the highest in Australia (72 
per cent) followed igr India (70 per oent). 
1. End of 1938 for Japan, eud of 1937 for the U.K., end of 1938 for Sweden and end 
of 1939 for other oountries. 
2* Including debentures of coa!Q>aniee» 
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As wgards Industrial seourities* there was a decline la the proportlcm of 
atocka and shares in the U.S.A., th© U.K,, Canada and Japan during the war, the 
fall being the largest In Japan. At the end of the proportion of stocks and 
I 
shares stood at 17 per oent in Japan, 20 per cent in Canada, 27 per eeni In the tJ.K. 
and 2S per oent In the 17. S« A. In the case of Japan* loans made by life Insiurance 
oomponies to industries had also deollned In laportanQ0= India is the only samt^ 
where investments in Indtisirial securitiGs showed a proportional rise ^ ve®. during the 
v&r, froa 6.8 per cent to 9.4 per cent of total assets. ?his is largely due to the 
development of Industries during iwrar.^. 
The wa^ -tliae trend in siojrtgage loans end bonds vue sliallar to that of indus-
trial seourities. Mortgage bonds whlcii had accounted for 53 per oent of the total 
assets in Mormy in 1039 dropped to 26 per oent in 19 4S. Similarly in other countries 
the share of mortgage loans had recorded a fmbstential decline during the ifar. This 
was due to the var time destruction of houses in some comtries and the alm(»t 
/ 
complete oesaaticm of private building activity in obhers during the war. 
The post-war period witnessed a signifioant shift away from Investaxents in 
Governments and seial*govemment securities in Australia* Canada, Japan, Norway, the 
. . "(Tr^Tr', ip'^  -t-M ft, A ^ — h a u i d , in Sweden tha li'atio or gixt-edged invastaents 
to total assets was almost unchanged and this could be attritaited to the post-war 
agreemnt between the RiJcs-bank and insurance companies, l a India, the i»roportion 
of such Inveatiaents to total assets showed a gradual fall from 70 per oent at the end 
of 1949 to 96 per cent at the end of 1955. This was probably facilitated "fcy the 
rednotion in the minimum invostaisnt in Govenimant seeuilties from 30 per cent to 
29 per cent under the Insurance (Aa®ndaont) Act 1950. Uim^ 1957, there has been a 
steady increase in Lh© proportion of inmatmenta in government and semir-govemment 
eeouriiies and the ratio stood at 61 per oent &t the end of 1950, India is the only 
country where the proportion of investments in government and semi-government securi-
ties remained around 60 per oent both at the end of 19^ and also at the end of I960; 
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whereas in Australia, Canada, Japan, the U.K. and the U'.S.A., the ratio of suoh 
investi^ nta to total assets was maoh less than on the pre-war II period. 
In post-war period, Inirestinents in stotdcs and shares ligr life Instiranoe oo]iq>anies 
have expanded in all oountries owing partly to the rapid eoonomio develoi»Bent and 
expectations of hij^Jier profits and partly due to the drop in the ^ eld on govenment 
securities. An additional factor in the ^ se of the SA was the gradual liberalisa-
tion of legal provisions relating to investments of life funds in equities particu-
larly the 1951 anendisent to the Hew lork Insurance Law (further liberalised in 1957) 
permitting limited investment in common stocks. An interesting feature of the 
eTcpaxuiim. in the holdings of Stock and shares by life insurance companies in the U.K. 
and U.S.A. in post-war years is that a large portion of industrial securit^s has 
been acquired throu|^  direct negotiations between the insurance conqp^ nies and 
industrial Iwrrowers or through the oediuja of issuing bonus. It will be seen fro® 
Table 7(4 that the proportion of life funds invested in stocks and shares in the 
post-war period had risen significantly in India, Australia, U.K., and U.S.A. 
1 
In Norway the proportion rose from 6 per cent In 1945 to 14 per cent in 1953. In 
the U.K. the rise in such investments in the post-war period is someiAiat obscured 
bgr the nationalisatlai of SOIM Industries,(e.g. Railways)in the early post-war period 
which caused a shift in classlfieatlon of investments trm the private to the putiLlo 
seotor. The low ratio of investments in stocks and shares of Swedish insurance 
Oompanies is due to the legal restrictions th^ t no part of life insurance funds should 
be invested in stocks and shares* As oomipared to the pre-war period, the ratio of 
investn»nt8 in industries to total assets at the end of 1960 had risen in India, 
Australia, Japan (including loans to industries), the U.K. and the U.S.A. in the 
post-war period. In Sweden, on the other hand, though the amoutit of mortgage loans 
had more than doubOLed between 1945 and 1955, as a proportion to total assets, thsy 2 
had declined from 32 per cent to 28 per cent, h^e increase in mortgages was 
1. Data for later years are not available but the post-war expansion in holdings 
industrial securities is clear* 
2. Data for the years are not available. 
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particularly sharp In Canada (from 8 per cent In 1945 to 38 per cent In i960) where 
changes in legislative provisions eaabled life insurance companies to Invest larger 
sums in mortgages. A development which is common to all countries is the post-war 
housing construction boom. Mortgages now constitute the second important item in 
the portfolio of insumnee companies in Canada^  Sweden and the U.S.A. while they 
ars the meat iaportant items of assets in Australia. Although separate data are not 
/ 
available in respect of loans made Igg^  Japanese insurance oompanies for hovuiing 
1 
building purposes, some life insur^ce couqpanies have established subsidiaiy Companies 
8 
for hotise mortgage lending. 
Japan and U.S.A. provide an interesting example -of direct loans granted by life 
instirance oompanies to industries which recorded enormous expansion in the post-war 
years. Direct loans in Japan have yisen from / 0.4 billion in 1935 toYS i4S billion 
3 
in i960. As & proportion to total assets» loans made by life insurance oompanies 
spurted up to SO per cent in 1960 fx«m 15 per cent in 1935. It is important to note 
that these loans constituted the lai^ gest single item of assets of Japanese life 
insurance companies in the post-war period. It appears that the rapid induatrial 
revival of Japan in the post-war pei'iod when the Japanese economy eiqperieneed aoute 
capital shortage, had increased the dependence of Japanese enterprises on financial 
institutions which led to the rapid growth in loans made by life insurance companies* 
Tlie Direct Placement or Private Placement method in U. S. A. represents a natural 
development in corporate bond finanoing. These developments in U.S. A. and Japan 
1« According to th^residentof Hippon life Insurance OMspaz^ Osaka, insiiran^  
ooiiq;>anies in Japan were scheduled to loan, ten 15 million in 1957 to the -•Ck>Tem-
ment Housing Corporation and this amount was expected to increase yearly.(Edited 
by Davis W and McQiU, Dan Ms World Insurmce Traids, p 50). 
2. Huosa,Qent Life Insurance Business in Japan since the War -Proceedings American 
Life Ccmvention, 54th Annual Meeting, 1959, p 227. 
3. T» Ten 
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Indleate that while life Insuranoe ooimpanles ae a group oan not oreate new outlets 
of funds) but they- defini^ tely oreate olimate for the eoonomio development of the 
countries. 
SuimauMfy and Conolusioni 
It is olear fr<MB the above analysis that under more or less siadlar liability 
oonditions^  the various patterns of insurance investment have ea^ rged under different 
eo«»iomic and sooial oiroumstances. For iastanoe* during the war period nearly all 
the Insurers in the world heavily invested in Qovemamt seourities in order to serve 
the 'national interest** In the post-war period^  the funds flowed in diverse direc-
tion aooording to the eoenomic and social requirements of the coxmtry. These changes 
resulted due to the decline in yield on Cbvemment seourities and also due to inoreaso 
demand for oapital ftmds Igr the private sector* 
l^ e risk involved in the investmnet in private sector was minimised ic^  design« 
ing sudi methods of finance that suited the investment requirements of insurers* 
The industr'al loans in Japan; and the * Direct Placement' in U*S*A. and Canada 
Mortgage Finanee in U. S. A., Canada and Norway provide good examples of the investment 
of life fond for sooial and eoonomio advanoement of the countries ooneemed. Tbe 
experience of these countries oan form the basis on whioh the portfolio struotuz« of 
L.I.C. oould be sorutinised* It also suggests the lines on which the investment 
policy of L.I.C. oould be rationalised. The next section^  therefore^  makes a 
oritioal study of the investiffint pollcqr of L.I.C* 
SECTKaS Z 
CRITIQTIE OF DIVBSTMEIIT POUCI OF L. I. C. 
In the forogoing discussion it has been observed that the *yleld* and 'risk* 
oharaoteristlcs of the seoxurltles change with the eoonomio development of the country 
Consequently no cembinatioa of the seourities offers a permanaBt policy. In the 
following pages I have examined the changes that have ooourn^ in the portfolio 
VII. 9 
etruoture of L.I.C. slnoe the natiooaalieation of life ineuranoe. I ha^e evaluated 
the InveetiBeiit policy "of . t.I.C. from the point of view of the policyholders' 
interest us well as from the poijnt of view of the national economic and social 
advancement of the oountzy* 
Main Changes in the InvestmeBt 
Pattern since the Bationalisation of 
Life Inatirancei 
L.I.C. inherited a pattern of investment which was basad on the independent 
policies of 243 insurers which differed in sise« ability end in many o ^ r respects* 
%eir investment policy on the whole was rigid and inelastic due to dominance of 
Ctovemment securities. I am not cwicemed here with the merits or oidierwise of the 
policy followed ty the insurers before nationalisatioin of life insur^oe. It would 
suffLce to mention that huge investotsnt in government securities was an important 
1 
feature of their invsstfi»nt which has not earned much credit for them. Similarly 
in the management of life fund they have not inspired publio confidence. This was 
2 
the main reason which led to the nationalisation of life insurence in India. After 
the nationalisation also there has been little change in the traditional inves^nt 
pattern of L.I.C. Oovenment seeturities still dominate the protfolio stracture of 
L.I.C. and in fact as percentage to total assets their share is on the increase* 
This is evident from the following Table 7<5. 
A ooaqparison of the investment policies at the end of I955(i.e . last year of 
private enterprise) and i960 in the Table 7(5 tfiMi reveals the following faotss 
I. Investment in Central (lovemment securities has gone down Igr about 9 per cent 
and that of State Gtovemment securities has increased by about 69.8 per cent 
and to approved securities it has increased by about 9.6 per cent* 
1. Sufficient light m tba investment poli^ of the insurance companies before 
the nati<mali8ation of life insurance has been thrown ly Prof* Agarwala, A.Nt 
Insurance in India* Op.Cit, pp 362-74. 
2. Shri C.O.Deshmuldi Statement in the Lok Sabha, Lok Sabba Debates* 29th Februaryf 
1966* column U44. 
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TABLE HO 7 5 
PSRCENTAOE CHANGES I N I H S UNNSSTMENT PA7TEBN OF I I . I . O . 
n m 1959 to 1960 
(Ag perQentai^  to total %v«atment) 
August tteoomber Peroentage ehange 
Class of ZavestiQtnt 1955 31^  31, Isivsstaeat 
1956 1960 1955-1960 
Total Investment (Ss Grores) S88.4 348.7 S87.0 82.7 
1. aovemaent of India Securities 47.6 49.0 43.3 -9.0 
2. Indian State Qovemment 
Securities. 10.6 9.7 18.0 •69.8 
3. Foreign. 2.6 4.2 2.5 - 3.8 
(a) Qovemment Munioipal 
etc* Securities. 3.8 2.4 mm 
(b) Debentures and share 
of Joint Stock Companies. - 0.5, 0.1 •> 
Konicipal securities, 
Ckjvomment guaranteed and 
other approved securities* 7.3 8.7 8.0 •9.6 
5. Shares and Debentures of 
Companies• 20.6 16.3 17#5 «15 
(a) Ordinary Shares. 8.8 6.6 9.1 43.4 
lb) Preference Shares. 4.8 3.8 3.9 -18.9 
(o) Debentures 7.0 5.9 4.5 -35.9 
6. Loans on Mortgages 5.2 4.3 1.7 -67.3 
7. land and House Property. 6.1 5.5 5.0 ~ 18.0 
8. Housing Loans including other 
investioents. 2.2 4.0 •• 
100.0 100.0 lOO.O 
Notot Pelioy Itoans and Personal Loans etc. are not included in the total. 
SOURCSSJ Insurance Tear Book 1955. 
Reserve Bank of India Balletin» November* 1961* 
Z, XnvestlBent in debenttires and shares of J'oint Stock Companies has gone dovn tgr 
15 per eent; in Mortgages it has fallen Ijgr 67«3 per eent and investment in 
Land and Hoose Property had declined by about 18 per cent. 
3. Housing Loans etc. appear to be quite a new avenue of investment after the 
nationalisation of life insurance. 
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Ilk is important to enquire at thia stage as to how far the portfolio straotitre 
of L.I.G. is aoooTdiQg to the speeifioation as preaoribed bgr lav and to idmt extent 
it serves the beet interest of the poli<^olders and the national eoonomio interest 
of the eoioitiy, 
(a) Statiitory Requirement si 
fltatutory^ requiresie&ts and the aotual investsis&ts cf L*X.C. ocm lie c^anined 
from the foUoving Table. 
TABtS NO. 7^ 5 
BAUKCE aOBST OF TtiE IHVES'mBKT OF COHTROIIJBD FUND 
AT THE W D OF I960 
Legal Requireuiente. Controlled Pond 










At least 50 per e«Q.t of the 
omtrolled F^d of the 
Corporation 
3S per <M>nt of the 
o(sitrolled fund of the 
oorpoiration* 
Not more than 15 per cent 
of the oontroUed fund 








(including all foreign 
I^Testment) amounting 








2 9 . 5 0 
Total 93 577.96 
SOQRCEt Iogakdi0iBa« 1961* Vol. 5, Nos. 8-9, p 55. 
* The Balanoe is represented bgr other assets which are not of the nature of 
iftvastiasnts. 
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It will be observed f ^ the above fable that the legal requirements of ia-vest-
nent have been fully and adequateljr oat Igr L.I.C. It has invested in the categories 
fiaffld for it b^ law md in this manner th» Corporation has not offended the 'oanm 
of seotiritg''.' The oritioism on the oontrar/* is that it has been too eonservative 
and has nmeeeasarily eonoemed itself with the principle of safety which has mads 
investment policy unenterprising. £iet me examine this aspect of L.X.C's invest^mot 
policy in the light of the objectives that have be^ formulated in Chapter VI and 
n x of this thesis. 
Ik Chapters VI and VIZ I ha^^ discussed the investment objectives of L.I.C. 
and have laid down guiding principles for its inveetment policy. These are briefly 
reproduced below to discuss the investment policy of in proper perspective. 
1. the primary objective of L.I.C. is to earn tfa» maximum possible 'income' witMn 
the confine of 'safety* end 'liquidity.' 
2. In theozy L.I.C. has to discharge its obligations in fixed monetary unite 
bist its 'Trusteeship' duties require that it should hedge the policyholders 
from the falling value of the 'monetary unit.' 
3. L.I.C's Investments should as far as possibla harmonise with the national 
economic interest. In other words L.I.C's investments should be for the 
larger economic and social advancement of the country. 
4. In the context of wider trusteeship duties the Corporation must contribute 
for the Regional Eocmomic l}avelo|Haent of the country* 
5. In order to maximise yield and 'minimise risk the Corporation should resoft 
to proper combination of securities and spread its investment as far as possible* 
I have discussed the portfolio structure of L.I.C. in the background of the 
above stat-^ d objectiges* I have first of all examined as to how far the increas* 
ing investment in Government securities and in the Public Sector as a whole has 
served the best interests of the policyholders as well as the national economic 
interest. This can be studied fr«Mn the Table 77 on the following page which shows 
that L.I.C. has continuously increased its investment in Public Sector in relation 
to the Private Sector. 
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U m M NO. 7f7 
PERGENTAOE DISTRIBOTIOK OP INVESTMENTS OP L. I, C. IN INDIA IN POBLIC AND PRIVATE 
SECTORS 1957-1960 
Sectors 1957 1958 1959 1960 
PUBLIC SECiX)R 
1. Oovemnent Securities 69.S 69.3 69. S 70.6 
2. Approved Securities. 8.2 8.6 8.4 7.9 
3. Monicipal Loans. tm « 0.2 0.1 
4. Debentures 1 preference and 
ordinarv shares. tm 0.2 0.1 0.1 
TOTAI. 77.4 78.1 78.2 78.7 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
1. Approved Securities. 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 
2. Debentures,preference and 
ordinary shares in Joint 
Stock Companies. 20.9 20.5 20.5 20.1 
TOTAL 22.6 21.9 21.8 21.3 
GRAND TOTAL 100 100 100 100 
SOMCESt li.I.O.t Azmtial Reports and Aooounts* 
The above table ohowe that inreeiaaent In Public Sector has increased from 77.4 
per cent in 1957 to about 78.7 per cent in 1960j while inveetinent in the Private 
Sector has correspondingly declineed trm SS.6 per cent to SI.3 per cent. The 
ocaatinuing increase of L.I.C.'e invastiaents in the Pulblie Sector do not fully serve 
the poliogiholders interest nor L.I.C. haa lived to the soleim assurance given by 
Mr. C.D.Deehoukh, the then Pinonce Minister who while pHoting the L.I.C. Bill, 
observed! 
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"I votild like to teXl the spokesman of the private eeotor, industidalists 
and others, that it is not Governments' inteirtion to divert the flow of 
funds, that is, large dimensions of the present funds, to the puhlio 
sector, to a greater extent than at present. Nov it is my endeavour to 
see that at least as nuoh mmsy aa is agailable to day is made available 
for investment in the private seator."(l) 
There is very little to say against the investment policy of L.I.C. if the 
Qovenuaent assuranoe was o61y for an absolute amount as the total investment of L.I.C. 
in the private sector has increased from Rs crores in 1957 to [b crores 
in I960* Bat in a developing ooonomy rigid amount for investment of increasing life 
insurance saving can not be preserlbed. It is the relative pvreentage of L.Z.G's 
total investment in the private sector which is important and rightly therefore the 
Finance Hjjmistar has assured the private sector in the Lok SaUlia in the following 
words) 
''...It happens that on 31st of December 1954, the proportion of life 
insurance i\inds invested in shares and fieiientures of Joint Stock companies 
was less than 16 per cent, and ths custodians have been advised to invest 
upto 16 per cent in such investments'*(2) 
It is clear therefore that the relative decline of Ii.I.O's investment in the private 
sector is not in oonfdrmity with the assurance given ty the government to the private 
sector at the tine of nationalisation of life insurance. 
In defence of L.I.C. it can be said that the relative decline in its investment 
in the private sector was quite natural and it was in iine with the investment trends 
that appeared since 1951. It va& indicated in Chapter IV.^  that after the adoptitm 
of new monetary policy and the increase in the yield of government securities 
insxurers investment in public sector have gradtaally Iccreased. This became quite 
prominent in 199S. In this way the process of increasing investment in public sector 
was initiated by the private insurance companies themselves. After nationalisation, 
L.I.C. also responded to the new monetary policy under which the yield on government 
securities continued to increase (See FigJ.6) and consequently L.I.O's investments. 
1. Quoted in Bstimates Committee Report, Op.Oit, p. 4P» 
2, Lok Sabha Debates - \rol. I, No. 15, 3rd March, 1956, colunns 154&* 
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in Ooirexnment aeouritids, espeoially in State Oovexments eeotirities also inor^ aoed* 
Thfi Inveetment policy of L.I.C, was in no way different from its inherited policy* 
It <mn, however, be criticised for adopting a completely passive attitude towards 
interest rates. 7he Gorporati(% could haire played an important role in patting 
\;q;>ward pressure on the interest rate on government seworities fcy shifting a part 
of life fond in the private sector. This kind of shift would Imv© baen useful 
to the Corporation as well as to the econony. Such ^ shifts* on the part of the 
insurance ctsiqpanies have been an important factor In the economio developaent of 
1 
tlio ir.K. and the U.S.A. However, the * shift Ability' of the funds itself depends 
t^on the availability of alternative outlets. In a lees developed econosiy ttore 
is not the diversity of corporate seexirities for investment that exists in the 
advanced economies. Consequently the 'shiftability' of the funds is restaricted 
hjr the overall availability of alternative investa^ nt outlets. Bat in India the 
Corporation followed an extremely passive policy at a time when the 'investment 
opportunities* to the private sector were increasing through rapid industrialisation 
during the Second Five fear Han. 
This is st^ ported fr^ the Table 78 which gives the indices of industrial pro-
duction and Index numbers of iMustrial profits. 
It will be observed that the average general index of industrial produotion 
(with base J 1951»100) rose to 151.9 in 1959 and further to 167.T during .Tanuaxy-
June, 1960. This iMicates that annual rate of increase has accelerated to 8.7 
per cent and fuxther to 10.4 per cent in the first half of I960. Ilie index of 
1. The Goaaittee on the Working of the Monetaxy ^ t em in U.K. has described the 
effect of the shifts on the eoonooiio activity in the following words i 
"•..It iiqilies, if debt is to be satisfactorily marketed, a rise in bond 
yields relatively to equity yields. It is the kind of rise in interest rates 
that can not damage econoade activity, since it is a response to the addi-
tional attractiveness that son^  channels of investment have acquired. Besis-
tence to the i3^ ward drug occasioned by expectations of inflation, would tend 
to encourage unbalanced capital development ly companies which can sell 
equities." - Beport of the Committee on the Working of the Monetasy ^tam. 
Her Majesty's Stationary Office, Iiondon, 19S9> p 2J2, 
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TABLE NO. 7'8 
INDEX miMBERS OP IMDUSTRUL PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL PROFITS 
fear General Index of Percentage variation Profits before tax 
Induetrial production. in the prerLoue yB&v 
1950 . 100 
1951 100.00 132.4 
1982 103.6 •S.e 86.6 
1993 ld5.6 •1.9 100.9 
1954 132.9 t6.9 121.6 
1955 122.4 150.1 
1956 132.6 167.2 
1957 137.3 •S.S 133.7 
1958 139.7 -H.7 151.7 
1939 151.9 +8.7 N.A 
1960 167.7 no. 4 K.A. 
(Jan-^une) 
SOORGBt Reserve Bank of Ijadia Bulletin^  Februazr^  1961, p 175. 
Note I Base year of Industrial Produotion 1951 »100 
Base year of Profit « 1950 *> lOO. 
profits before tax (with base 1990»100) also increased to 151.7 in 1958 (latest 
available). The analysis supports the criticism that L.I.G. increased its investment 
in dovemment ^ecunities without exploiting the investment opportunities in the 
private sector. Thus the oorporati<m adopted the passive policy. The 'passive 
policy, followed by the Corporati<»i at a tim when better alternative investmsnt 
opportunities were available was also <tetPinnental to the best interests of the policy-
holders. L.I.C. which is the trustee of policyholders funds is not only expected to 
keep safety of funds, foremost but it is also expeoted to earn the maximum possible 
to 
interest on invesi^nt with a view to reduce the cost of insurance an(y serve the 
poli<^olders. It may be pointed out here that the degree of elasticity and flexibi-
lity of the investment policy pursued Igr the insurers of a country is an indioati<8i 
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of their aoxiety to serve policyholders and is a measure of their success in this 
respect. Hew ccMablaations of security and profitability represented tgr different 
types of invest laects have to be chosen trom tii&e tA tine* fudged from this stand 
point L.Z.C. did not earn mioh credit* It is true that the Corporation has earned 
1 
adequate yield in the sense that the net rate of interest of 3*4 per cent (eaoLuding 
reftoid of inoonstax earned Igr L.I.C. is hi^r than the assuided rate of interest 
of jj|r per cent in the computatitm of premium rates. SlmU-arly, as against the 
estisated profit of Its 6 per thousand cantemplated in the present structure of 
premium rates^  the M.G was giving a bontis of Rs 14 per thousand. Bat L.Z.C. should 
not mortgage the policyholders future in this manner. This is mainly because the 
rise in actual income ia entirely duo to the increasing rate of interest adopted 
to control inflationazy conditions in the economy. Hovevert the margin of eaming 
that is the difference isetveen the assumed rate of interest and a ctual rate of 2 
intez«et earned ty li.I.C. has not improved significantly in spite of the rise in 
intes^ st rates. This is shown in Fig. 25. 
The 'margin of earning is in fact a sound criteria of the iniiBStment policy 
of an insurer. It will be obseiiived froaa; Fig. ZB that there had boen no significant 
improvement after the nationalisatioa of life insurance in this margin. Before the 
nationalisaticm the policy holders Interest has suffered because of the unenterprising 
policy of their insurers} things have not materially clianged after the nationalisa-
tion of life insurance. Furthermore* a life insurance is a long-term contract and 
in a developing econoBQr due to inflationazy methods of economic devslopment* the t 
policyholder is often at a loss in taking such a long-term of contract. It was 
essential for the corporation to protect this interest of the policyholders. It 
was also Importoat for the copporatlcn to oonqpensate for increasing cost involved 
in spreading insurance much more widely and oheaply.iri virgin rural areas. 
1. The net yield including refund of income tax amounted to 4.08 per cent* 
2. The difference between assumed and actual rate earned shown In Fig. 25 is based 
on the rate assumed by the largest number of Insurers in that particular year» 
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In U.K. and Canadaf for inatande> the inaurers have invested signlfioant 
amoTinta In equities in order to hed^ the inoreaaing administrative coat against 
inflation. It ia also important to note that one of the reasons for the rapid 
growth of life insurance in tbsse oountries in the post-war period is the rationali-
sation of the investment policy with a view to provide a degree of economic and 
1 
social protection to the policyholders. 
The adaptation of the investment policy to meet the changing expectation of the 
policyholders ia of oonsiderable importance for L.I.O. becauae life tosurenee ia 
taken in India both as a method of protection aa well da a media of saving. 
Pailtire of L.I.C. to provide the 'real social' protection and lack of proviaion of 
aufficient financial inducement to the income motivated saver haa been the main I 
cause of the alow growth of life insurance savings in India. 
Lack of Support to the Develop-
ment of Hew Ei^ terpriaeai 
It waa pointed out in Chapter 1M 1-; that L.I.C. facilitated the gro\rth of new 
entezprisea only indirectly through underwriting of sharea and through seoondazy 
Financial Institutions and that too only to a limited extent. Its direct participa-
tion in the sbax^ s and debentures of new ccnapanies is very insignifioant in relaticm 
to its total investraant in shares and debentures. For exaaqple out of Ra 7.04 crorea 
invested in 19S9 in shares and debentures, Rs 4.81 crorea i.e. 68.5 per cent waa in 
shares already in the market. Only ?« 17.15 lakh i.e. 2.4 per cent was Invested in 
the shares and debentures of newly floated companies while a little over 29 per cent 
was invested in the shares and debentures floated by eiisting companies. Thua the 
purchase of shares which are already in the market can hardly serve the purpose of 
aiding the development of new induatriea or expansion of eiiating onea. Such 
inveatment normally go to the benefit of the persona who are already possessing 
1. i)ay,jr.Qi Development of Investment Policy During the last decadey 
Op.Cit, p 127. 
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suoh shares rory Xiksly for aepeoulation. In otbsr it is aeserbed that 
L.I.C. has made little attesq^ t to provide equity capital to nev industries «ad to 
aUsTiate the position et mv firm* Thie assertion against L.X.C. ffiost te exemiiied 
in the context of the lessnle^loped Mmoay, the tTpe of finenoial risk tiHoh suoh 
an econoagr presents and the basio Hmitatioa of L.I.C. in assusdng the risk of 
eoonooio develo];»aent« 
Primarily it should be recognised that issomiee enterprise itself oannot 
initiate the proeess of growth. Its investment depends upon the availability of 
suitable securities* It is equally iiaportent to remember that in the early st^s 
of economic developa^ nt eofporation finanoe is a risky investment vhioh L.X.C. 
as tl» custodian of policyholder's funds can hardly assume. Moreover the risk of 
investirant in new enterprise is far greater than the ability of L.I.C, to assume 
such a risk. 
"This is due to tis9 faet that in ccmteriog nev and lumsual ventures# this 
type of investment confront a difficult problem of discovering and evaluating 
promote. It is a difficult enough Job to assess the earnings prospects 
of estalilished companies or products; it is far more difficult to judge the 
profitability of ventures yet unborn." (2) 
this obviously restricts the L.I.O. to invest in new ventures. But at the 
same time L.I.C. can not keep itself aloof from the process of growth. In its 
broader trusteeship duties it has to underwrite the process of growth in a manner 
c<aisi8tent with safety of foods. In advanced economies* insurers have overcome 
this inconpatability between their obligation towards the poli<^oldere and in 
the discharge of their broader trusteeship.duties through intensive and extensive 
research programmes, the development of 'Direct ISegotiations' in U.S.A., 
1. Estimates Committee» p. 43* 
2. International Industrial Development Centre! Private United States Venture 
Capital for Investment in New Developing Countries - Investmiwit Series, 2 
Stanford Research Ihstitufce, California^  1958, p 9* 
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Cai&ada and end Xnduatrial Iioans in Jipipen bear testimomr to the faot that 
altiiough life ineuranoe oonqpanies oould not oreate new outlets for funds, the/ 
oouM at least ore«te eljjiate in vhioh life ineuranoe funde oould aid eeonoade 
developamt. I>*I.C. made very limited effort to eaqplore new outlets of investment. 
It has not made any endeavour to improve its investaent administration by appoint-
ing expert investnent or otherwise adopting soimd and rationalised polioies* or 
even to ponder seriously on the matter. In viev of its socio-economic status, 
Xt.I.C. should not have pursued a completely passive and unenterprising policy* 
As the largest saving institutions it could have aided the growth of new and small 
concerns by devising mothods to suit its owti investment requirement. Instead^ 
L.I.G. reduced the entire lnv8s1»Qent operation to a simple routine by investing 
in the Publio Sector on the plea thatt 
"Tbs distinction between the pfuKLie and private sector is, however, losing 
sezie of its validity as the ftmds ad^^ced to the public sector are often 
utilised for the benefit of private sector cbidertakings or private indivi-
duals. For exaiBiplef the Corporation's investments in the various State 
Financial Corporations are utilised ly these institutions for the purpose 
of financing industries in the private sector. Similarly the housing loans 
advanced by the L.I.O. to State Qovemments are used by them for disburse* 
ment to their eB5)loyee8 as well as other pi^ vate persons for constructions 
of houses." (l) 
This is rather a poor criteria of an investswnt policy* The doctrine of 
guardianship of policyholder's interest on the other hand requires that, subject 
to the over-'riding consideration of security of investment« the main object should 
be to obtain the highest possible return. The return from investment in the Fublic 
Sector in decidedly lower than the private sector* 
(iii) ^ ak of Diversificationi 
The incase of the Corporation is derived from policyholders scattered through" 
out the length and breadth of India and it is ozUy proper that the policyholder's 
savings utilised for the economic development of the country as a whole* 
1. Z>. 1.0*0 Chairman's Evidence before the Estimates Committee, Op.Cit*, p 44* 
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Bosidda, for a sound investment policy It is essential that thd investment should 
be geographieally diversified. Buit from the following Table it appears that the 
corporation has failed to attain this objeotive* 
TABLE -79 
REaiONAL DISTRIBOTIOM OP L.I.C'S BTVESTMEaiTS 




in the State Percen-











ing 3 years 
Peroentage 
Andhra 5,84.09 4.17 12,99.81 5.85 7,15.76 8.70 
Assam 1,08.76 0.78 1,86.84 0.84 78.08 0.95 
Bihar 8,57.33 6.12 15,93.81 6.99 6,96.48 8.43 
Delhi 91.83 0.66 1,19.98 0.82 24.15 0.29 
QnSfivat } 




24.40 18,60.36 22.60 
Kerala 1,54.56 1.10 4,73.83 2.13 3,19.27 3.88 
Madhya Pradesh) 3,14.18 2.24 6,24.93 2.81 3,10.39 3.77 
Madras 12,69.29 9.07 18,76.28 8.44 6,06.99 7.37 
Me^ore 9,44.42 3.89 9,67.68 4.35 4,23.26 5.14 
Orissa 2,02.37 1.49 9,01.38 2.26 2,99.01 3.63 
Punjab 93.59 0.67 1,97.82 0.89 1,04.23 1.27 
Rajasthan 63.94 0.46 4,66.14 2.10 4,02.20 4.89 
Uttar Pradesh 14,37.0^ 3 10.26 2944.25 13.24 15,07,22 18.31 
West Bengal 37,74.34 26.96 46,96*11 20.95 8,81.77 10.71 
Jamnu & l^shmir - m 2*90 O.OlX 2«50 0.03 
Total 139,98.45 100.00 222,30.08 100.00 82,31.63 100.00 
Sooroet Xogakshema, Vol. 9 (l96l), fios. 8-9 (August-Seiktember), 
p 96. 
It will be observed from the above Table that nearly one fourth of the total 
investments of the Corporation were in two States> Bonbay (Maharashtra and CHijrat) 
and West Bengal, Madras and Bihar oame next in importance; while Eajasthan, Punjab, 
Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, Delhi and Assam se«ii to hav^ been aej^eoted by the 
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Corporaticm. Though Andhra and Orftasa have reci6ived sonewhat more attention of the 
L.I.O. In recent fmars, this gives an impression that the poli<^ of promoting 
balanoed regional eo<m<N!iic develo|»aent of the country enonioiated the Planning 
Commission has not been followed Scrupulously by the corporation. 
In this o(ameetion» it is important to recognise the basic limitatiixns of L.I.O. 
It should bs appreciatod that X..I.C. has inherited a large part of investment from 
the previoxis insurers, who, having their head office in certain regions, preferred 
1 
investments in those areas. This naturally led to the concentration of invesfaaent 
in certain regions. The new Investments by the corporation cannot at once diffuse 
that concentration* 
Similarly it should be realised that the objective of spread of investments by 
regions is subject to consideration of availability of Investments satisfying the 
requirements of safety of capital and yield. Certain regions in the oountty are 
industrially well developed and offer greater opportunities, for suitable Investment 
than other regions. Thtts the four States of Bombay, Delhi, tfadras and West Bengal 
where L.I.C's investments are mainly concentrated have about fti per cent of the 
total number of Joint Stock Companies and 81 per cent of the paid up capital of all 2 
companies at work in the country as on 31st March, 1958. The combined share of 
West Bengal and Bomlmy in the total number as well as In tbe total paid-up capital 
was much higher than the combined shares of the x>emaining' States. The States of 
West Bengal and Bombay (Mahrashtra and Qkijrat) together accounted top 63 per cent of 
total number end S9 par cent of the total paid-up capital of all oomapnies at work 
as on Slst March, 1958, 
1. logakshema, Tola. 8-9, 1961, Op.Cit, p 56. 
2. HigamjRaj.K and Chaudhuri, N.Ct The Corporate Sector la ladia, 
Op.Citf p 21. 
Moreover the Industrially developed regione where L.I.C'a Inrestments are 
OQncentrated have largely contributed In the total life boelneaB in force. ThJtts 
the enclosed map and the following table shova that at the end of 1999 Western 2k>ne 
(comprising Mahrashtta and Qujrat) vhlch havB oontribated about 41 per cent to 
life insurance in force have dLalmed about 38.87 per oent of L.I.C's Invastmenta; 
Sastcm Zone (which comprises the States of Assam,Blhar« Orlssa and West Bengal) 
have contributed about 84.3 per oent In Business in force while they have claimed 
34 per oent of L.I.C's Stock Exchange investments. Southern Zone (which comprises 
the States of Andhra, Kerala, Madras and Jfysore) have contributed 18.2 per oent in 
Business in force and have claimed 19.74 per cent of Stock fixchange investment. 
Central Zone (comprising Madhya Pradesh end U.P) which have contributed aboQt 
6.4 per cent in L*I.G's business have claimed about 12.60 per oent of investments. 
Northern Zone (eaaprising Punjab and Rajasthan) have oantributed 10,1 per cent in 
business in force could claim cmly 2.79 por oent of investments* 
TABLE 8:0 
ZONAL DISTRIBOTIOB OP LlfE INSORAHCE IK FORCE AND STOCK KXCHAMQE 
IKVBSTMEKT OP L, I. C« 
as on 31st Deo* 1959. 
Zone Ss percentage of 
total l^siness 
in Force, 
As percentage of ' 
total investments 
Bastean 24.3 33.99 
Westezn 41.0 30.87 
Central 6.4 12.61 
fiorthena 10.1 2.79 
Sotthem 18.2 19.74 
Total 100.0 100.0 
SOURGESi 1. L.I.Ct Annual Reports and Accounts 
2. Istimates Committee Report. 
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It la olear from the abo^ aeootmt that L.I«C*8 investnisate are more or leaa^ iiii 
conformity with the busiaeea ia fore© in tho regloaa.Again, praetioal eonsideratione 
do not allow investment in regions in proportion to the premium inoom or net surplus 
funds derived therefrom nor would such considerations allow equal investments in tl» 
different regions.Henee some of the dispari^ is also due to this reason. 
In spite of these limitationsi the Corporation has been and is making serious 
efforts at divereifioation of investments W regions as far as practicable considera-
tions allow. But it has not fialljr succeeded in its mission as the net additions 
made during three years periods in BombeyCHfOirashtra anA ajrat)>^.P. and West Bengal 
is moro than its investments made in other States (See Table 70)* The failure of 
the Corporation to diversifjr its investment geographically is not only dtie to the 
non*avallaMlity of investment outlets in certain regions but also due to the tedb* 
niqus adopted l;or ttas Corporation in spreading its investments. fh9 Corporation used 
Stated GovBWttfflnt secta^ ities for diversif^ ria® its investment in different regions and 
did not exploit local investment opportunities for investment. This is evident from 
the 7al:ae Ko. 81. 
TABI£ NO 81 
PEROENfAOB ADDITION IN STA3S QOVEBnUT SBCORrTXES iUtIO O T ^ SECUaiTIBS IK VmOITS 
s u m BURma I!RB BRIOD 1957.196O 
State Government Approved securities and Shares esd Debenture of 
socuritiesC percen- Municipal securities companies whose works «r 
States tage increase! 4-) or (Percentage increase(+) factorieB ere situated in 
decrease («•) or decrease (-) the Stat«(Percentage 
increase(+)or decrease(>) 
Andhra •255.8 • 30.2 + 38.3 $ 
Assam • 261.8 • 5.S % 
Bihar +213.9 +392.8 • 50.0 5 
Delhi • • 19.2 % 
Bombay •lOS. 4. • 29.2 • 34.4 
Kerala •871.0 • 299.1 • 3.2 % 
Madhya Pradesh •128.0 - 67.4 + 125.1 {5 
IWras • 39,8 • 51.1 • 74.6 % 
Mysore • 81.1 • 44.7 • 80.2 ^  
Orissa •393.0 - 88.7 • U.8 ^ 
Punjab •188.0 • 398.7 • 13.3 % 
Rajasthan •739.4 • 24.8 • 551.0 % 
Uttar Pradesh •127.8 • 203.6 • 9.5 % 
West Bengal • 91.8 • 18.4 • 24.3 % 
Jamma & Kashmir. - -
S0UB(S5f li.I.C. Annual Reports and Aocounts* 
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It will be observed that during the period 19S7 to i960 the peroentage 
iaoreaae in State Cbvemment securities and approved seotirities in the under developed 
States of Orissaf Assam* Bihar, U.P. and Hajasthan is more significant than in 
oorporate seourites. The addition in State Govenu&ent aeourities has been made at 
the cost of almost all forms of Investments. This is also substantiated by the 
foUoidng table. 
fABLB So 8:2 
INDICES OF 0IFFEH1KT CUSS OF INVESTMENTS AS 
PERCaiTAGB TO TOTAL ASSETS 
B^E 1956 * 100 
tear Central State Municpal Corporate Mortgage Land and 
Oovem- Oovem- and other Securities Building 
ment ment approved 
Securities Seeunttee ^curities 
1956 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1957 96.8 108*3 93 .1 108.0 83.3 97.8 
1958 97 .1 1 ^ . 1 100.0 103.1 69 .4 93.6 
1959 93.a IS9.3 94.7 se .9 87.2 
1960 89.0 180.9 89.4 105.1 41.6 87.2 
sotmcBt L.I.C. Annual Reports and Aocotmts. 
The above table gives ti^ie indices of various foxms of L.I.G's investments as 
percentage to total assets with 1956 as Base tear. It will be observed that L.I.C's^ 
in/estments in State Oovemment securities have increased br about 80 per cent at 
the expense of variouo other forms of investments. The decline in Central Qoveiia-
ment securities is vexy nominal ast against the rise in State Government securities* 
In pursuing a 'defensive' investment policy for regi«Mial development not only the 
poli<grholders interest has suffered btit L.I.C. has also not succeeded in its mission* 
The preference of the Corporaticn to invest the growing v<^ume of life fund in 
Oovemment securities aM in established oonoems has resulted into concentration in 
few industries and in few companies* 
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Thus Tal>Le No. 83 <m the fcOloving |>age shows that Bleotrloity, Eaglneering 
Cotton and Iron and Steel todusttioa which are the oldest and most established 
industries of India have eaoh attracted on an average, about one-tenth of the total 
L.I.C. investsidnts in debentures and shares. The total average investoisnt in these 
industries accounted for more than 37 per oent at the end of 1960. Cement* Jute and 
Paper oaii» next in importance with a percentage share of about § per cent* 
investment in vegetable, oil, Railways, Mining, Housing, Chemicols, Plantations, 
Shipping, Transport and Textile (iother than cotton) are almost of a negligible order* 
The miscellaneous group accounts for about <»ie fifth of the total debentures and 
shares.. This concentration of invesetoent is partly due to its inheritance and partly 
due to the conservative investment policy followed L.I.C. Before the nationalisa-
tion of life insurance most of the life offices have invested large amount in more 
1 
or less scuse industzy and even in the saii^  company^  L.I.C. could not diffuse the 
investment because most of companies in whidh investments were tied were the established 
concern which aecounted for signifioant portion of the total capital of all Joint 
Stock Companies in India. For examtfLe CottonJEextile, Iron and Steel, Electric 
Qoods and Eleotrioity supply and £bgineering cosqpanies contributed about 39 per oent 
of the total capital of Joint Stock CaqpAnies and aooounted for more than 22 per 
2 
cent of the total number of Joint Stocdc Companies at work in 1997-58. Cmseq^ntly 
in Cotton Textile the amount of Re 857.36 lakh ±B invested by L.I.C. in 1960 is 
distributed ^ u r^Sng- ' X64 companiesj In Engineering the investment of te 909,84 
lakh is spread in 66 oompanies, in Electricity the investment of Bt 954.70 lakh 
is diversified in 55 companies. Uhlle in Iron and Steel the investment of Bss 767.30 
1. Lok Sabha Debates, Second Series, Vol, XXII, 29th November, 1958. Columns 2160-61 
2. Nigam and Chaudfaori, The Corporate Seotor in India, Op.Cit, p 21. 
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DISBRIBOTKMi OF L.I'.O's INVESTMENT AMONG VAEIOUS IBCfBSTRIES 
1957 1960 Net addition during the 
period 1957 to 1960 Amount Pereen- Amount No. of Peroen-
ladustzy tage of Gompa- tage Amount Pereentage total nles* of iaoreased invest- in total 
ment in the invest-
indus- indus- ment 
tries. try. in 
indus-
tries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Aluaiaiiim ^ 264.75 4 2.9 264.75 tm 
Bei^ 263.22 3.8 296.77 53 3.2 33.65 1.2 
Cdtnent 365.96 9.3 533.87 14 5.8 167.91 45.8 
GoaX m,95 2.8 236.42 39 2.6 44.^ 23.2 
Cotton 690.85 lt).0 857.36 164 9.3 ,166.51 24.2 
078. Gbsoioals 
& Pharmaoeutioals 119.94 1.7 182.57 32 2.0 62.63 52.2 
Eleotrioity 829.21 11.9 994.70 55 10.3 125.« 15.1 
Eleetrlo goods • 306.33 21 3.3 306.33 
Engineetlng 714.21 10.3 909.84 66 9.9 195.63 27.3 
Food^ Dxlnk & 
Tobaooo. m 80.53 16 0.9 80.53 
Inatirance 135.62 2.0 259.83 38 2.8 124.21 91.8 
lAvaatiaent 
Trusts 50.42 0.7 184.83 25 2.0 134.41 266.6 
Iron & Stool 548.40 7.9 767.30 2 8.3 218.90 39.9 
JTuto 414.63 5.9 431.64 56 4.7 17.01 4.1 
Itan^ ging Agents 168.44 2.4 177.fO 8 21 2.0 8.64 5.1 
Matohes • - 57.97 3 0.6 57.97 « 
Minftng 33.65 0.4 63.66 7 0.7 30.01 89.8 
Minoxal Oil - - 749.24 5 8.1 749.24 
Paper & Boards 309.00 4.5 409.05 17 4.5 100.05 32.8 
Plantation 133.52 1.9 2^.32 147 2.2 64.80 47.8 
BaHuays 70.58 1.0 65.89 18 0.7 - 4.69 - 6.6 
Rubber Produots « • 216.21 7 2.4 216.21 • 
Shipping and 
Transport 121.39 1.8 96.30 16 1.1 -25.09 -20.4 
Sugar and 
Brevaries 142.55 2.1 289.66 64 3.2 147.11 103.2 
Textile other 
than Oottos 89.34 1.2 192.31 6 2.1 102.97 115.2 
Vegetables Oil 33.22 0.5 65.74 15 0.7 32.82 98.5 
Gooperatiye 29.61 0.43 23.60 4 0.3 - 6.01 -20.3 
Miscellaneous 1456.18 21.6 331.14 115 3.6 -1125.04 -77.3 
Total 6913.77 100 9204.91 1031 100 2291.14 
SOORCEi L. L G< B ANNUAL REPORTS MO ACCOUNTS. 
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lakh is concentrated <mlj in two ooopanies (8«e ooluon 4 and 6 of the table BZjI. 
The oonoentration of L.I.C's investioents In certain Industries is also due to its 
orthodox investment policy. Thus the Reserve Bsuak Sflrvey of ownership of sharetr in 
Joint Stock Companies as at the end of December 1999, shows that in 96 old established 
companies L.I.G's holdings are about 6.26 per cent of the total value of the shares 
issued hy those companies* As against this t,XcG*s investssnts in 14 new con^ anies 
is only 1.24 per cent of the total value of the shares issued by these companies. 
The same survey also reveals that in the coal. Rubber* Electricity end Cement I<.X.G*s 
1 
holdings varies from 8 per cent to 15 per cent. A holding of more than 6 per cent 
by L.X.C. in one eonqaany is considered to be carrying sufficient weight against the 
*imorganised number of individuals. In view of the nationalised status of L.I«C. 
su(^ concentration of holdings in established concems created suspicion which is 
detciminental to tho growth of private enterprise in India, From Ipureoyaa invest-
ment point of view also ths concentration of investment is undesirattLe. But this is 
inevitable because the ntimber of established concern is limited in India end they 
are located| due to natural factors, in some regions. It is clear therefore that 
unless L.I.G. follows a more dynamic and enterprising investment poiicy to aid the 
growth of new concem in India it can not have a balanced and diversified |fortfolio 
structure. Methods to diversify the investment through intensive and extensive 
Research have to be devised to help the growth of new Tooncemj. in different parfes 
of the country. Such an investment policy will bring on the whole, a better return 
for the policyholders and will also encourage the flow of capital in different 
regions. 
1* iftJitQ*^  inTftfflfqeR^  m Social Advancement: 
Investment for Social Advencem«at is considered to be an important investment 
objective of L.I.C. to implement this the corporation selected the fdiitocing of 
u 
1. Reserve Bank of India Bmietin|May,1962.(The share of L.I.C. is given with other 
institutionsjtin that survey.But as pointed in Chapter V the share of other insti-
tutions is very insignificant in relation to L.I.C.The survey,therefore,roughly 
indicates L.I.C's position in various companies and in varioixs industries. 
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housing aohenes bsoause investment In Real Estate adequately meets the Investment 
requirements of L.X.C, Moreover^ housing is one of the most important soeial problems 
vhioh the country is faoing today. An idea of the gravity of the problem oan be had 
from the faot that as against the annual inorease of 4 per cent in the urban popular-
tion new houses have been oonstruoted only at the Rate of 2*5 per oent during the 
two Plens* The number of cities with a population of 1,00,000 or more has inore^ sed 
from 75 1951 to 115 in 1961 and their populaticai now forme about 43 per oent of 
1 
total urban populaticm. 
^ close up of the situatioi^  in Bombay reveals the faot that while the population 
during the last 17 years has finoreased by 200 per oent, the increase in the number of 
properties is only 17 per oent. Similarly a recent survey in Ahmadabad has shown 
that 43 per cent of the population havo normal habitation, 32 per oent live in over 
crowded hodses,while the rest live in huts hardly fit for human habitation. The 2 
conditions in other cities are more or less similar. 
The rapid increase in urban population has not only resulted in the oreati<ai 
of slum areas in the eities with grave economic and .social consequences but it has 
also created serious residential problems for the middle olass as the people of this 
income group mostly live in rented home in urban areas. The Urban Saving Survey 
for instance shows that 40per oent of the families in urban areas live in their own 
51% 3 
housee^ /in rented accommodation and the rest in rent free. Those litring in rental 
4 
housing are paying high rents. The high rents heavily tax the budget of Income-
earner which affeots his efficien<gr, undermine his earning capacity and saving 
1. The Third Five Tear Plan, p 689. 
2. Report of a Seminar Organised by the Indian Institute of Public Administration 
Bombay Regional Branbht Problems of Urban HousingjP<0pular Book Dept, Bombay,7 
Foreword, p HI. 
3. National Council of Api^ ied Economic Research: Urban Incoii» and Saving, 
Hew Delhi, 1962, p 110, 
4. National Council of Applied Economic Researoh; Delhi Saving Survey, Op. olt,p. 38* 
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ability. Thus tl» Delhi Saving Survey indicates that one of the important cause of 
the small middle class saving is due to hi^ rent and hig^ transport charges which 
the pe<^ le of this incase group are forced to pay for joining their offices from 
distance places. The sajall amount of saving, especially from middle class, in turn 
is responsible for many cobwebs in the planned and rapid economic development of the 
country/ 
Again, the rising urban land values due to industrialisation and urbanisation 
of the country is becoming an important cause for the xmequal distributicsn of wealth 
which is running ccaitrary to the basic objective of the Socialist pattern of society* 
It was therefore considered important that L.l.C's investmimt in housing would not 
only help in the solution of one of the most important social problems bat it would 
also help the implementation of the policy of Regional development and diversification 
of Investment. Invsstnient ia hcsuaing is beneficial to the growth of life insurance 
savings cause B it relieves the middle olase population from the pressure of pay-
ing hi^ rents. The sur^ u^s on this account can be mobilised by the corporation. 
Thus to help the solution of tho housing problems the corporation adopted the 
following schemes of housing development in the countiy. 
1 
1. Scheme for ^ jrant of Loans on mortgage of prop rty. 
2. Staff Cooperative Bousing Scheme. 
3. Scheme for Orant of lioana bo policyholders for construction of houses. 
4. Financing of State Housing Schemes. 
5. The Corporation has also schemes for grant of loans to (a) Apex Cooperative 
Housing Finance Societies (b) Public Limited Conqmies for the purpose of 
Housing schemee for their employees end (c) Housing Cooperative of en^ iloysee 
of Public Limited Ooo^ anies for eonstruoti<m of houses. 
From the commencement of these schemes within the last two years, the total 
housing loans sanctioned tay the corporation amounted to Rs S3.0S crores. These 
loans have not yet been fully utilised Igr the agencies which received them. Accord-
f 
ing to information available the State Goveiaments have so far sanctioned loans for 
the construction of 3,859 middle class houses and 4,238 State employees' houses. 
1. For details of these schems see togakshema, 1961, Vols 8-9, pp 60-62. 
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The Cooperative Houeing Finance Societies and other institutions have disbaraed loans 
for the oonstrttotlon of 2,705 houses and the corporation itself has constructed 264 
quarters in India besides semctionittg loans to its eiiq[>l07eee cooperatives for build-
ing 116 houses. The number of houses for whose construction or completion mortgage 
loans have been sanctioned is 95. Thus, ttm total number of houses constructed or 
under eoQstraeticu in the country with the aid of L.I.C. funds Is 11,36?. The 
Corporaticai has also indirectly helped the relief of housing shorti^ ge by pushing up 
or completing office buildings worth Rs 3.91 crores, during the last five years. 
Considering the acute shortage of houses it can be concluded from the above 
analysis that the Corporations' investments with regard to housing finance are still 
in the formative stage. Many defects have also crept in during this time. In the 
first instance the coloration has placed much reliance on the outside agency which 
is inefficient and weak. The fact that tim total amount of Rs 23.05 croros sanctioned 
by the cor^ration to the various State Schemes remained unutilised reflects adminis-
trative weakness of the scheme. Either there was no demand for these loans or the 
procedure was so complicated and the administrative machinery was so slow that it 
could not make timely disbursements of the loans. Whatever might be the reason its 
incidence must have fallen on the corporation for it: could not in/est the earmarked 
funds in any o her pernanent assets. 
Similarly the so called policj^ olders loan schemes which the Corporation has so 
ambitiously drawn is not likely to gain any popularity. Undoubtedly, frtan the 
investment point of view the scheme is quite sound as it guarantees adequate return 
with safety of capital. But from the realistic point of view the scheme will not 
gain much popularity since for the middle class for when the scheme has been prepared. 
1. In this connection the Chairman of the L.I.C. pointed out that the main cause 
is the shortage of materials and not of finance (Indian Express, New Delhi 
(Edition), February 1, I960. This again underlines the lack of coordination in 
our planning in which the financial aspect of housing is partially tackled but 
that of raw materials like Cement and Steel is liistt neglected* 
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it l8 not only the problem of finances for the construction of houses fcwt also the 
problem of time, superrLsion, building material, technical knowledge and skill* 
Host of the people could not spare time from the empl<^ ]rment for the collection of 
housing material and to supervise the construction of houses. It was essential, 
therefore, on tfas part of L.I.C, to look to these basic '^ requirements of the middle 
class population on whose prosperity it thrives* To a certain extent L.I.G's 
reluctance to take the Initiative and to assume the risk of direct financing is 
understandable, the corporation had the painful experience of inheriting large 
numbers of unsatisfactozy mortgages from various insurers, under the circumstances 
it can not but be extremely circumspect in granting loans. To my mind this very 
experience of L.I.C. should have prompted it to Mnance directly in housing instead 
of choosing the defensive policy. In the absence of sound mortgage market, the 
* defensive investment* policy is not always 'safe*. In the case of the foreclosure 
of the property, the corporation acqiiires the ItotUe under the most unfavourable 
circumstances under which ^it could ncH^  disposed it off* The management problem of 
associated with the Real Estate often discourage the insurer to adopt this method of 
finance* In my opinion the basis for judging any inv^ stnnnt should be its ability to 
meet the criteria of safety, yield and liquidty and not whether responsibility of at 
management is Involved. Since investoent in real estate satisfies aU the characteris-
tic's of sound investment) management problem alone should not be allowed to play the 
decisive role* Some of the problems involved in real estate management such as 
rent fixation and realisation; allotment and evioti<m of the tenants could be solved 
throu|^ the association of employers and institutions* The organisation of a fully 
equipped building depart^nt could manage various L.I.C. Housing projects* The 
con^ jetence of this department will uiiimately Justify the investment in real estate. 
Moreover, as explained earlier, the management of the foreclosed property in fact, 
is hor© difficult and unfavourable to the corporation than the construction of the 
building for the exclusive purpose to rent it. In the former case the corporation 
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has no eontrol over the looation, arrangement, standard of construction and selection 
of material. The corporation finds difficulties in letting the mortgaged building 
at a reasonable rent and still more difficult is to obtain en adequate value on sale* 
In case of direct inirestmsnt on the other hand| the corporation exercises its own 
disoretiOT in the selection of material and planning of the building* It is oompara-
ti'/sly easier for the eoipor&tien to realise a suitable ront or to dispose off the 
property at a fair price. It is surprising, therefore, that despite the social needs 
of 'housing' and its ability to 'match' insurers liability, this form of tnvostiwnt 
has not recei^d due ocnsideration »t fhe hands of li.I.C. 
It can, therefore> be concluded that in the absence of sound mortgage market 
and also due to the financial veakness of the municipalties and cooperative societies 
it will not be a 'safe course* for I^ .I.G. to follow traditional methods to finance 
housing development. Similarly financing throu^ the State Housing Scheme and throu^* 
indirect methods can not be an effeotive media for the early solution of the housing 
problem in the country. In the interest of its policyholders as well as for its own 
future growth the corporation had to take direct financing on the one hand and on the 
other hand it had to finance the development of anoiUaxy industries pznoduoing build-
ing material. tJnless the corporation undertakes both the functions together, its 
role will be seriously circumscribed in providing (belter to its constituents and 
relieving them fr(MB the burden of exeessive rents. 
V Constitution' and Working o^ 
the Investment Committee» 
According to section 19(2), the corporation has an investment committee which 
should not consist of more than seven members of whom not less than three shall be 
members of the corporation and the remaining members shall be persons (whether members 
of the corporation or not) who have special knowledge and ejqfwrienee in financial 
matters, particularly, matters relating to investment of funds* 
At present, eacatading; the Chairman of L,I.C. three members are from Bombay 
and one each from Calcutta, Delhi and Madras, ^he Investment Committee has not only 
1, Estimate Committee, Op.Cit, p. 44* 
has 
Inadequate representation of various aones bat also/no representation of the in^rtant 
Finanoial Institutions such as the Reserve Bank of India and Industrial Finance 
Corporation. The association of tbese agencies would have enabled the corporation 
to closely follow the ^ Public Policy' which is formulated ly the Mooetaiy authority. 
Besides the day to day working of the Investment Goonittee has also shown that 
its operations are based largely on the prodigious accumulation of detailed informa-
tion regardless of their pertinency* Before advising on investments the Ciommittee 
took into account the financial records of the various craapanies. For this purpose, 
the office of the corporation prepared background notes, including financial analysis 
with regard to new venturev where the adivce of the Investment Committee was required 
on specified investments. Besides there were also large numbers of last moment 
*offers* received from various stock exchanges* These offers are placed before the 
Investment Committee without assaying their investment value, fhe need for adopting 
such a course was that those were *time-limit orders', they were made on certain 
conditions and were open to specified time. According to the Chairman of )itbe L.I.C* 
the above procedure was essential because if the corporation restricted its investment 
to tin@ limit orders and ignored last hour transaeti<ms, most of its funds mi|^t 
1 
have remained idle* 
It is clear from the above account that ttos investment operation of L.I.C is 
based on chance and it is lucky if it avoids early failure. It is true that the 
borrowers and markets in our developing eoexnomy' are restless creatures, and the 
temptation to act quickly lest the oj^rtunity is lost &ften an irresistible one. 
To overcome this {Atfall, investment management should anticipate demand^  maintcdn 
readily x usable files of investment infoi>mati<m, and tcUcs immediate steps to catch 
the market and escplore new areas carefully. In this respect only the corporation 
has failed to investigate the investment opportunities but on numerous occasions it 
has acted on outside information without analysing the investment values of the 
1. Estimates Committee, Op.Cit, p 4S. 
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socuritios. Tha policioa and procedure actually adopted ly the corporation for 
investing its funds were contrary to recognised business principles^ against gii 
canons of sound invostnent and weighted heavily in favour of outside interests to the 
.detrimentof the interests of the policyholders. Interested parties, who wanted to 
get rid of their investments at hiifti priws, could mislead the corporation iDy raising 
of 1 
false alarms rogEirding the collapse/the stock market. Ths fact ie elearly ehow fey 
Justioe Ghagla in his report when observes i 
"Ashling that ths transaction was entered into not to releve Mundhra of 
his financial difficulties bat to stabilise the martet and remove the drag 
on it as suggested by Mr. Patel^ even so ths Investment has been made from 
extraneous purpose and not solely in ths interest of the polioj^olders. 
Xt is obligatoxy upon the corporation to consider evezy investment on its 
own merits and to decide ^ ther it^ is sound and prudent investment. It 
is only when government has issued a directive in writing under Section 21 
that it would be incumbent upon «iB oorporaticm to cany out that directive, 
even though in its opinion the investment may not be a sound one from the 
point of view of the yield whioh it might give or the security of the 
capital" . ( a ) 
Xhs most iiBfortunate aspect in the instance quoted by Justice Chagla was that 
an institution which was investing about Bs 10 lakh per d ^ relied on outside inf oxtaa4-
tion without Investigating the facte. As the largest investor of the country it was 
necessary that the corporation should have made proper research of the various 
investment out-lets end even forecast |$future investment trends. Instead of providing 
lead to other investors it tes been led by outside interests.' M6reover> the carzying 
out of an active and successful investment programmes requires that the investB^nt 
committee of the corporation should confer upon the investment manager a reasonable 
amount of latitude in making purchases of approved investments. But the corporation 
has rigidly fixed this limit by preecribing a limit i^dh bears no reasonable pro-
portim to the amount invested. 
1. Lok Sabha Debates, Td. XX, Ho, 8, 19th Februaxy, 1958, Columns 1^4-16^. 
2. Ibid, P. 16. 
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Thus aoeordlng to the approved rules azid procedures under inetruotions from the 
Chairman the Oireotor of Investments oould make between two sueoesslve meetings of 
tha Investment Committee» investments up-to a melimom limit of fis SO laldis ^ n respeot 
of dovexnment and approved seourities, Hs 5 Xakhs in respeot of debentures and Us 5 
lakhs in respeot of ordinary and preference shares together, provided that investment 
in no single soript was of a size larger than Rs 2.3 lakhs in the oase of debentures 
and Rs 1 lakh in the case of preference and ordinazy shares* The Executive Director 
(Investment) was also given standing authorit;^ - to maiso, under instructions from the 
Chairman, investments in forei^ ^ countries to the extent of Bs 23 lakhs in the aggregate 
in between two suecessive meetings of the committee, subject to oertain conditions* 
In ordor to prevent the time of the Investment committee being taken up in considering 
trifling offers, individual offers received for consideration by the Investment 
Committee involving an investment of He 50,000 or more were considered Igr the Committee 
while those less than Rs ^ ,000 were disposed of V the Ebcocutive Director (IDavestment) 
under instructions from the Chairman* If a compan^ r issued suitable shares and there 
was a time liml.t for appljiring for those shares and the Investment Committee was due 
to meet only efter seven or ten days, the local members of the Committee were informally 
consulted on phone and investments were made irrespective of the amount involved in 
anticipation of its advice. Thereafter, the matter was put vep to the Committee for 
ratification. It is clear that the powers of the Executive have been unnecessarily 
circioiseribed. The Investment Committee which occasionally holds its meetings, has 
neither the time nor the ability to choose the investcent outlets* lii a developing 
economy the selection, and aoquisitlon of investment is hlgfhly technical and dynamic 
funoti<m which should be entrusted to an^ Exeoutire bocSy consisting of experts* The 
Investment Committee should formulate broad framework of a policy for the guidance 
of the Executive. It should also review the investment policy from time to time and 
appoint the brokers and exercise fall control over the Executive but it should not 
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take over the fonotion of selection of seourities. 
Fiirther, the corporation has maintained tmusually and unneoeesax^ cash balanoea 
iA oarrent aooooats in the last months of the year. This has resulted in loss of 
interest to the policQrholders. The fallowing table i^ eveals the cash position of 
Ii*I*C. in December eaoh year* 
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SOtmcaS; Estimate Oomndtee, p 33. 
The reason for maintaining such huge cash balances was due to a large number of 
proposals which were introduced in the last month of the year when nearly Rs 5 crores 
were collected as pr^mia. £»an on this aecount the amount maiAtained by the Corpora-
tion is qxiite excessive as compared with its needs. This is evident frodt the faot 
that during the period Ist September, 19S6 tOvSlfrt December 1959, the investments of 
the corporation amounted to Us 108 orores. During the year 19^, tlwse amounted to 
Rs 35 crores. On an arerage the amount required for investments every month would 
come to about Rs 3 orores. As the table en the next page jjadicates, the average 
m<mthly balance during the first three racsithe of i960 was about Rs 3.5 orores after 
meeting all expenses other than amount required for investments. If this pattern 
persisted in earlier mmths, as ia likely, it wotiLd appear that the monthly surplus 
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SOORCEt Sstltaate Cooaittes, p 34. 
funds would have been adequate for investments. The large balances, therefore. In 
current aoeounts at the end of the year, as indioated in Table 85 oould, have been 
invested gainfully in call deposits. 
General Api>rai6ali 
Thus the investment polioy of L.I.C. during the period of five years reveals 
that the corporation has failed to achieve the much avowed objective of natioaalisa-
ti<ai of life insurance. It is true that this is a short period to Judge the useful-
ness of the polioy, 3ret there is no dei^ ring the fact that a store dynamic approach on 
the part of LjI.C. towards different avenues of investnent was urgently called for. 
Of late, sevaral suggestiraas have been made to evolve a more satisfactory investment 
policgr for the corporation bat the following suggestions are worth nwntionlngi 
An observer who seems to be perturbed by the continuing increase of Qovemment 
securities in the portfolio structure of the L.I.C. has pointed outi 
''It is only logical that when prAvate companies, which had been asked to 
invest & certain ndnimuia in'Qovexzoasnt aeouriteos with a view to ensuing 
safety of funds and preventing mis-adventure, are replaced by a State-
ouned ooxporation, a maximum limit for investment in such securities is called 
for." (1) 
This suggestion Ignores the basic differmce in the nature and characteristic 
of Qovexnment securities and corporate securities in relation to the investment 
1. Artha Vignana, Sept., 1959, p 210, Quoted in the Indian Journal of Commerce, 
June-September, 1961, Vol. XI? (Part II and III, No. 50), p 8S. 
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requirements of t.I.G. It nay be reoalled here that the legal restrlotione Imposed 
on the corporate securities was not €«i account of any fear of the flow of life fund 
in the private sector bat due to the risligr nature of such securities. In Contrast 
to private obligations Qovenuaent securities are eomparatively safe. Thus any 
attempt to prescribe lioit on the lnvo8tBS)nt of L.I.O*s funds in Government securities 
will add more rigidity in L.I.C's investnrents without benefiting the polioyholdsrs• 
What is Important is to bear in mind that as an autoaomous body the corporation should 
adopt an intelligent and dynamic Investment policy. 
Sh^ ^ other proposal, which is on the other extreme* has been made by the Estimate 
1 
Committee appointed ty the Lok SaMia. This Committee has suggested that the corpora-
tion should be relieved of the duties of Investment and the function of Investment 
should be entrusted to an Investment Board to be constituted by the Government. 
This would enable the corporation to concentrate on procuring insurance business and 
rendering service to tla policyholders. Further, it would elj^ minate the chances of 
speculative dea!.ings end consequent allegations and aspersions which are liisely to 
undeznine the prestige of the corporation. Not only this, the various requirements 
of diversifications, development, social advancement and furtherance of the interest 
of the eommmity as a whole wotild be better served by the suggested Statutoiy Invest-
ment Board. The genesis of the recommendation has boon given in ths following wordss 
"The Committee feel that it would be in the interest of the country and the 
Plan programme for tha Government itself to talce over the entire investlble 
funds of the L.I.C. as an unfunded debt. The interest payable t^ Government 
could be pre-detemined periodically in consultaticA with the corporation to 
give an adequate return to meet the corporation's liabilitio<). It should not 
be difficult for the government to pay an interest d 3 per cent deemed to be 
sufficient by the Chairmn, Ii.I.O. or for a matter of that even something 
more. Such an arrangen^nt would provide in the third Five Xear Plan period an 
estimated amount of Ra 135 orores in addition to a sum of Ra 315 crores 
approximately wbiidi could be utilised by government to the beet advantage 
for the development plane, '•he various roquiremonts of diversification, 
develo|8aent, social advancement and furtherance of the Interests of the ccomunity 
as a whole could be better served by government with the help of the funds 
provided by L.I.C. for the Plan than could be done by the Corporation Itself. 
Govomment could likewise provide ftnads for the devolopmcnt of now Industries 
1. Ibid, pp 54>96. 
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expansion of ezieting ones oontengjlated evidently for the private sector 
mder the Plan. Sadi investment could l» oada through other financing • 
agencies in the Public Sector, taking Into account the size of investments 
made btjr the L.I.O* for this purpose in the past and the allocation in the Plan." 
the r©o<»Bondation9 of the committee to divest L.I4C. from the resptosibility 
of investment is based on the misconception of life i^ Jsorance and also of the 
vfi'bng'nbtion'Ofitfhe^ f^inanbial-requirements of the country. 
Thus the suggestions of the Batimatos Committee that tiie sale and service aspect 
of the corporation could be improved if it is divested of the worries of Investment 
is based upon an inadequate knowledge of ths principles of life insurtmce. Invest^  
ment decisions in life insurance investment are based on the (me hand on the acc\izaalai» 
tioa of life fimd cmd cai the other hand on the changing conditicais of the Investment 
ffi?irlset. Th© Inflow and outflow of funds require coordinated action. The pattern as 
suggested ly the Estimate Committee ap]^ ars to be confusing in view of the consequent 
increase in *eash hoards* at various levels, ^ e remark of the Chairman of L.I.G, 
9 
®to get rid of the bother of looking after investment^ obviously is not in the 
interest of policyholders." 
1. Ibid, p 56. 
2* It may l» pointed out here that the government could not treat the life 
fund of m the same basis as the aoomBiLated funds uader Social aecurity 
scheme, sudh as Bmjiloyees State Insurajice Corporation, there are nuaeroiw 
differences in the aecmtultttion of ftinds xmder the two schemes. Hr^  case 
of L.I.O. the ability to aecuTsulate funds depends m the one hand up on the 
continuance of preaiume incoines anci the interest on funds already held, and 
on the other upcn the nature of the risks involved, some of whioh are not 
foreseeable. In national Insurance, the ability to accumLata funds techni-
cally depends up^ the same factor^ f^ iKit one particular source of income, 
the Exchquer's contribution ss of special nature which depends upoji the 
Government's Policy, Obviously in such a circumstance the Oovemment can 
exercise greater control on the funds of the Social Geourity than on L.I.O. 
funds. t.ife fund aoetinralated by I».I.O, oan not be taken over by the <iovex»-
ment on 'aoral.' ground as it cantributea nothing towards these funds. 
(For other difference b0tw«sen National aaid Priv.it® Insw.mce , See Peacock, 
Alan ?t The Boonoraioa of National Insurance, Villiam Hod^ and Company Ltd, 
London, 19S2, pp 41-SO,) 
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SeoondljTy the suggeetion of the Estitoates Conunittee is not even in oonfdrmity witl 
the eoonofflic Tequirements of tliffi ooimtry. There is a basic aiseoneeption in the 
proposal of the oommittee that the entire addition to the life funds should be 
treated as a loan to go-vemnont. The estimates committee seems to oonsider that 
onljf those funds, which are directly spent fcgr gOTemment* serve the Plan purpose, 
mad not other funds which are invested hgr the L.I.C. directly in productive ventures* 
In India under orders of CapStcQ. Control Issue» industries are allowed to raise 
capital according to the Plan programme. L.I.C^s subscription in such shares should 
be regarded as investment for financing the plan. Besides in the *mi]»d econcm^* 
of India, private sector has a important place and its development wiU also depend 
in case of 'effective moblLisatian of sav:big' on the resources protided bgr L.I.C. 
does 
If the life fund t/o not flow into capital formation in the private sector whether in 
» 
the form of 'equities' or loans', a source for l>he corresponding resources must be 
provided for its developm^t. The committee seems to be aware of the implication of 
their recommendation and have therefore sug^sted that the government themselves may 
provide fluids for the development of new industries or expansion of the existing ones 
in the private sector through other financing agencies in the public sector taking 
into account the size of the investoent made by the L.I. C. for this purpose in the 
past and the allocations in the Plan. This means that after having taken over the 
funds of the li.I.C, Qovemment should make the investment in appropriate industries 
in the private sector. What I fail to understand is that if direct investments in 
stocks and shares by the L.I.C. lead to allegations and aspersions and also to 
speculation, how tl» other financing agencies or the results of the decisions of 
these agencies wiU be immune from themi 
The decision of the Committee will simply mean 'robbing Peter to pay Paul* 
in as much as the policyholders toterest is concemed. The primary conceru in the 
investment of^fe fund as pointed out earlier should be to safeguard and promote the 
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Interest of the polioyholders. The Inveatawnt mast, therefore, be made with a view 
to their safety, eoimdness and profitability and larger returns and benefits to the 
polioyholders in the form of bonus etc. The yield of the investment in the private 
eeotor is higher, and it is not fair to deny this benefit to the polit^ holders. The 
view that it is enough if government take over the entire funds and pay the ninimam 
rate of interest that would enable the coiporation to meet its liabilties is not 
justified. It is basically toafair to ther. - withe profit policyholders, because it 
denies then the benefit of rising yields from Investn^ts In equities in an e^ qpanding 
econonQT* 
Rightly, therefore, the government had not aceeded to the above recomnendation s 
of the Estimates Gomaittee, on the gromd that the proposal of the Committee wou3,d 
aake the corporation * static* and would mortgage the policyholders' future by keeping 
donw the bonuses. In fact the problem of the investment of life fund can not be 
solved either by imposing additional curbs <m their 'nattUsal flow' nor fcgr divesting 
the corporation of its legitimate function. The investment of the life fund is the 
Integral and essential part of the modem life insurance bosiness. It is only the 
corporation as the «seller of security" that can determine the rate of the accumula-
tion Of fund and can plan the outflow of funds in the different sectors of the economy. 
What is Hqportant ist 
"L.I.G. should be on its toes with regard to Invest^nts, servicing and 
everything else. Let it answer fully for everything. If it fails, it should 
be consured. But merely taking away duties from it may not necessarily help 
to improve its efficiency." (l) 
It is clear, therefore, that taking over the function of investment from the 
L.I.C. will, not solve the problem of the investment of life fund. In fact the 
corporation has on the one hand to rationalise its Investment policy with a view to 
stset its obligations of the policyholders and on the other hand to finance the 
requirements of an expondlag eoonoqy* 
1. Evidence of the Bepresentative of Finance before the Estimates Committee, 
Quoted in the Report, C^.Cit, p 59. 
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Conelttslont 
^e main obsertratlons as regards the investment policy of L,I.C. can be aummariied 
as follows} 
It has been noted that the govemoent securities still dominate the portfolio 
structure of l.I.C, In fact the ratio of government securities to total assets has 
considerably increased after nationalisation* %is increase is partly due to 
increasing yield on government securities and partly due to the * passive investment 
policy foUoved by L.I.C. In pursuing such a policy the coloration has no doubt 
earned adequate yield to discharge its obligatims to the policyholders^  but it has 
not taken fall advantage of its administrativty capacity end has not utilised the 
vast accumulation of life fund to the best of its ability. It has been 'passive* 
in solving the problems of national ectmomic interest» lilce the development of housing 
and removing of the regional ^ balance which could have materially added to the wel«= 
fare of the econosgr and finally to the development of life insurance in India, fy 
pursuing an active investment poli<^ the corporation could have effectively served 
the policyholders interest as well as the social and eoonomio advancement of the 
country. An outline of such a policy is suggested in the next section. 
SEOTION 3 
suoaBSTioNs FOR s m o m m T m THE IKVESTMBARR POLICZ OF L , I . Q. 
In the previous section it has been noted that the Corporation has not to a 
V 
great extent suoceeded in achieving tlM much avowed objectives of nationalisation 
due to its 'passive investaaent policy. The Corporation shouldi however* be made to 
realise that life insurance was nationalised for the positive objectives of 'effective 
mobilisation of peoples saving and efficient financing' of eoonomio developsent. 
These objeotives oan only be achieved if the L.I.C. functions like a 'well run 
insuranoe company.' h^e ooneeption of a 'well run insuranoe ooapaay' was rightly-
elaborated by Mr. C.D.Deshmukh* the then Finanoe Minister* before the I<ok Sabha on 
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29th February 1956 in the following uorde: 
"The tmsinesB mtet be eondttoted with the utmost eccHiQQQr and with the f"n 
realisation that the money belongs to the polioyholdere. The premium must 
be no higher than is warranted by striot actuarial considerations. The 
funds must be invested so as to seoure the maximum yield for the policy-
holders that it may be possible to secure consistent with the safety of 
the capital. It must render a prompt axid efficient service to its policy-
holders and Igr its service make insurance widely popular. Finally, the 
management must be ccaducted in a trusteeship."? l) 
The above aspirations of nationalisation iiqpose great responsibilities on 
the Investment management of L.I.C, ^hey can not be achieved met«ly through a 
defensive investment policy. A dynamic and active investment policy is the need 
of the hour which in t«m demands change of attitude towards Government securities* 
Too much leaning on Government securities no doubt liiakos the management carefree 
and to some extent it can also be said that in a planned eoonoiiQr, inves-toent in 
government securities serves a useful social and eooiicniic purpose mbifi. ^t they 
do not ultimately solve the problem of life fund because the yield on such invest-
ments is comparatively low and policyholders interest ultduomtely suffers if the 
corporation continues to make hug^^ investments in the public sector* 
Similarly to preserve the best interest of the policgrholders it is highly 
desirable that the composition of government securities should' be thoroughly 
revised. Emphasis should be laid on State Government securities as these securities 
offer higher yield and would enable the corporation to follow a policy of Regional 
economic development. The investment of SO per cent of life f\xnd which has been 
prescribed by law, should be fairly distributed between the Central Government, 
State Governments, securities and approved securities* 
1. It may be pointed out here that the performance of private life insurance 
commnies was Judged against this standard by Mr. C.S.Deshmulih in the talk. 
Sabha - (Vide Lok Sabha Debates • Voll, No. 12, 29th February 1956, 
Clause 1139). 
Even within the etatutory llmlta, there Is sijffioient scope for the L.I.C. to 
diversify its Investment pollojr* Conditions are now being created and throu|^ 
rapid eeonomio development, would <s«itlnufi to be oreated, linder whi<di L.I.C. can 
safely and profitably Invest a part of its funds in what have hitherto been the 
negleoted ohonnels of investment. Moreover, rapid eeonomio development of the 
oountry is a matter in whioh L.I.C. shoiud be interested as it is oonduoive to 
its growth. It should g:ive pjA:pniy to those lines of investments whioh ere liteely 
to accelerate the planned economic development of the country. Needless to say 
that suoh Investments can not be made hapha«ardly. An active investment policy 
requires the estalxLishmnt of a well-organised Besearoh Department. In a develop-
ing economy * investment opportunities' must be 'unveiled' and tailored according 
to the investment requirements of L.I.C. The 'mv^ing* of the investment 
opportunities or the aoceptaaoe of the 'investment offer' from the 'users of 
capital,* requires the assessment of the existing Investment risks and proli^ ible 
futtire trends. The proposed Resear^ Department will assess the various investmnet 
risks and will advise new avenues for Investnents. Life offices in the U.S.A. and 
in other advanced countries rely heavily m their Research Depa]:>tment to pursue 
highly dynamic and flexible investi&^ nt polioy. L.I.C. being the sole insurer of 
the country has sufficient resources to bear the cost involved in organising such 
a department. The expenses of this department can be directly sot off against the 
iaihanced yield from securities. It is esqpected that this department will not entail 
any extra 'load* on the administrative expenditure of L.I.C. The efficient working 
of this department will itself justify its existence in future. 
For the successful implementation of the investment policy of the L.I.C. it 
is desirable that the Zonal and Divisicnal Offices should be given more and more 
authority to invest in mortgages, sreal estate and in the distribution of 'Term Loan'. 
The local Investment opportunities can be better exploited through these offices 
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tban tfarotigh Central imnestment Board. Thifi wlIL also enable the Corporation to 
spread its iavestmenta for Bogiosal Sevelopo^nt. Siiailarlj^ j tmder the present 
valuation re^uAi^aents* it vould not be possible for the Xi.Z.C. to inorease its 
holdings in ordinay^ r shares substantiaUiT bat such an investment is desimble for 
th» general eooaomie develO|»»»nt of the eomtry as veil as for earning higher 
yields to protect the beat interests of the poUoyholdors. the Corporation will 
be veil advised if it explores the possibility of ianresting at least 12 to 15 per 
eent of life fund in ordinarjr shares* Zn this conzisotlon, as pointed ovtt earlier* 
ths maintenanoe of Investment Beiwrve Fund at a pvopsic le^l is highly desirable* 
There ar© othsr atethods, both direct and indiroot, through whioh the Corporation 
oan diversify investmnts in tl^ interest of its policy holders as veil as for the 
rapid oeottowio development of the eoantry. Sooe of these methods to finance the 
espital formtion in the oountry; vhieh havo been tailored to suit the invesi^nt 
req^drements of L.X, are suggested in tl^ f^^oving pages. 
of Indui^ trial Developtasntt 
i?inaooing of'ssiall-tosinsss halpe-oapital-foggo^^ 
venture if the Corporation laalms direot investssent in them. It is therefore desir-
able that I<.I.C. should ooUaborate with speoialised institutions suoh as lodus-
trial Hnanoe Corporation and States Finanee Coiporations end similar other insti-
tutions. fhe Industrial Finance Corporation Aot has recently %B en aoended to enable 
the IFC to provide exiqity oapital to industry, this step is in the right direoti<m 
and vill bslp to solve th9 problem of *equi-^ oapital* of the izidustry. Bat the 
seoondary finanoial Institutions oould not themselv^ is help the industries unless 
the primyy saving institutions suoh as L.I.C. provide them with the neeossazy 
reserves. The ^ perienee of the IFC Whioh has reoeived many requests for assis-
tanoe than it has te en able to aooommodate sliovs that there is i^enty of soope in 
the capital oar^ alt for eugumenting tto resources of the existing institutions and 
for assisting the growth of more specialised agenoiesk 
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Mother method which L.I.C. oould adopt to finance the industrial growth is 
through 'Term Loans'. Insurance oonpanies as pointed oat earlier have earned 
satisfactorily hi^yield »dth adequate safety In U.S.A, and Japan through invest-
ment in Term Loans, h^e important features of these loans is that they are devieed 
with the Butu/al agreement of the lender (insurers) and the borrower and in this 
way both the parties could decide the Hera* of the loan according to their require-
ments. The •Tontt Loans' carry the provision for amortisation or a sinking fund. 
As a rule Term Loans are m dnseoured though oocasionally they may be secured ty 
coHaterial or a mortgage. Bat carefolly drawn conditions relating to th© conseiw 
vation of assetoi the use of earnings, sinking funds, interest, and provision of 
1 
repcqnaentSi makes such loans quite 'safe' from an investment stand point. These 
loans, however, impose extra problems of the investigation of the financial and 
credit conditions which can be easily collected throuj^ Zonal and Mvisional 
Offices of L.I.G, 'Sfo compensate for hig^r acquisition and service costs, and the 
risk involved due to lack of marketability in Term Loans, the yield is somewhat higher 
than the public inssuer: of debentures etc. 
Another, aspect of 'Term* Loans deserves mention. Being made to relatively 
small enterprises of i^ch there are many, they offer the possibility of substantial 
volume if aggressively sought* This could alone reduce the cost involved in the 
distribution and supervision of loans, fesides the borrowing companies are usually 
in the sub-virban areas and less-developed regions and investment in them would also I 
enable the corporation to diverslfiy its loans* 
In extending such loans L.I.C, can ftother reduce the 'risk' by using the 
'Guarantee Organisation' set up by the Government of India. The guarantee organisa-
tion is operated by the Reserve Bank of ^ dia. L.I.C. can avail the facility to 
cover a part of Its risks. Another method to minimise the risk in financing the 
Small concern is throu^ 'Joint Financing.' The system of 'Joint Financing' 
1. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin May 1962 (Report of the Working Group on the 
Appraisal of Applloations for Term Loans) pp 693-697. 
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haa come Into prominence t»der the leaderehip of IPC only recently for the financing 
of large projects. aystem at Joint participation igr different tixumoial Inatl-
tutions including L.I.G. has helped In eetatliBhlng healthy practices regarding 
the aprutiny of applications, coverage of loans and the follow-up operations, 
system of * Joint Financing* can be enooiu^ aged by L.I. C. in collaboration 
with the State Finance Corporations, the National Small Industries Corporation, and 
many other small industries corporations which are being established by the State 1 
Governments for the development of industrial estates. Besides holdings the shares 
and bonds L.I.C. can also collaborate with these agencies in eaitending loans to 
the small scale industries. This wiU create an understanding afitong the institutions 
and would minimise the cdiances of losses. 
Similarly L.I.C. could also assist the development of industrial estates 
through the Guarantee provided by the State Govermiierte, The establishment of 
indTistrlal estates on cooperative basis has recently attracted small industrialists* 
It is expected that during the Third Five tear Plan period one hundred cooperati^,. 
industrial estates would be set up all over the countiy. The Government has also 2 
planned to set up three hundred new Industrial estates of vaxying sizes and types* 
They will be located as far as possible near small end medium sized towns and in 
selected ifhiral areas, ^he loans to the Industrial Estates are secured by the 
equity capital provided by the State Governments and also by the hundred per cent 
guarantee given by the State Governments* Again the higher yield in these loans 
will oongjensate for the risk involved due to lack of marketability. Investment in 
Industrial Estates would also serve a useful social function as they would facilitate 
the scheme of Regional Development. Moreover, in ftiture L.I.C. is expected to 
mobilise hugs • rural saving. It is desirable that these funds be Invested for 
rural^ development in the Interest of rural policyholders. In the absence of 
1. Reserve Bank of India - Reports on Currency and Finance, 1961-62, p 73. 
2. Third Five lear Plan, p 449* 
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(a) A Proposal for the Establishment^  
of Oentral Housing Finance Corporationt 
Mortgage Finance in U.S.A. pz>ovldes a good example as to how the insurers can 
effectively combljae and attain the self-imposed obligatiwis of investment of sookl 
advancement with safety, yield and liquidity. I have pointed out earlier that one 
of the reasons of the huge investment in real estates in USA is. the extensive use of 
specialised agencies such as Federal Rousing Administration, Vetems Administration, 
Federal Hatioaal Mortgage Associatitm, ^ armers Home Administration etc. These 
agencies have considerably reduced the risk involved in Real Estate Fijtanoe. Thus 
the first and primary conditicm for L.I.C's investn^t in housing is the creation 
of an a.^ eney which could assume tha risk of such investment. In this connection 
I propose that the government should examine the possibility of establishing a 
Central Housing Finance Corporation* This organisation wiU help to channel the 
L.I.C*'s funds into housing schemes* It will also encourage the flow of credit on 
easy terms, amongst other things, by means of insured mortgages. The pressed 
Corporation will grant mortgage loans to the individuals and the institutions 
either directly or it can guarantee loans to the approved borrowers on the lines of 
Federal Housing Board and Vetem Administration in the United States of America. 
The proposed corporation shovuLd function tbrough State Housijag Finance Corporation 
in each State. The corporations at the Centre and in States can be useful links 
in connecting and coordinating various Housing Schemes of the State Governments. 
It can also assist the Qovemment in its land;i^  acquisition programme during the 
Third Five Year Plan 
The capital of the proposed Housing Finance Corporations should bo provided by 
the financial institutions and the Oovemment as in the case of Industrial Finance 
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Corporation. The establlsluaent of a Central Housing Corporation and the State 
Housing Corporations can also assist in evolving a uniform housing policies in all 
the States. It would facilitate the ccmstruction of houses fc^ persons of limited 
means for thsir own use and enable the L.I.C. commercial Banks and other financial 
institutions to undertake varioxis fserjwice Evolved in the development of Housing 
in the country. 
(B) Pireot Finanoiiag of Housiftg 
Develoi^fit: 
It was also pointed out earlier that in the absence of specialised agencies, 
it is not 'safe' for L.I.O. to extend mortgage loans, h^e establishment of the 
proposed Housing Finance Corp^mtions will oonsiderabljir z«duce the risk in mortgage 
Finance, Hcuever, the demand for housing in the oountxy is increasing and as 
shown earlier equity investment in Real Estate bosides meeting the invest^ ient 
requirements of L.I.C. promisee a better return. L.I.C. can afford to meet the 
expenses of fully equipped building departmenb attached to its Zonal and Divisl<mal 
offices. It is therefore suggested that the oorporaticm should also examine the 
possibility of direct investment in Housing. 
The actual planning and administration» designing of hoiases are all technical 
matters which depend upon tbs local conditions. As far as possible the sittks for 
the proposed L.I.C.Colonies* should be selected with the coordiziation of Local 
govomi^ cnt offices, \miver8itie8, coUoges, factories and other institutions and 
public bodios. The corporation should enter into agreement with these bodies for 
tho allotment of houses and the realisation of rents from the pay roll of the 
allotteos. Since the Qovemment offices and other instfttutions are themselves 
keen to provide homsing facilities bo their employees to their plaoe of work, they 
would willingly extend all possible cooperation to the L.I.C. 
The direct L.I.Cs investment in housing would have considerable ioqpact on the 
pattern of economic dev»l<^ent. In5«rovem©nt in the standard of living, of thOM 
who will be provided with comfortable, cheap and standard houses by L.I.C. ai^ the 
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new eaployment opportunities for those %dio will get employment in the building 
industries will generate new income azid oreate additional saving margin. This 
would enable the corporation to mobilise more and more middle class savings in the 
form of l i f e insurance. Further, smart L.I.C*s eolcoiies with some distinct designs 
and features in different parts of the countiy can be good media of publicity 
to posh the sales of l i f e insurance. L.I .C's direct investment in housing can, 
therefore» make a significant contribution towards the eoonomio and social advance-
ment of the country* 
In future, the pattern of oconomio development will be such that L.I .C's 
housing constructicm will jus t i fy i t s investment in housing more and more convino-
ingly* We are approaching a stage that has already been reached in many other 
oountries. Land ia growing scarcer in toyns and there i s inoreaeing trend of 
\ 
population growth. Attention must now be given to the eatabHshment of o i ^ 
housing estates in the countryside. This will not be possible without the L.I«C'8 
investment. National and regional planning i s a beginning of this development, 
but i s s t i l l indadequats from the Investment point of view. Private individuals 
and institutions wiU not be cble to handle this problsm unless financial inst i-
tutions are prepared to put up with the anarohy of wield over building. But as 
regards price, too, i t will hacom more d i f f i cu l t , indeed imposible, as time goes 
on, for private biUding ef forts to provide suitable hoiiaing for the masses. The 
increase in the population and i t s concentration in urban areas will ra i se more 
and more problems cf liousing aooommodation which can only be solved by the country 
as a whole, and in tho solution of whioh the L.I.O. has an important part to play. 
Apart from the social point of view, investment in the acquisition of land i s 
just i f ied purely on financial grounds and business principles. In swae towns, 
there are poirerful factors like the starting up of new industries and tho establish-
ment of now public and other off ices whioh will considerably increase t l » value of 1 
land in those areas. L.I.C' v can take advantage of tJiese tendencies af ter 
• 
1. The Third Five tear Plani p 690. 
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ooniniltln.^  the Planning Commission and Town Planning Cosu&it'toss in thd vapious 
regions. 
(C) Flnaneiitg ths Research and Develoment 
of Cheap Varieties of Housing Materiali 
It is not only the problem of finance but also the shortage of Bailding 
Material that oauses serious battleneok to housing develop^nt in the county* The 
fact that the prioes of bailding material haw goM up Iseyond the reach of persons 
of average means and that due to the scarcity of building material nmsrous diffi-
culties involved in its procurement* are well known and needs no documentation. 
The loans sanctioned by L.I,C. whether directly or indirectly throu^ the various State 
will 
Housing Finance Corporation/generate new demand for building material such as 
cemont, iron and bricks. The greater part of the loan sanctioned will thus bo 
absorbed by the black-marketers profit. Even the demand for building matorial bgr 
L.I.C. for its own housing projects will result into ^ culative rise in prices-which 
will affect building activity eleeidiere in the eoonoay. Moreover, rising prioes of 
building material will incarease the cost of construction of L.I.C's building 
projects and it will not be possible for the corporation to let the houses at 
low rent. This will be self defeating. It is essential, therefore, that in a 
planned oohem of housing development in the coimtry there must be active coopera-
tion and oo-ordinaticoi between various official and non-official agencies Involved 
in different services e.g. finance, material producing industries, institutions 
engaged in the research and development of cheap, varieties of buildiiig matorial 
and organisations uoiag planning and designing of low cost houses. 
1. planning commission also pr<^se8 to set up Town Planning Organisation eaoh 
State cund a Central ^ gicoial and Urban Planning Organisation to assist the 
State Oovemments in the establiahment of new towns, in the preparation of 
master plsms and informulatlng suitable urban and regicmal development poli-
cies (Third Five tear Plan, p 692). L.I.ti. oan acquire virgin lands in 
oonsul+.ation with the proposed Planning Organisation in the various States. 
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Stunmagyi 
^ above reooamendations are designed to enable the L.I.G. to fulfil 
satisfaotorily Its role as an In^ ortant source of loanable f^ds for capital 
formation vithout jeopardising Its primazy function as an insurer* It has been 
suggested that L.I.C. should try to remedy the deficiencies of the capital market 
through a more active and dynamic Investment policy. ^ adoption of an entes*-
prlsing policy should not necessarily mean the undertaking of tmdue risks. But it 
must be cautions and veil conceived policy. Investment opportunities should be 
uncovered through the Research Department* In pursuing a dynamic Investment policy 
the maintenance of Investment Reserve Fund at a proper level is highly desirable* 
It can be said without any fear of contradiction that within the present 
legal framevorky there is considerable scope for Ii.I.C* to follow a more oon^re-
hensive and active investment poliqy* Suggestions which have been tailored to 
meet tbs investment requirements of L.I.G|. have therefore been made for financing 
the economic development of the countzy* It has been maintained that under the 
present valuation requirements it is not possible for L.I.G. to make investment in 
ordinary shares substantial]^ * L.I.C. could, however, adopt other direct and 
indirect methods to finance the indxistrial developiaent. 
As regards Housing developsent it has been suggested that besides 'mortgage 
lending' throuji^  the proposed Central Housing Pinaace Corporation and States 
Rousing Finance Corporations, L.I.G. should make direct investment in housing 
colonies. This will enable the ooiporation to play a more dynamic role for the 
social and economic advancement of the country* 
Main Conaltislonsi 
In this Chapter I have examined the investment policy of L.I.C. with special 
reference to the economic development and capital formation in the country* The 
analysis in the first section has shown that economic changes have considerable 
Influence on the portfolio structure of the insurers. This has also been proved 
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by the experlenee of the inveatment pattern of the Insurers In other eountrles* 
In pursuing an aotiw investment polioy the insurers In foreign countries antici-
pate eoonomlo ohanges and forecast demand for capital funds in the various sectors 
of the econoiqjr. They devioa means to enter the new investment market first and 
take full advantage of their position. This enable them to earn more and serve 
the best interest of their policyholders. 
In the light of the above obsearvation and also in the background of the 
discussion in Chapter VI and VIi:,, it can be pointed out that the coiporation has 
not to a great extent succeeded in adbdeving the much avowed objectives of nationa-
lisation. The ratio of Sovemment securities to total assets has considerably 
increased since nationalisation. Thus the corporation has all along followed a 
defensive investment policy which has no doubt earned adequate yield to discharge 
its obligationQ but it Ims not taken fall advantage of its position as the largest 
investor in ttoa country. It has for instance not diversified its investaents 3a 
regional development, housing programmes and in removing the deficiencies of the 
capital market* 
In reviewing the investment policy of L.I.G. one can take the view that as 
an insurer, IIC has no responsibility in remedying the deficiencies of the capital 
market. This is rather a negative view and it can even obstruct the process of 
groifth. In future L . I . 0 . is expected to mobolise huge personal saving and as such 
the corporation can uot escape the responsibilities of financing the economic 
development in the country. It is therefore suggested that after a thorou^ search 
of the investm^ int opportunities, l>.I.G. should deH^e the methods to assist the 
development of new ooncems. This Includes financing through specialised agencies, 
distribution of Term Loan through State Governments and the aP»arantee organisation 
of the Qovemmant of India. Direct Financing in housing to relieve the middle 
class population from pressure of high rents can be of special significance to LIC. 
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Moreover^ rapid eooncmtio growth of the oountxy is a matter in which L.I.C. is 
deeply interested; and oonsistent with the policyholders interest L.X.C* should 
give priority to those lines of invostment which are likely to help the planned 
economic development of the ootintxy. By suggesting an active investment policy 
I never advocated that the corporation should take tmproportionate risk. Vlhat 
I reoosuaend is the spreading risks both geographically and industrially so that 
chances of losses be minimised* Such an expansion would benefit the capital market 
without impairing ths proHtability of the corporation. It can be emphasised in 
the end that L.I.C.;,to Justify its existence as a nationalised institution^  should 
pursue an intelligent» dyoamioi elastic and diversified investment policy rather 
than faithfully following the old pattern of the defensive investment policy* 
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APPENDIX A 
Hot* on Souroes and Uso of Offloial Statlstios Ragaxding Xdfe Insurance Saving 
and InTestnent in I^ia 
Although a great deal of detailed etatistioal information on the finoneial 
traneaotiona of life insuranee oompaniea operating in India was publiehed before 
nationalisation» estisiaticm of Indiat^polioyholders aarLngs fflth adequate aocuraegr 
is a oomplieated tasl^ . This is due to peoularities of life insurance aoeoanting 
praotice and^ more espeoiallyf to the fact that separate data covering activity 
in India of Indian 3±re oowanles is not availabls for many transaetione relevant 
to the estiiaates, while the aecoimting of operation of foreign oompanies in India 
is incomplete. 
The estimates of Individual's saving in life insurance can be obtained either 
from balance sheet or the x^venue account of all insurance oompanies. annual 
reports of the oontroUsr of Insurance ^and the Life Insurance Corporation of India ^  
provide relevant statistical aatltrial and give statemonts of the combined balance 
sheets and revenue accounts of all Indian and non-Indian insuranoe companies 
classified according to the type of business. The net incroase in life insurance 
funds can be derived as year-to-year change in the corresponding balance sheet 
i^ems or from the life insurance re enue aocounts. Both these sources do not 
give separate records of life insuranoe lAisiness in India. The life insurance 
revenue accounts and Salance sheet of Indian insurance companies prior to nationa-
lisation, as given in the pabUsbed reporta ty the o«!itreller of iAsuranoe, relate 
to their total business in India as well as abroad. Under these circumstances 
life insurance saving in India could be computed only on the basis of certain 
assumption. 
Thus the Reserve Bank of India | which has computed life instirance saving 
throu^ net changes in the total life fund as appearing in the Balance sheet has 
opportftoned the changes in life fund cm the basis of ratio of life funds relating 
to resident policyholders to the total life funds of the It.I.C. for the period 
Soptember 1956 to December 1957C 3 ). On the other hand* tho national council of 
Applied Economic Research which has estimated the life insurance saving through 
Reneime Account, has allocated the saving on the basis of QTOBB Premium Income 
in India to Total Premium Income.( A ) 
In the two sources of estimates of life insurance saving there is difference 
not only because some discrepencies eTcist between the estimates given in the 
published balanOe sheet and those reported in the Revenue Account, but also due 
to assumptions made in the estimates* A comparison of the two sources of estimates 
will show that whereas the National Council estimates show upward trends, the 
Reserve Bank estimates indicate some fluctuations. ( 5 ) 
1. Controller of Insuranee, Simla, India, Insuranoe tear Book. 
2. L.I.Ct Annual Reports and Accounts* 
3. Reserve Bank of India Bulletin - March, I960 « p 309. 
4. National Council of Applied Bconomio Research « 
Saving in India, p 92. 
5. National Council of Applied Economic Research - Saving in India, 
p 99 (Table 3,4.2). 
( b ) 
I have not aade my attempt to revise these estiaates becoase under the 
olroumstaaees no improveaient could have heen made. Siailarly separate sta^ lstios 
regarding: the iAvestsent of life insurance funds are also not available. Hie 
summarised balance sheet of Indian Insurers mearly indicate how total liabilities 
(iBcliiding life fund, non-life fund, general reserve funds, capital and other 
credit balances) are balanced by total investments end othsr debit balances. 
Besides we can not even make a stut^ of the investment of all the funds, reserve 
and reserve funds (including life insurance funds) collectively, because total 
investments do not exactly aggregate to the collective total of these funds. The 
former are sometimefl more and sometimes less than the latter. (Vide Table I m 
page ). This deviation cause special difficulty in expressing a particular type 
of investment as a per<H>ntage of the total of all the funds and reserves for 
comparative purposes* Moreover, it is doubtful on principle, a study of the ^  
investments of all the funds and reserves, has any special significancej^or'^ 
sttJdy of life fund investments. 
Since 1950 and particularly after the nationalisaticai of life insurance there 
had been considerable improvement in the official statistics* ^he Indian Insur^ce 
4AaeedKeat)Aot-of 31990, for instanoe, has introduced complete control of the 
investment of life insurance fund and controlled funds; and the lav requires the 
submission of statements showing their investments separately* Information 
regarding the investment of life insurance fund has, tfasrefore become available 
since 1950. Also L.I.C. is publishing separate figures of life insurance fund in 
India since 195?. But even the information is not of much use for a Mstorioal 
sttidy as part statistics are not available on a comparable basis* 
I hare, therefore, fooussed my attention on total investments, proceeding on 
the assumption that total investments of Indian insurers as shown in their balance 
sheets are representative indirection, if not wholly in dimension, of the invest-
ment of life insurance fund. For comparing the irelative importance of the various 
fcnus of investments, I have expressed individual investments as percentage of 
total assets of Indi^ insurers. The adoption of this course is Justifiable 
not merely on the ground of non-availability 6f suitable statistics in India at 
the official level, hat also because no serious error seems to enter in adopting 
this practice* Other dims and reserves as shown in Figure 21 are so insignificance 
in relation to life fund that they can not exert considerable influence on the 
total investnwnt picture. 
APPENon; B 
COMPaTATIOH OF THE AMOUNT OF CAPITAL FOItMATION THROI}(B INSTTEAHCB COtflPAHlES 
IK THB PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR IN INDIA 
Ths Batio of Prodttotlire and Unproduotiirs Debfc of the Gbvernoent India 
has been oos^ted on the tea is of the following table. 
TABLE No. B.l(a) 
q OOVBSNMBHT OP INDIA MBf 
tear 
Covered tgr Not covered 




































Total 19,926.08 4488.77 268.71 2 470 4.09 
SOURCEt Reserve Bank of Indiat Reports on Correncf and Finanoe 1961-62 
Statenwnt 64. 
19,926.08 Or X 100 
24455.38* 
82 per cent approdtioately. 
OR the basis of the above estiioates, L.I.C*a investaent in the Central 
Ooveraa»nt securities has been considered productivo to the time of 82 per cent 
and tmproductive to the extent of 8 per cent. 
State Oovefmwnts borrowing as p r capital budget of States (vide Stateaent 
62 of the Report on Corrsn^ and Finanoe 1960-61) are largeljr for develoinent* 
I have therefore assumed that L.I.C's investntent in State Qovemisent Securities 
is fully productive. 
Investment in Approved Securities consist prtooipalljir of loans and debentures 
of Muniopalties, Inqprovement Trusts, Port Trusts, Central I«nd Mortgage Banks 
and shares and bonds of Industrial Finance Corporatim of India and State Finanoe 
Corporations. These investments have been considered productive by the full 
amount. 
Amounts due from State Governments in respect of their controlled bosiness 
taken over by L.I.C, which appears as an Investment in the Annual Repots and 
Accounts of L.I.C* has beenignored. Loans to State Qovsmments for Housing Schemes 
have been classified in the Public Sector and Loans to Cooperative Housing Finance 
Societies have been oonsidez«d as Approved Investments similar to L.I.C's invest-
ments in Industrial Finance Corporatioga and State Finanoe Corporations and Central 
Land Mortgage Banks. 
« Represents Total after deducting cash and securities held on Treasuzy account. 
( d ) 
Since 1957 L.I.C's claseiflcatlons of tho Distrlbation of the lavestments In 
India in Public and Private Sector of the Stock Exchange Securities have been 
adopted. In that olaasification 'Approved Securities' and Invee^ aent in 'Debentures 
Preference and Ordinary shares has been apportioned between the Public and Private 
Sector of the eoonoayr. 
On the basis of the above assumption the following estimates of capital 
formation through insurance companies during the period 1948 to I960 have been 
computed. Capital formation has been shown as net addition to various types of 
iavestisent on the h&eis of the above assumption in Tables B-I (b)s B-I (e)-B-l (d). 
TABLE B-I (b) 
OAPITAI. F(®MATION THROUGH INSOEAHCE COiCPANIES Hi THE PCIBLIC SECTOE 
Central Cbvemo State Munici* Total of Ket addition ment Securities Qovem- paltias Housing 2 to 5 during the Tear Total 82^ of ment and other Loans year 
amount ths securi- approved 
total ties. securities 
Invest-
ment* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1947 93.1 78,8 1.2 9.7 89.7 m 
19 48 106.8 87.6 2.2 10.0 » 99.8 10.1 
1949 113.5 93.1 2.7 11.0 106.8 7.0 
1990 112.7 92.4 4.7 11.0 •k 108.1 1.3 
1951 121.6 99.7 1.6 13.7 115.0 6.9 
19Se 122.1 lOO.l 16.4 17,7 ^ 134.2 19.2 
19SS 126.8 104.0 22.4 18.8 m 145.2 11.0 
1954 131.1 107,5 23.^ 18.4 m 149.8 4.6 
19S5 137.3 112.6 30.6 21.0 m. 164.2 14.4 
1956 171.04 140.3 34.99 31.33 206.62 42.42 
1997 • 185.89 1S2.2 42.53 27.05 221.78 15.16 
ia58 200.45 164.4 55.37 32.33 252.10 30.32 
1999 174.0 64.66 34.76 5.30 278.72 26.62 
1960 228.25 187.2 94*91 36*9 13.80 332.81 54.09 
( e ) 
lAm B-I (c) 
GM»ITAL FORMATIOH THROSaH INSTOAHCE GOMPAHIES IH PRIVATE SECT® 
Corporate 
securities Mortgages Land and Total Net addition 
Tear Building 2 to 4 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
19.3 3.1 6.2 28.6 
1948 24.5 4.4 6.6 35.5 6.9 
1949 50.2 6.0 8.6 45.0 9.5 
1950 33.2 7.7 9.6 50.5 5.5 
1951 u.f 10.0 12.5 37.2 6.^ 
1952 41,8 15.3 JLS.2 70.3 13.1 
1953 45.8 14.6 17.4 77.8 7.5 
1954 50.6 15.6 16.6 82.7 4.9 
1955 99.5 15.1 17.5 92.1 9.4 
1956 56.9 15.0 19.3 91.2 -0^9 
1957 74.62 13.66 21.38 109.86 16.66 
1958 80.61 12.30 21.64 114.7jJ 4.89 
1959 86.68 10.37 22.57 119.62 4.87 
1960 97.38 9.05 25.66 132.09 12.47 
TASLE B-I (d) 
CAPITA!- POBMATIOH THROUGH IRSBRAKCS COMPANIES W THE PUBLIC SECTOR-^  fvuv^Ssei^^ 
(BS in Croroa) 
crob^e-) 
tear 
Publio Private Sector 
Seotor 
Total 
1948 10.1 6.9 17.0 
X9m 7.0 9.5 16.9 
1950 1.3 5.5 6.3 
1951 6.9 6.7 13.6 
1952 19.2 13.1 32.3 
1953 11.0 7.5 18.5 
1954 4.6 4.9 9.S 
1955 14.4 9.4 23.8 
1986 42.4 -0.9 41.5 
1957 1S.2 18.7 33.9 
1958 30.3 4.9 35.2 
1959 26.6 4.9 31.5 
1960 54.1 12.5 66.6 
SOURCBSi 1. ControillBr of Insurance Slmlat InsurancS tear Books. 
2, Reserve Bank of Indlas Banking and Monetary Stat lot ios. 




STATISTICS RELATDTO TO THE DISTRIBffTIOH OP ASSETS OF lOT IKSOHANCE 
COMPi^IES m DIFFERENT GOTlltTRIBS 
TABUB HO B.IIl(a) 
Bistribation of Assets of hxte Insaranos Gonpanies 
in Australia 
( Miilions of A£) 
1939 1946 I960 
AmouDt Percen- Amount Percen- Amount Percen-
tage to tage to tage to 
total total total 
GoTsmaent & Municipal 
Securities* 115.7 50.9 301.9 72.1 331 32.8 
Loans on Mortgages 61*7 Zl.l 57,1 13.6 356 35.3 
Loans on Companies Policies 22.4 9.8 21.1 5.0 36 3.6 
Other Loans N.A* - 3.9 0*9 26 2.6 
Corporate Bonds and Shares 6.5 2.9 8.4 2.0 199 19.7 
Real Estate 12.8 9.6 16.1© 3.8 61 6.0 
Total(including other assets 22?.9 43.8.8 1009 
± 
® Including furniture. 
II.A * Not available. 
SOORCBi 1* Annual Beports of the Insurance Qomai8sioner» Australia* 
2. tear Book of the Commonwealth of ^ tralia 199S. 
3. Australasian Insurance and Banldng ReeordSf JTul^ , 1961. 
( h ) 
fABIS HO B.ZIl(b) 
DSstrlbatioo of Assets of Xiife Insm^oe Coapanies 
in Canada 
JteOteS-SLSiIl 
1930 1945 1960 
il^mt Pereen« AtBount Peroen* AzMtznt Percen-
togo to tage to tage to 
total total total 
Oovezxment Bonds 6ZQ 26.4 1,967 87,1 470 5,3 
Looal Autiiority Itonds 289 10.0 1S8 4.6 
Transporation Bonds 51 2.2 1$ 0.6 
Ptiblio Vtilitj Bonds zm 10.6 zsz 10.2 3«674 41.8 
Industrial Bonds 73 3.1 ICS 3.0 
Other Bonds 30 1.3 20 0.6 
Stoeles 30S 13.0 206 6.0 
(a: Preferred 36 l.B 60 K.A. 
(bi Ordinary 269 U.4 146 4.2 n.A, 
Loans on Mortgages* 305 13.0 267 7.7 3,204 36.2 
Real Estate 16 3.3 36 1«6 298 3.4 
Polio^ Loans 247 10.8 177 5.1 443 5*0 
Tetal( including other assets) 23S1 3,445 8,899 
».A« w Hot Available. 
j^ llROEds 1* Reports of £l^ >erintoBdent of Insurance« Ganda. 
2. U.S.Life Instxranoe Faog 1961. 
( i ) 
TABI£ fiO B.m(o) 
DSatzlbatlon ot Aeaete of Life Xnewcanw Gompanies tn Ie.pm 
< 91 ten) 
1935 19 4S 1960 
imowBi ?ercentage A m ^ i Pereenia^ 
to total to total to total 
C&sh and Deposits. 290.0 U.6 I9O68 6.8 4,881 0.6 
Oovornnant Bonis 277.5 U.l m»2 14,374 Oebentnrea 588.5 23.3 2.1 
^oaka and Shares 5S7.S 2»007 16*9 iss,2ia 21.7 
l^ans 632.9 2&»3 1>164 9.6 441,833 63.0 
(a) OrdinafT Loans 372.S 14.9 •• * 347,833 49.6 
(b; Policy Loans &60.0 10.4 m 94,000* 13.4 
Call Loans • > m B,OQrt 1.1 
Real Bstato 135.0 5.4 11.9 47,000» 6.7 
Total Assets (ineliiding 
othar assets) 2,500.00 12,172 701,376 
« lacludiag Poet Offiae Life Inauraoee Bustaeea for trhioh sej^ irrbe data arc 
oot diraila!3le} data relate to end-Jtme I960. 
@ As at the end of March, 19 Source: World Insunance Trends: Edited by Davis W.Gregg and Dan Mc (Jill 
TABIE HO B-IlKd) 
Distribution of Assete of Life Instiranoe Companios in Norway 
of Kronera) 
1960 1939 1945 
atStmi Pat^oeaW Anibifait iato^i i^^^it^ 
to total to total to total 




Indttstrial Bonds & Loans 
Shares 
Credit Assooistion Bonds 
Advances on Policies 
Beal Estate 
rr-,7 





fotal(inoluding other assets) 913.9 
18.6 769.0 «7.0 1,185.0 23.8 
6.9 97.1 3.9 979.0 11.9 
S2.7 26.1 
6.2 89,8 9.9 2,477.0 49.7 0.6 10.5 0.6 
6.1 88.9 9.4 
7.1 30.5 1.9 89.0 1.8 
1.8 17.0 1.0 H.A. -
1,637.3 4,980»0 
B.A* e Not Airailable* 
Source: Norjes Bank Bulletin, No. 3 of 1954 and International Financial Statistcs 
October, 1961 
SiSSaSBSSSm 
( i ) 
n m B HO B-IIX(e) 
Oietrlbtxfclon of Assets of l<ifo Insuranes Compatiies in Sveden 
fft JoffWfl) 
1938 1945 1995 
Afflouttt Peroentago Aoouttt Percental^ ^ m t Pereentai^ 
to total to total to total 
Htmieipal loons 201 6 . 4 199 4.0 1,165 9 .5 
Bonds and Oebraitixres 1«130 39.3 51.7 5 , 5 ^ 45.7 
Shares and other equities 61 S.O 91 1 .8 283 2 . 3 
Real property 137 4 .4 m 3.8 seo 4.3 
Mortgage loans 1,387 1,556 31.5 3 , ^ 6 PM 
Other seourities iaeluding 
loans to business* 13S 4.2 176 3.6 389 3.2 
Total( inc^ uliiig other 
Assets) 3,117 4,938 12,131 
Source: Index , June 1953 and April 1956 
nsiE m B-iii (f) 
Dietributlos of Assets of Insvironoe Gompaniee in 9.S,A* 
LifflliSSLsLil 
1939 1946 1960 
Amount Fdrooniai^ iaiomi i'orcontag© imomt Peroeniago 
to total to total to total 
0.S.Ck>venuBent Seourities 5,451 18.7 20,583 45.9 6,427 5.4 
Foreign Oovexnment Bends 919 2.1 437 0.4 
State,Provincial and 8.0 
Xioeal Bonds. 1.047 2»3 4,576 3.8 
RaiLoroad Bonds 2,769 9.5 2,943 6.6 3,668 3.1 
Pnblie TBhility Bonds 3,826 13.1 5,212 U.6 16,719 14.0 
Industrial & Hiseellaneous 
Bcmds 1,396 4.6 1,900 4.3 26,728 22.4 
Stooj^ 587 8«0 999 2.2 4,981 4.2 
Mortgages 5,683 19.4 6,636 14.8 41,771 34.9 
Beal Estate 2,139 7.3 857 1.9 3,765 3.1 
Poli<7 loans 3,248 11.1 1,968 4.4 9,231 4.4 
fotal (including other 
Assets) 29,243 44,797 119,976 
SOIJROBi U.S.Idfo lamiranoa Fact Book> 1954 and 1961. 
( k ) 
imM m B-in {$) 
Dlatrlbotion of t>f lif© Insurance Companies in 
1911 1945 mo 
ABtOtbt Feroen*" Amount Fsrcen- Amount Foroon-
tage to tage to tage to 
total total total 
British Qotrerament Socuritios sm,6 21.6 955.4 41.9 1,159.0 13.8 
Cosmcmt^alth doveszuae^ t end 
Btmloipal Stocks. iio.o 6.T 92.6 4.2 
Foreign Ooveroment 486.0 7.9 
Provincial and Htmioipal Stooks 81.7 5.0 88.2 4.0 
Oebenttares 268«1 16.2 245.4 11.0 890.3 14.4 
Proferenoe and gmwaiteed ^wss l^.S 8.3 163.6 7.3 325.3 5.3 
Ordinary shares 162.5 9.8 194.6 8.T 1«267.2 20.6 
Real Proj^rty 90.7 S.S 105.0 4.7 957.4 9.0 
Mortgages 186.9 11.4 14f?.9 6.6 917,8 14.9 
Poli«gr loans SX.3 3.1 87.2 1.2 79.0© 1.3 
fotal (iiududing otlier Ascmts) 1»656.0 2,235.6 6,166.7 
Note: Figaros for i93S7 and 194S ar© those of 84 and 85 life inataranoe conpanies 
T&pmtiMg to Board of Trade, uMle those for 1960 relate to 45 ooopaniee* 
SOtlROBS} t. Baiil»r> Atigust, 1950 
2. Eeonoaist dated Jvly 22, 1961. 
3. Idfe Insurancs Pact Book 1961. 
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